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INTRODUCTION
We all belong to a ‘family’, whether we like it or not; but you may have one
idea of what your family is, and who comprises your family, and others may
have a completely different idea. Distinctions in these definitions may arise
due to cultural differences, historical patterns, economic factors and social
values, and yet the definitions will all have some form of validity. So, for
example, a family may comprise a married couple, with or without children;
or a cohabiting couple, heterosexual or same-sex; or a single parent with
resident children; or all relationships created by a blood link. While you may
or may not class all these as being family, they can all be seen as such; but this
does not mean that they are all socially or legally accepted. Although the law
generally reflects social values, this is not always the case where family law is
concerned. To give you an example, society is generally accepting of
heterosexual cohabiting couples, and yet the law provides this type of
relationship with very little in the way of family law rights. The law faces
difficulties in providing legal codes to cover the family relationship precisely
because the family is a potentially nebulous concept; and it is interesting to
note that the law does not really define what it means by a family, but simply
provides enforceable rights to specified groups or defined relationships. The
interface between social values and the legal code is such that the law usually
reacts to changes in social norms rather than being proactive in establishing
the family unit. The acceptance, in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association
[1999] 3 WLR 1113, of same-sex relationships creating ‘family rights’
demonstrates this. Throughout this text you will come across areas where
developing social values raise issues for legal intervention – is it right to give
same-sex couples the same rights as married couples? Should parents who do
not marry have the same rights in relation to their children as those who are
married? Should the fact of marriage grant special status at all? All these issues
raise the question of how the law can, and should, intervene in the lives of
individuals, and the extent to which state regulation in family life is desirable.
While the issues can be raised, whether they can be answered is debatable, and
this book does not seek to provide an absolute answer – you should try to
form your own opinions on the issues based, of course, on sound legal
reasoning!
Before these types of questions and issues can be posed, the existing law
needs to be fully understood – and so this book will introduce you to the main
areas of state intervention in family life. You should treat this almost as a story
– a couple meet, marry, have children, fall out of love, decide to separate and
divorce and then have to sort out the consequences of ending the relationship.
They also have to consider their parenting role and how this relates to their
children’s rights, if any such rights exist. Finally, for good measure, the couple
have to be aware of the consequences of them being classed as ‘bad parents’,
and the powers the state has over their children in those circumstances. These
are the main life events for a large sector of society and are all life events
subject to legal rules and oversight by the courts and the state. 
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Before embarking on this story of life, a couple of general points need to be
highlighted in relation to the manner in which family law operates. First, there is
no single family court, despite calls for one to be created. Hence, family law
rights can be enforced in a variety of forums, from the magistrates’ court (which
is known as the Family Proceedings Court (FPC) when dealing with family
matters) through to the High Court Family Division, although the county court
deals with the highest percentage of cases. Secondly, the passing of the Human
Rights Act (HRA) 1998 brings the European Convention on Human Rights (the
Convention) into play where family rights are concerned. Section 2(1) of the
HRA 1998 provides that the various family courts must: 
take into account any judgement, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of
the European Court of Human  Rights … whenever made or given, so far as, in
the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant to the proceedings in which
that question has arisen.
Section 3(1) of the HRA 1998 dictates that the family courts must ensure that:
[In] so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the
Convention rights.
Hence, some of the issues for debate will require knowledge and
understanding of the various Convention rights – principally, in family law, the
right to a fair trial (Art 6), the right to privacy and family life (Art 8), the right to
marry and found a family (Art 12) and the right not to be discriminated against
(Art 14). Finally, the familiar system of precedent takes, to a certain extent, a
back seat in the operation of the law. While general principles can be
established through case law, the diversity of family life is so great that it is rare
to find another case with exactly the same facts and issues.  This does not mean
that you can forget about reading cases! Throughout the text you will find
extracts from a range of cases and also some references to other cases that
illustrate key legal points. You will aid your studies and gain a deeper
understanding by seeking out all these decisions and reading them. These cases
are not always going to be groundbreaking decisions, nor will they always be
the most recent, but they have been selected since they provide a good
illustration of how the law is applied in practice and show how difficult it is, in
some situations, to deal with relationship breakdowns or disputes. You will
also see ‘Questions’ posed throughout the text – these are issues for you to think
about. Try to formulate your opinion on the matter, since this will help you to
understand the law and perform better in any assessments you have on the
topic. Finally, the majority of chapters will have an ‘End of Chapter
Assessment’ section comprising of one or more questions relating to the topic in
that chapter. Do attempt them since this too will aid your understanding and
assessment performance. Hence, by the time you have digested this text and
done the additional directed reading you really will ‘Understand Family Law’.
ME Rodgers
The Nottingham Trent University
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CHAPTER 1
1.1 OBJECTIVES
By the end of this chapter you should:
• understand and be able to describe the legal rules on the process of
marriage;
• be able to apply the law to client scenarios and advise on the marriage
formalities; and
• be able to advise clients on the consequences of failure to comply with
the formalities.
Historically, the law did not involve itself too much in the regulation of
marriage. An individual was free to ‘marry’ merely by the exchange of vows, or
by the act of sexual intercourse with their partner. This lack of legal regulation
led to the term ‘common law wife’, which is still in use today, although having
little, if any, legality or rights attached to it. The law did, however, start to
become involved in marriage in the 18th century, and now legislation provides
the rules surrounding the process of marriage. In this chapter you will be
looking at the formalities of the marriage process and the potential consequences
of failure to comply with the law, to establish how you marry, before moving on
in the next chapter to look at the issue of who can marry whom.
1.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
As you have just seen, the law has only begun to become involved with the
process of marriage in the last 250 or so years, by laying down requirements on
parties wishing to marry. Common law marriages, which took the form of an
exchange of vows (not required to be in a church or religious place of worship),
or the act of living together and having sexual relations, were the norm.
While there may have been advantages to this system, for example, the lack
of expense and the lack of state regulation over what was seen both as a
religious issue and also as a personal matter, there have been some problems
identified with this common law system. Cretney, Masson and Bailey-Harris
in Principles of Family Law, 7th edn, 2002, Sweet & Maxwell, p 10, identify
them thus:
Question
Can you think of any problems that may arise from such a form of marriage?
1
MARRIAGE – THE STARTING POINT
The informality permitted by the common law had a number of disadvantages.
First, there would often be uncertainty about the validity of a marriage. It was
not so much that there might be doubts about the validity of the informal union
itself; but rather that indiscreet and quickly forgotten words breathed under the
influence of passion would be relied on many years later by one of the parties
to a, possibly transient, relationship. The intention underlying such an assertion
of an informal marriage might well be to invalidate the other party’s
subsequent solemn marriage with a third party.
Secondly, hasty and ill-considered marriages were facilitated. The
agreement which is all that is necessary to form a valid common law marriage
might – as an American writer has put it – have been entered into ‘in the
privacy of one’s own bedroom, in an automobile after a picnic in the country,
or after a night’s debauch’. In such cases, it seems unlikely that there would be
much point in inquiring whether the promises were in the present or future
tense.
Thirdly, the creation of such a marriage might have important and undesirable
legal consequences. The American case of State v Ward 28 SE 2d 785 (1994),
provides a striking illustration of the potential evil of such ‘quickie’ marriages:
the defendant to a charge of unlawful intercourse with a minor successfully
asserted that the complainant was his wife at common law.
Consequently, legislation was passed in 1753 to regulate marriage, and the
manner in which a marriage could be contracted. While the Act is commonly
called Lord Hardwicke’s Act, its correct title was the Clandestine Marriages
Act 1753, and it succeeded in replacing the common law marriage with a
marriage celebrated in church. Certain pre-marriage formalities were
stipulated (such as the calling of banns), and failure to comply with them
would result in the marriage being invalid.
In 1836, the Marriage Act was passed, which amended Lord Hardwicke’s
Act, and introduced the secular procedure for marriage. This, therefore,
meant that couples could legally marry without having to go through a
Church of England ceremony. This secular ceremony was not to be as simple
as the common law exchange of vows, since the Act again specified the
formalities to be met before the marriage would be acceptable in law. This
dual system of marriage and, in particular, the dual system of pre-marriage
formalities, is still with us today. The legislation has occasionally been
amended, and the relevant law is contained in the Marriage Act 1949 (as
amended).
1.3 THE FORMALITIES OF MARRIAGE
Within this heading, there are different areas to be considered, namely the
pre-marriage requirements, the solemnisation of the marriage, and consent.
However, when most people contemplate marriage they probably think
more about the practicalities of getting married, and what they perceive to be
the formalities – such as getting the wedding outfits, choosing the rings,
Understanding Family Law
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arranging the reception and making sure that hostile relatives do not end up
sitting next to one another. However, these sort of practicalities have nothing
to do with the legality of the process; they are little more than the social
etiquette that is attached to the wedding ceremony. The legal formalities
refer to the giving of notice of the forthcoming ceremony and other
prerequisites, and these will differ according to the type of ceremony you
have, that is, a Church of England ceremony, a purely secular or civil
ceremony, or a religious ceremony (other than C of E).
1.3.1 Pre-marriage requirements
1.3.1.1 Civil marriages and marriages other than in accordance with the Church
of England
A secular marriage, as well as a marriage which is conducted under the
auspices of a religion other than the Church of England, must only be
performed after the necessary forms of notice have been given and the
relevant superintendent registrar’s certificate issued. Read the following
extracts from the Marriage Act 1949 to establish the type and form of notice
required to marry:
27 Notice of marriage
(1) Where a marriage is intended to be solemnized on the authority of
certificates of a superintendent registrar ... notice of marriage in the
prescribed form shall be given –
(a) if the persons to be married have resided in the same registration
district for the period of seven days immediately before the giving
of the notice, by each of those persons to the superintendent
registrar of that district;
(b) if the persons ... have not resided in the same registration district
for the said seven days ... by each of those persons to the
superintendent registrar of the ... district in which he or she has
resided ...
(2) A notice of marriage shall state the name and surname, marital status,
occupation, place of residence and nationality of each of the persons to
be married ... and –
(a) ... shall state the period, not being less that seven days, during
which each of the persons to be married has resided in his or her
place of residence;
...
(4) The superintendent registrar shall file all notices of marriage and ...
enter the particulars given in every such notice, together with the date
of the notice ... in a book furnished to him for that purpose ... and the
marriage notice book shall be open for inspection free of charge at all
reasonable hours.
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(5) The superintendent registrar shall be entitled to a fee ... for every entry
made in the marriage notice book under this section.
28 Declaration to accompany notice of marriage
(1) No certificate for marriage shall be issued by a superintendent registrar
unless the notice of marriage is accompanied by a solemn declaration
in writing ... made and signed at the time of the giving of the notice by
the person by whom the notice is given ...
(a) that he or she believes that there is no lawful impediment of
kindred or alliance or other lawful hindrance to the marriage; ...
(c) where one of the persons to be married is a child ... that the
consent of the person or persons whose consent to the marriage is
required ... has been obtained, that the necessity of obtaining such
consent ahas been dispensed with ..., that the court has consented
to the marriage ... or that there is no person whose consent is so
required.
...
31 Marriage under certificate without licence
(1) Where a marriage is intended to be solemnized on the authority of
certificates of a superintendent registrar ... the superintendent registrar
to whom notice of marriage has been given shall suspend or affix in
some conspicuous place in his office, for 15 successive days next after
the day on which the notice was entered in the marriage book, the notice
of marriage ...
(2) At the expiration of the said period of 15 days the superintendent
registrar ... shall issue a certificate in the prescribed form unless –
(a) the superintendent registrar is not satisfied that there is no lawful
impediment to the issue of the certificate ...
As you can see, any marriage that is not under the auspices of the Church of
England will have to give the same notices before the couple will be granted a
certificate to marry. For these non-Church of England ceremonies, the
requirements for notice are as follows: the parties have resided in the district
where notice is given for a period of at least seven days; they have declared
that there are no lawful impediments to the marriage; they meet the residence
requirements and the relevant fee is paid. Once the notice and the
declarations have been given to the superintendent registrar, notice will be
posted in a marriage notice book available for public inspection. A total
period of 15 days will have to pass from the posting of the notice before the
certificate authorising the marriage ceremony can be issued. It is important to
remember that notice has to be given by both of the couples and must be in
person.
1.3.1.2 Church of England (or Anglican) marriages
The formalities relating to these weddings are linked with religious tenets. It
is possible that some of these requirements will be changed in the near future,
Understanding Family Law
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perhaps due to their ‘old-fashioned’ nature. As before, read the following
extracts from the Marriage Act 1949 to see how the notice must be given:
5 Methods of authorising marriage
A marriage according to the rites of the Church of England may be
solemnized –
(a) after the publication of banns of matrimony;
(b) on the authority of a special licence of marriage granted by the
Archbishop of Canterbury ...;
(c) on the authority of a licence of marriage (other than a special licence)
granted by an ecclesiastical authority having power to grant such a
licence (... referred to as a common licence); or
(d) on the authority of a certificate issued by a superintendent registrar ...
6 Place of publication of banns
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, where a marriage is intended to be
solemnized after the publication of banns of matrimony, the banns
shall be published –
(a) if the persons to be married reside in the same parish, in the parish
church of that parish;
(b) if the persons to be married do not reside in the same parish, in the
parish church of each parish in which one of them resides ...
7 Time and manner of publication of banns
(1) ... banns of matrimony shall be published on three Sundays preceding
the solemnization of the marriage during morning service, or if there is
no morning service on a Sunday on which the banns are to be
published, during evening service ...
You will have seen that three types of marriage are permitted:
• marriage after publication of banns;
• marriage under common licence; and
• marriage under special licence.
The former is more common and is also cheaper! The requirements are for
the banns to be published for three consecutive Sundays in the parish
churches where the parties reside (having at least 15 days’ residence) and in
the church where the marriage will be conducted, if different. Publication
means that the banns are both entered into a written register and also read
out in the church itself during a service. Once the banns have been published
the marriage ceremony can be conducted immediately. It should be noted
that the Church of England has mooted the possibility of changing this type
of preliminary requirement and proposed that the requirement for the
reading of banns be removed. No steps have been taken towards the
abolishment of the requirement.
Marriage under common licence is rarer and has different requirements.
There is still the residence requirement, but in relation to only one of the
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parties, and it is still 15 days. Rather than the requirement for the registering
and reading out of the banns, one of the parties is required to swear an
affidavit stating that there is no impediment or legal reason why the couple
should not marry. There is no waiting time and once the licence is granted
the marriage can be conducted.
Marriage under special licence is covered below under ‘other forms of
notice’.
According to the Efficiency Scrutiny of the Registration Service (1985), the
Register Office notice board is generally used by those tradespeople who
have an interest in weddings, for example, the photographer, the chauffeur,
the florist, etc. The real purpose of giving notice and having the forthcoming
marriage publicly displayed is to enable anyone who knows of any
objections to the marriage to bring those objections to the notice of the
registrar. The same is true of the calling of banns. In reality, the notification
of objections is not likely to occur, since many individuals would never think
to view the notice board (when did you last do so?) or go to church. Also,
with a more ‘mobile’ population it is not as common for individuals to be
well known in an area.
1.3.1.3 Other forms of notice
The above notice requirements may not be suitable for all situations, and
forms of ‘emergency notice’ exist to deal with ‘deathbed’ weddings or
‘prison’ weddings. Under the Marriage (Registrar-General’s Licence) Act
1970 it is possible to obtain a licence to marry away from a register office if
one of the parties is seriously ill and not likely to recover, or if one of the
parties cannot be moved to a place where marriages can be conducted. If
the same situation is relevant to an Anglican ceremony then, under the
Ecclesiastical Licences Act 1533, the Archbishop of Canterbury is able to
grant a special licence to permit a marriage at any time of day, whether or
not in a church (this is the special licence referred to in s 5 of the Marriage
Act 1949 above). This is often used to permit marriages in college chapels
or churches where the parties have no connection with the church in which
they are to be married, and hence cannot use the traditional notification
procedures.
1.3.1.4 Reform
As you have just seen, the purpose of giving notice is not, in today’s society,
truly met. You may ask, why bother? The ineffectiveness of notice periods
has been noticed and proposals for change have recently been mooted. In the
Government Green Paper, Supporting Families: A Consultation Document
Question
Why do couples have to give notice?
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(November 1998, TSO), it was suggested that rather than remove the notice
periods, they should be increased to a minimum of 15 days. In addition, it
was proposed that both parties to the forthcoming marriage should have to
attend to give notice jointly. This has now been introduced via the
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.
The reasoning behind the proposed alterations gives an indication of the
changing view of why notice is necessary. The Green Paper states in
para 4.27 that a minimum of 15 days’ notice would ‘... allow couples more
time to reflect on the nature of the commitment they are entering into and to
take up marriage preparation’. The reasons for joint notice are that it ‘...
would test the willingness of each partner to enter into the marriage contract
and would enable the registrar to provide information on available guidance
and to refer both partners to pre-marriage support’. Can you see how this is
focusing more on the couple themselves than on letting the public know
about the marriage? The concept of pre-marriage counselling is not new, but
perhaps is more important given the current high divorce rate. You may
agree that it is better to know what marriage entails before you enter in to it
than find out to your cost later!
1.4 THE MARRIAGE CEREMONY
While only two forms of notification procedure exist, there are four main
types of ceremony that are permitted in English law. You should know of
two of these: namely, the civil ceremony and the Church of England
ceremony. The others are religious ceremonies not according to the rights of
the Church of England, and marriages according to Jewish or Quaker
traditions.
1.4.1 The civil ceremony
After the civil preliminaries have been complied with, a marriage can take
place in any register office, subject to certification, although the office in the
area where one of the parties resides is often preferred unless the couple are
marrying in a stately home, etc. The marriage ceremony will need to be
conducted by an authorised person and will need to take place between the
hours of 8 am and 6 pm. In addition, the marriage should take place with
‘open doors’, meaning that any member of the public may enter (as required
by the Marriage Act 1949). The parties to the marriage must, at some point
during the ceremony, declare that they know of no impediment to the
marriage and also make the ‘required declaration’. This means that the
parties are required to call upon the persons present at the ceremony to
witness their contract with one another. The precise wording of the
declaration is set out in s 44(3) of the Marriage Act 1949 although the
Marriage Ceremony (Prescribed Words) Act 1996 permits another form of
wording to be adopted. The reason for the very minor alterations in
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language under the latter Act seems to be nothing more than modernisation
of the language used. Consequently, the wording is more readily understood
and perhaps may be thought to be more appropriate to the individuals
concerned; but other than for these reasons, there seems to be no clear reason
for introducing this option.
1.4.1.1 Alternative venues for the ceremony
In addition to the changes to the wording used in the ceremony, recent
changes have occurred with regard to the place where a civil marriage can be
carried out. The Marriage Act 1994 amended the Marriage Act 1949 to enable
marriages in ‘approved premises’. These are premises approved by the
relevant local authority for the purposes of a marriage ceremony.
The Marriages (Approved Premises) Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/510) set
out the process for the application and registration of other ‘premises’. The
extracts from the 1995 Regulations that follow should enable you to see what
the basic requirements are:
Schedule 1 (Regulation 5(1))
1 Having regard to their primary use ... the premises must, in the opinion of
the authority, be a seemly and dignified venue for the solemnisation of
marriages.
...
4 The premises must have no recent or continuing connection with any
religion, religious practice or religious persuasion which would be
incompatible with the use of the premises for the solemnisation of
marriages ...
Schedule 2 Conditions to be attached to grants of approval (Regulation 6(1)(a))
...
7 No food or drink may be sold or consumed in the room in which a
marriage ceremony takes place for one hour prior to that ceremony or
during that ceremony.
...
9 The room in which a marriage is solemnised must be separate from any
other activity on the premises at the time of the ceremony.
...
11 Any reading, music, words or performance which forms part of a
ceremony of marriage ... must be secular in nature ...
12 Public access to any ceremony or marriage solemnised in approved
premises must be permitted without charge.
A marriage will not be permitted anywhere: for example, there must be a roof,
it must be a permanent structure or be permanently moored if a boat. The
criteria that the premises are a ‘seemly and dignified venue’ are perhaps a little
subjective since each individual is likely to have their own view as to what is
Understanding Family Law
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seemly. The changes do however mean that individuals have a greater scope
for marrying in surroundings that they feel to be appropriate and, perhaps, far
more attractive. The popularity of these alternative venues is clear, and the
number of church weddings has declined considerably since the introduction of
the regulations. Most stately homes, many hotels and even football stadia can
be used as a venue; but attractive as some of these are there can be potential
problems with some venues, for example, the Eurostar Waiting Room at
Ashford Station, which applied for permission to hold weddings in 1996.
If you recall the requirements for a marriage ceremony, it needs to be
conducted with open doors. If guests have to go through customs (as they
would at such a station) before they can witness the marriage, then is it truly
open to the public?
1.4.1.2 Reform of civil marriages
As you are aware, reform of the various marriage formalities has been
mooted in several government publications (for example, Supporting
Families). In January 2002 a White Paper was published with a view, amongst
other things, to changing certain aspects of civil marriage (Civil Registration:
Vital Change). These changes are primarily directed at the nature of the
marriage ceremony and the place of the ceremony. Once the changes come
into force, couples will not be constrained in terms of where they marry –
unless the place is deemed unsafe, such as in a shark cage or at the bottom of
a bungee rope. The place of the marriage will no longer have to be
registered; the fact that the marriage celebrant has the requisite licence will
be the important factor.
In terms of likely implementation, the White Paper suggests that the
updating of existing legislation should be completed by 2004 and that the
changes should be implemented by the end of 2005. However, this will be
dependent on sufficient parliamentary time being available; but some of the
changes may be implemented via delegated legislation reducing the time
frame for implementation, although, at the time of writing, no such changes
have yet been implemented.
1.4.2 The Church of England ceremony
The nature of the ceremony is very similar to that in a register office, with the
obvious emphasis on the religious nature of the ceremony. There must be a
qualified clergyman to conduct the ceremony, before witnesses, with open
doors, and between the specified times. Again, the prescribed words and
Question
What do you think the problem may be?
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declarations must be made, although there is little scope to amend them as
with civil ceremonies.
1.4.3 Other religious ceremonies
This category will incorporate those individuals of the Roman Catholic faith,
Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims. Before the ceremony the civil preliminaries
must be carried out. Thereafter, the ceremony may be carried out in
accordance with the relevant religion. The law requires that the building, in
which the ceremony takes place, is one which is a place of meeting for
religious worship (s 41 of the Marriage Act 1949). In addition, there must be
an authorised person in attendance – this may in fact be the registrar but is
more commonly a priest or minister of the necessary faith. Regardless of
which religion is involved, the wording in s 44(3) of the Marriage Act 1949
(the required wording referred to in civil ceremonies above) must be said at
some stage in the ceremony.
1.4.4 Jewish and Quaker marriages
For some reason these two faiths were exempted from the provisions of the
Marriage Act 1753. Hence, today the only requirements are for couples to
comply with the civil notification procedure. The ceremony takes place in
accordance with the religious requirements of the relevant faith.
1.5 REGISTRATION
Formal registration of the marriage is necessary to enable the parties to have
proof of their status. As you will realise, many rights and obligations, both of
the parties to one another and of the state, are dependent upon the status of a
married person. The marriage register must be completed and signed by
witnesses. A copy of this entry in the marriage register is provided to the
couple.
1.6 CONSENT
This is an issue to which you will return in the next chapter when
considering the legal status of a marriage. At this point it is necessary merely
to note that marriage is, in effect, a contract between the two individuals
concerned, although, it is true to say, it is a contract with little by way of
clear obligations on either party. As such, it is a very simple contract and
most individuals are deemed capable of entering into it. The idea that
individuals need to be of a certain age to enter a contract holds true for
marriage: it is not permissible to marry under the age of 16. If a young
person between the ages of 16 and 18 wishes to marry, they can do so only
Understanding Family Law
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with the consent of their parents (or those who hold parental responsibility)
or their guardian. If the person or persons who are required to give consent
refuse to do so, the court can be asked to give consent instead. If no one is
able to give consent, perhaps due to a disability, the need for consent can be
dispensed with by the superintendent registrar (this is covered in s 3 of the
Marriage Act 1949). However, if this consent is not given, or the consent is
fabricated, and the marriage ceremony goes ahead, it will still be a valid
marriage.
1.7 CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE FORMALITIES
You may have decided that if the preliminaries were ignored then the
marriage should be invalid and, hence, have no legal consequences.
Alternatively, you may have looked at the nature of the requirements and
decided that they were not really significant and, hence, failure to comply
should not result in the marriage being deemed invalid. Unfortunately, the
legislation is not so clear cut, as the extracts from the Marriage Act 1949
below illustrate:
48 Proof of certain matters not necessary to validity of marriage
(1) Where any marriage has been solemnized under the provisions of this
Act, it shall not be necessary in support of the marriage to give any
proof –
(a) that before the marriage either of the parties thereto resided, or
resided for any period, in the registration district stated in the
notice of marriage to be that of his or her place of residence;
(b) that any person whose consent to the marriage was required ... had
given his consent;
(c) that the registered building in which the marriage was solemnized
had been certified as required by law as a place of religious
worship;
(d) that the building was the usual place of worship of either of the
parties to the marriage; ...
nor shall any evidence be given in to prove the contrary in any
proceedings touching the validity of the marriage.
49 Void marriages
If any persons knowingly and wilfully intermarry ...
Question
What do you think the consequences should be if the required
preliminaries have not been complied with?
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(a) without having given due notice of marriage to the superintendent
registrar;
(b) without a certificate for marriage having been duly issued by the
superintendent registrar to whom notice of marriage was given;
(c) without a licence having been so issued, in a case in which a licence is
necessary;
(d) on the authority of a certificate which is void ...
(e) in any place other that the church chapel, registered building, office or
other place specified in the notice of marriage and certificate of the
superintendent registrar;
(ee) ... on any premises that at the time the marriage is solemnized are not
approved premises;
(f) in the case of a marriage in a registered building (not being a marriage
in the presence of an authorised person) in the absence of [the] registrar
...;
(g) in the case of a marriage in the office of a superintendent registrar, in
the absence of the superintendent registrar ...;
(gg)in the case of a marriage on approved premises, in the absence of the
superintendent registrar ...;
the marriage will be void.
As you will have seen, these sections set out the breaches of formalities
which will have no effect on the validity of the marriage, and those which
will mean the marriage is void (this is a topic covered in depth in the next
chapter).
If you were to summarise these sections in a table or list form it would
look something like this:
VALID
Breach of residence requirements.
Lack of consent of parents/
guardians if either party below 
18 years. 
Building not registered as a place of
religious worship.
Building not the parties’ usual place
of worship.
VOID
No notice given to the registrar. 
No certificate issued or void
certificate issued.
No licence issued (where one is
necessary).
Married in a place not specified on
the certificate.
Building not an approved place.
Married in the absence of an
authorised person or registrar.
Understanding Family Law
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When reading the sections did you notice the caveat to the invalid or void
marriages? If not, go back and try to spot it.
You should have noticed the phrase, ‘If any persons knowingly and
wilfully intermarry ... the marriage shall be void’. This means that it is only
where a marriage is carried out with the parties knowing that they have not
fulfilled the relevant preliminaries that the marriage is not valid. It is not
clear from the legislation whether or not both parties should know of the
defect, although most writers (for example, Cretney, Masson and Bailey-
Harris, and Hayes & Williams, Family Law; Principles, Policy and Practice,
1999, Sweet & Maxwell) do speak in plural terms, suggesting that both
parties should know.
Earlier on in this chapter you were told that a marriage (whether secular
or Anglican) had to be conducted between the hours of 8 am and 6 pm. What
would be the situation if the marriage took place at 6.05 pm?
The sections extracted above are of no assistance on this particular point
since the law is not clear as to the effect of failure to comply with certain of
the formalities. The hours for marriage is one such formality. Others that fall
into this ‘vague’ category include the requirement for open doors and the
need to make the required declarations.
1.8 SUMMARY
In this chapter you have looked at the means by which a marriage can be
conducted and legally formed. You should now be familiar with the
requirements for notification of an impending marriage ceremony and the
purposes for which this notice is given. The ability in today’s society for this
notice to achieve its aims is an issue you should be able to discuss. The actual
process of the marriage ceremony itself, who may conduct it and where, is
another area which you should feel comfortable discussing. Linked to this,
the consequences for ignoring the legal requirements should be clear. You
should also be in a position to suggest why there have been calls for reform
in this area, since this is relevant to the End of Chapter Assessment.
1.9 END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT
‘[M]any of the procedures [relating to marriage] are unnecessarily
complex and restrictive’: Registration: A Modern Service, Government
Green Paper, Cm 531.
Discuss the validity of this statement.
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CHAPTER 2
2.1 OBJECTIVES
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
• explain the importance of ss 11 and 12 of the Matrimonial Causes Act
(MCA) 1973;
• analyse and discuss the meanings within the legislation;
• apply the law to problem scenarios and advise hypothetical clients in
problem-style assessment questions;
• identify areas where the law may be capable of change and the nature of
those changes; and
• explain the relevance of legally authorised separation to end a marriage.
In 2002, only 167 marriages were brought to an end by the use of the nullity
procedure compared with 148,164 divorce petitions ( Judicial Statistics,
2003, HMSO). Consequently you may be wondering why you need to
study this area of law. While nullity, in particular, is little used to bring a
marriage to an end, it is important to the understanding of the legal rules
surrounding marriage itself and of the question, ‘who can marry whom?’ In
addition, nullity illustrates the historical difficulties of obtaining a divorce
which, in reality, is only a recent option. Legally authorised separation is also
a little used provision but does retain relevance for certain individuals in
society.
2.2 VOID VERSUS VOIDABLE
In the previous chapter you came across the term ‘void’ in respect of a
marriage, but do you know what voidable means and are these terms you
would expect to find in family law?
In reality, marriages fall into three categories:
• those that are valid and can only be brought to an end through divorce or
legally authorised separation;
• those that are void and have, therefore, never existed as a valid marriage;
indeed in law, no marriage has been created; and
• those that are voidable and which will be seen in law to be valid, although
due to an irregularity, the marriage may be set aside and declared to be
no longer in existence.
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The terminology stems from the fact that marriage is seen as a contract and
so terms are used that reflect contractual situations. However, we will see in
this chapter that the distinctions between void and voidable marriages, in so
far as the consequences are concerned, are not that great.
2.3 VOID MARRIAGES
Those marriages that are deemed void are covered in s 11 of the MCA 1973,
which you will find below. Have a look at the section and list those types of
marriages that are void:
11 Grounds on which a marriage is void
A marriage celebrated after 31st July 1971 shall be void on the following
grounds only, that is to say –
(a) that it is not a valid marriage under the provisions of the Marriages
Acts 1949 to 1986 (that is to say where –
(i) the parties are within the prohibited degrees of relationship;
(ii) either party is under the age of sixteen; or
(iii) the parties have intermarried in disregard of certain requirements
as to the formation of marriage);
(b) that at the time of the marriage either party was already lawfully
married;
(c) that the parties are not respectively male and female;
(d) in the case of a polygamous marriage entered into outside England and
Wales, that either party was at the time of the marriage domiciled in
England and Wales.
For the purposes of para (d) of this sub-section a marriage is not polygamous
if at its inception neither party has any spouse additional to the other.
It is one thing to know what the law says, another to know what it means, so
now let’s consider what each of the categories cover and look at some of the
difficulties that they throw up.
2.3.1 The prohibited degrees
The first to consider is that the ‘parties are within the prohibited degrees of
relationship’ (s 11(a)(i)). There are two types of prohibited degrees within the
law and they clearly reflect the question ‘who can marry whom?’ The first
Question
Do you agree with the inclusion of all these categories?
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category is the prohibited degrees of consanguinity, that is, relationships by
blood. The second category is the prohibited degrees of affinity and these are
relationships created by marriage.
Schedule 1 to the Marriage Act 1949 lists those individuals who are
prevented from marrying due to their being in these categories. Below you
will find a summary of the prohibitions in this Act.
Prohibited degrees of consanguinity:
• A man may not marry his:
mother, adopted mother or former adopted mother, daughter, adoptive
daughter or former adoptive daughter, father’s mother, mother’s mother,
son’s daughter, daughter’s daughter, sister, father’s sister, mother’s sister,
brother’s daughter, sister’s daughter.
• A woman may not marry her:
father, adoptive father or former adoptive father, son, adoptive son or former
adoptive son, father’s father, mother’s father, son’s son, daughter’s son,
brother, father’s brother, mother’s brother, brother’s son, sister’s son.
Prohibited degrees of affinity:
• A man may not marry his:
daughter of a former wife, former wife of his father, former wife of his
father’s father, former wife of his mother’s father, daughter of the son of
his former wife, daughter of the daughter of his former wife, mother of
his former wife, former wife of his son.
• A woman may not marry:
son of her former husband, former husband of her mother, former
husband of her father’s mother, former husband of her mother’s mother,
son of the son of her former husband, son of the daughter of her
former husband, father of her former husband, former husband of her
daughter.
The justifications for these restrictions span a variety of considerations. As
you may know, the potential for genetic defects in offspring is greater the
closer the blood link between parents. Genetically, therefore, marriage
within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity may increase the risks of
inherited disease. The morality and social policy considerations of marrying
a member of one’s close family are also relevant, especially in the degrees of
affinity where step-parents or step-children and other affines are concerned.
It would not be acceptable in the majority of circles for a child to be raised by
someone acting as a parent and then for those two parties to marry
subsequently and create a totally different relationship.
Question
Who do you think should be covered by this sort of prohibition and why?
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Clearly, here there is less of a ‘family’ relationship and so you might agree
that the law should treat such a case differently; yet the degrees of affinity
have been relaxed only in the recent past. There are now limited situations
where marriage across the degrees is permissible. These are set out in s 1 of
the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act 1986, which relaxes
the prohibition where:
• both parties are over 21 (in all cases);
• the marriage is between step-parent and step-child and the child had not
been treated as a child of the family before reaching the age of 18;
• the marriage is between an individual and their parent-in-law, or child-
in-law, and the respective spouses are dead.
2.3.2 The age of the parties
The terms of this restriction are not difficult to understand, but the rationale
is less clear. It would appear that social mores affect this principle. You may
not be aware that in the early part of the 20th century it was permissible for a
girl to marry at the age of 12 (this age was raised in 1929), something that
would seem quite unacceptable today. The fact that there is a minimum age
for marriage does not seem too important, with only a minority of
individuals marrying in their teens.
If a child of 16 or 17 wishes to marry, this is permissible subject to the
consent of their parents (or persons with parental responsibility). However,
in the event that this consent is not forthcoming the court can be asked to
give consent instead. If consent is not given, the child lies about their age, or
a parental consent is invalid, but the marriage goes ahead, then the marriage
is still valid in law. No challenge may be made regardless of the breach of the
requirements. You must remember that this only applies to marriages where
the minimum age of 16 is met.
2.3.3 The disregard of certain formalities
You should recall the situations and the types of breach that will invalidate
the marriage from the previous chapter – if you can’t, go back and re-read
that section of the book.
Question
Do you think that the same prohibitions should apply if the step-parent
and step-child (in the list of prohibitions above, being daughter or son of
former spouse) had not actually lived in the same household in a
parent/child relationship?
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2.3.4 Already lawfully married
As with the s 11(a)(ii) of the MCA 1973 prohibition, this prohibition should
not cause too many problems. The restriction on marriage, when already
lawfully married, is in connection with the second marriage. The first
marriage will remain valid (always assuming it was valid to start with); the
second marriage will automatically be void. As you may be aware, if one of
the parties to a marriage is already married, a criminal charge of bigamy may
result.
2.3.5 The parties are not respectively male and female
This again would appear to be an uncontroversial aspect of the legislation
since it reflects the notion of marriage as being the union of one man and one
woman. In reality, there has been continued debate on this provision and the
issue of what is meant by ‘male’ and ‘female’.
The starting point in case law on this issue is Corbett v Corbett [1970] 2 All
ER 33 and the opinion of Ormrod J. The facts of the case, briefly, were that
the respondent, April Corbett, nee Ashley, was born and their birth
registered under the name of George Jamieson. In 1960, the respondent
underwent a ‘sex change’ operation to reassign his sex to female. The parties
married in 1963. In the proceedings to establish if the marriage was void due
to the parties being of the same gender Ormrod J stated:
Since marriage is essentially a relationship between man and woman, the
validity of the marriage in this case depends, in my judgment, on whether the
respondent is or is not a woman ... The question then becomes what is meant
by the word ‘woman’ in the context of a marriage, for I am not concerned to
determine the ‘legal sex’ of the respondent at large. Having regard to
the essentially heterosexual character of the relationship which is called
marriage, the criteria must, in my judgment, be biological ... the law should
adopt, in the first place, the first three of the doctors’ criteria, ie, the
chromosomal, gonadal and genital tests, and, if all three are congruent,
determine the sex for the purpose of marriage accordingly, and ignore any
operative intervention.
Hence, applying this to the respondent they had at the time before the
marriage:
... been shown to have XY chromosomes and, therefore, to be of male
chromosomal sex; to have had testicles prior to the operation and, therefore, to
be of male gonadal sex; to have had male external genitalia without any
evidence of internal or external female sex organs and, therefore, to be of male
genital sex.
As a result, the marriage was held to be void since, despite the respondent
undergoing reassignment surgery, the test for maleness or femaleness was
taken to be the sex determining factors at birth.
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Although the issue of ‘gender’ has been raised in the European Court of
Human Rights, when arguing a breach of Art 12, the right to marry and
found a family, the traditional approach of Ormrod J was upheld as being
within the scope of national law for many years. This approach was
demonstrated in Cossey v UK [1991] 2 FLR 492; (1991) 13 EHRR 5. Here,
Cossey had been born male and her birth certificate stated this fact. She
developed psychologically as a female and received gender reassignment
surgery. Cossey’s request for a change to her birth certificate was refused. She
later married Mr X but the marriage was declared to be void because the
parties were not male and female. On an application to the European Court of
Human Rights, when it was argued that there had been a violation of Art 8
(right to family life) and Art 12 (right to marry) it was held, by a majority, that
the refusal to alter Cossey’s birth certificate was not a violation of Art 8. The
UK’s birth registration certificate was a public record and respect for Cossey’s
private life did not impose an obligation on the UK to alter existing records.
There was no violation of Art 12 which, as you recall, lays down that a
person’s right to marry is subject to domestic law. The UK’s restriction of the
right to marry to persons of the opposite biological sex did not affect Art 12,
which concerned traditional marriage between male and female. Judge Palm
and two colleagues, dissenting, argued that there had been significant
changes in public opinion as regards the full legal recognition of
transsexualism which should be taken into account in the interpretation of
Art 12.
Again, in Bellinger v Bellinger [2001] EWCA Civ 1140, the Court of Appeal
accepted that the assignment of gender at birth, in accordance with the
Ormrod J criteria, must stand, and while they acknowledged the
psychological aspects of transsexualism, together with the fact that it is
medically recognised as a psychological condition, they did not feel able to
give these ‘secondary factors’ priority over the biological ones. There was
however a clear statement that the present state of affairs was unsatisfactory
and that it may not match the changing views of the European Court of
Human Rights as evidenced in the case of Sheffield and Horsham v UK (1997)
27 EHRR 163.
Mrs Bellinger appealed to the House of Lords but, before this hearing
took place, the European Court of Human Rights heard the case of Goodwin v
UK (2002) 35 EHRR 18. In the Goodwin case several issues were raised with
regard to the treatment of post-operative transsexuals under the law of
England and Wales. With reference to the right to marry, enshrined in Art 12
ECHR, the Court found:
The Court recalls that in the cases of Rees, Cossey and Sheffield and Horsham the
inability of the transsexuals in those cases to marry a person of the sex opposite
to their re-assigned gender was not found in breach of Article 12 of the
Convention. These findings were based variously on the reasoning that the
right to marry referred to traditional marriage between persons of opposite
biological sex, the view that continued adoption of biological criteria in
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domestic law ... was encompassed within the power of Contracting States to
regulate by national laws ... Reviewing the situation in 2002, the Court observes
that Article 12 secures the fundamental right of a man and woman to marry
and to found a family. The exercise of the right to marry gives rise to social,
personal and legal consequences. It is subject to the national laws of the
Contracting States but the limitations thereby introduced must not restrict or
reduce the right in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the
right is impaired.
The Court has found ... that a test of congruent biological factors can no
longer be decisive in denying legal recognition to the gender of gender of a
post-operative transsexual.
One of the consequences of this declaration, and the fact that Goodwin had
declared refusal to accept a transsexual in their new gender for the purposes
of marriage to be unlawful, was the publication of a draft Gender
Recognition Bill in July 2003. It should be noted, however, that this was not
sufficient for Mrs Bellinger’s case to be successful in the House of Lords
([2003] UKHL 21).
The Gender Recognition Bill was introduced in the House of Lords on 27
November 2003, and gained Royal Assent on 1 July 2004. Its aim is to
enable individuals to gain formal recognition of their change of gender
via application for a ‘gender recognition certificate’ (s 1). The applicant
will have to be over 18, and be accepted as ‘living in the other gender’
(s 1(1)(a)), or having ‘changed gender under the law of another country or
territory outside the UK’ (s 1(1)(b)). Any such application will be determined
by a new body, the Gender Recognition Panel, which will be required under
s 2 to grant the certificate if satisfied the applicant:
(a) has or has had gender dysphoria;
(b) has lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years ending
with the date on which the application is made;
(c) intends to continue to live in the acquired gender until death; and
(d) complied with the requirements imposed by s 3.
Section 3 sets out the nature of the evidence needed to substantiate the
application. It is not a requirement of s 3 that the applicant actually
undergoes surgery, or such treatment, for the gender dysphoria – a diagnosis
alone can be sufficient. Section 3(6) also requires the applicant to indicate if
they are married (this can only be in the original gender unless, of course, the
applicant is seeking a certificate under s 1(1)(b) where the marriage may be
in the acquired gender). In addition, birth certificates must be submitted
with the application.
If the evidential aspects are met the Panel must grant the certificate, but if
the applicant is married, only an interim gender recognition certificate can be
granted (s 4(3)). The interim certificate can be made into a full one if the
marriage is ended by virtue of nullity proceedings or the spouse dies. There
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is a time limit of six months after the ending of the marriage or death of the
spouse for the certificate to be made into a full gender recognition certificate
(s 5).
Amendments will also be made to the MCA 1973 to increase the
situations when a marriage may be deemed voidable. These will be covered
later in the chapter.
There are, however, some situations where the ‘sex at birth’ and the
application of the biological tests are not conclusive. These are cases where
the individual is deemed ‘intersex’ and, hence, are not covered by the test
in Corbett. In these situations, the secondary factors can legitimately be
used to assign the individual to the ‘correct’ gender as in W v W (Nullity:
Gender) [2001] 1 FLR 324. Here, H and W had married in 1993. In 1997 a
decree absolute had been granted following W’s petition. H did not
contest the divorce but later sought a decree of nullity on the ground that
at the time of the marriage the parties had not been male and female
respectively. He contended that the marriage was void in that W was not a
woman but a physical intersex. Although W was registered at birth as a
boy, and in spite of treatment with testosterone injections from an early
age, her general appearance had been more female than male. From the
time she was able to choose, she had lived as a female. In 1987, following
oral oestrogen treatment, W had undergone gender reassignment surgery.
The court held that H’s application should be dismissed. Charles J stated
that the factors determining a person’s sex for the purpose of marriage, as
set out in Corbett v Corbett (1971), were biological and, if the gonadal,
chromosomal and genital tests were congruent, that was determinative of
an individual’s sex. W’s genetic and gonadal sex was male but her
genitalia were ambiguous, hence she did not fulfill the Corbett criteria.
Partial androgen insensitivity caused her to be in a physical intersex state.
Given such insensitivity, its cause and effect, evidence of W’s final choice
to live as a woman before the oestrogen treatment,  her gender
reassignment surgery, and her capacity to consummate the marriage,
Charles J was satisfied that this was sufficient to demonstrate that, for the
purposes of the marriage, W was a woman.
2.3.6 Polygamous marriages
The restriction on polygamous marriages would appear to overlap with
that of bigamy and this is true to the extent that both concern marriages to
more than one person. However, polygamy is not automatically a criminal
offence; in other words, a polygamous marriage may be valid in England
and Wales.
Section 11(d) of the MCA 1973 often causes confusion and yet it is not a
complicated provision. The key issue in deciding whether or not a marriage
will be void for polygamy is the question of where the parties are domiciled.
If the country of domicile permits polygamy (for example, Pakistan), then as
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long as all the parties to the polygamous marriage, ie, husband plus two
wives, are domiciled within that jurisdiction at the time of the ceremonies,
there will be no question of the marriage being invalid. If one of the parties is
domiciled in England and Wales and the other is not, for the marriage to be
valid it must be between single people.
2.4 VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Those marriages that are deemed voidable are covered in s 12 of the MCA
1973, which you will find below. Have a look at the section and list those
types of marriages that are voidable.
12 Grounds on which a marriage is voidable
A marriage celebrated after 31 July 1971 shall be voidable on the following
grounds only, that is to say –
(a) that the marriage has not been consummated owing to the incapacity of
either party to consummate it;
(b) that the marriage has not been consummated owing to the wilful
refusal of the respondent to consummate it;
(c) that either party to the marriage did not validly consent to it,
whether in consequence of duress, mistake, unsoundness of mind or
otherwise;
(d) that at the time of the marriage either party, although capable of giving
a valid consent, was suffering (whether continuously or intermittently)
from mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health
Act 1983 if such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfitted for
marriage;
(e) that at the time of the marriage the respondent was suffering from
venereal disease in a communicable form;
(f) that at the time of the marriage the respondent was pregnant by some
other person other than the petitioner.
In addition, under the Gender Recognition Act 2004 it has been inserted into
the MCA as sub-para (g):
that an interim gender recognition certificate under the Gender Recognition Act
2004 has, after the time of the marriage, been issued to either party to the
marriage.
2.4.1 Incapacity to consummate or wilful refusal to consummate
Although these two categories are separate, their similarities mean that it is
easier to consider them together.
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The condition of consummation is one that requires sexual intercourse to
take place between the parties. Intercourse does not have the same definition
as it would in criminal law for the purposes of rape. Sexual intercourse must
be ‘ordinary and complete’. A marriage will be consummated regardless of
whether or not ejaculation occurs, and does not depend upon the use of
contraception: what is at issue is not the ability to conceive, but the ability to
have sexual relations. For example, in Baxter v Baxter [1948] AC 274, H and W
married in 1934. Some 10 years later H left W. H petitioned for a decree of
nullity on the ground of non-consummation due to W’s wilful refusal. H
stated that W refused sexual intercourse unless he used a contraceptive. The
court held that consummation of the marriage was not prevented by the use of
contraceptives. Per Lord Jowitt:
I am unable to believe that Parliament, by using the word ‘consummate’ in
connection with this new ground of nullity, intended that the courts should be
involved in enquiries of this kind. Long before the passing of the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1937, it was common knowledge that reputable clinics had come
into existence for the purpose of advising spouses on what is popularly called
birth control and ... it is also a matter of common knowledge that many
young married couples agree to take contraceptive precautions in the
early days of married life. I take the view that in this legislation
Parliament used the word ‘consummate’ as that word is understood
in common parlance and in the light of social conditions known to exist,
and that the proper occasion for considering the subjects raised by
this particular appeal is when the sexual life of the spouses, and the
responsibility of either or both for a childless home, form the background to
some other claim for relief. On this basis I am constrained to say that, in my
opinion, there is no warrant for the decision in Cowen v Cowen (1945)
[(unreported) in which the Court of Appeal had held that there had been no
consummation where a husband had persisted in the use of a contraceptive].
The result is I would dismiss this appeal.
In the case of W v W [1967] 1 WLR 1554 the court considered a petition in
which evidence was given suggesting that penetration had not led to
ordinary, complete intercourse. The court held a decree of nullity would be
granted. As Brandon J stated:
There are binding decisions that the emission of seed, or possibility of
procreation, are not necessary ingredients as a matter of law to ordinary and
complete intercourse, and there are authorities which seem to me to be right, if
not binding, that full and complete penetration is an essential ingredient to
complete intercourse.
I do not think that there is any authority which binds me to hold that any
penetration amounts to consummation of a marriage, and in the absence of
Question
How would you define consummation?
Understanding Family Law
24
Chapter 2: Nullity and Legal Separation
such authority I do not see why I should not make a finding of fact in
accordance with what seem to me to be the realities of the case. On those
grounds, in my judgment, this marriage has not been consummated and I am
satisfied that the cause of that non-consummation is the impotence of the
husband which existed at the date of the marriage and continued at all material
times. There will, accordingly, be a decree of nullity of marriage on the ground
of incapacity.
Incapacity to consummate can be due to the ‘defects’ of either party, and an
individual can rely on their own incapacity, but it is always for the petitioner
to prove that incapacity exists. The common perception of incapacity would
relate to physical difficulties in consummating the marriage. This does not
have to be the case, and psychological aversion can suffice. In the case of
Singh v Singh [1971] 2 WLR 963, H and W, aged 21 and 17, were Sikhs who
were married in a register office. W’s parents had arranged the marriage and
she had never seen H before the ceremony. It was intended that the civil
ceremony would be followed by a religious ceremony. W took a dislike to H
when she first saw him at the register office and she refused to participate in
the religious ceremony or to live with him. W’s subsequent petition for a
decree of nullity was based upon duress and incapacity to consummate
because of her ‘invincible repugnance’. The petition was dismissed.
Karminski LJ stated:
There is the matter of repugnance. It is true that W never submitted herself to
the physical embraces of H, because after the ceremony of marriage before the
registrar it does not appear that she saw him again or went near him. Having
taken the view which she did, that she did not want to be married to him, it is
understandable that she did not want to have sexual intercourse with him: but
that seems to be a very long way from an invincible repugnance ... Here W
abandoned the idea of her marriage altogether, and there is nothing of a
psychiatric or sexual aversion on her part which is in any way established. In
my view that ground of nullity fails completely.
By contrast, for wilful refusal to be proven the petitioner must prove that the
respondent has reached a ‘settled and definite decision without just excuse’
(per Jowitt LC in Horton v Horton [1947] 2 All ER 871, at p 874) not to have
intercourse. The assessment of the settled decision is a question of fact for the
court.
An example of when it may be deemed ‘just excuse’ can be found in the case
of Ford v Ford [1987] 17 Fam Law 232. Here H was in prison and despite
being able to engage in intercourse with W (albeit against prison rules) the
court held that his failure to consummate the marriage whilst still in prison
Question
When do you think a respondent would have a just excuse not to
consummate the marriage?
25
would have equated to a just excuse: it was a valid reason for not having
intercourse. The existence of other evidence for non-consummation meant
that the marriage was, nevertheless, held to be void. The case of Baxter v
Baxter [1948] AC 274 (above) demonstrates a situation where there was no
just excuse.
Given that the focus of both s 12(a) and (b) of the MCA 1973 is on the ability
of the couple to have sexual intercourse it would be logical to answer this
question in the affirmative. However, what is at issue is whether or not the
marriage has been consummated and therefore the ability or desire of the
parties prior to the ceremony is irrelevant.
2.4.2 Consent
The legal requirements for consent cover three main areas.
Starting with unsoundness of mind, the first thing you should be aware
of is that this is not automatically the same as mental illness, although it may
include it. The real concern here is that due to the individuals’ mental
incapacity they are unable to enter a contract; marriage is a contract. The
level of understanding and therefore capacity that is needed is quite low
since marriage is a simple contract (per Hodson LJ in Re Park [1954] P 112, at
p 136).
Turning to duress, this fact has had a variety of approaches taken in the
courts as to what actions will constitute duress, and hence vitiate consent.
In Szechter v Szechter [1971] 2 WLR 170, P, a Polish national, was arrested
and imprisoned in Warsaw, having been charged with anti-state activities. R,
an eminent Polish scholar, to whom the authorities had given permission to
emigrate, assisted in effecting P’s release by divorcing his wife and marrying
P while she was in prison. P, R and his former wife came to England. P
petitioned for a decree of nullity on the ground of fear and duress, in order
that R and his first wife might remarry. Simon P stated that:
It is, in my view, insufficient to invalidate an otherwise good marriage that a
party has entered into in order to escape from a disagreeable situation, such as
penury or social degradation. In order for the impediment of duress to vitiate
an otherwise valid marriage, it must, in my judgment, be proved that the will
of one of the parties thereto has been overborne by genuine and reasonably-
held fear caused by threat of immediate danger (for which the party is not
himself responsible) to life, limb or liberty, so that the constraint destroys the
reality of consent to ordinary wedlock.
Question
Would it make a difference to this ground if the parties had had sex
before the marriage?
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In the later case of Hirani v Hirani [1982] 4 FLR 232 P, aged 19 and a Hindu,
was living with her parents, also Hindu, in England. There she met X, an
Indian Muslim. The parents opposed the friendship of P and X and arranged
for P to marry a Hindu; neither P nor the parents had met him. P was
threatened with expulsion from the family home unless she married in
accordance with her parents’ wishes. The marriage was not consummated
and P left her husband after six weeks. She petitioned for nullity on the
grounds of duress. The judge refused to grant a decree because there had
been no threat to P’s life, limb or liberty. P appealed. The appeal was allowed
and a decree was granted. Ormrod J stated:
It is clear that the judge was greatly influenced by the judgment of Simon P in
Szechter v Szechter (1971) ... Reading that passage – and one can understand
what the judge had in mind – he felt that he had to find a threat to life, limb,
liberty in order to find duress. With respect, I do not for one moment think
that the President intended that result. He was merely contrasting a
disagreeable situation with one which constituted a real threat. The matter
can be dealt with quite shortly by referring to Pao On v Lau Liu Long (1980)
unreported in which Lord Scarman said: ‘Duress, whatever form it takes, is a
coercion of the will so as to vitiate consent.’
The crucial question in these cases, particularly where a marriage is involved,
is whether the threats, pressure or whatever it is, is such as to destroy the
reality of consent and overbears the will of the individual. It seems to me that
this case of a young girl, wholly dependent on her parents, being forced into a
marriage with a man she has never seen in order to prevent her (reasonably
from her parents’ point of view) continuing in an association with a Muslim
which they would regard with abhorrence. But it is as clear a case as one
could want of the overbearance of the will of the petitioner and thus
invalidating or vitiating her consent.
In the first of these cases the court’s view was that to establish duress the
petitioner had to show that their will had been overborne by genuine and
reasonably held fear that was caused by an immediate threat to life, limb, or
liberty. In the case of Hirani, the interpretation of duress was that it will be
found where pressure, of whatever kind, had been such as to destroy the
reality of the consent given to the marriage.
Of the two interpretations the latter is preferable since it looks at duress in
a more common sense way and focuses on the subjective element of consent.
Mistake is the final reason for obviating consent to marriage.
There are two types of situations where a mistake might occur. You may
have thought of a situation where one does not realise that what they are
doing is getting married. In a case in 1945 (Mehta v Mehta [1945] 2 All ER 690)
Question
Can you think of any situations where a mistake would mean that a
marriage could be avoided?
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the petitioner wrongly believed that they were going through a ceremony of
religious conversion. This mistaken belief was held to vitiate consent.
Alternatively, you may have considered the situation where one wrongly
believes their spouse to be a millionaire when, in reality, they are a pauper.
In this case, if it is merely a mistake as to the attributes of the person one
marries, one cannot plead mistake. If, however, one marries Tom, believing
him to be Fred, his twin brother, mistake would be a valid claim.
2.4.3 Mental illness
Again, the mental capacity of one of the parties to the marriage is the main
issue, but here the requirement is that the party is suffering from a mental
illness within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983. The important
point to note is that in s 12(d) of the MCA the mental illness is more
specifically defined than in s 12(c), which refers to unsoundness of mind, a
much wider and potentially vague concept. It is also important to note that
the consequence of the mental illness is relevant. The party must be ‘unfitted
for marriage’ for s 12(d) to apply; by contrast s 12(c) is simply looking at
consent. You should remember that an individual may have a mental illness
but still be capable of giving consent. After the marriage it may be found that
such an individual is ‘unfitted’, and the marriage can be avoided by use of 
s 12(d).
In Bennett v Bennett [1969] 1 WLR 430, H had married W in 1965 but
they spent only very short periods of time with each other because H was
abroad on active service. W had been admitted twice to a mental hospital
before the marriage, once for a month and, later, for a fortnight during
which she was given shock treatment. H was not aware of these facts when
he married W. When he returned home in December 1965 he learned from
a doctor that W had been receiving treatment in a mental hospital.
Following another tour of duty abroad, he filed a petition of nullity. The
court held that whilst accepting W’s behaviour was likely to be difficult
over a relatively short period of time, it was clear that W was suffering
from no more than a temporary neurosis. The marriage of H and W was
valid. Per Ormrod J:
Concerning the definition of mental disorder [in the Mental Health Act] the
question is, what did Parliament mean by the phrase ‘unfitted for marriage and
the procreation of children’, because they are conjunctive and not disjunctive.
‘Unfitted’ is a word which is not easily construed. It might be given a very wide
interpretation or a very narrow one. It is quite plain to me, having regard to the
context, with the background of mental deficiency in mind, that Parliament
cannot possibly have intended to use the word ‘unfitted’ in an extensive sense.
This must really mean something very much like the test of unsoundness of
mind although perhaps not quite the same, it really must mean something in
the nature of: ‘Is this particular person capable of living in a married state and
of carrying out the ordinary duties and obligations of marriage?’ I do not think
it could possibly be given any wider meaning than that.
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2.4.4 Venereal disease
This reason for avoiding a marriage is little used and is perhaps
anachronistic given the ability of medicine to cure venereal disease (VD).
Today the sub-section has generated debate in relation to HIV and AIDS and
whether this would be within the terms of the provision.
No cases on nullity, to date, seem to have focused on HIV or AIDS. The
problem would be that HIV itself is not really a disease, it is a virus, and also
both HIV and AIDS are deemed to be blood disorders, and not VD. To a
degree this would make sense since HIV can be transmitted in manners
other than sexual contact. Given this doubt it may be preferable for an
individual to seek a divorce rather than use the nullity provisions.
2.4.5 Existing pregnancy
The presence of this ground for annulling a marriage is rooted in history
when fraudulent or wilful concealment of a relevant fact was ground for
annulment. If a wife was pregnant by another man and had not revealed this
to her husband before the marriage it did not amount to fraud or
concealment and hence would not enable the husband to end the marriage.
An existing pregnancy would also not be sufficient to enable the husband to
divorce the wife. Consequently, the law had to be changed to ensure that
men who had been deceived into marriage could break those legal ties;
hence, the provision now found in s 12(f) of the MCA 1973. Today it seems
more to highlight the potential discrimination in the law: do you think a wife
could petition for nullity because her husband had caused another woman to
become pregnant before the marriage?
2.4.6 The new gender grounds
As you will remember, from earlier in the chapter, the Draft Recognition Act
2004 increases the grounds upon which a marriage will be voidable. Under
s 12(g) the court will be able to end a pre-existing marriage by means other
than divorce, where one of the parties is seeking a full gender recognition
certificate but, due to the marriage, has only been able to obtain an interim
certificate.
Question
Do you think HIV or AIDS fall within this provision? Should it?
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2.5 BARS TO THE ANNULMENT
Section 13 of the MCA 1973 does, to a degree, temper the effects of s 12. The
basic premise is that if an individual is seeking to set their marriage aside as
voidable, but that individual had, despite knowing it would be possible to
set the marriage aside, conducted themselves in a manner which suggested
they did not intend to set the marriage aside, it would be unjust for the court
to set the marriage aside, in which case the court can refuse to make the
order. Section 13 also limits the scope for annulment in relation to the
consent, mental illness, VD or pregnancy grounds. The proceedings must be
commenced within three years of the marriage. Also, if the petition is
brought under the VD and pregnancy grounds, the petitioner must satisfy
the court that they did not know of the illness/pregnancy at the time of the
marriage. The Gender Recognition Act 2004 inserts s 13(2A) into the MCA
1973, providing a limit of six months in which proceedings can be brought
by virtue of one of the parties obtaining an interim gender recognition
certificate. Presumably, if this timescale is not met, the parties would have to
bring the marriage to an end via divorce. You should note that this would
not entitle the party changing gender to obtain a full recognition certificate
unless the divorce was instituted within six months of the gaining of the
certificate – in which case why not just go for nullity?
2.6 WHO CAN APPLY FOR THE 
MARRIAGE TO BE ANNULLED?
If you looked back at the relevant sections of the MCA 1973, you will
probably have noticed that s 12 indicates who can petition on which ground,
but that s 11 is silent on the matter.
Where a marriage is void the number of potential applicants is much wider.
It includes not just the parties to the marriage, but also any other interested
individual (for example, a child) who may wish to have the marriage set aside.
This can happen, not just in the parties’ lifetime, but also posthumously. A
reason why this might occur is in relation to rights of inheritance.
If the marriage is voidable only the parties to the marriage can annul it
and only in accordance with s 12. You should, therefore, make sure you are
fully aware of who can petition on which ground. For example, under
incapacity to consummate either party can petition and an individual’s own
incapacity can be relied on.
Question
Who do you think can apply to end the marriage under the nullity
provisions?
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2.7 CONSEQUENCES OF NULLITY
Apart from the obvious consequence that once a marriage is annulled it will
be brought to an end, other consequences flow.
2.7.1 Parties’ rights: void marriages
Where the marriage is void, that is, has never been valid, it may still give the
parties rights. If any children are born to the parties, then if one of the parties
reasonably believed the marriage to be valid, the child will be treated as
being legitimate (s 1 of the Legitimacy Act 1976). When a marriage is ended
there are inevitably financial considerations. The ability to seek financial
remedies is not restricted to divorce, but can also be extended to nullity
(ss 23 and 24 of the MCA 1973). The willingness of the court to do so will
depend on the reason for declaring the marriage to be void. The courts have,
in the past, considered the public policy aspects of benefiting from ones own
crime crime, when deciding these cases, and have refused, for example, to
grant financial relief to someone who deliberately committed bigamy. This
has also been taken to cover the fact of perjury where a party claimed to be
male when they were in fact female! This trend is however not really a trend,
with the courts returning to their traditional discretionary approach and
looking at the individual facts of the case rather than simply stating the
committing of a ‘marital crime’ should automatically deprive the party
committing that crime of financial relief at the ending of a marriage. You will
be looking at financial remedies on the ending of a marriage in a later
chapter. For now, look at the following cases that cover both nullity and the
ability to seek financial awards when the marriage is annulled.
In J v S-T (Formerly J) (Transsexual: Ancillary Relief) [1997] 1 FLR 402, the
defendant (D) was a transsexual male who had been born a female and had
concealed his true gender from the registrar and his ‘wife’ (the plaintiff (P))
for some 17 years. The true facts became known to P only when she
examined D’s birth certificate. A decree of nullity was granted in 1994 and D
applied for ancillary relief (periodical payments and a property adjustment
order). P then challenged D’s right to apply. In January 1996, the judge held
that D was debarred from continuing the claim for ancillary relief on the
ground that it was contrary to public policy. D appealed and the Court of
Appeal held that D’s claim would be dismissed. Sir Brian Neill stated that, in
the exercise of the court’s discretion under s 25(1) of the MCA 1973, it was
legitimate to take into account principles of public policy. The applicant (D)
had been guilty of a serious crime (perjury) and had practised deception of a
grave nature on P; these matters constituted relevant circumstances which
were to be taken into account. It was possible to make the necessary
assumptions of hardship in D’s favour – P was very rich, whereas D had
nothing except assets given by P and, perhaps, an equitable interest in the
sale of the matrimonial home. However, no court could, in the proper
exercise of its discretion, grant ancillary relief of the kind claimed by D. D’s
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conduct at the time of the marriage ceremony (when he described himself as
‘a bachelor’), when judged by principles of public policy, tipped the scales in
decisive fashion against the grant of any relief.
In the earlier case of Whiston v Whiston [1995] 2 FLR 268, the court had
also used public policy as a means to prevent a female bigamist from seeking
a financial award when the marriage was annulled. However, in Rampal v
Rampal [2001] EWCA Civ 989, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the
conduct of the party in relation to a void marriage must be seen in the round
– hence being a bigamist will not always prevent a financial award being
granted as Whiston suggests.
2.7.2 Parties’ rights: voidable marriages
Where the marriage is voidable, the same consequences will apply as for a
void marriage. However, this is due to the fact that the marriage is valid
unless and until it is annulled.
2.8 LEGAL SEPARATION
Legally authorised separation operates as a sort of halfway house
between marriage and divorce. It does not totally rescind the marriage
contract, but merely absolves the parties from certain requirements, for
example, living together. The grounds for seeking a legal separation are
currently found in the MCA 1973 and are the same as for divorce, with
the exception that the court is not required to establish an irretrievable
breakdown in the marriage (s 17(2)). As you will see in the next chapter,
the applicant for a legal separation need, therefore, only show that a
‘matrimonial offence’ has occurred or that separation has already taken
place. As legally authorised separation is not designed to terminate the
marriage there is no need to go that one stage further and prove the
marriage has ended completely.
If a couple uses legally authorised separation, there are certain
advantages or consequences:
• a divorce petition can be brought at any future point during the
marriage;
• financial relief can be sought;
• the parties do not have to cohabit;
• the parties are not free to remarry another person;
• for intestacy purposes the separated spouses are treated as being dead;
• the order can be converted to a divorce provided the remainder of the
legal rules pertaining to divorce are met.
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2.9 SUMMARY
The annulment of marriage is, at best, the confirmation of necessary rules
relating to marriage and, at worst, the continuation of a set of anachronistic
provisions with little, if any, real role to play in marital law. As you have
seen, there exist a number of reasons or grounds for annulment, some of
which may continue to be highly relevant, others less so. You should be
familiar with their definitions and the consequences of a petition.
2.10 END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT
Here are a selection of smaller advice and essay type questions rather
than one long question.
1 Alfred has been undergoing medical treatment for clinical depression.
The drug regime has made him intermittently ‘hazy’ and he has
difficulty in understanding or making sense of things. Last week
Alfred went through a register office wedding with Bernadette. After
the ceremony they booked in to a hotel nearby and the marriage was
consummated. They have not lived together beyond that first night.
Alfred has now sought your advice on bringing the marriage to an
end.
2 To what extent can an individual marry whomsoever they wish,
wherever they wish?
3 Andre is married to Steffi and the marriage took place eight months
ago. Shortly after the marriage Andre confessed he was bisexual. Due
to this, Steffi insisted that Andre must have an HIV test. This has been
returned with a positive result. No sexual intercourse has taken place.
Advise Andre, who wishes to set up home with Phillip and to
relinquish all his marriage ties.
4 Four years ago Paramjit and Ravi married in their local temple, 
the marriage having been arranged by their respective families. The
couple had not met prior to the ceremony. Ravi was not keen on the
prospect of marrying but, due to her age at the time (28), her parents
were constantly telling her of the shame that she was bringing on the
family. The marriage has never been a happy one; Ravi has never felt
able to have physical contact with Paramjit, and sexual intercourse has
never taken place. Again, due to the family concerns, Ravi agreed to
be artificially inseminated and has borne one child, Amandeep, now
eight months old. Advise Ravi on her chances of bringing the marriage
to an end.
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CHAPTER 3
3.1 OBJECTIVES
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
• explain the legal provisions that enable a divorce to be granted;
• evaluate the proposed changes to the legal regime;
• evaluate the effectiveness of, and any problems with, the provisions; 
and
• advise hypothetical clients as to their rights.
As you may be aware, the law on divorce has been subject to review over the
last few years. The Family Law Act (FLA) 1996 was enacted with one of its
aims being to change the divorce regime and to support the institution of
marriage. While a large part of the FLA has been brought into force, Pt II, the
part that dealt with divorce, was left unimplemented. Primarily this was to
enable pilot studies to be carried out as to the best method for
implementation. These pilot studies, and the accompanying research, were
not favourable and hence Pt II of the FLA 1996 will, at some point, be
repealed. This means that the Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) 1973, despite
criticism, remains in force and it is this Act’s provisions that establish how a
divorce can be obtained. In addition to studying the MCA 1973 you will look
briefly at the FLA 1996, but this will be to enable you to understand why the
reform failed and it will assist you in learning how to evaluate the law in a
critical way. You should try to approach this part of the text on the basis of
why the FLA’s principles were so unworkable, and whether anything
beneficial could come from it, etc. You will also be looking at mediation, a
FLA concept for resolving issues in divorce, this being one of the parts of the
FLA 1996 that are fully in force and operational.
3.2 A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
England and Wales are perceived to have a high divorce rate – the number of
divorces granted in 2003 being in excess of 148,000, although this is a
fluctuating figure. This number of divorces is seen as being detrimental to
the stability of family life and, indeed, detrimental to the family per se. The
ability to seek a divorce, for the majority of couples who wish to do so, is a
relatively recent development. Historically, divorce was available only to a
few, those rich enough to obtain a Private Act of Parliament, and was often
only an option for the male partner. In 1857 the concept of judicial divorces
was introduced, being available where one party to the marriage was guilty
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of adultery and the petitioning spouse was free from any guilt. A move away
from adultery as a basis for divorce came in 1937 with a widening of the
categories, although the categories were all a ‘matrimonial offence’, such as
cruelty, desertion, insanity or adultery. The modern law stems from the
Divorce Reform Act (DRA) 1969 and was re-enacted without change in the
MCA 1973. This change was intended to move away from the idea of a
matrimonial offence as a basis for bringing the marriage to an end.
Following the full introduction of the DRA 1969, the number of divorces
increased although not immediately. However, there was over a threefold
increase in decrees granted between 1968 and 1978. The Law Commission
has pointed out that whilst it may be easy to blame changes to the divorce
laws for increasing marital breakdown, a change to divorce law and the
number of divorces are not necessarily linked and you may find it useful to
look at the paper (Law Commission Discussion Paper, Facing the Future – A
Discussion Paper on the Ground for Divorce No 170, 1988, HMSO).
The increasing number of divorces does not predicate that marriage is
unpopular, although it is true that marriage for the never-married category
of individuals is decreasing. This, in part, could be due to the increasing
acceptability of cohabitation instead of marriage: but it is also true that many
individuals who divorce will go on to remarry, hence the term ‘serial
monogamy’.
3.3 THE BASIC PRESUMPTIONS OF THE MODERN DIVORCE
The forerunners of the DRA 1969 Act were the reports entitled Reform of the
Grounds for Divorce: The Field of Choice (Law Commission, No 6, 1966) and
Putting Asunder, produced by a committee set up by the Archbishop of
Canterbury and also published in 1966. These reports set out to establish
what purpose a ‘good’ divorce law should serve.
The main planks upon which the new divorce law was to be built were that
the law should ‘buttress, rather than undermine, the stability of marriage’
and ‘enable the empty shell of a marriage to be destroyed with the maximum
fairness and the minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation’.
Question
Can the divorce law achieve these aims? If so, how?
Question
What do you think the purpose of the divorce law should be?
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To achieve these ends the legal basis upon which a divorce should be
granted was to be changed. The methods for change suggested by the Law
Commission were:
• removing the references to matrimonial offences and replacing that
ground with ‘irretrievable breakdown’ either with or without the need to
carry out a thorough inquest into the breakdown;
• allowing divorce by consent, noting problems where children are
involved; and
• allowing divorce where there has been a minimum of six months’
separation, although possibly longer (but this was perceived to be an
additional ground to the existing matrimonial offences).
Several safeguards were suggested, including the need for a minimum
duration of marriage of three years, adjournment of the proceedings for
reconciliation to be attempted and improving the rules in relation to
arrangements for children born to the marriage. The resulting legislation, did
not, however, reflect the Law Commission’s proposals in all respects and
was in reality a mixture of the approaches in the Law Commission and the
Archbishop’s report.
3.4 THE GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE – 
THE MATRIMONIAL CAUSES ACT 1973
The DRA 1969 implemented the changes and these were re-enacted in the
MCA 1973. A divorce may be sought on the following grounds:
1 Divorce on breakdown of marriage
(1) Subject to section 3 below, a petition for divorce may be presented to
the court by either party to a marriage on the ground that the marriage
has broken down irretrievably.
(2) The court hearing a petition ... shall not hold the marriage to have
broken down irretrievably unless the petitioner satisfies the court of
one or more of the following facts, that is to say –
(a) that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner
finds it intolerable to live with the respondent;
(b) that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner
cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent;
(c) that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous
period of at least two years immediately preceding the ... petition;
(d) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous
period of at least two years immediately preceding the
presentation of the petition ... and the respondent consents to a
decree being granted;
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(e) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous
period of at least five years immediately preceding the presentation
of the petition.
...
3 Bar on petitions for divorce within one year of marriage
(1) No petition for divorce shall be presented to the court before the
expiration of the period of one year from the date of the marriage.
(2) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the presentation of a petition
based on matters which occurred before the expiration of that period.
As you will see from the above extract, there is only one ground on which a
divorce can be granted, namely that the marriage has broken down
irretrievably.
In the attempt to move away from the idea of matrimonial offences, the
ground for divorce was intended to be ‘fault free’ and, notionally,
irretrievable breakdown does achieve this aim. However, there are two
major inroads into the idea of dissolving the ‘empty shell’ of a marriage: in
s 3(1) of the MCA 1973 the prohibition on being able to seek a divorce until
the marriage has existed for at least one year; and in s 1(2) the need to prove
irretrievable breakdown by reference to one or more of five facts.
3.4.1 The five facts
Of the five facts, the first three (adultery, behaviour and desertion) are
normally perceived as continuing to emphasise fault in the divorce process.
The two separation facts are less clearly rooted in the fault mould and
perhaps can be seen to be more consistent with the aims of the legislation.
When you look at what needs to be proven and how this is done under the
MCA 1973 process, the importance of fault seems to be minimal in the sense
of the law and even for the parties themselves.
3.5 THE DIVORCE PROCESS
The method adopted during the 1970s to process the majority of divorce
petitions is called the ‘special procedure’. The procedure is, in effect, a purely
documentary process. Under the special procedure the party seeking the
divorce files their petition with the court and serves it on the respondent
(although the court automatically serves the petition unless specifically asked
Question
Does this ground include fault, or require the party petitioning for
divorce to allege fault to end the marriage?
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not to do so). The respondent files an answer, normally agreeing to the
divorce and confirming the facts alleged to be true. The documentation is
then placed before a district judge to ‘check’ that everything is in order and to
confirm that the ground and fact for divorce have been proven. In
the checking of the paperwork it is unlikely that anything other than
procedural errors will be spotted and no real investigation into the facts
will take place. This is despite a requirement in s 1(3) of the MCA 1973 for
the court ‘to enquire, so far as it reasonably can, into the facts alleged by
the petitioner and into any facts alleged by the respondent’. The reliance
on the special procedure, and the failure of the court to meet its
theoretical obligation in investigating the truth of the statement of
irretrievable breakdown, has caused concern and helped drive the reforms
contained in the FLA 1996. Indeed the Law Commission has stated that
‘[district judges] act as little more than rubber stamps’ (Facing The Future – A
Discussion Paper on the Ground for Divorce).
Given that the Law Commission was clearly of the view that the special
procedure has resulted in a ‘rubber stamp’ exercise they concluded that
individuals who want a divorce can gain one relatively easily – especially
where adultery or behaviour is cited as the fact to support the breakdown.
The fact that the special procedure cannot ‘pick out’ those cases of collusion
means that divorce can be obtained, in effect, by consent.
As you know, the MCA 1973 was deemed to introduce ‘no fault’ divorce,
and yet has been criticised for retaining ‘fault based’ facts to prove
irretrievable breakdown. However, if couples who no longer wish to live
together and wish to end their relationship can collude and pretend that
adultery has taken place or that one party’s behaviour is such that the other
party cannot reasonably live with them, then is there any ‘fault’? There may
be fault in the sense of perjury but this is not the criticism that has been
levelled at the legislation.
There is potential evidence to support the claim about collusion in the
statistics on the facts used to support a divorce petition. There is a clear
distinction between the genders when considering the number of applications
for divorce, with women accounting for two-thirds of the applications.
Women are more likely to apply on the basis of their husband’s behaviour
(51,982 compared to 12,786 in 2001) or his adultery (20,766 compared to 12,073
in 2001). In relation to the separation facts, 25,822 petitions, petitions based on
these facts, were granted to women in 2001 and 19,236 granted to men in the
same year. While the statistics do not show that the couple is consenting to the
use of the ‘fault’ facts, they are clearly more popular than the ‘non-fault’
Question
If divorce can thus be gained by consent if the parties are willing to
collude, what does this say about fault?
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separation facts. The Law Commission has commented thus: ‘... the evidence
suggests that behaviour and adultery are frequently used because of the need
to obtain a quick divorce.’
In relation to the facts for separation, the time limits may be important (it
will take a minimum of two years) but so will the economic realities of trying
to establish two separate homes before divorce proceedings commence,
although this is in fact a problem for many divorces anyway and many
couples will not be in a position to enter into a separation deed. You may
also like to think about whether the separation facts are truly fault free.
While some couples may simply ‘grow apart’ and hence separate, is it not
also the case that many separations will arise due to some act, or fault, on the
part of one or both of the parties?
3.6 OTHER DIFFICULTIES
The inability of the special procedure to prevent cases of collusion and the
inconsistency of a fault free divorce law primarily founded on fault based
facts are merely two of the problems with the MCA 1973. Closer examination
of the facts themselves should reveal additional conceptual and legal
difficulties, in particular that the MCA 1973 is confusing and misleading.
3.6.1 The respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner
finds it intolerable to live with the respondent
This fact, as you will see, involves the proving of two distinct elements:
• the fact of adultery; and
• the fact that there is a level of intolerability.
The first is easily defined: there must be an act of sexual intercourse between
the respondent and another person, not being the respondent’s spouse.
Intercourse does not have the same definition as in nullity proceedings, and
all that is required is some degree of penetration.
The idea of adultery comprising sexual intercourse is a very common sense
approach, but the definition ignores the fact that sexual conduct less than
intercourse may be just as distressing to the petitioner and yet they would
not be able to petition. Also, the definition applies only to heterosexual
intercourse and, therefore, there would be no means of redress through this
fact for the petitioner if their partner had had a homosexual or lesbian
relationship.
Question
Do you think this is an adequate definition? What are the shortcomings?
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Turning to the second element, intolerability, this is a subjective issue in
that the MCA 1973 states that ‘the petitioner finds it intolerable’. As the Law
Commission have explained:
... this requires some finding of incompatibility ... it has been held that there
need be no causal link between the two requirements. Thus, the petitioner may
find it intolerable to live with the respondent for any reason, not necessarily
because he has committed adultery. The court or registrar is in no position to
gainsay the petitioner ... (Facing the Future – A Discussion Paper on the Ground for
Divorce).
The fact that no link is needed between the two elements of the adultery fact
is certainly problematic. In Cleary v Cleary [1974] 1 WLR 73, H and W
married in 1964. In 1971, W left H and went to live with another man. A
month later W returned to H and stayed for six weeks, then leaving to live
with her mother. H petitioned in 1972 on the ground of irretrievable
breakdown of the marriage, arguing that H had behaved in a manner
making it intolerable for her to live with him. H admitted the breakdown of
the marriage and asked for a dissolution on the ground of W’s adultery. The
court heard evidence showing that W’s adultery was proved and H
submitted that, because there was no longer any real basis for the marriage,
he could no longer live with W. His petition was dismissed and he appealed.
On appeal it was held that H’s appeal should be allowed. Per Lord Denning:
As a matter of interpretation I think that the two facts in the section [adultery
and intolerability] are independent and should be so treated. Take this very
case. H proved that W committed adultery and that he forgave her and took her
back. That is one fact. He then proves that, after she comes back, she behaves in
a way that makes it quite intolerable to live with her. She corresponds with the
other man and goes out at night and finally leaves H, taking the children with
her. That is another fact. It is in consequence of the second fact that he finds it
intolerable – not in consequence of the previous adultery. On that evidence it is
quite plain that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. He complies with
the section by proving (a) her adultery which was forgiven; and (b) her
subsequent conduct (not adultery) which makes it intolerable to live with her ...
A judge in such cases as these should not accept the man’s bare assertion that he
finds it intolerable. He should inquire what conduct on W’s part has made it
intolerable. It may be her previous adultery. It may be something else. But
whatever it is, the judge must be satisfied that H finds it intolerable to live with
her. On the facts of this case I think that the judge could and should have found
on the evidence the two elements required: (1) W’s adultery, and (2) H found it
intolerable to live with her.
3.6.2 The respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner
cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent
This is commonly called the unreasonable behaviour fact, but you should
not fall into this shorthand description. When looking at the words used it
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is, or should be, clear that it is not the behaviour that is unreasonable, but
the expectation of cohabitation. There are, again, two conditions to be
satisfied:
• that there has been some form of ‘behaviour’; and
• that it is unreasonable for the petitioner to continue living with the
respondent.
With regard to the first condition, almost all types of behaviour will have
been cited by a petitioner somewhere, at some time. In general, behaviour
such as violence and excessive drinking are the ones that spring to mind, but
the continued occurrence of minor or trivial incidents will often be sufficient.
In one case the court had to consider, under the behaviour element, the
parties’ methods of washing their underwear. This is hardly what one would
consider to be adequate to gain a divorce!
Turning to the unreasonableness of cohabitation, you are again looking at
a type of subjective test – it is what is reasonable for this petitioner – but with
aspects of objectivity. The test was formulated, in Livingstone-Stallard v
Livingstone-Stallard [1974] Fam 47, at p 54, thus:
Would any right-thinking person come to the conclusion that this husband has
behaved in such a way that this wife cannot reasonably be expected to live with
him, taking into account the whole of the circumstances and the characters and
personalities of the parties?
Can you see the two aspects of the test?
Other cases where the nature of the test have been considered include:
Thurlow v Thurlow (1975) 3 WLR 161, the W’s epileptic fits, from which she
suffered at the time of the marriage, meant that she was increasingly confined
to her bed. She became very aggressive and damaged the home. It was obvious
that she was in need of permanent institutional care. H petitioned for a decree
of divorce on the ground that W’s behaviour was such that he could not
reasonably be expected to live with her. W contended that this did not amount
to behaviour under s 1(2)(b) of the MCA 1973.
The court held that passive behaviour, for example, that caused by medical
illness, can amount to ‘behaviour’ within s 1(2)(b). Taking into account the
strain undergone by H a decree was granted. Per Rees J:
I am satisfied that by July 1972 the marriage had irretrievably broken down and
since the wife, tragically, is to spend the rest of her life as a patient in a hospital,
the husband cannot be expected to live with her. But the question remains as to
whether the wife’s behaviour has been such as to justify a finding by the court
that it is unreasonable to expect him to do so.
As to the distinction which has been made between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’
behaviour, I can find nothing in the statute to suggest that either form is
excluded. The sole test prescribed as to the nature of the behaviour is that it
must be such as to justify a finding that the petitioner cannot reasonably be
expected to live with the respondent. It may well be that in practice such a
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finding will more readily be made in cases where the behaviour relied upon is
positive than those where it is negative.
In reaching a decision, the judge will have regard to all the circumstances
including the disabilities and temperaments of both parties, the causes of the
behaviour and whether the causes were or were not known to the petitioner,
the presence or absence of intention, the impact of it upon the petitioner and
the family unit, its duration and the prospect of cure or improvement in the
future. If the judge decided that it would be unreasonable to expect the
petitioner to live with the respondent then he must grant a decree of divorce
unless he is satisfied that the marriage has not irretrievably broken down.
Approaching the facts in the instant case upon the basis of these conclusions I
feel bound to decide that a decree nisi should be granted. This husband has
conscientiously and courageously suffered the behaviour of the wife for
substantial periods of time between 1969 and 1972 until his powers of
endurance were exhausted and his health was endangered. This behaviour
stemmed from mental illness and disease and no blame of any kind can be
attributed to the wife.
In Ash v Ash [1972] 2 WLR 347, W filed a petition for divorce on the ground
of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, citing H’s various acts of
violence and drunkenness. H admitted the acts but denied irretrievable
breakdown. The court held that W did not appear, clearly, to be of such a
character that she could be expected to live with H. The marriage had broken
down irretrievably and a decree should be granted. Per Bagnall J:
In order to answer the question whether the petitioner can or cannot be
reasonably expected to live with the respondent, in my judgment, I have to
consider not only the behaviour of the respondent as alleged and established in
the evidence, but the character, personality, disposition and behaviour of the
petitioner. The general question may be expanded thus: can this petitioner,
with his/her character and personality, with his/her faults and other attributes,
good and bad, and having regard to his/her behaviour during the marriage, be
reasonably expected to live with this respondent? It follows that if a respondent
is seeking to resist a petition on the first ground on which the husband in this
case relies, he must in his answer plead and in his evidence show the
characteristics, faults, attributes, personality and behaviour on the part of the
petitioner on which he relies. Then, if I may give a few examples, it seems to me
that a violent petitioner can reasonably be expected to live with a violent
respondent; a petitioner who is addicted to drink can reasonably be expected to
live with a respondent similarly addicted ... and if each is equally bad, at any
rate in similar respects, each can reasonably be expected to live with the other.
Other cases you may like to look at include: O’Neill v O’Neill [1975] 3 All ER
289; Bannister v Bannister [1980] 10 Fam Law 240; Pheasant v Pheasant [1972]
2 WLR 353.
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3.6.3 The respondent has deserted the petitioner for a
continuous period of two years
Desertion is an infrequently used fact and accounts for less than 0.5% of
divorce petitions. For desertion to be proved it requires the respondent’s
withdrawal from the state of marriage, without just cause. Hence, there
needs to be a mental withdrawal from the marriage which, in most
cases (although not necessarily in all), is accompanied by a physical
withdrawal. If the respondent has a reason for not being with the
petitioner, for example, if he or she is imprisoned, or has to work abroad for
a lengthy period, then desertion will not be proven. Again, as with the
‘behaviour fact’, the legal elements are unlikely to be understood by Mr and
Mrs Average.
In addition, the desertion fact overlaps greatly with s 1(2)(d) of the MCA
1973 and it is generally the case that the separation fact will be used in
preference.
3.6.4 The parties have lived apart for a continuous period of two
years preceding the presentation of the petition and the
respondent consents
This fact is similar to the desertion fact, except that consent is required. There
is still a requirement of withdrawal from the marriage – the separation – which
must last for two years. It is possible for parties to be living in the same house,
but to be separated from each other. This reflects the common economic reality
that it is often hard for couples to physically move out from the matrimonial
home, but it can cause problems in relation to separation. If the parties share
any community of living then they will not be deemed to have separated.
What is important to proving separation in this situation is that no shared
activities take place, for example, cooking and eating meals together, or, if they
are, that it is under a clearly differently constituted relationship, for example,
as a lodger with the spouse and their new partner. To prove this fact, there
must be unconditional consent from the respondent, they must know what
they are consenting to, and if induced to consent, the divorce may be set aside.
In Mouncer v Mouncer [1972] 1 WLR 321, H and W were married in 1966. The
relationship became unsatisfactory and from 1969 to mid-1971 they moved into
separate bedrooms although they shared other rooms in the house and ate meals
together with the children and participated in keeping the house clean. H
argued that he stayed in the house only in order to be involved in the
upbringing of the children. H left in mid-1971 and petitioned for divorce. The
Question
Would Mr and Mrs Average understand the true legal concept of this
fact?
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court held that H and W had not been ‘living apart’. Indeed, they had shared the
same household. The fact that they did this with the ‘wholly admirable motive’
of caring properly for their children could not alter the result of what they did.
By contrast, in Fuller v Fuller [1973] 1 WLR 730, H and W, who had been
married in 1942, separated in 1964, W going to live with another man. In
1968 H became unwell and was told he could no longer live alone for health
reasons. H then moved in with W and her partner. He took one meal with
the ‘family’ and his other cooking was done by W, but he paid a regular
amount for board and lodgings. On a petition for divorce based on five years
separation the court held that H and W were in fact separated even though
living in the same house. Per Lord Denning:
From 1964 to 1968 the parties were undoubtedly living apart. From 1968 to
1972 the husband came back to live in the same house but not as a husband.
He was to all intents and purposes a lodger in the house. I think the words
‘with each other’ mean ‘living with each other as husband and wife’. In this
case the parties were not living with each other in that sense. It is impossible
to say that husband and wife were or are living with each other in the same
household. It is very different from Mouncer v Mouncer where the husband
and wife were living with the children in the same household – as husband
and wife normally do – but were not having sexual intercourse together. That
is not sufficient to constitute ‘living apart’. I do not doubt the correctness of
that decision. But the present case is very different. 
3.6.5 Separation for five years without consent
This fact is basically the same as the separation fact discussed above, with
the exception of the time period and the absence of consent. The purpose of
the longer period is to prevent unilateral divorce being too easy, although as
you have seen, and will see later, perhaps this does not work appropriately.
3.7 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GROUND 
FOR DIVORCE AND THE FACTS
Question
How do you think the ground for divorce and the facts interrelate?
Question
Having read the facts of Mouncer, do you think that they should have
been successful in their petition since they had lived in the way they did
purely in the interests of the children? Do you think that this is a state of
affairs other couples could find themselves in?
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You should remember that the ground for divorce is ‘irretrievable
breakdown of the marriage’ and that proving one of the five facts evidences
that breakdown.
The simple answer is that even if you can prove a breakdown of your
marriage, but cannot prove the fact, you cannot get your divorce. Equally, if
you can prove a fact, but the court is not convinced that the marriage has
broken down irretrievably, you cannot get your divorce. However, it is one
thing for a respondent to claim their marriage has not broken down, another
to get the court to believe it, as the following illustrates:
In H(T) v T (Divorce: Irretrievable Breakdown) (2002) unreported, 6 June,
H, whose defence to W’s divorce petition itself alleged that W had
committed adultery, that W had entered into the marriage purely for
financial gain, and that she was a bad mother, an unsupportive wife and a
drug taker, could not convincingly argue that the marriage had not broken
down irretrievably. H had, in his defence, pulled away every foundation and
cornerstone of the matrimonial relationship, and it said much about his
attitude to W that he could begin to think that a reconciliation might be
possible.
Here also, Mouncer v Mouncer is relevant since there the marriage had
broken down irretrievably, but the pleaded fact could not be proven.
In Buffery v Buffery [1988] 2 FLR 365, H and W had been married for 20
years and had three children who, having grown up, had left the family
home. W complained that, while the children were at home, she and H rarely
went out together. Furthermore, she complained of H’s control of the family
finances. H and W appeared to have moved apart and had lost the capacity
to communicate with each other. W sought to divorce H on the ground of his
behaviour under s 1(2)(b) of the MCA 1973. The recorder held that H and W
had ‘merely drifted apart’. W’s petition was dismissed as she had failed to
prove her case under s 1(2)(b). She appealed and the court held W’s appeal
would be dismissed. Per May LJ:
Reading the judgment of the recorder in full, I conclude that in so far as any
dissension over money matters was concerned, although H had been
somewhat insensitive, nevertheless this did not constitute sufficient behaviour
within the relevant statutory provision. In truth, what has happened in this
marriage is the fault of neither party; they have just grown apart. They cannot
communicate. They have nothing in common, and there lies, as the recorder
said, the crux of the matter.
Question
What would be the position if you could not prove a fact to the court’s
satisfaction, but still felt your marriage had broken down irretrievably?
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It was submitted that if the matter went back to the recorder he could make
various findings on the evidence about the sensitivity of W in relation to these
matters and various further findings of fact about the nature and extent of H’s
behaviour complained of. I, for my part, do not think that he could. He heard
all the evidence, and the conclusion to which he came was that nobody was
really at fault here, except they both had grown apart. In these circumstances,
in my judgment, W failed to make out her case under s 1(2)(b), although she
satisfied the recorder that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. I do not
think that any advantage would be gained by sending this matter back for a
retrial. The matter was fully investigated and the recorder made the findings to
which I have referred. In those circumstances I would reach the same
conclusion as did the recorder, namely that the petition should be dismissed.
It does seem somewhat unfair that a marriage may be accepted as having
broken down and yet cannot be ended due to the failure to prove the fact or
that one can prove the fact but not the breakdown. Also, can you see that this
aspect of divorce law could result in confusion to the parties?
3.8 DEFENDING THE DIVORCE
As the case of H(T) v T, above, shows, it is possible to defend the divorce
petition, although this is very rarely done and is even more rarely successful!
One of the main reasons for defending the petition is to dispute the evidence
relied on to support the fact in s 1(2) of the MCA 1973; for example, to
dispute that the respondent has behaved in a certain way. Most cases like
this will also include a cross-petition, alleging the breakdown to be the ‘fault’
of the original petitioner. In such a situation both parties have clearly
accepted that the marriage has broken down and it is then a case of
negotiation to find an acceptable fact or evidence upon which to proceed to
obtain the divorce.
3.9 BARS TO DIVORCE AND STOPPING THE CLOCK
Can you remember the first principle of a good divorce law? If not, go back
to the beginning of the chapter and refresh your memory. The manner in
which the law tries to promote the stability of marriage is found in s 2 of the
MCA 1973, which establishes a range of time bars to the different facts and
also permits the parties to stop the fact clock from running in separation
cases, hence promoting attempts at reconciliation. The way the section works
differs for each fact so, for example, with adultery a petition must be lodged
Question
How do you think this approach fits with the idea of divorce law ending
the empty shell of the marriage?
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within six months of the petitioner’s knowledge that the respondent has
committed adultery. This clearly goes to the root of the intolerability
criterion, for if cohabitation continues, it cannot be intolerable. For
behaviour, the length of continued cohabitation after the behaviour
complained of would affect the assessment of the reasonableness of
continued cohabitation. For the other three facts the reconciliation provisions
will stop the clock for a maximum of six months, although the time spent
attempting reconciliation will not be taken into account in computing the
length of desertion or separation. The parties must however ensure that if
their reconciliation fails they separate within the six months, since if they
exceed this time they will lose the benefit of any previous period of
separation in calculating the total time to prove the fact.
Sections 5 and 10 also provide a means to prevent a divorce, or delay it
being granted.
These sections relate only to petitions under the separation facts and,
only s 5 can prevent the divorce from going ahead; s 10 being a delaying
tactic. For s 5 to operate, it must be shown that there will be a ‘grave financial
or other hardship’ to the respondent if the divorce is granted. The hardship
must relate to the divorce. Where financial matters are concerned, it is
generally the case that the court’s power to make financial awards will
negate any hardship claimed to exist.
In Le Marchant v Le Marchant [1977] 1 WLR 559, H, a post office employee,
petitioned for divorce on the basis of five years separation without consent.
W claimed, under s 5(1), that the divorce would cause grave financial
hardship due to the loss of the index-linked widow’s pension from the post
office pension scheme. The court found in H’s favour and W appealed. The
appeal was dismissed. Per Ormrod LJ:
It would be quite wrong to approach this kind of case on the footing that the
wife is entitled to be compensated pound for pound for what she will lose in
consequence of the divorce. She has to show, not that she will lose something
by being divorced, but that she will suffer grave financial hardship, which is
quite another matter altogether. It is quite plain that, prima facie, the loss of the
pension, which is index-linked ... is quite obviously grave financial hardship. [if
the respondent] should set up a prima facie case of financial hardship ... the
petition should be dismissed unless the petitioner ... [puts] forward a proposal
which is acceptable to the court as reasonable in all the circumstances, which is
sufficient to remove the element of grave financial hardship which would
otherwise lead to the dismissal of the petition.
The view which I have formed is that the present offer is a reasonable one in
the sense that it will, if implemented, remove the element of grave financial
hardship so far as the wife is concerned, and remove therefore the defence
which she has to the present petition.
Where ‘other hardship’ is concerned, cases often reflect religious factors, but
the court’s attitude is such that this will generally be insufficient to meet the
requirements and prevent divorce.
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In Rukat v Rukat [1975] 2 WLR 201, H, a Pole, and W, a Sicilian, both
Catholics, were married in Italy in 1946. They came to England where their
daughter was born. W returned to Sicily and H told her not to return to
England because he had fallen in love with another woman. W came back to
England when the other woman died and sought to revive the marriage. In
1972, H petitioned for divorce but W opposed the petition, contending that
in Sicily she would suffer hardship on social grounds if she, a Catholic, were
known to be a divorced woman. A decree was granted and W appealed. The
court held that W’s appeal would be dismissed. There was no evidence as to
the reality of W’s fears. Per Lawton LJ:
The learned judge ... found that W was feeling at the time of the judgment that
she could not go back to Sicily. That, if it was genuinely and deeply felt, would
undoubtedly be a ‘hardship’ in one sense of that word. But one has to ask
oneself whether sensible persons, knowing all the facts, would think it was a
hardship. On the evidence, I have come to the conclusion that it would not ...
Per Ormrod LJ:
The court has first to decide whether there was evidence on which it could
properly come to the conclusion that W was suffering from grave financial or
other hardship; and ‘other hardship’ in this context, in my judgment ... must
mean other grave hardship. If hardship is found, the court then has to look at
the second limb and decide whether, in all the circumstances, looking at
everybody’s interests, balancing respondent’s hardship against the petitioner’s
interest in getting his or her freedom, it would be wrong to dissolve the
marriage.
Section 10 of the MCA 1973, by contrast, permits the respondent to a
divorce petition founded on five years separation to request that the divorce
is not made final until all the financial and property aspects of the case have
been concluded. As these may take some time to complete, this can delay the
divorce for the petitioner quite considerably unless they co-operate.
3.10 THE REFORMS OF THE 1990s
When the Law Commission continued its work on the reform of family law,
it set out its criticisms of the MCA 1973 thus:
• The law is confusing and misleading – for example, irretrievable
breakdown does not appear to involve fault yet the facts do. The fact
relied on does not have to have any relationship to the breakdown. The
law suggests an inquiry is being made into the breakdown and yet this
does not occur.
Question
What do you think are the defects of the MCA 1973?
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• The law is discriminatory and unjust – for example, the only non-fault
based facts require separation, which may not be economically possible.
The inability to cross-petition or defend a divorce means that agreeing to
the divorce requires acceptance of blame that may not be truly felt.
• The distorts the parties’ bargaining powers – for example, the party who
alleges fault will perceive themselves to be in a better position to bargain
on financial matters.
• The law provokes unnecessary hostility and bitterness – for example, the
system of making allegations in the petition must increase hostility; the
allegations may be exaggerated and may not be contradicted by the other
party.
• The does nothing to save the marriage – for example, the making of
allegations may destroy any chance of reconciliation. 
• The existence of s 2 of the MCA 1973, which permits time for
reconciliation, is contrary to the facts.
• The law can make things worse for the children – for example, the
system encourages antagonism between the parents which continues into
issues surrounding the children. The system does not emphasise the needs
of the children (Law Commission, No 192, Family Law: The Ground for
Divorce, 1990, HMSO).
The Commission concluded that this long list of criticisms ‘would amount to
a formidable case for reform’. This is at odds with an earlier comment in the
report where it was stated that 67% of the people questioned in a public
survey found divorce under the present law ‘acceptable’. Surely this must
raise the question, ‘Why the change?’ Perhaps the prevalence and general
acceptance of divorce is of concern. Also, there were concerns expressed by
the Law Commission as to the cost to the state of legal aid payments for
divorcing couples and the cost of the welfare benefits system. Finally, the
adversarial nature of divorce proceedings has been seen as contrary to the
interests of the couple and any children.
3.10.1 Options for reform and basic principles
The Law Commission perceived there to be three possible options for
reform:
• retention of a ‘mixed’ system along the present lines, perhaps with some
modification;
• divorce after a fixed minimum period of separation; and
• divorce after a fixed minimum period for reflection and consideration of
the arrangements, referred to as ‘divorce by a process over time’.
Of these three, the last was the preferred option and was taken through to
the legislature in the FLA 1996.
The aims of the FLA 1996 were similar to those in the MCA 1973
but, unlike the MCA 1973, the FLA 1996 has incorporated some of the aims
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in the Act itself. Hence, s 1 of the FLA 1996 required the court, and anyone
exercising functions under the Act, to have regard to the following:
• supporting the institution of marriage;
• encouraging the parties to save the marriage;
• where a marriage is to be ended, doing so with the minimum distress to
the parties and any children, and reducing the impact on the children of
the end of the marriage;
• reducing costs; and
• reducing the risk to the parties, or children, from domestic violence.
Although the reform proposed in the FLA 1996 to the divorce process itself
will not be coming into force, the remainder of the Act is in force, so these
basic principles must be applied by the court, lawyers and ‘other
professionals’ involved in matrimonial disputes. These ‘other professionals’
are mediators, who have, thanks to the FLA 1996, an increased role in the
divorce process. The matters to be borne in mind under s 1 of the FLA 1996
will also potentially introduce difficulties and conflicts. To what extent will
a solicitor be required to encourage the supporting of a client’s marriage
and give referrals to counselling when consulted on divorce? Will it require
all professionals to fulfil a role of marriage counsellor?
3.10.2 The framework for divorce
The FLA 1996 framework for the divorce process was intended to reduce the
scope for allegations of fault being made to the court and to change the
procedure to a series of steps to be completed at specified times by the
parties. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage remained the sole ground for
divorce or a separation order, but the link between irretrievable breakdown
and a ‘fact’ was disposed of. The primary means to prove irretrievable
breakdown was to be that a substantial period of time had elapsed and,
together with successful completion of the required steps, would result in a
divorce being granted. It was to be a paper based exercise, amounting almost
to divorce on demand. Parties were to be encouraged to save their marriages
by, first, being given information on the divorce process – presumably the
thinking being that if they know how difficult the process is, they are less
likely to want to go down that route. This information stage – the
information meeting – was piloted to establish the best way of getting
information across to the parties but the results were not as expected. The
research, from the pilot projects, found that those attending an information
meeting were more likely to seek a divorce, having received the information,
Question
Will the inclusion of s 1 of the FLA actually assist in the saving of
marriages?
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and were unlikely to want to utilise mediation to assist in the divorce
process. The fact that only one party to the marriage was required to go to a
meeting was also criticised as it was seen as reducing the scope for
reconciliation.
Following an information meeting, the parties would commence a
divorce by filing a statement of marital breakdown, which would not declare
the marriage had ended as it was believed that this would to leave the door
open for reconciliation. Having filed the statement the parties would then
have to spend time ‘reflecting and considering’ the breakdown, trying to
reconcile and, if unsuccessful, making arrangements for the future – these
being financial and property arrangements and also those relating to
children. It is difficult to predict how effective the period for reflection and
consideration would have been in addressing reconciliation versus
arrangements. How long would couples be expected to take to reconcile
before realising that it was not possible? Would couples try to reconcile on
Monday to Wednesday, make arrangements Thursday to Saturday and have
a day of rest from negotiations on Sunday? Also, would it be fair to make
couples wait the full period of time (as the FLA 1996 required) if they have
made their arrangements in less than a month? At the end of the required
period, provided the criteria were met, the divorce order would be granted.
While the reforms in the FLA 1996 do aim to meet the criticisms of the
MCA 1973, they do not do so absolutely. Fault may be removed from 
the requirements needed by the court, but that does not remove it from the
parties’ own explanation of what went wrong. The court based process may
not require allegations to be made relating to the breakdown, but this would
not stop the parties making these allegations to one another. The additional
time taken to end the marriage, due to the need to go through a period of
reflection and consideration, may add to the distress felt by the parties
because they are being kept in an unhappy marriage. While the system aims
to put children and their needs to the fore, there is nothing to actually ensure
that this is being done. The changes and procedures highlighted above are
not, due to the perceived problems with them, to be brought into force.
3.11 MEDIATION
The introduction of mediation was seen as being central to the conceptual
changes to be brought about by the FLA 1996 and to the promotion of party-
led resolution of issues. Mediation for family disputes is covered in Pt III of
the FLA 1996 and it is important to remember that this Part of the Act was
brought into force on 21 March 1997, originally to enable pilot studies to be
carried out. Mediation, and its effectiveness, has been evaluated and
although, as you will see later, it has not been ‘revolutionary’ and despite the
fact that Pt II of the FLA 1996 is NOT being brought into force, mediation is
here to stay and is currently being used in relation to divorce under the MCA
1973 framework.
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The process of mediation is to enable the parties to resolve disputes and
make arrangements themselves, with a third party acting to facilitate
communication. The mediator (who may or may not have legal
qualifications) should not pressure couples into agreements, should not
suggest ways to resolve problems and should not give advice. Mediation is
deemed to be a voluntary process, and yet this may not be entirely accurate
when you consider who has to use mediation. In addition, it is useful to note
that most mediators, whether legally qualified or not, expect their mediation
clients to have access to independent legal advice to evaluate the
appropriateness of any solutions proposed as a consequence of mediation.
3.11.1 Who will have to use mediation?
To establish who has to use mediation, it is important to understand how
mediation has been brought into effect in the family law system. The FLA
1996 deals with mediation in Pt III, but this Part simply amended the
legislation in relation to state funding for legal services – initially by
amending the Legal Aid Act 1988. The Legal Aid Act was subsequently
repealed and replaced with the Access to Justice Act (AJA) 1999; however the
substantive detail on who must use mediation is found in the Funding Code,
which is imposed by the AJA 1999. A detailed explanation of the working of
the Funding Code is beyond the scope of this text, hence, at its most simple,
where divorce is concerned, the only people who are required to use
mediation will be those who are seeking state funding for the ancillary
procedures to divorce – meaning the financial and property orders or orders
in relation to children. (You should note that the divorce itself under the
MCA 1973 is generally paid for as a private client. The Legal Help Scheme
under the AJA 1999 only permits help to be provided to the client in
completing the divorce petition. The solicitor should not draft the petition or
institute proceedings.)
Despite calls for mediation to be used more widely throughout the justice
system and family justice in particular (see, for example, Parental Separation:
Children’s Needs and Parent’s Responsibilities, Cm 6273, 2004, TSO) it is going to
be hard to encourage the clients or users of the system to try something new,
Question
If mediation is supposed to be the ‘best’ method for resolving family
disputes, and hence financial issues arising from divorce, why is it only
aimed at those individuals seeking state funding?
Question
What do you understand mediation to be about?
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or something they are not familiar with. While most people will not divorce or
be involved with legal proceedings, most have some idea of how law is
implemented and mediation does not necessarily fit within that idea. Hence,
one way to encourage use of mediation is to link it to something that is
controlled, or underpinned, by government – the Community Legal Services
Fund – which receives it’s funding from the Treasury. Arguably, then, the
reason for implementing mediation is as a means to reduce costs since lawyers
are perceived as being too adversarial and hence likely to drive up costs.
So, if a client is seeking state funding for their family law problem, they
must be assessed for suitability according to the Funding Code, which sets
out a variety of services available to them. Although limited help may be
available from a lawyer, the emphasis is on mediation and this will require
the applicant to be referred to a mediator to assess if mediation is suitable to
deal with the dispute. If the mediator decides the dispute is one that can be
dealt with by mediation, the applicant will be assisted in applying for state
funding to pay for the costs of mediation. If this application is successful, the
funding granted will pay for mediation services – it will not pay for legal
advice alongside the mediation. If such legal advice is required, the client
will have to apply for funding to cover this and it should be noted that such
funding has only limited scope – for example, to provide help in drafting an
agreement reached by mediation.
Where mediation is deemed suitable, and the client reuses to go down
this route, although they may then apply for funding to cover legal advice
and help, the reasonableness of the refusal to mediate will be considered as
part of the decision as to whether legal help will be funded. This may
therefore reduce the level of voluntariness to mediate, since there is no
certainty that funding for a lawyer will be forthcoming if mediation has been
refused.
If mediation has been attempted and has failed, again the client can apply
for funding for legal help. Once more, before funding will be granted, the
reasons for the failure of mediation will be considered, so here too there is no
certainty that more funding will be available.
The Funding Code does recognise that there are some situations where
mediation can be seen as unsuitable without necessarily going through the
mediation intake assessment. These ‘exceptions’ are as follows:
• where the case is a matter of urgency;
• where there is no recognised mediator available to hold the assessment
meeting;
Question
Can you think of any situations where mediation will automatically be
seen as unsuitable?
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• where the mediator is satisfied that mediation is not suitable because
another party to the dispute is unwilling to attempt mediation;
• where family proceedings (this is wider than divorce and ancillary
matters and will cover a range of issues within family law) are already in
existence and a court hearing date is set to take place within eight weeks
of the application for state funding; and
• where the client has a fear of domestic abuse from a party to the
mediation and is therefore unwilling to participate in mediation.
These exceptions do attempt to ensure only suitable cases are put forward
for a mediation assessment meeting. The inclusion of the exception where
one party is unwilling to mediate is welcome, since this would cover cases
where one party to the divorce proceedings is privately funded and the other
not, and the privately funded party does not want to mediate. As a privately
funded party there is no requirement to mediate and it would be ridiculous
to expect a party to mediate by themselves.
As has been made clear, the Funding Code is operational now and is
being applied to applications under the MCA 1973 divorce regime. On a
conceptual level it must be questioned whether a process founded within 
a fault free approach to divorce (the FLA 1996) can work effectively within a
so called fault based approach to divorce (the MCA 1973).
3.11.2 Mediation, the MCA 1973 and the role for lawyers
The effectiveness of mediation should be assessed against the ability of
participants to reach, and comply with, agreements on their future.
However, the reality is that mediation is being assessed by way of its cost
effectiveness and its ability to speed up the settlement process. When first
introduced, mediation was also seen as being a useful way of reducing the
reliance on lawyers in the divorce process – another way to save costs but
dressed up as ‘party participation’. As you will recall, from earlier in the
chapter, the use of mediation will not automatically reduce the lawyers’ role
– mediators usually expect their clients to have legal advisers too.
The function of mediation, to try to achieve a voluntary arrangement,
depends on the willingness of the parties to co-operate. Even if this
willingness is present, total agreement is not always going to arise, or the
talks may break down. In such situations, recourse to legal advice will be
needed. Remember, though, that if state funding has been granted for the
mediation, which does not succeed, the Community Legal Service Fund will
not automatically give assistance for legal advice. Even if agreement is
reached, lawyers will still be needed. While many legal practitioners are
Question
Why else will lawyers be needed even if mediation is used?
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seeking to become qualified mediators, it is still the case that most mediators
have no legal qualifications at all. As you will learn, when you look at
financial arrangements later, the courts are required to take into account
certain factors when dealing with ancillary arrangements. The question is: to
what extent will mediators make these factors known to the parties? Will
parties find an agreement being thrown out when the application to ratify
the mediated agreement is presented at court. Will parties be able to re-open
a negotiated agreement if they later find that they could have got more? To
prevent these potentially drastic situations arising, it must be the case that it
is appropriate for legal advice to be sought alongside the mediation. Finally,
if agreement is reached there will be no means of enforcement unless and
until the agreement is formalised by way of a court order. Lawyers will be
needed, in most cases, to assist the parties to achieve this outcome, and the
limited scope of legal advice funded via the Funding Code may not be truly
adequate.
It might not be possible to access legal advice purely due to the inability to
pay, especially if the party is making a contribution to the costs of mediation
or because of refusal or a limitation of state funded legal advice. Can you see
how this reference to mediation (and the lack of legal advice) may create a
two-tier service for divorcing individuals?
The pressure to remove lawyers from the process of divorce may simply
be cost driven since mediation is perceived to be cheaper than legal advice
from lawyers. If mediation is cheaper, what better way to reduce the amount
of state funding on divorce? The backlash may be an increase in litigation
after divorce, relating to failure to meet the legal considerations in the MCA
1973 on financial issues.
The question of whether mediation is effective has been considered in
research by Gwynn Davis et al in Monitoring Publicly Funded Family Mediation
(2000, Legal Services Commission). The findings from this research suggest
that use of mediation has increased but not dramatically so. The agreement
rate amongst couples who mediate was low – less than half agreed where the
dispute related to children and only a third agreed where the dispute was
about financial matters. The costs involved in mediation were generally less
than in a non-mediated dispute with the not-for-profit sector being
significantly cheaper, but this did not take into account additional costs for
implementing the agreement. The authors concluded that while mediation
may have something to offer to some parties at a particular time, mediation
could not be seen as a panacea for all the problems associated with divorce
and state funding. This conclusion, taken together with figures to show the
Question
Why might it be difficult for an individual who is mediating to access the
services of a lawyer?
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limited numbers of mediators available, indicates that the immediate future
for mediation is not that rosy.
3.12 SUMMARY
You have now finished a difficult chapter: you are dealing, in part, with
areas of law reform and failed law reform at that! However, you should now
be able to advise hypothetical clients on divorce, but also understand the
criticisms levelled at the divorce regime. You will also be able to comment
briefly on the nature of the changes proposed by the FLA 1996 and evaluate
why they were not implemented following the relevant pilot studies and
evaluate why they have been unsuccessful.
3.13 END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT
1 Joyce and Ralph married 10 years ago and approached their
relationship on an ‘open marriage’ basis. Consequently, both partners
have had casual relationships outside the marriage. Last year Ralph
began to have a change of heart and decided that he would not
participate in any such casual relationships. Joyce did not concur with
this decision and has continued to act in the same way, much to
Ralph’s disgust. Recently he learnt that for the last seven months Joyce
has been having an affair with Anne-Marie.
Advise Ralph on his rights in relation to divorce. Is there any way that
Joyce could prevent a divorce?
2 Peggy and Tony married 15 months ago and stayed together for two
months before Tony left the matrimonial home. He has recently
contacted Peggy and asked to give the marriage a second chance.
Advise Peggy how this would affect her potential right to seek a
divorce.
3 Anne and Ben married four years ago, having cohabited for the 14
years preceding the marriage. Carl, their son, was adopted by Anne
seven years ago, and Ben has a joint residence order with Anne. Three
years before they married, Anne adopted Carl.
Their relationship was deteriorating when the adoption took place –
not having a child was one reason why the difficulties were occurring.
The situation did improve for a while, but not for long. The marriage
was a method to achieve a reconciliation. This has not happened.
Anne and Ben have slept in separate rooms for the last five years. Ben
has now met Diana and would like to commence a relationship with
her.
Advise Ben on ending his marriage
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CHAPTER 4
4.1 OBJECTIVES
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
• explain the nature of the orders that can be made on divorce, both for
property and finance;
• list the criteria and factors that the court will have to consider when
making orders;
• provide an analysis of those criteria;
• apply the law to hypothetical problems; and
• highlight and discuss any defects in or criticisms of the legal rules.
The granting of a divorce does not end the legal relationship between
a spouse and their partner. The existence of children and jointly held
assets will ensure that further contact or legal action is needed. In this
chapter you will be considering the nature of the orders that can be made
and the principles upon which such orders are made. Remember, in this
chapter you are learning the rules with regard to spouses and not children;
child support will be covered later in Chapter 6. This area is not complicated
but does need to be considered methodically to ensure you really do
understand it.
4.2 THE CONCEPT OF MAINTENANCE
Before you start to study the nature of the orders that can be made for
financial and property assets when a couple divorce, it is perhaps wise to
think about why these orders are needed. The law operates on the basis that
there is a mutual obligation on spouses, and ex-spouses, to maintain one
another. The extension of the obligation after divorce may strike you as
strange: if the obligations arise from the entering into of a marriage contract,
surely they should end when that contract is ended?
If you consider the marriage contract purely from a contractual position then,
arguably, the maintenance that is sought equals the damages that could be
claimed when a contract is brought to an early end. However, the notion of
Question
Why should these obligations be extended beyond the divorce?
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maintenance also illustrates the unequal status of women in society, especially
those women with childcare responsibilities. Women who marry, and have
children, will often (although not always) face a loss of marketability in
employment terms, a career may have been broken or entirely given up on
marriage. Despite the Equal Pay Act 1970, women’s salaries are still
consistently lower than men’s and this will inevitably place women at a
disadvantage after divorce. If a couple do have children, the law places an
obligation upon the parents to care, or to pay for care, for them. The societal
constraints within the family see the mother as the primary carer and the man
as the breadwinner and the mother will often retain this primary carer role
after any separation. If unable to work as well, she will need some form of
support. Politically it is not acceptable for that ‘provider’ to be the state.
4.2.1 Amendments to the MCA 1973
The concept of permanent maintenance, whilst being in accordance with the
above hypothesis, is equally one which the law is loath to accept, unless
necessary. The Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) 1973 was amended in 1984 to
introduce the ‘clean break’ provisions, which you will look at later. These
provisions require the court to reflect upon the possibility of ex-spouses
gaining financial independence from one another after divorce, in other
words moving away from the idea of a long term right to be maintained. The
courts do not impose clean breaks in all cases, the reality of the situation in
each case is always considered.
4.2.2 The orders available
The orders that can be sought under the MCA 1973 cover financial and
property matters. A mixture of financial and property orders are the norm.
The term applied to these types of proceedings is ‘ancillary relief
proceedings’, since the proceedings are ancillary to the divorce; in reality
these are often the more contentious issues, along with proceedings relating
to children which you will look at later.
4.3 FINANCIAL ORDERS: s 23
Section 23 of the MCA 1973 establishes the range of financial orders that may
be sought and they fall into the following three categories:
• periodical payments;
• secured periodical payments; and
• lump sum orders.
If you look at all of s 23 you will note that it does cover orders for children –
this will be returned to later when looking at maintenance for children.
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4.3.1 Periodical payments
Periodical payments are the most common form of maintenance awarded.
This form of maintenance covers the making of regular payments of
specified amounts from one spouse to the other. These payments may be
substantial or only a nominal figure (such as five pence per annum). An
order which is nothing more than nominal will enable the recipient to return
to court for an increase in the amount in the event that their, or their ex-
spouse’s, situation changes. When the payments are ‘periodical’, if the payer
fails to comply with the terms of the order the payee must seek to enforce
the order through court action. If the order is secured, as in the second
category, in the event of non-payment the payee has a means to obtain
payment. This is because a secured periodical payments order will require
the payer to set aside a capital fund, which may comprise shares or other
forms of interest-bearing capital, but could even be property, such as a home,
to act as a ‘pot’ into which the payee can dip if the payments are not made as
ordered.
There are a variety of potential cut-off points for periodical payments. The
most drastic is where either party dies. If the order has been secured, while
the order may not extend beyond the death of the payee (the recipient) it
may in fact extend beyond the death of the payer. This does in fact make
sense since the ‘pot’ will still exist and is likely to be in the hands of trustees.
The order will also end on the remarriage of the payee, and this is a factor
to be borne in mind when advising clients. The same is not true of
cohabitation and it has been suggested that this fact will result in a
disincentive to marriage (see Cretney, Masson & Bailey-Harris, Principles of
Family Law, 7th edn, 2003, Sweet & Maxwell). In addition, there may be a
detriment to the payee and any children from the first marriage if a second
marriage results in an overall lower standard of living. In this case, the only
option would be to endeavour to increase maintenance for the children. If
cohabitation is favoured as a means to avoid the provision, the payer may
seek to vary the order, in any event, to reflect the changed situation if the
order itself does not provide for the possibility of cohabitation. Regardless of
marriage or cohabitation, it could be argued that periodical payments merely
continue to highlight the attitudes of society to the roles and dependencies of
men and women.
Clean breaks may also be mentioned in the duration of the order. A clean
break does not have to be effective immediately, and can be deferred. In this
situation maintenance will end at the time specified in the order itself. The
rules relating to deferred clean breaks are found in s 28 of the MCA 1973.
Question
How long do you think periodical payments will last?
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4.3.2 Lump sum orders
An applicant can only seek one lump sum order, although s 23 uses the term
‘lump sums’.
Lump sums can be useful where a couple has substantial financial assets,
and these sorts of payments promote the idea of a clean break. A court may
order the payment of a lump sum and dismiss periodical payments if the
lump sum could generate sufficient income on a regular basis. The ordering
of a lump sum does not have to be to the exclusion of periodical payments
however; it may be appropriate in a particular case to order both.
When lump sum orders are made, the court has the power to direct that
payment be made by instalments, hence the reference to ‘sums’ in the
section. This might be suitable where the payer is likely to have difficulty
raising sufficient capital immediately. An instalment order may also be
useful to take into account future realisation of assets, such as a pension,
which may account for a large sum. If instalments are ordered then there is a
power to ensure the payments are secured.
An advantage for the payee is that the lump sum, once made, is virtually
irrevocable, and the remarriage of the payee will not affect the payment
made.
4.3.3 Maintenance pending suit
Under s 22 of the MCA 1973 an order for maintenance can be sought prior to
the divorce being made absolute. This is useful if the couple has separated and
one individual is not in employment or, if so, has a lower income than is
needed. The court can only make periodical payments orders under this section
which highlights that the order is intended to be a temporary one, pending final
resolution of the divorce process. While the order will not last beyond the
granting of the divorce (the decree absolute), the amount of the maintenance
may be influential in any final settlement. It is also interesting to note that s 22
of the MCA 1973 can be used to claim sums to cover legal costs being incurred
in connection with a divorce. This point was considered in A v A (Maintenance
Pending Suit: Provision of Legal Fees) [2001] 1 WLR 605. H and W were involved
in divorce proceedings with substantive issues still to be decided. W had been
in receipt of state funding for the proceedings but, upon being awarded
maintenance pending suit under s 22, her state funding was withdrawn
resulting in increasing legal costs to be paid by her. W sought to increase the
maintenance pending suit to include an amount towards the ongoing legal
costs. The court held that the sums should be increased to assist W to pay her
legal fees. Per Holman J:
Question
Why do you think this is?
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The periodical payments must be ‘such ... as the court thinks reasonable’ but
must also be ‘for his or her maintenance’ ie the maintenance of the payee ...
There is no doubt that in all sorts of ways ‘maintenance’ does extend to, and
orders for maintenance pending suit have for many years been intended to
cover, matters which are not ones of ‘daily living’. Provision may be included,
if there has been a history of it, to enable the payee to make charitable
payments or payments to a third party ... Such payments are not part of the
‘living’ expenses of the payee at all, but may be a component of the order.
Further, provision can clearly be made to cover legal costs as such ...
4.4 PROPERTY ORDERS: s 24
Section 24 of the MCA 1973 establishes the range of property orders that may
be sought and they fall into the following four categories:
• property transfers;
• property settlement;
• sale of property; and
• variation, extinguishment or reduction of interest in an ante- or post-
nuptial settlement.
4.4.1 Transfers and settlement of property
In the majority of marriages the home will be the largest asset that is
possessed by the couple. On divorce the court, under s 24, has considerable
powers to re-order the ownership of family property or even to order its sale.
The order made will depend on the individual circumstances. It is obvious
that one household is unlikely to become two in an easy way, and deciding
who shall occupy the family home will inevitably result in loss to one party.
The need to house children will weigh heavily on the court’s mind when
deciding on the appropriate order.
4.4.1.1 Types of property adjustment orders
Taking the types of arrangements, in no particular order:
(a) The court might order an immediate sale of the property concerned. This
can be coupled with an order that the proceeds of sale be divided
between the parties. Whilst this has the advantage of promoting a clean
break for the couple, it can only be used in limited situations. To start,
you should notice from s 24A, it can only arise as part of other orders –
Question
What type of adjustment orders might the court make? What are the
advantages or disadvantages of the different orders?
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the court must be making a secured periodical payment order, or a lump
sum order, or a property adjustment order. Both parties need to be in a
position to secure alternative housing; this is especially so if there are
children involved, and so invariably there will need to be sufficient
equity or other capital available.
(b) The court may transfer complete ownership of property to one party. To
reflect the potential loss of a large asset there may be compensation in the
form of reduced maintenance or a lump sum payment back or a charge
being placed on the property.
In Hanlon v Hanlon [1978] 1 WLR 592, H and W separated after a marriage
of 14 years. W continued to care for the four children from the marriage.
Both H and W were in full-time employment with gross incomes that
were almost equal. W remained in the matrimonial home and H lived
rent free in accommodation provided by his employer. In the earlier
hearings different orders had been made in relation to the matrimonial
home: an outright transfer to W subject to her paying H £5,000, with
reduced maintenance payable by H. On appeal the property was ordered
to be held on trust for sale in equal shares with the sale delayed for five
years, with maintenance being increased from the original order. W
appealed and the Court of Appeal agreed that postponing the sale would
result in both parties being potentially homeless as the sale would not
produce sufficient equity to fund the purchase of a home. H was in a
better financial position regarding the future compared to W and hence
the proper order would be for the matrimonial home to be transferred
outright to W with a reduced maintenance order being made.
Other cases of interest include Mortimer v Mortimer-Griffin [1986] 2 FLR
315 and Knibb v Knibb [1987] 2 FLR 396.
There are advantages to property adjustment orders; they will achieve
certainty, and enable a clean break to be achieved in so far as housing is
concerned. However, there are the following difficulties:
• the introduction of the Child Support Acts (CSAs) in 1991 and 1995
means that it is virtually impossible to offset maintenance for children
against a capital transfer;
• the party gaining the property may not be in a position to pay back
a lump sum or may be unable to get a loan or mortgage to do so;
and
• the party in receipt of the charge-back will have to wait, potentially
some considerable time, before being able to benefit from the property.
(c) The court may settle the property on one party until a specified event
occurs and establish the division of proceeds for when this event
happens. This often used to be set at the date that the youngest child of
the family reaches 18 years or leaves full-time education. Orders of this
type are called Mesher orders. Whilst it is common for a Mesher order to
reflect the children’s situation, the specified event may be the wife’s
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subsequent cohabitation or marriage, or death if neither of the former
occurs. As you can see, this is quite a flexible order.
A major criticism of the Mesher order, and one of the reasons why it has
lost favour with the courts, is the fact that it merely delays the time when
the parties will have to consider rehousing themselves. If the order is to last
until the youngest child reaches 18, and then the property is to be sold, the
wife may find herself, literally, without a roof over her head, and if the
equity is insufficient to rehouse her. In addition, by virtue of the time
delay, she may be unable to obtain employment as her role as carer of the
children may reduce her earning capacity, again impacting upon the ability
to obtain a mortgage. The order also ignores the fact that many children do
not leave home when they reach 18 and the home may still be needed for
the wife and children. If the event specified is cohabitation or re-marriage,
it may be the case that the new partner is not financially able to support the
wife, and children of that relationship if there are any. Again, it would
seem unfair for a wife to have to continue to support the children but with
the loss of the property. Finally, you should have noted that the Mesher
order does not accord with the principle of the clean break. Some of these
disadvantages were raised in Hanlon v Hanlon (above).
The impact of the CSAs 1991 and 1995 has also affected the potential
use of this order. It has been suggested that the Mesher order may come
back into favour since it can run alongside the husband’s continuing
obligation to his children under the CSAs 1991 and 1995. Given the inability
to utilise clean breaks to offset child maintenance, the Mesher order may be
preferred.
4.5 HOW WILL THE COURT REACH ITS DECISION?
The court will need to have regard to the criteria set out in the MCA 1973,
which you will look at shortly. However, the court operates in a pragmatic
manner and, as you have seen from the types of orders that can be made, can
act without necessarily having regard to who owns what in a legal sense.
The best explanation of the court’s approach was by Lord Denning MR in
Hanlon v The Law Society [1981] AC 124, where he stated (at p 147):
[The law] takes the rights and obligations of the parties all together and puts
the pieces into a mixed bag. Such pieces are the right to occupy the matrimonial
home or to have a share in it, the obligation to maintain the wife and children,
and so forth. The court then takes out the pieces and hands them to the two
parties – some to one party and some to the other – so that each can provide for
Question
What are the disadvantages?
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the future with the pieces allotted to him or to her. The court hands them out
without paying any too nice a regard to their legal or equitable rights but
simply according to what is the fairest provision for the future, for mother and
father and the children ...
The House of Lords decision in White v White [2000] 3 WLR 1571, covered in
depth later, has added a gloss to this notion of ‘fairest provision’ by reference
to the ‘presumption of equality’ elucidated by Lord Nicholls. This does not
mean that spouses, on divorce, will automatically share the assets, but
simply that there must be close consideration of the statutory criteria to
establish how close to equality the award will be.
4.5.1 The statutory criteria
When the court is making decisions with regard to property and financial
claims the MCA 1973 provides a checklist of factors to assist the court in
making its decision. The factors are not prescriptive, nor is the list
exhaustive. You should also remember that more often it is the legal advisers
who will be considering the checklist because the court’s role should be kept
to the minimum. The Solicitors Family Law Association’s Code of Practice
works on the basis that the legal adviser will endeavour to deal with matters
in a non-antagonistic and non-confrontational manner. Court action is
perceived to heighten emotions and often to be contrary to the clients’
respective needs – it does not promote good future relationships. This is not
to say that court action should never arise, in some cases the only option will
be to go to court. It is also important to note that the court will also question
the need for its involvement if the issue in dispute is not very significant.
Increasingly, the court is critical of parties who litigate and incur costs to
such an extent that most of the assets are eaten up – the antithesis of the aim
of family lawyers.
Section 25 of the MCA 1973 sets out the factors for the courts
consideration thus:
(1) It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers
under sections 23, 24 or 24A ... to have regard to all the circumstances of the
case, first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any
child of the family who has not attained the age of 18.
(2) As regards the exercise of the powers of the court ... in relation to a party to
the marriage, the court shall in particular have regard to the following
matters –
(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources
which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the
foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity any
increase in that capacity which it would in the opinion of the court be
reasonable to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire;
(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the
parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
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(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of
the marriage;
(d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;
(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;
(f) the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the
foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any
contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family;
(g) the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would
in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it;
(h) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value
to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit (for example, a
pension) which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the
marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring.
4.5.2 Section 25(1): an overview
This sub-section reflects the non-exhaustive nature of the list that follows in
s 25(2). It also highlights the importance of children of the family and this,
again, can be linked with the priorities of the CSAs 1991 and 1995, which
include the duty of a parent to maintain their child. It also emphasises the
notion that a parent may be able to divorce their spouse, but not their child.
However, you should note that the child’s welfare is not the court’s
paramount consideration, but only the first consideration.
Also part of the consideration of ‘all the circumstances of the case’ is the
desire of the court to provide ‘fairness’ to the parties in the event of divorce.
As you will see, fairness will not mean granting equality, although many
cases will refer to the principle of equality when looking at whether the
award is fair. Fairness requires the court to investigate the s 25 factors
thoroughly; this will reduce the scope for precedent in this area of the law.
General principles may apply from one case to another, but the fact that each
family situation is different means that only the general trends can be
followed, detailed amounts cannot.
Fairness and equality appear to have replaced the judicial debate on the
starting point for financial and property division. In the past, the court has
held that it was appropriate for the starting point for division of finances and
property, before considering any plus or minus factors from s 25, to be two-
thirds of the assets to the husband and one-third to the wife.
Question
From looking at the above list, are there any factors you think are
unnecessary? If so, why?
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The one-third rule, now clearly inapplicable, was adopted because,
according to Lord Denning MR in Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] Fam 72:
[T]he husband will have to go out to work all day and get some woman to look
after the house – either a wife ... or a housekeeper ... The wife will not usually
have so much expense ... she will do most of the housework herself ... Or she
may remarry, in which case her new husband will provide for her ...
That this attitude has not prevailed is perhaps understandable in today’s
society!
So now a 50:50 division may just as easily be seen as the appropriate
starting point before adding and subtracting the s 25 factors. The important
thing to note is that the recent case law is simply looking at the different weight
to be attached to the various factors to be considered, not seeking to replace
s 25, despite the fact that s 25 is seen as being a poor tool to use in today’s
divorce regime.
In White v White, H and W, who had divorced, had been considered by
the court as ’equal partners’ throughout their 33-year marriage, during
which they had managed a very prosperous farming business. H’s father had
made a large contribution to the finances of the farm in its early years. In an
application for ancillary relief W had received 40% of the total property. H
had argued that this was an overgenerous award because it represented
much more than W’s financial needs within the meaning of s 25 of the MCA
1973, even if financial needs were to be interpreted as ‘reasonable
requirements’ (see Dart v Dart [1996] 2 FLR 286). H appealed and W cross-
appealed, contending that the resources ought to have been divided equally.
The appeal and the cross-appeal were dismissed by the House of Lords.
The House of Lords took the view that although there was no presumption of
equal division, the principle of equality ought to be departed from only if and
to the extent that there was good reason for doing so. A judge would be well-
advised to check, prior to reaching their decision, their tentative views against
the yardstick of equal division. The financial needs of the parties, even when
considered as ‘reasonable requirements’, were not to be considered
determinative; they constituted only one of the factors to be taken into account.
H and W had built up a sound business partnership in which W had looked
after the family and the home and H had concentrated on business matters.
Where, as in this case, assets exceeded financial needs of both parties there
could be no justification for considering W’s share as reflecting her actual
needs while H was to be allowed to keep any surplus assets. Attention would
be paid to the contribution made by H’s father and to W’s express wish that
she might be able to make appropriate provision in her will for the children.
Per Lord Nicholls:
Question
Can you think why these fractions were cited?
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Confusion might be avoided if the courts were to cease using the expression
‘reasonable requirement’ in cases of this type. There is much to be said for a
return to the language of the statute. This would not deprive the courts of the
necessary degree of flexibility. The end product of the court’s assessment of
financial needs should be seen and treated for what it was, namely, only one of
the several factors to which the court was to have regard.
4.5.3 Resources and earnings
As you have seen, s 25(2)(a) relates to the resources that each party to the
marriage has, whether it be income, property, earning capacity, or resources
that the parties will conceivably have in the future. While the current assets
and earning capacity should be easy to establish, subject naturally to the
party’s co-operation, the future earning capacity requires a court to gaze into
its crystal ball.
Dealing first with disclosure and establishing the existing financial and
property assets, parties are under a duty to make a full disclosure of assets
and liabilities, and not just in contested cases but also where the court is
being asked to endorse an agreement by way of a consent order. Failure to
disclose leads to delay, extra cost and the possibility of later appeals, so is
certainly not approved of!
In Livesey (Formerly Jenkins) v Jenkins [1985] 2 WLR 47, W was granted a
decree nisi on 1 March 1982, made absolute on 14 April. On 12 August 1982
solicitors for H and W agreed on a consent order for property adjustment
and financial provision. H’s half-share in the matrimonial home would be
transferred to W, subject to her accepting future responsibility for the
existing mortgage. On 18 August 1982 W became engaged to X, a matter
which had not been disclosed to anyone. On 2 September 1982 a consent
order was made by the registrar. On 22 September 1982, H conveyed his
half-share to W. On 24 September 1982 W remarried. H became aware of this
and on 3 April 1983 made an application for leave to appeal out of time and
for the order to be set aside. H’s appeal was dismissed, as was a further
appeal to the Court of Appeal. H appealed to the House of Lords. The House
of Lords held that H’s appeal would be allowed. The discretion of the court
could not be exercised properly under s 25(1) of the MCA 1973 unless the
court had been provided with information which was correct and up to date.
H and W were under a clear duty to make a complete disclosure of all
material facts to each other and to the court. Furthermore, that principle
applied also to any exchanges of information leading to consent orders. W’s
remarriage ought to have been disclosed: it was one of the ‘circumstances’
mentioned in s 25(1). Because it was not disclosed, the consent order would
have to be set aside.
Another useful case on this point is Rose v Rose [2003] EWHC 505 (Fam).
Looking now at the crystal ball gazing the court will undertake, this
primarily affects women who may be expected to return to the work force.
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However, you should not disregard the potential increases in men’s salaries
through promotion, etc.
The courts appear to recognise the difficulties for a woman when it comes to
returning to the workplace given the nature of the economy, both in terms of
availability of employment and the income that a woman can generate, but
still feel able to make judgments on quantification of earnings. Statistics
show that more women will work on a part-time basis than men, with the
resultant reduction in earning capacity and long term benefits. This is
especially so if the woman has care of any children. A factor that seems to be
ignored by the judiciary (perhaps because the majority of judges are men,
one could suggest) is the difficulty of working as a single parent. Many
employers do not operate on a sufficiently flexible basis to accommodate
employees’ needs for time off work to deal with children’s illnesses, or
school holidays. However, the courts do take into account the problems of
retraining and lack of skills that women may have.
There are a range of cases that illustrate this point; for example, in M v M
(Financial Provision) [1987] 2 FLR 1, W had, before her marriage, worked as a
secretary but had only done limited part-time work during the marriage.
After 20 years of marriage, and following the divorce, the court felt that,
even with training, W would be unable to achieve anything other that a low
grade secretarial position since she lacked crucial skills and experience.
Again, in Leadbeater v Leadbeater [1985] FLR 789, the court felt it was not
reasonable to expect W to familiarise herself with modern technology after
several years of part-time employment, but that it was reasonable to expect
her to increase her part-time hours. Finally, in Hardy v Hardy [1981] 2 FLR
321, the court assessed H’s ability to pay maintenance to W not on his actual
salary but on the salary H could have obtained on the open market, as H
worked for his father at ‘reduced rates’.
Crystal ball gazing may also include examining aspects of potential
inheritance for one of the parties. If it is expected that a party will inherit
property or assets in the near future the court may take this into account.
This also raises the issue of what resources can be considered. What should
happen if a marriage has broken down several months or years earlier and
then one spouse inherits after the breakdown, but before a divorce?
Question
Should these assets, acquired after marriage breakdown, be excluded
from the ‘matrimonial pot’?
Question
How easy is it for women to return to the workforce? What difficulties
may they face?
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It may seem a little unfair to take account of a windfall gained after
breakdown; after all it is not a matrimonial asset. Unfortunately for the
recipient, the court can take into account any resources, whether gained pre-
or post-breakdown, if obtained before the ancillary proceedings.
In Schuller v Schuller [1990] 2 FLR 193, H and W were married in 1956 and
separated in 1977 when W left the matrimonial home to keep house for an
elderly friend, X. In 1987 a decree absolute was granted. On X’s death W
inherited his flat, which was worth £130,000. She became a residuary
beneficiary of X’s estate, which was valued at £5,000. H remained in the
matrimonial home, worth £127,500 with an outstanding mortgage of some
£5,000. W contended that X’s flat was an after-acquired asset which was not
related to the marriage in any way and which ought not to be taken into
account. W appealed against a lump sum order awarded on the basis of a
‘clean break’. W’s appeal was dismissed. W appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The court held that W’s appeal would be dismissed. The word ‘resources’
in s 25 of the MCA 1973 was not qualified in any way; it could not, therefore,
be limited in any way. The court had to approach the matter of parties’ assets
realistically; all available assets based on real figures must be taken into
account. Neither the registrar nor the judge had been in error in treating W’s
after-acquired assets in the way they did; the flat was a highly relevant factor
in their decision.
In White v White [2000] 3 WLR 1571, however, the House of Lords did
take into account the fact that some of the assets held by H did in fact result
from a transfer from H’s father. Consequently, it was deemed inappropriate
to transfer these assets to W.
4.5.3.1 New partners
With regard to new partners, on a general level the court will take into
account any assets or earnings that the new partner possesses when deciding
on maintenance for the first spouse. However, this is not to say that a second
partner will be made to pay maintenance to the former spouse. The court
approaches the matter by asking, ‘to what extent does the second partner’s
financial situation free up the income and assets of the spouse?’. To give you
an example, in the case of Martin v Martin [1977] 3 All ER 762, H had
commenced cohabitation with another woman, intending to marry. H lived
in his new partner’s council house, the tenancy of which could be transferred
to them jointly. When the ancillary matters were decided, the court took
account of the availability of accommodation for H and treated it as a
resource of his own. Consequently, the wife was awarded a life interest in
the former matrimonial home.
Question
To what extent do you think the court will take into account the earnings
of a new partner when dealing with ancillary matters?
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It is potentially easier for the court to assess resources where the asset in
question is property rather than earnings. While the court can consider a new
partner’s financial status, this new partner cannot be compelled to give precise
details of their economic position in writing but they may be required to give
evidence in court. The danger of new partners making no disclosure is that the
court will make assumptions about the wealth or otherwise of the partner.
4.5.4 The financial needs, obligations and responsibilities
These three categories are not synonymous but all have to be balanced in so
far as is possible. The main need, in the majority of cases, will be to rehouse
the parties and to ensure that any children are adequately provided for.
There is, of course, a possible conflict if there are two families that need
providing for, a fact that will need to be taken into account although the
child support legislation may make important inroads here. The MCA 1973,
due to the manner of its interpretation by the court, permits the husband to
maintain his second family as a first priority and his prime responsibility,
thereby reducing his capacity to support his first family. It is suggested,
however, that while the needs of, and obligation to, a new family may result
in a reduction in maintenance to the first wife, it may not significantly reduce
the maintenance payable to the children under the CSAs 1991 and 1995.
4.5.4.1 What is the test of ‘need’?
For the purposes of the MCA 1973 the needs of a party will be considered
subjectively, that is, what does this party need, having regard to the
financial status of the parties? Need is, therefore, relative and a rich spouse
will ‘need’ a more expensive lifestyle than a poor one, although the courts
do draw the line somewhere – even if the family has been well off, claims
for maintenance to include top of the range cars, holiday homes in Florida,
etc will be looked at carefully. In Leadbeater v Leadbeater, W claimed that
she needed a three-bedroomed property and around £20,000 to furnish it.
H had claimed the property was too large and also in an area that was
too upmarket. H had offered the sum of £6,000 to furnish the property.
The court held that W’s reasonable needs required a two bedroomed
property and £10,000 to furnish it. In Dart v Dart, the Court of Appeal
was faced with a dispute in what is often called a ‘big money case’. H’s
assets were more than sufficient to meet the claim from W. The parties
had enjoyed a lavish lifestyle during the marriage and following
the divorce W sought an order for in the region of £122 million together
with a property in the US. When assessing W’s needs the court held that
Question
How would you determine need? Would you apply a subjective or
objective test?
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needs should be taken to mean the reasonable requirements of the spouse
seeking the order. Once those reasonable needs, founded upon the
consideration of W’s need for a home, provision for the children and
lifestyle, had been met there was nothing in the MCA 1973 to justify further
capital distribution.
Even where the couple is of more modest means, the matter will still
need to be assessed on a subjective basis, although more notice will need to
be taken of the actual financial standing of the couples in question.
4.5.4.2 How are needs calculated: what is the starting point?
As indicated earlier, the court often wants to have a ‘starting point’ for the
distribution of assets. The one-third rule was highlighted in Wachtel v Wachtel
(above) and the move to an equality based approach was seen through cases
such as Burgess v Burgess [1996] 2 FLR 34 (not extracted) and White v White
(above).
However, while it is often advantageous to have some sort of starting
point in the assessment of needs and division of assets, the court cannot
fetter itself by applying a blanket formula. (You may want to compare this
with the approach taken in cases under the child support legislation.) In the
three cases mentioned, the court was able to use other factors from s 25 to
justify the distribution that was made, rather than simply ‘equality’.
Insofar as needs are concerned, White v White does highlight the view that
where the assets are more than sufficient to meet needs there should be no
reason why the husband is permitted to keep the excess after a wife’s
reasonable needs have been met. It appears that the court is clearly moving
away from the view in Dart v Dart (above). In the White case, the House of
Lords, per Lord Nicholls, felt that:
[where the] husband and wife by their joint efforts over many years, him
directly in his business and hers indirectly at home, have built up a valuable
business from scratch, why should the claimant wife be confined to the court’s
assessment of her reasonable requirements, and the husband left with a much
larger share? Or, to put the question differently, in such a case, where the assets
exceed the financial needs of both parties, why should the surplus belong solely
to the husband?
This argument does seem to make sense, although this is only applicable
where assets are extensive – it would not apply necessarily to Mr and Mrs
Average.
4.5.5 Section 25(2)(c), (d) and (e): the standard of living, the age
of the parties, the duration of the marriage and physical
and mental disabilities
The criteria covered in these three sub-sections can be taken together, since they
are not problematic. Indeed, these criteria should have been identified by you
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as being potentially unnecessary when you first considered the s 25 checklist.
However, by specifically raising them as considerations it ensures that relevant
factors are not overlooked by the courts.
4.5.5.1 The standard of living
It has long been recognised that normally one household cannot be divided
into two and result in the parties enjoying the same standard of living. The
court is only required to see what standard of living was in existence during
the marriage, and this will affect the consideration of each party’s relative
needs under s 25(2)(b) above.
4.5.5.2 Age of the parties and duration of the marriage
Again, you should see how these two considerations reflect other factors
in the checklist. The age of the parties and the duration of the marriage
will affect the assets that the parties have available and will also
reflect their ability to seek employment, rehouse themselves and meet their
needs.
4.5.5.3 Physical or mental disability
If one party has either a physical or mental impairment, the same arguments
as raised above concerning ability to gain employment and rehousing will
arise. The individual’s ability to become more self-sufficient may be limited
and their needs may be considerably greater. Therefore, this factor could
easily be subsumed into the others.
4.5.6 Contributions made to the marriage
There are many contributions that are relevant – the sub-section itself refers
to contributions to the welfare of the family and these will include looking
after the home and the family. Principally, this is directed at the ‘housewife’
who should not be at a disadvantage from not working in the public
economic sphere. As Lord Simon of Glaisdale expressed it: ‘The cock bird
can feather his nest precisely because he is not expected to spend most of his
time sitting on it’ (With All My Worldly Goods, 1964, Holdsworth Club).
Once more, there is an overlap between this factor and s 25(2)(a) and (b).
While the sub-section highlights time spent caring for the family, other
contributions, perhaps helping build up a family business, can be included
under this head. In many cases, however, this latter type of action would
also be referred to under the next sub-section.
Question
What sort of contributions will be relevant here?
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What is certain following White v White is that contributions will become
far more important in future cases. The cases that have come before the
courts post-White have illustrated this; but it is important to note that the
parties’ skills in creating monetary wealth have seemed to predominate,
emphasising the business skills over and above the homemaking skills of the
wife. In the case of Cowan v Cowan [2001] EWCA Civ 679, [2001] 3 WLR 684,
the husband’s business skills were described as ‘stellar’, hence justifying an
unequal distribution in the husband’s favour. In Lambert v Lambert [2002]
EWCA 1685, the court (Thorpe LJ) stated that:
The authority of Cowan v Cowan cannot be elevated nearly as high ... the danger
of gender discrimination resulting from a finding of special financial
contribution is plain. If all that is regarded is the scale of the breadwinner’s
success then discrimination is almost bound to follow since there is no equal
opportunity for the homemaker to demonstrate the scale of her comparable
success.
And hence that:
If the decision of this court in Cowan ... has indeed opened ... a forensic
Pandora’s Box then it is important that we should endeavour to close and
lock the lid.
Whether the judgment of Thorpe LJ will be successful in reducing the
forensic evaluation of business skills has not been thoroughly tested, but
there does appear to be less reference to it in the reported cases. In Parra v
Parra [2002] EWCA Civ 1886, H and W had been married for 20 years and
had two children attending fee paying schools. W had been rehoused with
the proceeds of the sale of the former matrimonial home and H was living in
a property related to H’s business. The original order left W with 54% of the
overall assets and H with 46% and H was to be responsible for the children’s
school fees. On H’s appeal, the court held that throughout the marriage the
parties had arranged their financial affairs so as to be equal and the court
could see no reason why this equality should not be maintained following
divorce since there was nothing that would suggest fairness between the
parties required reordering. Hence, W’s lump sum was reduced. In GW v
RW (Financial Provision: Departure from Equality) [2003] EWHC 611 (Fam),
most of the assets had been accumulated from savings, not through business-
making ventures. H had raised the argument of ‘special contribution’ to
justify an unequal division between H and W. The court stated: ‘The class of
case where a special contribution can now be taken into account must be
very narrow indeed.’ In paragraph 46 of his judgment, Lambert Thorpe LJ
stated:
However for the present, given the infinite variety of fact and circumstance, I
propose to mark time on a cautious acknowledgement that special contribution
remains a legitimate possibility but only in exceptional circumstances. It would
be both futile and dangerous to even attempt to speculate on the boundaries of
the exceptional ... Certainly the mere fact of making a large amount of money
cannot of itself demonstrate the existence of a special contribution.
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4.5.7 The conduct of the parties
Under the MCA 1973, conduct will be taken into account when it is such that
it would be inequitable to disregard it.
Both positive and negative conduct has been considered by the courts under
s 25(2)(g) of the MCA 1973. In Wachtel v Wachtel it was held that conduct
would only be taken into account to reduce a financial award if the conduct
were ‘both obvious and gross’ (per Lord Denning, at p 835). The difficulty for
the courts would otherwise be that a full investigation into who was
responsible for the breakdown, or whose conduct was worse, would be
needed. This would also be contrary to the ethos of the MCA 1973 and ‘fault
free divorce’. It is not the case that only conduct leading to the breakdown of
the marriage will be considered. A husband’s reckless dissipation of assets
has been classed as ‘conduct that was inequitable to disregard’, but generally
there will be some link to the breakdown.
In J v S-T (Formerly J) (Ancillary Relief) 3 WLR 1287, the defendant (D), a
transsexual male who had been born a female, had concealed his true gender
from the registrar and his ‘wife’ (the plaintiff (P)) for some 17 years. The true
facts became known to P only when she examined D’s birth certificate. A
decree of nullity was granted in 1994 and D applied for ancillary relief
(periodical payments and a property adjustment order). P then challenged
D’s right to apply. In January 1996, the judge held that D was debarred from
continuing the claim for ancillary relief on the ground that it was contrary to
public policy. D appealed.
The court held that D’s claim would be dismissed. Sir Brian Neill stated
that, in the exercise of the court’s discretion under s 25(1) of the MCA 1973, it
was legitimate to take into account principles of public policy. The applicant
(D) had been guilty of a serious crime (perjury) and had practised deception
of a grave nature on P; these matters constituted relevant circumstances
which were to be taken into account. It was possible to make the necessary
assumptions of hardship in D’s favour. P was very rich, whereas D had
nothing except assets given by P and, perhaps, an equitable interest in the
sale of the matrimonial home; but, no court could, in the proper exercise of
its discretion, grant ancillary relief of the kind claimed by D. D’s conduct at
the time of the marriage ceremony (when he described himself as ‘a
bachelor’), when judged by principles of public policy, tipped the scales in a
decisive fashion against the grant of any relief.
In Beach v Beach [1995] 2 FLR 160, [1995] 2 FCR 526, H and W
were involved in farming although this did not prosper. The parties agreed
that W would receive £450,000 from the sale of the farm to meet her claim
under the MCA 1973 for ancillary relief. H failed to sell the farm and was
Question
When will that be likely to happen? What sort of conduct will it be?
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declared bankrupt leading to W receiving less that the agreed sum. H
claimed a lump sum from W. The court held that H’s claim should fail. Per
Thorpe J:
The history is a financial tragedy, and one of the ingredients of that tragedy is
the wife’s forbearance. Time and time again, she was talked round. Had the
farm been sold in 1983, there would have been money. Had the farm been sold
in 1989, there would have been substantial money ... I think Miss Ralphs is fully
entitled to suggest that the husband’s conduct amounted to conduct which it
would be inequitable to disregard. He obstinately, unrealistically and selfishly
tailed on to eventual disaster, dissipating in the process not only his money but
his family’s money, his friends’ money, the money of commercial creditors
unsecured and eventually his wife’s money ... The responsibility is, in my
judgment, not shared, not hers, but his.
4.5.8 The loss of future benefits, especially pensions
The matrimonial home is normally perceived to be the largest matrimonial
asset that a couple will possess. Today, with the growth of company pensions
and private pensions, more couples will find themselves with another major
asset, that is, a pension. Although sub-s 25(2)(h) of the MCA 1973 does not
concentrate purely on pensions, these provide the focus of this section.
Under the MCA 1973, the loss of benefit could be dealt with by
compensating the loser in another manner. Lump sum orders should spring
to mind as possible remedies. This might not be an option if, for example, the
husband does not have sufficient capital assets. The making of a property
transfer order, giving all the equity in the home to the wife, may also be
possible subject to the husband’s ability to rehouse himself. In some
situations the compensation has taken the form of an annuity
4.5.8.1 The Pensions Act 1995
Until the introduction of this Act and its amendments to the MCA 1973, the
scope for the court to intervene with pension rights per se was limited. A
pension fund had been divided between divorcing spouses in the case of
Brooks v Brooks [1995] 2 FLR 13, but the circumstances of the fund itself had
been unusual in this case. This uniqueness had enabled the court to hold the
pension fund as being a post-nuptial settlement and, hence, capable of
reallocation under the MCA 1973.
In addition to the powers of the court to make adjustment for pensions in
the ways outlined above, the 1995 amendments introduced the concept of
pension ‘earmarking’ or ‘pension attachment’ with regard to the pension
Question
How might a court deal with potential loss of a benefit such as a pension?
77
itself. Under s 25B(4) of the MCA 1973, if the court makes a s 23 order it can
require the pension fund trustees or managers to make payments from the
fund to the non-fundholder. These payments may be periodical or lump sum,
and are dependent on the type of pension fund benefits for the fundholder. In
effect this power permits the court to divide future pension benefits between
the parties, albeit only one has contributed. Problems do exist; what is the
situation if the fundholder dies before the beneficiary where the pension has
not ‘kicked in’; can the court do anything if the fundholder simply stops
paying in to the fund and starts another pension fund elsewhere; can the
fundholder prevent the court taking the pension value as a whole if a large
proportion of the fund was built up prior to the marriage?
A further order in respect of pensions was introduced in December 2000
due to the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999, although the plans for the
order were first mooted in the Family Law Act 1996. The order introduced is
for pension sharing which differs from ‘attachment’ in that the pension fund
will be split into shares and the shares allocated to each party. Sharing
pensions in this manner would prevent some of the problems identified with
attachment: a shared pension may be transferable to other pension providers
and it will not disappear on the death of the fundholder and provides
fairness in that contributions after divorce will benefit the individual making
the payments. The extent to which this order is being used is unclear, but it
has added to the range of options available to reach the fairest outcome. The
difficulty with the expansion of options is that if a couple are mediating on
their divorce settlement, without the aid of legal advice, they may fail to take
pension assets into account. Not only is this a problem, but so too is
establishing the value of the pension fund.
4.5.9 The clean break
As you have read earlier, the clean break provisions were introduced due to
the need to encourage ex-spouses to be independent and also self-sufficient
after divorce. When a court is exercising its powers under the MCA 1973, it is
under a duty imposed by s 25A to consider if financial obligations can be
ended immediately or at some time in the future. This fits with the notion
that a divorce should end the empty shell of a marriage and allow the
individuals to move on to another life without any ties from the relationship.
Some of the orders you have studied in this chapter are naturally suited to
this concept.
If the court does not feel that the parties can be financially independent,
despite the wide range of orders available, it may believe that this
Question
Which of the orders that you have looked at support the concept of a
clean break?
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independence will be possible in the future. Consequently the court can,
under sub-s (2) of s 25A, make a periodical payments order for a specified
period of time. At the end of this period the payments may end
automatically without the possibility of the recipient seeking a continuance.
The court can, and often will, impose a prohibition upon the right to obtain a
continuation of the order under the provisions of s 28 of the MCA 1973. In
some cases this prohibition is not placed on the order. If so, a further
application for maintenance can be made.
You should note that following McFarlane v McFarlane and Parlour v
Parlour [2004] EWCA Civ 872, these periodical payments can be ordered to
enable the recipient to build up capital which will then mean a clean break is
feasible in the future.
4.6 WHEN WILL THE ORDERS BE MADE?
Under the MCA 1973, financial and property orders are normally made after
the decree of divorce has been made absolute (final). These ancillary
proceedings may take quite some time to conclude in comparison with the
speed with which an agreed divorce can be granted.
4.7 PREVENTING OR DELAYING THE DIVORCE
4.7.1 Preventing the divorce
Under the MCA 1973 there is a possibility of preventing the divorce from
being made absolute, or of delaying it, to enable financial matters to be settled.
Under s 5 of the MCA 1973 the court can refuse to grant the divorce where:
... the respondent to a petition ... in which the petitioner alleges five years’
separation may oppose the grant of a decree on the ground that the dissolution
of the marriage will result in grave financial or other hardship ... and it would
be wrong in all the circumstances to dissolve the marriage.
Financial hardship must relate to the ending of the marriage, not the fact of
separation. As you have seen, in the previous chapter, it is unlikely that
financial hardship will succeed to prevent divorce since the court has
considerable powers to deal with the financial aftermath of separation. If
‘other hardship’ is cited, again this is unlikely to be successful. The cases of
Le Marchant v Le Marchant [1977] 1 WLR 559 and Rukat v Rukat [1975] 2 WLR
201, which you read in Chapter 3, are relevant here.
4.7.2 Delaying the divorce
Again, this provision has been highlighted in the previous chapter but, to
remind you, s 10 of the MCA 1973 provides that where the divorce is
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proceeding on either of the two separation facts, the respondent can apply to
the court for their financial situation to be continued, resulting in the court
being unable to:
... make the decree absolute unless it is satisfied (a) that the petitioner should
not be required to make any financial provision for the respondent, or (b) that
the financial provision made by the petitioner for the respondent is reasonable
and fair or the best that can be made in the circumstances (s 10 (3)).
This is simply a delaying mechanism to ensure that the ancillary relief has
been settled before the divorce is completed.
4.8 VARIATION AND APPEALING OF ORDERS
Variation and appeal of orders are often possibilities in family proceedings,
reflecting the fact that family life can change post-divorce. Variation will
normally only be possible if the orders are of a certain nature and in the
absence (normally) of a clean break.
Two types of situation, which generally give rise to the wish to change the
order made, are as follows:
• a change in circumstances; or
• a lack of full and frank disclosure.
Although s 31 of the MCA 1973 lists all the orders capable of being made by
the court as open to variation or discharge, in reality periodical payments are
most commonly varied and for this reason it is often tactically useful to get a
nominal periodical payment that may be revived at a later date if
circumstances change. If the order was specified for a fixed period of time, as
can be done under the clean break provisions, the court may be prevented
from reopening that arrangement due to the use of the restriction in s 28(1A)
of the MCA 1973.
The criteria to be considered by the court when faced with a variation
application are all the circumstances of the case with first regard being had
to the welfare of children under 18. However, in practice the court will take
into account all the factors of s 25 of the MCA 1973 anew.
In terms of how orders can be varied, the court does have discretion – it
can replace orders with clean breaks, change periodical payments to lump
sums or even grant a property adjustment order.
The parties to the proceedings will have the right to appeal against the
decision made, although any client wishing to do so will need to be advised
Question
Why might someone wish to change the financial order made by the court
or agreed by the parties?
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of the costs involved in so doing. Only if it is clear that the appeal is
warranted should it be attempted. Appeals will lie from the county court to
the Court of Appeal.
Appeals may be based on either a change in circumstances or fraud, with
the latter more likely to be successful. Regardless of the reasons for seeking
the appeal, as with other civil matters, there is only a limited time in which
to do so before leave of the court is required. If an appeal is sought after the
time limit has expired the Court of Appeal will need to grant leave to appeal.
The criteria upon which an appeal out of time will be permitted include that:
• the basis or fundamental assumption underlying the order had been
falsified by a change of circumstances;
• such change had occurred within a relatively short time of the making of
the original order;
• the application for leave was made reasonably promptly; and
• the granting of leave would not prejudice unfairly third parties who had
acquired interests for value in the property affected.
For an application for leave to appeal out of time to be successful, all of the
criteria must be satisfied.
One difficulty with these criteria is the issue of whether they would
apply fully to an appeal out of time where the applicant has discovered that
the other party has been acting in a fraudulent manner by virtue of, say,
failure to disclose.
In Barder v Barder [1987] 2 WLR 293, during divorce proceedings a
consent order was made whereby H would transfer his interest in the
matrimonial home to W absolutely, and periodical payments would be made
to the children. Five weeks later, while the order was not yet in operation, W
killed the children and then committed suicide. At this time the period for
appealing had passed. The sole beneficiary of W’s estate was X, W’s mother.
H’s application for leave to appeal out of time was granted. His appeal was
allowed and the consent order was set aside on the ground that it had been
based on the underlying assumption that W and the children would need the
home for some years ahead. An appeal by X, as intervener, was allowed by
the Court of Appeal. H appealed to the House of Lords.
The House of Lords held that H’s appeal would be allowed. The judge’s
decision had been correct: he had jurisdiction to hear an application for leave
to appeal out of time and he had made the right order. There had been an
implicit and basic assumption by H and W, and their solicitors, that W and
the children would require a house for several years after the making of the
order, but this assumption had been totally invalidated. An order giving
leave to appeal out of time ought to be made only where the appeal, if it
were heard, had a strong likelihood of success, if the supervening event had
happened within a short period after the making of the order, and if the
application had been made promptly. No application for leave to appeal
should be made where it would prejudice a third party who had obtained, in
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good faith and for valuable consideration, an interest in the property which
was the subject of the order in question. These conditions had been fulfilled
in this particular case.
Other cases where appeals have been considered include Vicary v Vicary
[1992] 2 FLR 271 and B v B (Mesher Order) [2002] EWHC 3106 (Fam).
4.8.1 Procedural changes
In an attempt to clarify proceedings in ancillary relief matters, the Ancillary
Relief Protocol has been introduced. This protocol limits the extent of
disclosure, although requests for additional information (with reasons for the
request) will be permissible. The scope for more appeals, or claims against
lawyers for negligence, cannot be ruled out.
4.9 REFORM
While the FLA 1996 raised the issue of change to the procedure for ancillary
relief, the debate arising from the case of White v White has perhaps been
more influential in bringing the current problems with the way in which
the MCA 1973 deals with the question of ancillary relief. This is not to say
that discussions on change have not been taking place elsewhere. For
example, in 1998 Geoff Hoon, MP, raised the possibility of changes to
incorporate the possibility of making pre-nuptial agreements legally
binding. This proposal was followed by including the possibility of binding
pre-nuptial agreements in the government Consultation Paper Supporting
Families in November 1998.
A pre-nuptial agreement is simply an agreement entered into by a couple
prior to their marriage, setting out the ownership of property and financial
assets. These assets may be taken into the marriage or ‘after acquired’
assets such as furniture or other goods bought during the relationship.
These agreements can be entered into now, but the difficulty with them is
that the court will not automatically uphold the agreement, because
without legislation the court’s jurisdiction under the MCA 1973 cannot be
ousted. What the court is likely to do is to use a pre-nuptial agreement
as evidence of intention only, although where the parties’ agreement has
been entered into with the benefit of full understanding and legal advice
the courts will, if considered appropriate, uphold the terms of the
agreement.
Question
What do you understand pre-nuptial agreements to be? What do you
think the court’s attitude would be to enforcing a pre-nuptial agreement?
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In G v G (Financial Provision: Separation Agreement) [2000] FLR 472, H
and W had been married for just over four years. H had a successful
business and was wealthy whilst W had only a modest income. Before the
marriage they signed a pre-nuptial agreement with W undertaking not to
claim against H’s business in the event of separation and with H providing
capital for a property and sums to provide for daily expenses and the
education of W’s children from a previous marriage. Upon separation H
purchased a house for W and provided regular maintenance. W
subsequently sought ancillary relief. The court held that the matter was one
for a clean break and ordered H to pay W a lump sum. Connell J found that
the pre-nuptial agreement was one of the most important factors to be
considered in relation to s 25(1) and s 25(2)(g) of the MCA 1973 – the fact
that the parties had not received legal advice did not affect the
consideration of the agreement. The parties had thought the agreement fair
and there was nothing in the parties’ conduct that would render the
agreement inappropriate for establishing the starting point for resolving
the issue. Connell J did make it clear that the agreement was highly
persuasive but not conclusive of the matter.
To illustrate how far the court has moved on pre-nuptial agreements, in
K v K (Pre-Nuptial Agreement) [2003] 1 FLR 120, H and W had been married
for 14 months. Both were wealthy, W by virtue of a trust fund, H by way of
property dealing. W sought a lump sum of £1.6 million and periodical
payments of £57,000 per annum. Prior to the marriage the couple had
entered into a pre-nuptial agreement. The court upheld the agreement in
relation to the capital element, having posed a series of questions to establish
if the agreement was binding or influential:
• Did W understand the agreement?
• Was W properly advised as to its terms?
• Did H put W under any pressure to sign it?
• Was there full disclosure?
• Was W under any other pressure?
• Did W willingly sign the agreement?
• Did H exploit a dominant position, financial or otherwise?
• Was the agreement entered into in the knowledge that there would be a
child?
• Has any unforeseen circumstance arisen, since the agreement was made,
that would make it unjust to hold the parties to it?
• What does the agreement mean?
• Does the agreement preclude an order for periodical payments to W?
• Are there any grounds for concluding that an injustice would be done by
holding the parties to the terms of the agreement?
• Is the agreement one of the circumstances of the case to be considered
under s 25 of the MCA 1973?
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• Does entry into the agreement constitute conduct which it would be
inequitable to disregard under s 25 of the MCA 1973?
Having considered these points, the court upheld the agreement and, in
addition, periodical payments were ordered (which were not, on the court’s
interpretation, forbidden by the agreement) suggesting, in effect, that the
agreement was treated as being binding rather than being influential.
Whilst pre-nuptial agreements may be a good idea, and certainly
continue the theme of pre-marriage guidance reflected in the consultation
paper, there are difficulties with them.
Any list of difficulties should include things such as:
• the birth of children after the marriage when this was not covered in the
agreement;
• a change in circumstances, whether for better or worse;
• failure to get legal advice before signing the document;
• duress or pressure exerted by one of the parties; and
• undisclosed assets.
All of the above are valid reasons for questioning the contents of a pre-nuptial
agreement and hence the need to keep some form of oversight by the court. In
its Green Paper, Supporting Families: A Consultation Document, the government
set out the situations when a pre-nuptial agreement would not be legally
binding as follows:
• where there is a child of the family, whether or not that child was alive or
a child of the family at the time the agreement was made;
• where under the general law of contract the agreement is unenforceable;
• where one or both of the couple did not receive independent legal advice
before entering the agreement;
• where the court considers that the enforcement of the agreement would
cause significant injustice to one or both of the couple or a child of the
marriage;
• where one of both of the couple have failed to give full disclosure of
assets and property before the agreement was made;
• where the agreement is made less than 21 days prior to the marriage.
These caveats to the enforceability of the agreement are in some cases far too
liberal. For example, surely if a child of the family was already in existence at
the time the agreement was made, the parties would take this into account?
The extent of the exceptions is such that legislation along these lines would
add nothing to the existing situation that has been developed through the
court and would, therefore, be almost meaningless.
Question
What are the problems you can think of?
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4.10 SUMMARY
In this chapter you have covered a great deal of ground. The information
itself is not complicated, although you may feel it is having read so much! It
is important to realise that, where financial settlements are concerned, the
prime objective is to reach a suitable agreement without the need to go to
court. This achieves a better relationship between the parties and also a
reduction of costs. When advising clients, you should always keep the s 25
factors in mind, but the approach must be holistic. You cannot focus purely
on one or two of the factors to the exclusion of others – the approach must
relate to the net effect on the couple. Matrimonial assets that once kept a
family are unlikely to keep two families. You should also remember that,
unless the parties are very well off, no situation will be ideal and invariably
both parties will lose out.
4.11 END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT
Anna and Bob have been married for 18 years and together have built up
a successful business. They have two children: Carmen, 20, and David, 16.
Both children live in the matrimonial home. Carmen is currently finishing
her university degree and David is soon to start college.
Anna has worked in the family business since the time of the
marriage, although she has never received a proper salary. The
matrimonial home is owned jointly in equal shares, although Bob has
been the major contributor financially to the acquisition and upkeep of the
house.
The marriage began to deteriorate several years ago and Bob has been
living in a separate annex to the matrimonial home for the last six years.
Advise Anna on:
(a) her ability to seek a divorce;
(b) the principles the court would apply in assessing her claims for
ancillary relief; and
(c) the types of order the court could make.
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CHAPTER 5
5.1 OBJECTIVES
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
• describe the legislative provisions for obtaining maintenance in the
absence of a divorce or legal separation;
• evaluate the effectiveness of the provisions;
• advise hypothetical clients as to the preferred options;
• discuss the rules relating to occupation of property by virtue of spousal
status;
• outline the factors used by the court to assess property ownership rights
within equity; and
• consider the case for reform of cohabitees’ rights.
Having spent time looking at what happens after divorce, you will now turn
to the position of couples who may part and lead separate lives, but who do
not wish to divorce or separate. Indeed, some couples may utilise the legal
provisions to obtain maintenance or property rights without thinking about
separating at all! As well as financial orders, the rules in relation to property,
both occupation rights and ownership, will be discussed. Many of these
property provisions will be equally relevant to cohabitees and you will also
look at the proposals for legislative reform for cohabitees rights.
5.2 MAINTENANCE WITHOUT DIVORCE
As you will recall there is a common law duty of a spouse to maintain the
other spouse and it is this duty which forms the basis of the existing laws on
maintenance in divorce. However, what happens if a couple do not wish to
divorce but merely prefer to live apart? Should the same rules apply or
should the law recognise this as a different category and provide other
remedies? Is it practicable for spouses to seek to enforce the common law
duty whilst still living with their partner, or do you think that this would
create too much antagonism?
In fact, the law treats the question of maintenance without divorce in
only a slightly different manner to maintenance with divorce. The principles
relating to issue of property are, by contrast, more akin to land law
principles than it is to matrimonial law. If a couple have not separated, there
is nothing, legally, to prevent property claims being made under land law,
provided the criteria for the application can be met. You should note that a
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full discussion of land law principles is beyond the scope of this text – all you
will cover here are the bare bones of the topic.
5.2.1 Claiming maintenance
Spouses are able to seek maintenance under two statutes, the Matrimonial
Causes Act (MCA) 1973, with which you are already familiar, and the
Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act (DPMCA) 1978. Neither
of these Acts is available to cohabitees, and this is an important fact to
remember. Although the general thrust of both Acts is the same, there are
however some subtle differences that must be borne in mind when deciding
which is the most appropriate to use.
5.2.1.1 The MCA 1973
Section 27 of the MCA 1973 allows maintenance to be sought where the
other party has ‘failed to provide reasonable maintenance for the applicant’.
This is the sole trigger factor. When assessing what reasonable maintenance
is, the criteria are in fact the same as for any other maintenance application
under the MCA 1973. Consequently, what you learnt in the previous
chapter is relevant here. A major difference to be aware of is that the court
is only reflecting upon the maintenance situation under s 27; the holistic
approach, which takes in property requirements, does not automatically
apply. If couples are separating without divorce or legal separation, and
they wish to deal with the matrimonial home, land law principles are
applicable.
The types of orders that can be granted, again, are very comparable to
those under s 23 of the MCA 1973. The court can make a periodical payments
order, which may or may not be secured, or a lump sum order (s 27(6)).
There is no set limit on the amount that may be awarded; the court will
assess the ‘reasonableness’ purely on the s 25(2) factors. In addition, lump
sum orders may be made, again with no limit as to amount (s 27(7)). What is
important to remember is that this only covers financial orders.
The orders that can be made under s 27 can be for any term that the court may
specify. Hence, the notion of fixed term payments is clearly anticipated. If a
spouse is merely trying to force the other into paying maintenance, a short term
order may be appropriate. In any event, the court may be loath to grant an
unlimited duration order if the parties are still cohabiting, but a long term order
is not outside the realms of possibility. If an unlimited term order is made, the
only restrictions on duration are set out in s 28(2) which provides that:
Question
How long should the orders last? Would the fact that the couple have not
separated make a difference?
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... where a periodical payments ... order in favour of a party to a marriage is
made otherwise than on or after a grant of [divorce or nullity], and the
marriage is subsequently dissolved but the order continues in force, the order
shall, notwithstanding anything in it, cease to have effect on the remarriage of
that party.
Clearly, the remarriage of one of the parties will not be the only situation
that ends a s 27 order. The couple may resume cohabitation, or maintenance
may be paid more willingly and an application to terminate the order be
made, one of the parties may die or, perhaps less tragically, the couple may
divorce and another order be made in those proceedings. You should note
that the divorce of a couple, which has obtained a s 27 order, does not
automatically end that order.
5.2.1.2 The DPMCA 1978
This is the alternative source of remedies for spouses who seek maintenance
where a divorce is not contemplated. Indeed, this Act is only applicable
where spouses are currently cohabiting or are separated. The criteria in s 1,
which trigger the jurisdiction of the court, are that the other party to the
marriage has:
• failed to provide reasonable maintenance for them;
• has behaved in such a way that the applicant cannot reasonably be
expected to live with the respondent; or
• has deserted the applicant.
When the magistrates are assessing whether to make the order they must
consider the factors in s 3(2) of the DPMCA 1978. These will be familiar to
you since they are the same as the s 25 of the MCA 1973 factors.
The scope of the orders is where the constraints of the DPMCA 1978
become apparent. A court may make both periodical payments and lump
sum orders under s 2 but the court can only make unsecured periodical
payments, whilst those under s 27 of the MCA 1973 may be secured.
Additionally, the magistrates’ powers only extend to the making of a lump
sum order to a total of £1,000. There is no such restriction under the MCA
1973.
In relation to the duration of the order the restrictions included within s 4
of the DPMCA 1978 are the same as for s 27 of the MCA 1973. It is interesting
that the magistrates’ orders can survive divorce when the input this court
has into divorce per se is very small. Unlike the MCA 1973, however, any
order made for periodical payments will cease if the couple remains in, or
recommences, cohabitation for a period in excess of six months (s 25). This is
more logical than the MCA 1973; if the parties are living together, the state
should not have to intervene in this way; it should be for the individuals
themselves to sort out their financial affairs.
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This is the type of question you will need to reflect upon if you intend to
work within the family law. Where there are jurisdictional options for legal
proceedings, the legal adviser must explain the best option for that particular
client. The advantages of using the magistrates’ jurisdiction are that the court
is generally quite quick to deal with the application, the court is often easier
to access since there are more magistrates’ courts than county courts, and the
application will result in lower costs for the client. However, a disadvantage
of the magistrates’ courts is that state funding may not be granted for the
application since it might be perceived to be a simple application where no
legal assistance is warranted (however, it is true to say that in the future with
the restrictions on state funding in all courts this may not be a factor for
consideration).
5.2.1.3 Other orders in the magistrates’ courts
In addition to the orders available under s 1 of the DPMCA 1978 criteria, the
magistrates have a slightly extended jurisdiction by virtue of ss 6 and 7.
Taking s 6 first, this provides the magistrates with the power to make
consent orders (that is, orders when the court accepts an arrangement
reached by the parties themselves and hence not requiring a full contested
hearing). Without this section a consent order could not be made under the
DPMCA 1978. The court is not required to go behind the agreement, merely
to consider whether the making of the order is contrary to the interests of
justice. By implication, this would involve some investigation to ensure that
any provision within the consent order was reasonable.
Section 7 is a very useful section. Under the provisions of s 7 the couple
must have been living apart for more than three months. The court can make
an order, without consent, where one party has paid maintenance to the
other party voluntarily for three months or more. The aggregate amount of
maintenance will dictate the amount that can be ordered (subject to s 7(4)).
So, for example, if the absent spouse has paid £500 in month one, £300 in
month two and £400 in month three, then the maximum award would be
£400 per month, which is the total amount divided by three, that being the
period over which voluntary payments have been made.
There is a proviso in sub-s (4) which is important since the mean amount
may be deemed inadequate by the magistrates. Under this sub-section the
magistrates can treat the application as made under s 2 and, hence, increase
the amount awarded.
Question
Why would you advise a client to use the DPMCA 1978 rather than the
MCA 1973?
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5.2.2 The welfare state
In addition to the MCA 1973 and the DPMCA 1978, the influence of the
social security legislation may be felt. In the event of a couple separating,
and maintenance being unforthcoming, one party is potentially reliant on
welfare benefits. If this is so, under social security legislation the non-
claiming spouse will be classed as a ‘liable relative’ and thus ‘liable to
maintain his wife [and any children of whom he is the father]’. The same
liability applies to a wife. The Benefits Agency may ‘persuade’ the claimant
to apply for maintenance under the MCA 1973 or the DPMCA 1978.
Alternatively, the Benefits Agency may contact the liable relative directly to
request ‘voluntary payments’ to be made. If no maintenance is paid the
Secretary of State has the right to apply in the magistrates’ court for an order
against the non-claiming spouse.
It was explained earlier that the MCA 1973 and the DPMCA 1978 are
not applicable to cohabitees who separate or who do not maintain each
other: the same is not true of the social security provisions. A partner in a
heterosexual relationship who wishes to seek benefit may be prevented
from doing so if the Benefits Agency believes he or she is living in the
‘same household’ as their partner. Only one partner in a heterosexual
couple can claim benefits. The social security legislation implies a
dependency between cohabitees, but if benefits are paid to one partner that
partner cannot legally be ‘forced’ to hand over any money to the partner
unable to claim. This is a clear illustration of how the law currently treats
cohabitees differently and, arguably, may here be acting in a discriminatory
manner.
While you need to know these distinctions, detailed knowledge of
welfare benefits is beyond the scope of this book.
5.3 OCCUPATION RIGHTS AND THE MATRIMONIAL HOME
The right to occupy the matrimonial home is not the same as the right of
ownership, the latter of which you will be considering later in this chapter.
For many spouses (and indeed cohabitees) the matrimonial home will be
owned jointly and, as such, occupation rights will be bound up with rights of
ownership. While joint ownership is more common, there are cases where
only one spouse owns the matrimonial home. For the non-owning spouse
this may cause problems when the relationship ends but divorce is not
contemplated, or perhaps a third party becomes involved, for example, when
a bank forecloses on a mortgage. To ensure some form of protection for the
non-owning spouse, legislation has stepped in to grant rights of occupation.
You need to remember that these rights primarily apply to spouses only and
that cohabitees have more limited rights. You will cover these rights further
when looking at domestic violence.
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5.3.1 The Family Law Act 1996
This is the latest of several Acts designed to provide a non-owning spouse
with rights of occupation in the matrimonial home with the provisions in
ss 30–32 of the FLA 1996 replacing the Matrimonial Homes Act 1983,
although the provisions are substantially the same. This part of the FLA 1996
came into force in October 1997, so has already been in operation for several
years.
Section 30 of the FLA 1996 sets out the rights available – they are only
rights of ‘occupation’ and not of ownership. The occupation derives purely
from the status of marriage, and will only arise where one spouse has no
ownership rights but the other spouse does, these ownership rights being
legal or beneficial (that is, those ownership rights that exist behind the legal
title and arise from principles of equity).
The rights to occupy under the Act mean that the spouse with no
ownership rights can remain in the property and cannot be evicted by the
owning spouse unless the court orders otherwise, or gives the non-owning
spouse the right to be admitted into the property (if already evicted) subject
to the agreement of the court.
5.3.1.1 Seeking an order
If a spouse needs to enforce their rights to occupation under the FLA 1996,
they need to look to s 33 for the relevant order: the ‘occupation order’.
Occupation orders are wide in scope and permit the court to do a variety of
things in relation to the occupation of the matrimonial home, including:
• enforcing the applicant’s entitlement to remain in occupation;
• requiring the respondent to permit the applicant to enter and remain in
occupation;
• regulating the occupation by one or both of the parties;
• prohibiting, suspending or restricting the respondent’s right of
occupation in the home; and
• requiring the respondent to leave the home and/or excluding the
respondent from the vicinity of the home.
Before the courts decide on the appropriate course of action, they must be
certain that the order is warranted.
5.3.1.2 Criteria to be applied
Question
What criteria would you use?
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When considering a s 33(6) application the court must have regard to all the
circumstances of the case, the housing needs and resources of the parties and
relevant children, the financial resources of the parties and any relevant
child, and the effect of any order or decision on the health, safety or well
being of the parties and of any relevant child. In addition, the FLA 1996
requires the court to balance the needs of the applicant in gaining an order
against the potential effects on the defendant. This balance of harm test is set
out in s 33(7) of the FLA 1996. For cases on this area of the law you should
look at the chapter on domestic violence (Chapter 7).
5.3.2 Protecting rights of occupation
The right to occupy premises by virtue of status is, under common law, a
personal right that can be enforced only against the other spouse. This would
have the consequence of making the wife’s position insecure against third
parties. To overcome this difficulty, the FLA 1996 provides that a spouse
with occupation rights can register this right against the title of the property.
If the land is registered, the spouse can place a notice on the Register. If the
land is unregistered, the rights of occupation can be secured by way of a land
charge. Only one property may be subjected to a charge, so if two or
more houses exist, a choice will need to be made before registration occurs
(Sched 4, para 2 of the FLA 1996).
The difficulty for a non-owning spouse in this common situation is that the
mortgagee will have no notice of the wife’s right to occupy. She will not be in
occupation at the time the mortgage is completed, hence her rights are not
capable of overriding or binding those of the mortgage company. The
registration of a charge or notice will only be effective against later creditors.
Despite this limitation it is true to say that, in a failing relationship, it will be
normal for a non-owning spouse to protect their rights of occupation by
registration. This will hopefully prevent or discourage the owner from
selling the matrimonial home or from asking the non-owning spouse to leave
the premises.
Question
Will a notice or land charge protect the non-owning spouse against a
mortgagee granting a mortgage on completion of the purchase?
Question
Other than gaining an occupation order, can these occupation rights be
protected?
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5.4 RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP
Above, we concentrated purely on occupation, which may be nothing more
than a temporary right. The right of ownership is clearly of greater
significance.
Owning property, whether by way of a joint tenancy or a tenancy in
common, is a more permanent arrangement. Alongside the ownership rights
will run rights of occupation. An owner has a stake in the equity (profit) that
is built up within the asset. In times of falling house prices, this benefit may
become the detriment of a share in negative equity. A joint owner may
request an order for the sale of the property from, or be ordered to sell by,
the court under the terms of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees
Act (TLATA) 1996.
A legal interest in land generally has to be created by a deed. Any other
interest in land, which primarily will be an equitable interest, must be
created by a written contract signed by all of the parties (s 2 of the Law of
Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989). However, within the
matrimonial sphere, the situation will sometimes arise where one party has
no legal or equitable interest in accordance with the above principles. If this
is the case, a non-owning spouse may utilise the law of trusts to seek
ownership rights through the means of an informal trust. The same will be
true for cohabitees who do not jointly own property. The question of who
owns property is perhaps less significant for married couples who, as you
have learnt, have the MCA 1973 to fall back on if they divorce. Cohabitees
have to rely on property law, which is less flexible in its approach.
5.5 INFORMAL TRUSTS OF LAND
The term informal trust is being used here to cover resulting and
constructive trusts, both of which may be used to gain a beneficial interest
in property by a legal non-owning party. However, within case law it is true
to say that there is often confusion about the terms to be applied when
describing the vehicle for granting the interest. Lord Diplock, in Gissing v
Gissing [1970] 2 All ER 780, stated that it was unnecessary to distinguish
between which vehicle is used to permit the applicant to gain a right of
ownership. What was more important was establishing whether or not that
interest had arisen because of conduct or words used to induce the
beneficiary to act to their own detriment in the belief that by so acting they
were acquiring a beneficial interest in the land. This is a somewhat cavalier
approach to the matter, but the inaccuracy in terminology has been
Question
Why?
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retained, although some attempts have been made to tighten up the
language.
In Drake v Whipp [1996] 1 FLR 826, Peter Gibson LJ comments on the
types of trusts along the following lines:
• A resulting trust arises where the court presumes what the intention of
the party contributing to the property was. This presumption can be
rebutted.
• A constructive trust arises where the court has evidence of intention as to
the ownership of the property, or this intention can be imputed. There
should also be some act to the detriment of the non-legal owner.
As you can see, the concepts are quite similar, and for many non-owning
spouses the terminology will not matter – all they are concerned about is
getting a share in the property.
5.5.1 Resulting trusts
For Mr and Mrs Average (or Mr and Miss Cohabitee) the idea of buying a
house for the other partner is probably inconceivable. Would you buy a
house for your partner and relinquish all interest in it? The courts do not
differ from this view and will presume a resulting trust. As Lord Browne
Wilkinson states, in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC
[1996] 2 WLR 802:
... where A makes a voluntary payment to B or pays (wholly or in part) for the
purchase of property which is vested either in B alone or in the joint names of A
and B, there is a presumption that A did not intend to make a gift to B; the
money or property is held on trust for A (if he is the sole provider of the
money) or in the case of a joint purchase by A and B in shares proportionate to
their contributions.
5.5.1.1 The presumption of advancement
This presumption can operate to rebut the resulting trust concept. All that
it means is that in certain situations the court will, in the absence of any
other intention, assume that the contributor or purchaser intended the
conveyance to be a gift. The presumption of advancement will only arise
when transfers are made between persons in particular relationships where
equity recognises that the donor is under an obligation to support the
donee.
As you know, the law places spouses under a duty to maintain one another,
and this is the relationship in which equity applies the presumption of
Question
Who do you think would be under such a duty?
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advancement. However, due perhaps to the historical nature of this
presumption, it works only in favour of one of the spouses.
The presumption will only apply where a husband transfers property to his
lawful wife; it does not apply the other way round! Before you all rush off
and reorder your ownership of your matrimonial home, you should be
aware that the presumption can easily be rebutted and does not have the
same strength it did in the past.
In Pettitt v Pettitt [1969] 2 All ER 385, Lord Diplock suggested that the
presumption of advancement is rooted in history, in an age where women
were not economically active and were not permitted to own property.
Therefore, today:
[I]t would ... be an abuse of the legal technique ... to apply to transactions
between the post-war generation of married couples ‘presumptions’ which are
based on intentions of earlier generations ... belonging to ... a different social era.
5.5.1.2 Illegal motivation
In a moral sense, perhaps it would. You may recall the court’s attitude in
cases such as Whiston v Whiston [1995] 2 FLR 268 and J v S-T (Formerly J)
[1997] 1 FLR 402, where a spouse was not permitted to benefit from their
crime. You would assume the same to be true of resulting trusts. However,
this is not necessarily the case, with the court taking the view that all that has
to be established to create a resulting trust was that the transfer took place at
all and that the plan was for the property to be owned jointly.
In Tinsley v Milligan [1993] 3 WLR 126, the parties, two single women,
were in a joint business venture running lodging houses. With the proceeds
of the business, a property was purchased for them to live in, but with the
property being in the sole name of the claimant. The understanding was that
the property would be owned jointly in equity. The reason for this difference
was to enable the respondent to continue to claim social security benefits,
that is, acting fraudulently. After a disagreement between the parties the
claimant sought possession of the property with the defendant
counterclaiming on the basis that the property was held in trust in equal
shares. The court found that the property was held jointly by virtue of a
resulting trust; the fact that there was an illegal purpose was irrelevant. Per
Lord Browne-Wilkinson:
Question
Would an illegal motive prevent a resulting trust?
Question
In whose favour will this presumption work?
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Miss Milligan established a resulting trust by showing that she had contributed
to the purchase price of the house and that there was common understanding
between her and Miss Tinsley that they owned the house equally. She had no
need to allege or prove why the house was conveyed into the name of Miss
Tinsley alone, since that fact was irrelevant to her claim: it was enough to show
that the house was in fact vested in Miss Tinsley alone. The illegality only
emerged at all because Miss Tinsley sought to raise it.
5.5.2 Constructive trusts
The case of Tinsley is one that has elements of a constructive trust, in that
there is evidence of an agreement between the potential joint owners. In
many resulting trusts this evidence has to be implied. However, there are
more factors relevant to proving a constructive trust. In the leading case of
Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1990] 1 AC 107, Lord Bridge cited two situations where
a constructive trust would arise; that is where there:
... has at any time prior to acquisition, or exceptionally at some later date, been
any agreement, arrangement or understanding reached between them that the
property is to be shared beneficially ... Once a finding to this effect is made it
will only be necessary ... to show that he or she acted to his or her detriment or
significantly altered his or her position in reliance on the agreement ...
or where there:
... is no evidence to support a finding of an agreement or arrangement to share
... In this situation direct contributions to the purchase price by the partner who
is not the legal owner, whether initially or by payment of mortgage
instalments, will readily justify the inference necessary to the creation of a
constructive trust. But, as I read the authorities, it is at least extremely doubtful
whether anything less will do.
5.5.2.1 Agreement and reliance
This is the first situation that Lord Bridge stated would give rise to a
constructive trust. In relation to the agreement aspect of the test, the couple
are not necessarily expected to sit down and discuss their agreement in the
language or terms of a land law lawyer or equity judge. The courts
recognise that this is not how Mr and Mrs Average would deal with the
matter.
In Rosset, the wife tried to claim that her participation in the renovation and
decorating equalled detrimental reliance. However, you may have thought
of other things – what about the payment of all household bills, while your
Question
What do you think would equal detrimental reliance?
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partner pays the mortgage? What about the notion of giving up a career to
raise your partner’s children. Would that be sufficient since it would count as
a major contribution if you were divorcing?
Mrs Rosset was unsuccessful in her claim that her actions equalled
detrimental reliance, the court viewing her involvement as something a wife
would naturally do. However financial contributions which enable the ‘legal’
owner to service the mortgage, if taken together with an agreement to share
the property, are more likely to be seen as satisfying the test.
In Grant v Edwards [1986] 2 All ER 426, the parties had had a relationship
for two years, although both were already married. Following the birth of a
son, they decided to live together. A property was purchased in the name of
the defendant who stated that the plaintiff’s name could not be put on the
deed as this would affect her dealings with her husband in divorce
proceedings. The plaintiff contributed, from her earnings, to the household
expenses, kept house and looked after the children. She claimed and equal
share of the property.
The Court of Appeal upheld this claim stating (per Nourse LJ):
... it is clear that there was a common intention that the plaintiff was to have
some sort of propriety interest in 96 Hewitt Road. The more difficult question is
whether there was conduct on her part which amounted to acting on that
intention or, to put it more precisely, conduct on which she could not
reasonably have been expected to embark unless she was to have any interest
in the house.
... it is in my view an inevitable inference that the very substantial contribution
which the plaintiff made out of her earnings ... to the housekeeping and to the
feeding and to the bringing up of the children enabled the defendant to keep
down the instalments payable under both mortgages out of his own income,
and moreover, that he could not have done that if he had had to bear the whole
of the other expenses as well. I do not see how he would have been able to do
that had it not been for the plaintiff’s very substantial contribution to the other
expenses.
It should be noted that the ‘financial contribution’ in Grant was not treated in
the same way as a direct contribution to the purchase price.
5.5.2.2 No agreement but direct contribution
This is the second situation in which a constructive trust will arise. In Rosset
there was no evidence of agreement. Hence, the issue was whether there had
been any contribution to the purchase price from which an intention could
be inferred. As the wife’s activities had had nothing to do with the
purchasing of the property, merely the decorating and maintenance of it, she
could not show direct contributions.
In Rosset, only direct financial contributions seemed to be sufficient to
gain an interest without an express agreement.
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You have already come across the main type of indirect financial
contributions that may result in gaining an interest: the payment of
household bills in order that the other partner can meet the mortgage
payments. It would appear that, provided the payment of the bills is linked
to the inability of the other party to service the mortgage, this may
constitute sufficient indirect detriment sufficient to gain an interest. In
Gissing v Gissing [1970] 3 WLR 255, H and W were married in 1935. The
matrimonial home was purchased by H in 1951 in his sole name. W
obtained a decree absolute in 1966. Although W had made no direct
contribution to the purchase of the matrimonial home, she had spent her
own money on furniture, improvements to the premises and clothes for the
family. W applied by originating summons for an order concerning her
beneficial interest in the home. It was held by the judge that H was the sole
beneficial owner and was entitled, therefore, to possession. The Court of
Appeal reversed the decision and H appealed to the House of Lords. The
House of Lords held H’s appeal would be allowed. It was not possible to
draw from the evidence any inference that H and W had a common
intention that W should have any beneficial interest in the matrimonial
home. Lord Reid stated:
Why does the fact that H agreed to accept these contributions from his wife not
impose a trust on him? There is a wide gulf between inferring from the entire
conduct of the parties that there probably was an agreement, and imputing to
the parties an intention to agree to share even where the evidence gives no
ground for such an inference. If the evidence shows that there was no
agreement in fact, then that will exclude any inference that there was an
agreement. But it does not exclude an imputation of a deemed intention if the
law permits such an imputation. If the law is to be that the court has the power
to impute such an intention in proper cases, then I am content, although I
would prefer to reach the same end in a rather different way. But if it were to
be held to be the law that it must at least be possible to infer a contemporary
agreement in the sense of holding that it is more probable than not there was in
fact some such agreement, then I could not contemplate the future results of
such a decision with equanimity.
Lord Diplock commented:
The picture presented by the evidence is one of husband and wife retaining
their separate proprietary interests in real or personal property purchased with
their separate savings and is inconsistent with any common intention at the
time of purchase of the matrimonial home that the wife, who neither then nor
thereafter contributed anything to its purchase price or assumed any liability
for it, should nevertheless be entitled to a beneficial interest in it.
Question
Would any indirect financial contributions assist?
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5.6 EVALUATING SHARES IN EQUITY
In the above situations, the desired outcome for the non-owning spouse or
partner will be the granting of ownership rights. As you have seen, this will
result in a right to receive any proceeds from the value, or equity, in the
property. However, it is one thing to state that ownership rights exist, but to
what extent or value will that share be? If the non-owning party has
contributed to the property in terms of money (and after Lloyds Bank plc v
Rosset it is likely that this is the only means of evidencing a contribution), then
the starting point will be the proportion of that contribution. The presumption
that this is the correct starting point may be rebutted by any declaration to the
contrary, that is, that the parties have agreed the property will be shared
equally.
In Midland Bank v Cooke [1995] 2 FLR 215, H purchased a house in his
sole name with a mortgage, and in addition by using a wedding gift, and
by drawing on his savings. Later, the mortgage was replaced by a general
mortgage in the bank’s favour so as to secure H’s business overdraft. W
signed a form of consent which effectively gave the bank priority of rights
over her own. The property was then transferred into the joint names of
H and W. Proceedings, claiming payment of £52,000 with possession in
default, were brought by the bank. W contended that her consent
stemmed from H’s undue influence. It was held by the judge that the
bank had been aware of H’s undue influence and that W was not bound
by the signed consent. Furthermore, the judge held that W did possess an
equitable interest in the house, based on her contribution to its purchase,
her contribution having taken the form of her share of the wedding gift.
That interest was considered to be approximately 6% of the house’s value.
W appealed. The court held that W’s appeal would be allowed. When
seeking to evaluate an equitable interest, the court should take into
account the full history of the dealings between parties, relevant to
their ownership and occupation of the property, and their sharing of
burdens and advantages. It ought not to be bound, in arriving at a
decision, by the monetary contributions of H and W where it was possible
to infer some other arrangement relating to shares in the property. Per
Waite J:
It will take into consideration all conduct which throws light on the question of
what shares were intended. Only if that search proves inconclusive will the
court fall back on the maxim ‘equality is equity’.
The judge was wrong in considering W’s share in the property as having been
fixed according to her monetary contribution to the purchase price. Given all
the evidence in the case, there appeared to be the presumed intention that H
and W were to own equal shares in the house. A beneficial half interest would
be granted, therefore, to W.
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5.7 PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL
In many ways, the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is similar to the concepts
within informal trusts, above. The doctrine operates by preventing a person
asserting their legal right (in this case, the legal right of ownership) if it
would be deemed to be unjust to do so. In some situations the courts will use
proprietary estoppel to transfer ownership rights but, in others, a more
contractual approach is taken with tenancies granted instead.
The courts will consider criteria very similar to those in informal trusts,
namely has a party to a relationship acted to their detriment, either by
incurring expenditure or by some other act, in the belief that they own, or
will gain an interest in, the property, with that belief being encouraged by the
true owner?
The position may be complicated by payments to the mortgage loan
being made if there is no express agreement or understanding as to how the
property will be owned. As you have seen, indirect contributions, by way of
payment of bills, may not be sufficient to increase the share of ownership.
This may be particularly so with reference to cohabitees, where the court
may see payments of this kind (or even contributions to the mortgage) as
being nothing more than payments in lieu of rent. The issue reverts to the
question of what was the intention of the parties.
In Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431, the plaintiff was a business man
dealing with property. The defendant, a widow, had declined marriage
when asked by the plaintiff, but had, according to the court, ‘done all that a
wife would do’ – she helped in the business, did the housekeeping, etc. The
plaintiff provided housekeeping to the defendant, but the house, and its
contents, was owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff began a relationship with
another woman. The defendant claimed that she had been told the house
and all its contents were hers, although the plaintiff disputed this. The court
believed the defendant. Cumming-Bruce LJ stated:
The defendant stayed on in the house. She thought it was hers and everything
in it. In reliance upon the plaintiff’s declarations that he had given her the
house ... she spent money and herself did work on redecoration, improvements
and repairs ... We would describe the work done in and about the house as
substantial in the sense that the adjective is used in the context of estoppel. All
the while the plaintiff not only stood by and watched but encouraged and
advised, without a word to suggest that she was putting her money and her
personal labour into his house. What is the effect in equity? ... So the principle
to be applied is that the court should consider all the circumstances, and the
counterclaimant having at law no perfected gift or licence other than a licence
revocable at will. The court must decide what is the minimum equity to do
justice to her having regard to the way in which she changed her position for
the worse by reason of the acquiescence and encouragement of the legal owner.
We take the view that the equity cannot here be satisfied without granting a
remedy which assures to the defendant security of tenure, quiet enjoyment,
and freedom of action in respect of the repairs and improvements without
101
interference from the plaintiff ... [t]his court concludes that the equity to which
the facts in this case give rise can only be satisfied by compelling the plaintiff to
give effect to his promise and her expectations. He has so acted that he must
now perfect the gift.
Other cases that deal with these issues include Coombes v Smith [1986] 1 WLR
808 and Matharu v Matharu [1994] 2 FLR 597.
5.8 THE TLATA 1996
In the previous sections we have been looking at the methods by which to
obtain a legal interest in the matrimonial (or cohabiting) home, and how to
quantify the extent of that interest. This is naturally important if you wish to
sell the property and realise that interest. However, not all separating couples
do wish to sell up. The gaining of a beneficial interest will therefore assist if one
wishes to use the FLA 1996 occupation order provisions, and also provide a
means to protect against third parties. However, these benefits are not really
long term, and to deal with longer term issues the TLATA 1996 will have to be
utilised.
Section 12 of the TLATA provides that if one has a beneficial interest
under a trust (which one will if one has succeeded in persuading the court to
declare an informal trust) one has a right to occupy the property subject to
s 13. This next section, s 13, establishes a trustee’s powers, generally prevents
exclusion of the right to occupy where it is unreasonable and establishes
criteria that the trustees must consider if the right to occupy is to be
restricted. This section also states that if one beneficiary’s rights are
restricted, the trustees can impose conditions, such as the payment of
occupation rent, the payment of mortgage liabilities, etc. Under s 14 the
court, subject to an application being made, can exercise the same powers in
relation to the property as a trustee could have done. What may not have
been obvious to you is the consequence of s 14. Considering cohabitees, if the
female partner has established that, whilst not on the title deed, she has a
beneficial interest, she can (as you will see in the next chapter) seek to protect
her right of occupation by way of the FLA 1996, but this protection may not
last indefinitely. However, she could apply under s 14 of the TLATA 1996 to
obtain a right to exclusive occupation, which need not be time limited. She
may be ordered to pay a rent to her ex-partner or keep up existing payments.
However, do you see how similar this is to some of the orders available
under the MCA 1973 to divorcing couples? Whether by intention or by
oversight, it would appear that separating cohabitees, with beneficial interest
in property, are in an almost identical position to divorcing couples: all that
is different is the Act giving jurisdiction, the case of Drake v Whipp (above)
being illustrative.
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5.9 COHABITEES – FURTHER REFORM?
It is not just the area of land law that provides for cohabitees in a different
way to married couples. As you will no doubt have gathered from your
reading earlier in this chapter, cohabitees cannot utilise legislative provisions
to claim financial support from one another in the event of relationship
breakdown, regardless of any dependency on the other party. Rights may
accrue in the context of death if one cohabitee is clearly dependent upon the
other and they have cohabited for in excess of two years (the Inheritance
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, as amended). In the light of
this perceived discrimination, and the increasing number of individuals who
cohabit rather than marry, calls have been made to change the law to provide
remedies to unmarried couples similar to those provided to married couples.
Despite the increasing recognition of cohabitation, it is still not clear why
many individuals choose not to marry. If it is due to the assumption that
cohabitees have the same status as married couples, there may be an
argument for changing the law. However, could this not be dealt with by
better education? If, however, individuals cohabit because they do not wish
to be bound by the rules and obligations of marriage, is it fair to apply a
matrimonial type regime to them?
5.9.1 Government plans
Due to the concerns about the lack of rights for cohabitees, in 2001, two, in
effect competing, bills were introduced into Parliament, both of which aimed
to change this area of the law.
The Relationships (Civil Registration) Bill and the Civil Partnership Bill
were introduced into the House of Commons and the House of Lords in
October 2001 and January 2002 respectively. Neither completed a second
reading and it is unlikely that either Bill will be reintroduced into future
parliamentary sessions; however the Bills do illustrate the potential scope for
reform.
Both Bills applied to heterosexual and same-sex couples and while the
implication was that the couples would be cohabiting, this was only a
requirement in the latter Bill where six months cohabitation was needed.
Couples that met the requirements would be permitted to register their
partnership with a view to obtaining additional legal rights. Those rights
included or related to, inter alia, the following:
Question
What might the difficulties be in extending the law?
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• the ability to formally dissolve the relationship;
• the right to seek financial and property division via the court on
relationship breakdown;
• clarifying the position in the event of incapacity;
• cover pensions, social security benefits and tax implications; and
• housing succession.
It is also worth noting that, unlike the law relating to married couples, both
Bills enabled pre-existing agreements on property ownership to be upheld.
However, in terms of the Lords’ Bill, any property agreement had to be
registered with the Registrar (note the Commons’ Bill refers to an agreement
produced to the court). If no agreement was registered, the Bill introduced
an equal division of property which would arguably apply even if a co-
owning couple had bought a property as tenants in common, with unequal
shares, where they had failed to register this agreement. Finally, of interest
was the fact that cl 13 of the Lords’ Bill entitled a registered partner to make
decisions for the other partner, in terms of health and care decisions. This
may not sound drastic, but in fact this would have given registered partners
rights that currently are not available to spouses!
5.9.2 A limited response
Despite the introduction of the above Bills, the current way forward on law
reform appears to be more limited in scope. In December 2002, the Minister
for Social Exclusion announced that the Government would be carrying out
a consultation process into the legal recognition of certain partnerships, with
the consultation period ending in September 2003 and a Bill being
introduced into the House of Lords in 2004. At the time of writing this had
not completed its passage through Parliament. However, only same-sex
partnerships are covered in the consultation paper and Bill. The rationale,
put simply, is that same sex-couples have no legally recognised status as a
couple, and that the legal regime prevents them marrying. This failure to
provide a legal status is deemed discriminatory, and consequently needs to
be remedied. By contrast, an unmarried heterosexual couple does have a
means to gain a legal status – they can get married – and therefore there is no
perceived need to remedy any unfairness they suffer as a result of being
unmarried.
While this argument does have logic, it is questionable whether it is
sufficient to dismiss the call for additional rights for heterosexual couples. It
is clear that the majority of cohabiting, heterosexual couples believe they
Question
Do you agree with this rationale?
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have the same rights and responsibilities as married couples – they see
themselves as common law spouses – and this may account for the fact that
they never marry. Is it now appropriate for the law to continue to ignore the
reality of the heterosexual couple’s situation and beliefs? Should the Mrs
Burns’ of this world, who spend most of their life playing the role of
housewife and mother, and contribute their income to the family pot, in the
belief that they are gaining rights in the family assets (Burns v Burns [1984]
Ch 317), be left out in the cold? Or should the state seek to educate the
population to dismiss, once and for all, the concept of common law
spousehood? The fact that many of the prejudices associated with
cohabitation have disappeared from society, together with the increasing
popularity of cohabitation, is significant enough to warrant some form of
change, and the lack of knowledge by cohabitants themselves can not be an
excuse for failing to address the social changes. However, it would seem that
more than this is needed to persuade the government to look at the situation
of heterosexual couples.
5.10 SUMMARY
Having completed this chapter, you should be clearer about the way in
which the law assists married couples with regard to financial matters,
where the wide powers of the court under the divorce provisions are not
applicable. The traditional approach of land law and equity is relevant to
property disputes, since matrimonial law does not cover this area to any
great extent. The land law rules are also applicable to cohabitees and this is
the same regardless of whether they are living together or whether their
relationship has broken down.
5.11 END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT
Simon and Janice have lived together for seven years. They bought their
current house in 1993, each having sold previously owned properties. As
Janice was still going through her divorce, the new house was conveyed
into Simon’s sole name. The relationship between Simon and Janice has
now broken down, although they are still living in the same property.
The house is worth £120,000, with an endowment mortgage of £50,000.
Janice contributed £40,000 towards the purchase price, with Simon
contributing £30,000. Janice, despite only working part-time, has paid half
of the endowment fees.
Explain how the courts will assess her claim to be entitled to a half-
share in the property.
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CHAPTER 6
6.1 OBJECTIVES
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
• explain the scope of the Child Support Act (CSA) 1991 (as amended by
the CSA 1995);
• describe who is subject to this Act, and the situations in which the CSA
1991 takes precedence;
• evaluate the claim that the system introduced in March 2003 is fairer than
the previous formulaic approach;
• compare the CSA 1991 with the scope of other statutes.
The legislation governing child support and maintenance has undergone
major change over the last decade with the implementation of the CSAs 1991
and 1995, which have been amended considerably by the Child Support,
Pensions and Social Security Act 2000. These Acts gave a more
interventionist role to the state, and emphasised the responsibility of parents
to care for their children, if only on a financial footing. The impact of the
legislation has been widespread, but the CSA does not have total domination
over child support: other statutes still have a supplementary role to play.
You will, therefore, in this chapter concentrate on the CSAs 1991 and 1995,
but will also look at the interplay between the various provisions in other
legislation. This chapter will finish the discussion of financial aspects of
family law.
6.2 WHAT SORT OF CHILDREN?
This may seem to be a strange heading, but do not forget that in this section
we are talking about all children and not just those children whose parents
are separating or going through a divorce. The obligation to support a child
is not dependent upon the marital status of the parent, but purely upon the
status of being a parent.
While some of the statutory provisions reflect only the birth parents’ liability
to support their children, the blood relationship is not necessary to create
Question
Does this mean that only birth parents are liable to maintain children?
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obligations. If you think about the reality of family life, many children will
be cared for and supported within step-families, or possibly by other family
members. From a moral perspective these carers will also have obligations
towards the child or children in their care. Therefore, for each of the
statutory provisions that you study, you will have to ensure that you are
clear on the status of the child, or family, which is covered by the provisions.
For example, as you will see, the CSA 1991 and CSA 1995 place a statutory
obligation upon birth parents to support their children, whether those
parents are married, separated, have never lived together or possibly even
are unknown.
6.3 THE CSA 1991
By now many individuals will have experienced the impact of the CSA 1991
at first hand, or at least know someone who has had to deal with the Child
Support Agency. The CSA 1991 (note that the Act will be referred to as the
CSA 1991 – any references to the Child Support Agency will be to the
Agency) came into force in 1993. The long term aim was to remove child
support from the hands of the court and to make the assessment, collection
and payment of support an administrative process. Arguably, the
implementation was designed to reinforce the notion of family values and to
promote the responsibility of parents towards their children. Cynically, but
correctly, the CSA 1991 was also introduced to cut back the amount of
welfare benefits that were being paid to single parents.
The changes that have been made by the CSA 1991 are:
• to introduce an Agency with responsibility for assessing child
maintenance and enforcing payment of the same;
• to achieve consistency in maintenance payments by initially applying a
strict assessment formula to all cases covered by the Agency’s jurisdiction
and, since March 2003, to introduce a move from a formula to the taking
of a set percentage of income for child support;
• to remove the ability of other agencies – that is, the court – to make child
support assessments, when the case falls within the jurisdiction of the
Agency.
6.3.1 The Child Support Agency
The Agency is a national agency which ‘belongs’ to the Department of Social
Security. It is divided into regional centres (six in all), each centre taking
responsibility for the assessment of child support for individuals within its
area.
The staff dealing with the collation of information and assessment of
child maintenance are known as child support officers. The collation of
information, assessment of levels of support and enforcement of payment is
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the main function of the Agency. The Agency has been the subject of much
criticism for its inaccuracies in calculating assessments and its overall
inefficiency in contacting non-resident parents to enforce maintenance
payments. The efficiency of the Agency has improved, but is still not
considered to be adequate.
6.3.2 To whom does the act apply?
The CSA 1991 places a duty on ‘each parent of a qualifying child’ to be
‘responsible for maintaining him’ (s 1(1)). To meet this duty the ‘non-resident
parent shall be taken to have met his responsibility to maintain any
qualifying child ... by making periodical payments ... of such amount, and at
such intervals, as may be determined in accordance with the provisions of
[the] Act’ (s 1(2)). These two extracts highlight new terminology that is
applicable to the CSA 1991 and refers to those subject to the CSA 1991,
namely a ‘qualifying child’ and ‘non-resident parent’. In addition, the CSA
1991 refers to a ‘person with care’, just to complete the set.
These definitions are found in s 3 of the CSA 1991 and are stated thus:
(1) A child is a ‘qualifying child’ if –
(a) one of his parents is ... a non-resident parent; or
(b) both of his parents are ... non-resident parents.
(2) The parent of any child is a ‘non-resident parent’, in relation to him, if –
(a) that parent is not living in the same household with the child; and
(b) the child has his home with a person who is ... a person with care.
(3) A person is a ‘person with care’ in relation to any child, if he is a person –
(a) with whom the child has his home;
(b) who usually provides day to day care for the child ...
Does this really help? The definitions provided seem a little circular. What is
meant by a child? Who is a parent? The CSA 1991 further defines, in s 55, a
child as being someone:
• under the age of 16; or
• under the age of 19 and receiving full-time, non-advanced education at a
recognised educational establishment; and
• who has not been married.
‘Parent’ and ‘person with care’ are referred to in the interpretation section, 
s 54, but these further interpretations are not very helpful.
Question
How would you define these terms?
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6.3.2.1 Qualifying child
The meaning of ‘qualifying child’ is not problematic in the sense of a ‘child’,
but the decision as to whether the child is ‘qualifying’ relates to the parents.
A parent will be a legal parent, that is, a biological parent or a parent by
adoption. If the child has been conceived by medical reproductive
techniques, then you would need to look at the rules under the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. A person with parental responsibility
will not automatically be classified as a ‘legal parent’: the crucial factor is the
blood link or the status of the adoptive parent (you will look at parental
responsibility in a later chapter).
6.3.2.2 Non-resident parent
For a parent to be ‘non-resident’ they must not live in the same household as
the child and the child must live with a person with care. The non-resident
would in many cases be the father of the child, for example, where a married
couple have separated (whether or not they divorce) and where the child
remains with the mother and the father lives elsewhere. If the child in this
situation were living with the paternal grandparents, then both mother and
father would be deemed to be ‘non-resident parents’.
6.3.2.3 Person with care
A person with care will normally be a parent, but this need not be so as you
just saw in the example above. To be classed as a person with care, the child
must have their home with that person, and must be provided with day-to-
day care by them.
In many cases, this day-to-day care may not be consistently provided by
the same person. You may have a separated couple where the mother cares
for the child during weekdays and the father has contact at weekends, when
the child lives with him and he provides the day-to-day care. The CSA 1991
will acknowledge such shared care situations and the assessment of
maintenance payable may be altered to reflect the extent of care provided by
each adult. So, in our example of the father caring for the child at weekends,
he will in a year provide almost one-third of the child’s care. As a non-
resident parent he would be required to pay child support, but a full
assessment would be inappropriate given the extent to which he provides
care. The assessment would need to be amended to reflect the father’s caring
role.
6.3.2.4 Habitual residence
The jurisdiction of the CSA 1991 is only wide enough to cover those
habitually resident in the United Kingdom (s 44(1)). All the relevant
individuals, namely the non-resident parent, the person with care and the
qualifying child must be resident. If one or more is not so resident, the CSA
1991 cannot be used to seek support. If this is so, the alternative legislation
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must be looked at to see if it can provide assistance and you will be looking
at this legislation later in the chapter.
6.3.2.5 Denial of parentage
As the responsibility to make maintenance payments falls on biological
parents there is clearly no requirement for the parents to be a married couple
– unmarried parents cannot escape liability. (As you will learn later, an
unmarried father may have no other rights or obligations towards his child
other than to pay maintenance.) In some situations an unmarried father will
wish to dispute paternity. The fact that paternity is denied should not be
treated as a routine stage in the process, and assumptions should not be
made about paternity on a basis of ‘men always deny it’. If paternity is
disputed, the assessment procedure should be brought to a halt to enable the
paternity issue to be concluded – this means that no maintenance will be
required until paternity has been established. If, however, the father only
denies paternity after an assessment has been made, payments will continue
as normal, but may be refunded if paternity is disproved. Hence, if paternity
is to be disputed, it should be disputed at the earliest stage possible.
The procedure to be adopted in these cases is for the child support
officers to interview both the non-resident parent and the person with care
(who will normally be the other parent). Reduced price DNA testing will
also be available. If the mother refuses to comply with DNA testing, the
courts do have the power to order blood tests if they believe it will be in the
child’s best interests. This power was introduced into the Family Law
Reform Act 1969 by the Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act
2000. Failure to undergo testing can be used as an adverse inference in
deciding the issue. If testing is undertaken, and paternity disproved, any fees
incurred by the alleged father will be returned.
However, it is important to note that findings in other proceedings as to
parentage can be treated as decisive on this question. For example in R v
Secretary of State for Social Security ex p West [1998] EWHC 687 (Admin), S,
the father, had applied under s 4(1)(a) of the Children Act (CA) 1989 for a
parental responsibility order; this was made in his favour by consent. At a
later date S returned a form to the Child Support Agency in which he
denied paternity of the children involved in the earlier order. That order
was discharged. The Secretary of State made a decision not to make a
maintenance assessment. W, the mother of the children, made an
application for a review of that decision. W’s application was allowed. The
decision not to make an assessment was quashed. The making of a parental
responsibility order did fulfil the requirements for a finding of paternity
order under s 26(2) of the CSA 1991. The question of paternity was not
mentioned in the application for a parental responsibility order, but it
would have been ultra vires the children’s interests to make an order of this
nature unless the judge was convinced that S was the father of W’s
children. There was adequate evidence for this particular finding.
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6.3.3 When will the CSA 1991 be used?
This is an area that can be confusing to a student; however, by identifying
the key rules, the simplicity of the system can be grasped. In theory at least,
all payments of child support are to be dealt with under the CSA 1991 and
through the Agency. To accomplish this, all existing child maintenance
agreements and orders were to be taken on by the Agency by the end of the
1990s, in addition to the Agency dealing with all new cases of child
maintenance. In 1995, there was a partial U-turn, and since then there has
been an indefinite deferral of taking on applications where agreements
already exist and where there are no welfare benefits payments. In addition
to this change regarding full implementation, there are still some ways to
avoid having to use the Agency.
The CSA 1991 works by establishing situations in which the person with
care must apply to the Agency, and those where the person with care may
apply; be careful – the difference is important. Sections 4 and 6 are the
relevant provisions and state:
4 Child Support Maintenance
(1) A person who is, in relation to any qualifying child ... either the person
with care or the non-resident parent may apply to the Secretary of State
for a maintenance calculation to be made under this Act with respect to
that child ...
6 Applications by those claiming or receiving benefit
(1) This section applies where income support, an income based jobseekers
allowance or any other benefit of a prescribed kind is claimed by or in
respect of ... the parent of a qualifying child who is also a person with
care of the child.
...
(3) The Secretary of State may –
(a) treat the parent as having applied for a maintenance calculation
with respect to the qualifying child ... and
(b) take action under this Act to recover from the non-resident parent,
on the parent’s behalf, the child support maintenance so
determined.
...
(7) ... the parent shall, so far as she reasonably can, [provide the Secretary
of State] with the information which is required to enable –
(a) the non-resident parent to be identified or traced;
(b) the amount of child support maintenance payable by him to be
calculated; and
(c) that amount to be recovered from him.
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6.3.3.1 Must be used
Let us look first at the mandatory section, that is, s 6. Under this section, a
parent with care must allow the Agency to make an assessment for child
support under the CSA 1991 when that parent is receiving any of the
following state welfare benefits:
• income support or income related jobseekers allowance; or
• other prescribed benefits (disability working allowance).
In this situation, the person with care is not obliged to make an application,
and may utilise s 4 instead.
Under s 6(3) the assessment can go ahead without the parent with care
actually requesting the Agency’s involvement.
A parent with care may request that the Agency does not make an
assessment of child maintenance under s 6(5), which states that the Secretary
of State may not act if the parent with care requests him not to and that
request being made in writing. The CSA 1991 does not say in what
circumstances this request will be upheld. However, s 2 of the Act requires
any decision within the Secretary of State’s discretionary powers to take into
account the welfare of the child. If a clear case can be established by the
parent with care that if a child support calculation goes ahead there is likely
to be significant harm caused to the child, or possibly the parent with care, it
is likely that s 6(5) will be utilised.
You may have thought some form of financial penalty would apply; this is
exactly what happens. Under s 46 of the CSA 1991 a so-called benefit
reduction will be implemented, although failure to comply will not
automatically reduce the benefits payable: initially, the child support officer
must serve written notification on the parent to elicit the reasons why they
are not co-operating. Only if the response (if any) does not provide
Question
What happens if no grounds exist to prevent an assessment?
Question
What would happen if the parent with care refused to apply under the
CSA 1991?
Question
What if the child is being cared for by someone other than a parent with
care, but who is claiming benefits?
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reasonable grounds will a ‘reduced benefit direction’ be made. The
reduction in benefit will last for three years (it may be for a lesser period
although the situations when this will happen are limited). After the expiry
of those three years there is the possibility that the parent with care will
be subject to another reduced benefit direction if they continue to fail to
co-operate (Child Support (Maintenance Assessment Procedure)
Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/1813) and Child Support (Miscellaneous
Amendments) Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/1945)).
The amount of the reduction in benefit is not inconsiderable: it amounts to
40% of the income support allowances. As the total amount of income
support for a single adult over 25 is approximately £55 per week (before any
additional premiums), a reduction of around £22 is, it is suggested, harsh, or
at least a strong motivator to co-operate.
While the welfare of the child is normally relevant to legislation dealing
with children’s issues, with respect to the CSA 1991 it is only applicable as a
consideration when the exercise of discretion is in question. The imposition
of a reduced benefit direction is arguably a discretionary matter, since s 46
states that the Secretary of State ‘may ... give a reduced benefit direction’.
Additionally, the question of whether the failure to co-operate is reasonable
is also subject to discretion, which will necessitate the consideration of the
child’s welfare.
In some cases, the existence of a pre-CSA 1991 agreement or court order will
prevent the Agency from acting. However, if the parent with care is claiming
benefits, this is not so, and the CSA 1991 must be used, even if there is a pre-
existing order. Any maintenance calculation by the Agency will overrule the
previous order, and the previous order will not be capable of resurrection if
the parent with care ceases their benefit claim.
6.3.3.2 May be used
If the individual with care of the qualifying child is not a parent, regardless
of whether they are on welfare benefits, there is no compulsion to use the
Agency. The same is true of parents with care who are not claiming welfare
benefits. Section 4 of the CSA 1991 is applicable here, giving the person with
care the ability to seek an assessment.
There are, however, limitations on the use that can be made of s 4. First, it
cannot be used where a maintenance assessment is already in force under s 6
(s 4(9)). Secondly, s 4 cannot be used if there is a pre-April 1993 maintenance
agreement or court order in force (which has been made at any time, ie, not
restricted to pre-1993) and this order has been in existence for less than one
Question
Do you think it would make a difference to the exercise of discretion if
there is an existing court order?
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year, or the parent with care is on benefit as specified for s 6 purposes
(s 4(10)).
If the Agency is being used voluntarily, there may be a fee payable for the
administration of the application.
Voluntary applications may be made due to the perception that more
maintenance will be obtained from the absent parent. Equally, if there are
concerns as to the reliability of payments, the fact that a formal assessment
has been made may result in a more consistent payment regime. For
unmarried parents, the CSA 1991 is one of only two Acts under which child
support can be gained – it may be that the CSA 1991 has a higher profile and
so is resorted to more often.
It is worth noting that due to the wording of s 4(10), a parent with care
can in effect transfer any order granted, by virtue of legislation other than
the CSA 1991 to the Agency after one year. This may well enable them to
gain increased payments and will certainly assist with enforcement.
6.3.3.3 Limitations on the court
Section 8 establishes a prohibition on the court’s involvement where the CSA
1991 is applicable and the Secretary of State could make an assessment, unless
the court is being asked to make a consent order. The fact that case may be
within the Agency’s remit (ie, because the child is a qualifying child, etc)
does not mean the Agency must assess, unless it falls under s 6.
The inability of the court to make child support orders, except by consent,
may be one reason for voluntarily using the Agency. As all claims for
support involving a biological child are caught by the CSA 1991 (and the
other requirements met) and are capable of being assessed under this Act,
there are few situations where the court can now play a role. If the Agency
refuses to make the calculation of child support (even though it could), the
applicant may be able to argue that the case falls outside of the Agency’s
remit and should be decided by the court. This would be a very tenuous
argument. It is more likely the applicant would have to seek further review
by the Agency.
Question
What would be the case if the applicant’s request for an assessment was
not taken up by the Agency?
Question
Can you think why someone might prefer to use the Agency?
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6.3.4 Avoiding the CSA 1991
For those parents with care who are claiming benefit, it is not possible to
avoid the CSA 1991 and the Agency. Those persons and parents with care
who would fall within s 4 may consider using the court, provided they fit
within s 8(5) which states:
... this section shall not prevent a court from exercising any power which it has
to make a maintenance order in relation to a child if –
(a) a written agreement (whether or not enforceable) provides for the making
or securing, by a non-resident parent of the child of periodical payments to
or for the benefit of the child;
(b) the maintenance order which the court makes is, in all material respects, in
the same terms as that agreement.
This sub-section permits the court to make a consent order where the person
or parent with care would be a voluntary s 4 applicant. The parties must
have a written agreement, which may be negotiated after April 1993. As you
can see from the sub-section itself, the fact that the written agreement may
not otherwise be legally enforceable is immaterial. The agreement has to be
more than an expression of willingness to make payments, so if, for example,
the father said he would pay £40 per week for the child, this would not
amount to an agreement unless the mother has agreed to it. If this agreement
were to become incorporated into a consent order, the court would have to
replicate the agreement in ‘all material respects’ (s 8(5)(b)). The fact of
incorporating the written agreement into a consent order makes it legally
enforceable. If this consent order needs to be changed in the future, it is
unlikely that the court would have power to vary the order as s 8(3) would
prohibit it. However, there would appear to be no prohibition on the parties
negotiating a new agreement to be embodied in a new consent order.
If the court order predates the implementation of the CSA 1991, the court
retains its powers to vary or revoke the order because access will be denied
to the CSA 1991, subject of course to the question of whether the parent with
care is then on benefit. It is unlikely that the court will revoke an order
simply to enable an application to be made under the CSA 1991 and
especially since the CSA 1991 permits an applicant to transfer their order to
the Agency after one year. Additionally, even though the courts make their
orders under legislation other than the CSA 1991, they frequently adopt a
CSA 1991 based calculation when assessing the application. (You will be
considering the court’s jurisdiction later.)
6.4 THE CALCULATION
The method for the calculation of child support under the CSA 1991 was
originally a formulaic approach. However, this system required a great deal
of information to be collected and helped cause the difficulties experienced
by the Agency in making accurate assessments. The assessment calculation
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was changed in March 2003, for new cases only, by virtue of the Child
Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000. The changes were perceived
to be simpler and a fairer way of calculating child support but, due to the
problems of establishing a workable computer system, implementation of
this scheme was delayed past its original 2002 start date, and even though
the system has been in operation for over one year, there are still problems
surrounding the operation of the system.
The method of calculating the payments required by the non-resident
parent are set out in Sched 1, para 2:
(1) The basic rate is the following percentage of the non-residents parent’s net
weekly income –
15% where he has one qualifying child;
20% where he has two qualifying children;
25% where he has three or more qualifying children;
As you can see, the system is simple – the non-resident parent is expected to
pay a certain percentage of their income, dependent on the number of
children they have.
From the White Paper that preceded the changes it seemed that the second
family should not gain any greater advantage than the first, non-resident,
family. However, despite this statement of intent, the method adopted in the
legislation does not actually achieve this aim. Schedule 1, para 2.2 of the CSA
1991 states:
If the non-resident parent also has one or more relevant other children, the
appropriate percentage referred to in sub-paragraph (1) is to be applied instead
to his net weekly income less –
15% where he has one relevant other child;
20% where he has two relevant other children;
25% where he has three or more relevant other children.
Hence, as you can see, where there is a second family, that is, relevant
child(ren), the set percentages are deducted from the non-resident parent’s
income for the benefit of the second family, and only then are the required
percentages deducted for the first, non-resident children.
To show you how this works, consider the following example:
Anne and Bob have two children from their marriage. Bob left to live with
Carole and they have one child. Bob earns £1,000 per week.
When calculating Bob’s liability under the CSA 1999, first the relevant
percentage for the second family will be deducted. As Bob and Carole have
Question
What if the non-resident parent has a second family?
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one child this is 15%. Bob would be left with £1,000 – £150 = £850. Next, the
relevant percentage for the first family will be deducted. As Bob and Anne
have two children this is 20%. Bob’s liability to the children from his
marriage is £170 per week.
In terms of how much the children receive, you will see how much more
the second family in effect receives when compared to the first family.
In this situation, Sched 1, para 6 applies:
(1) If the non-resident parent has more than one qualifying child and in
relation to them there is more than one person with care, the amount of
child support maintenance payable is to be determined by apportioning the
rate between the persons with care.
As you can see, the CSA 1991 requires any child support to be apportioned
between the parents with care. Going back to the example above, if Bob did
not live with either Anne or Carole, his total child support liability would be
25% as he has three qualifying children. This 25% of income would be shared
two-thirds to Anne as she has two of the three children and one-third to
Carole. In terms of the figures, this would equal total support of £250 per
week, with £166 to Anne and £84 to Carole.
6.4.1 Income
What is meant by income will be very important given the fact that the
amount of child support payable is directly related to it.
Sched 1 of the CSA 1991 talks about net income, a term commonly used to
cover income earned less any income tax and national insurance
contributions. The Child Support (Maintenance Calculations and Special
Cases) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/155) do not really give a clear definition of
net income. However, in line with the previous child support regime, net
income will include the deduction of half of the non-resident parent’s
pension contributions.
Question
What if the non-resident parent has no income?
Question
How would you define income?
Question
What if the non-resident parent has two non-resident families?
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As the calculation depends on the income of the non-resident parent it
is going to be hard to get child support if they have no income to start
with!
In this case, the Secretary of State may utilise Sched 1, para 10B to treat
the non-resident parent as having some form of income. This provision is
very similar to other welfare benefit rules. It tries to ensure that individuals
do not place a burden on the state by deliberately divesting themselves of
assets, for example by having only non-income bearing capital.
An example of when this provision may be useful can be seen in the case
of Philips v Peace [1996] 2 FLR 230. This case also illustrates how other
legislation, for example, the Children Act 1989, may be utilised in situations
where the Agency has no jurisdiction. We will return to those scenarios later.
In the majority of situations the parent with care will not have an income, other
than state benefits. However, as a parent with care can use the Agency
voluntarily, there will be cases where they also have an income. It is reasonable
to assume that both parents’ incomes will be relevant – the child is both of
theirs after all. Despite this sounding logical, the CSA 1991, as amended by the
Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000, does not operate in this
way. As you have seen from the extracts, the CSA 1991 only refers to the non-
resident parent’s income. The caring parent’s resources are ignored.
6.4.2 Variations
The CSA 1991 does permit applications to vary the rate of maintenance
payable. The situations in which this is permissible are set out in Sched 4B of
the CSA 1991 and are as follows:
• where there are special expenses;
• where there has been a relevant property or capital transfer; and
• where there are additional, specified cases.
Question
In what situations do you think the non-resident parent should be able to
apply to vary the amount of support assessed by the Agency?
Question
Is this fair?
Question
What about the caring parent’s income?
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6.4.3 Special expenses
The ability to vary the calculation, where there are special expenses, is not
great. The non-resident parent must be able to prove they have special
expenses within the categories in the schedule which are as follows:
• costs incurred in maintaining contact with the qualifying child;
• costs attributable to a long-term illness or disability of a relevant child;
• debts of a prescribed kind incurred before the non-resident parent
became non-resident;
• boarding school fees for the qualifying child;
• costs incurred in paying the mortgage on a property in which the non-
resident parent no longer has an interest, but in which the child and
person with care still live.
In addition, the Regulations that accompany these provisions provide limits,
or rather thresholds, to the expenses before any reduction in child support
will be made. Thus where the net income of the non-resident parent is more
than £200 per week, the threshold is £15 of additional expenses, and if the net
weekly income is less than £200, the threshold is £10.
6.4.4 Property adjustments
In addition to applications to vary the amount payable due to special
expenses, the non-resident parent may seek to vary the amount payable by
virtue of the fact of a capital transfer, normally of property, in the course
of a divorce settlement. Prior to the implementation of the CSA 1991 this
was a common way to provide for a clean break and also meet maintenance
obligations. As the CSA 1991 was originally enacted, these settlements
could, in effect, be overturned as the CSA 1991 overrides any previous
agreements where the parent with care is on benefits. The court’s
approach was that any attempt to re-open the capital transfer or to
prevent the Agency’s involvement was impossible, since Parliament had
made it clear that all child support was to be dealt with on an
administrative basis.
In Crozier v Crozier [1994] 2 WLR 444, H and W made a clean break
settlement whereby H transferred his interest (half-share) of the proceeds
of sale of the family home, which was valued at around £10,000, to W in
settlement of her financial claims. A nominal maintenance order was made
for the child of the family, X, who lived with W. W was to accept full
responsibility for maintaining X. W was receiving income support. The
Department for Social Security asked for, and obtained, an order from the
magistrates ordering H to make a contribution to X’s maintenance. H later
became liable to pay child support for X and he asked for leave to appeal
out of time in order to recover his half-share of the proceeds of sale of the
matrimonial home. The court held that H’s application would be dismissed.
A clean break agreement between H and W on the breakup of a marriage
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does not represent a clean financial break between a parent and their child.
It may not be set aside because of the bringing into force of a new
statutory enforcement body (the Agency) which regulates the amount of
maintenance payable to children. No ‘new event’ which suffices to
invalidate the very basis of a consent order is constituted by either the
magistrates’ order or the assessment of H’s financial responsibility under
CSA 1991.
The judgment in this case made it clear that spouses (and the court) are
required to bring maintenance between them to an end as soon as possible
(the clean break provisions). However, where a child is concerned, there is
no power to achieve a clean break. The fact that parents may have made an
agreement along those lines does not form a binding agreement with the
state.
As a result of this perceived injustice, amendments to the assessment
regime were made in 1995. The current regulations are the Child Support
(Variation) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/156) and they state that unless a
property transfer has specified how much of the value is attributable to a
capitalisation of child support, no relief will be given. If there is such a
specification, then the child maintenance payable will be reduced by a set
amount, according to how much capital was attributable to child support,
with the minimum threshold being £5,000, and this may in reality be a
greater figure than can be attributed to the value of the actual transfer.
6.4.5 Other assets
The CSA 1991 provides for variations to the calculation in ‘additional cases’,
namely those set out in Sched 4B, para 4, which include where:
• the non-resident parent has assets which exceed a prescribed value;
• a person’s lifestyle is inconsistent with their income;
• a person has income not taken into account in the calculation; and
• a person has unreasonably reduced the income taken into account in the
calculation.
Further detail on these cases can be found in paras 18–20 of the Child
Support (Variation) Regulations 2000.
6.4.6 Effect on amount payable
If a variation application has been successful, then the non-resident parent’s
income will either be reduced by the relevant weekly value, for example, if
there are additional contact costs or a property transfer, or increased by the
relevant weekly value, for example, where the non-resident parent has
deliberately disposed of assets to reduce liability.
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6.5 WHEN IS THE CSA 1991 NOT APPLICABLE?
As we have seen, the CSA 1991 focuses on parents and children with a
biological link and bases the assessment on (almost) pure mathematical
calculations.
There are situations when the CSA 1991 will not be applicable or where
other legislation can be utilised in addition to the CSA 1991 and these are
identified in s 8 where it states that the courts can be requested to make an
order for child support even if a CSA 1991 assessment can be made:
• where the parent has already been assessed under the normal process
and fully meets their child support obligations and the parent is wealthy
(s 8(6));
• where the child is undergoing education or training and the
maintenance order is required to meet all or some of the costs involved
(s 8(7));
• where the child is disabled and the order is needed to meet the additional
costs involved with the disability (s 8(8)).
There are a few more situations that you could have mentioned where the
court will be the only option available to seek maintenance:
• where the habitual residence criteria are not met;
• where the child does not fall within the definition of a qualifying child –
they may be a step-child, for example, or may be in excess of the age
range for the CSA 1991; and
• where the parent with care is not seeking a periodical payment but a
lump sum or property transfer to the child.
6.5.1 Other legislation
While the CSA 1991 does not have the jurisdiction to deal with cases in the
categories listed in the above paragraph, before a court can make an order it
must have the ability to exercise jurisdiction, which will be granted by
statute.
Question
What other legislation can you think of that may provide jurisdiction?
Question
Can you identify any other situations where the Agency will not have
jurisdiction?
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Remembering what you studied earlier you should have been able to come
up with two of the alternative sources, that is, the Matrimonial Causes Act
(MCA) 1973 and the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act
(DPMCA) 1978. A third exists, being the Children Act (CA) 1989.
6.5.1.1 Status
The status of the child dictates which of the Acts apply. Both the MCA 1973
and the DPMCA 1978 state that the orders available are for the parties to a
marriage and any children of the family.
Section 52(1) of the MCA 1973 refers to a child of the family in relation to the
parties of a marriage as:
(a) a child of both of those parties; and
(b) any other child, not being a child who is placed with those parties as foster
parents by a local authority or voluntary organisation, who has been
treated by both of those parties as a child of their family.
Treating a child as part of the family will involve a common sense approach;
for example, has the child received the level of care, physical and emotional,
that would be expected from parents, etc? This would easily refer to a step-
child, but may, under (b) above, cover other children who do not fit the
standard norms. You should note that the MCA 1973 does not define a child
of the family by reference to any legal orders that may be obtainable. The
definition in the DPMCA 1978 is the same as the MCA 1973, as is the
interpretation.
The final thing to note, with reference to status, is that an application can
only be made under these Acts where the adults are or were married because
the definition refers to parties to a marriage to which the child is a child of
the family. Neither of these statutes applies to cohabiting couples and their
children. Also, you should note the situations when these orders are being
made, that is, either on divorce or where there has been a failure to provide
reasonable maintenance, as discussed in earlier chapters.
6.5.1.2 Orders
The nature of the orders that can be obtained for children are the same as for
spouses under the MCA 1973, that is, periodical payments, lump sums and
property transfers (the last not being available in the Family Proceedings
Court).
Question
How would you define a child of the family?
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As with spouses, the most common order made for maintenance of a child
will be the unsecured periodical payments order. Lump sum and/or
property transfer orders are the minority of children’s orders.
In many cases, as with spouses, there will not be enough available capital to
meet lump sum or property transfer orders. However, there is a more
fundamental objection to the transfer of property or large financial sums,
namely the fact that the award will probably extend beyond the minority of
the child, which is something that is not seen as appropriate since
maintenance is intended only for the child’s minority.
In Kiely v Kiely [1988] 1 FLR 248, the parties had divorced after 12 years of
marriage during which two children had been born. In dealing with the
financial aspects of the divorce, W had remained in the matrimonial home
with the children, with H retaining a 50% share in the home. Periodical
payments were ordered in favour of W and the children. When H ceased
making payments W sought a lump sum payment order with respect to the
children and such an order was made, to be paid when the children reached
18 years of age. On appeal the orders were revoked, with Booth J
highlighting that the court was bound to consider the factors in the MCA
1973 and that there was no evidence before the court that the children would
suffer hardship or any material disadvantage if the order were not made;
that there was no evidence that the children needed such a lump sum either
immediately or in the future; nor were there any special circumstances
requiring such an order to be made.
In T v S (Financial Provision for Children) [1994] 2 FLR 883, the parties were
unmarried and had five children. After the breakdown of the relationship an
order was made for the property in which the mother lived with the children
to be held on trust until the youngest child reach 21 years of age or ceased
full time education, with the benefit of the property passing to the children,
following sale, in equal shares. The father claimed that this order went
beyond the powers of the court since it extended the liability beyond the
children’s majority. Johnson J agreed that there was nothing in the
circumstances of this case that justified the extended duration – the role of
the court being to ensure that the children’s needs were met during their
minority.
Question
Why do you think this is?
Question
Which of these orders is most likely to be granted?
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6.5.1.3 Criteria
When a court is considering making an order with respect to a child, it will
have to have regard to the welfare of the child as being one of the first
considerations, but not the paramount one. There also will be a requirement
for the court to consider the list of factors in s 25(3) of the MCA 1973 and 
s 3(3) of the DPMCA 1978. These lists are almost exactly the same as the
factors for spouses, which have already been discussed.
One significant difference can be seen in s 25(4) of the MCA 1973 and s 3(4)
of the DPMCA 1978, which will have relevance to non-biological children
only. Under these provisions the court must assess the nature of responsibility
taken on by the parent being asked to pay maintenance, how long that
responsibility has lasted, whether it was undertaken knowing the child was
not their own and whether any other person is liable to maintain the child.
Given the greater chances of serial monogamy in today’s society, it is not
hard to imagine a situation where a biological father is paying child support
via the CSA 1991, and a step-father is being asked to pay via the MCA 1973.
6.5.2 The Children Act 1989
6.5.2.1 Status
The CA 1989 is broader than the MCA 1973 and DPMCA 1978 in that it
covers a wider range of children and situations. Status is referred to more
often in the context of the applicant for the order than in the context of the
child themselves, as indicated in Sched 1, para 1. The child can be the
product of unmarried or of married parents. The applicant can be a parent, a
guardian or an individual with a residence order (residence orders will be
covered in later chapters), and the respondent will be one or both of the
child’s parents. A child, under para 2, may themselves apply for an order
when they have reached the age of 18.
An order may only be made to extend beyond a child’s 18th birthday in
exceptional circumstances and where the child is to be undergoing training
or further education. Parents’ income is assessable for the purposes of
university fees already, so the CA 1989 is, in effect, merely giving the child
the means to enforce payment.
6.5.2.2 Orders
The range of orders available is the same as in the MCA 1973 and DPMCA
1978 and the same difficulties exist under the CA 1989 where the settlement of
Question
Does the fact that the CA 1989 permits a child to apply for maintenance
once they reach majority not go against the principles of the cases
highlighted previously on p 124?
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property is concerned. An added problem is that if a property settlement is
made in favour of a child of unmarried parents, the resident parent will gain
an advantage that otherwise would not be available. This was highlighted in
T v S (Financial Provision for Children) [1994] 2 FLR 883, when Johnson J stated:
‘The sadness here is that, after a long and seemingly happy relationship, this
mother of five children, never having been married to their father, has no
rights against him of her own.’ However, having acknowledged the problem,
the order was still only granted for the children for a limited time frame.
Equally, in A v A (A Minor: Financial Provision) [1994] 1 FLR 657, the parents
were unmarried. The court ordered a settlement of a property on the child,
with the property to revert to the father on the child reaching 18 or ceasing
full time education. In relation to the unmarried mother Ward J stated:
The mother’s obligation is to look after A, and A’s financial need is to provide a
roof over the head of her caretaker. It is, indeed, father’s obligation to provide
the accommodation for the living in help which A needs. Consequently, it must
be a term of the settlement that while A is under the control of her mother and
thereafter for so long as A does not object, the mother shall have the right to
occupy the property to the exclusion of the father and without paying rent
therefore for the purpose of providing a home and care and support for A.
The cases of J v C (Child: Financial Provision) [1999] 1 FLR 952 and Re P (Child)
[2003] EWCA Civ 837 are also illustrative on this point.
6.5.2.3 Criteria
Sched 1, para 4, of the CA 1989 sets out the factors to be considered by the
court when deciding an application. Unlike the MCA 1973 and the DPMCA
1978, if the CA 1989 is being used the child’s welfare will be the court’s
paramount consideration (s 1(1) of the CA 1989). Note: you will learn more
about the CA 1989 later.
The fact that the wording of the CA 1989 is different to the MCA 1973 and
DPMCA 1978 should reflect alternative approaches. However, any such
distinction is hard to locate in the law reports, and so, in reality, the court
seems to approach all the relevant statutes in the same manner.
6.6 SUMMARY
Child support is an issue that will, as time goes by, play a lesser role within
the court system due to the implementation of the CSA 1991 and subsequent
legislation. Even though cases still exist, which will remain within the court’s
jurisdiction, the starting points in financial terms are now expressed in the
Question
Do you think that this will make a difference?
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CSA 1991 maintenance requirements. There is of course more discretion to
be exercised by the court! Having completed your study of this area, you
should be able to explain the CSA 1991 remit and methodology. You should
also be able to discuss whether alternatives exist and those situations where
the CSA 1991 does not apply at all. To ensure that you have understood all
this, try the following End of Chapter Assessment questions.
6.7 END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT
1 In what situations can maintenance be obtained for children without
recourse to the Child Support Agency?
2 Steve is 32-years-old and employed as a fireman. He is unmarried. Just
over a year ago he split up from his girlfriend, Toni, and he has had no
contact since. Yesterday he received a letter from the Child Support
Agency together with a maintenance enquiry form asking for details
of his income, etc, with regard to Toni’s child, William. Toni is
claiming Steve is the father of William.
Steve seeks your advice. He does not believe that he is the child’s
father and he wishes to know how the Agency will approach this
denial. Also he wishes to know how the Agency will assess the claim
if he is treated as being the father.
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CHAPTER 7
7.1 OBJECTIVES
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
• appreciate the historical background to domestic violence laws;
• be aware of the multifaceted aspect of domestic violence legislation prior
to the Family Law Act (FLA) 1996;
• discuss the reasons for change and how the law has changed;
• evaluate the effects of the FLA 1996; and
• understand and apply the law to hypothetical situations.
Given the links between domestic violence remedies in civil law and rights
to occupy property, it is appropriate for you to look at this area of law now.
You should note that these provisions, found in Pt IV of the FLA 1996, came
into force in October 1997 and so have been in force for a number of years.
The history of the domestic violence legislation will also be touched upon to
give you an understanding of the problems surrounding this area of family
law.
7.2 DEFINITIONS AND THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To appreciate fully the reasons why laws to protect individuals against
domestic violence have developed in the manner that they have, a historical
perspective is needed.
Within your definition you have probably referred to some form of physical
violence, the assaulting of one person by another within the domestic
sphere. Violence may be quite minor, such as common assault, or more
severe and even includes murder. Did you think of domestic violence in
the terms of psychological harm? You may feel that violence, whatever the
extent, is permissible if carried out ‘behind closed doors’. When speaking
on the issue of reducing the age of consent for homosexual intercourse,
Edwina Currie MP stated that: ‘The state should be kept out of our
personal lives ... everybody is entitled to his or her privacy. What my
Question
How would you define domestic violence?
Would you ever consider domestic violence to be permissible?
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neighbours get up to in private is their business, not mine. It is not for the
state to interfere.’
Despite the difference in focus, that is, homosexual intercourse, not
domestic violence, is the principle not the same?
7.2.1 The wife as chattel
If you agree that domestic violence is not permissible in society, the fact that
violence has been condoned within marriage is a historical fact. Wives and
children were for a long time deemed to be the chattels of the husband – his
property to do with as he wished. If that included beating, no one would
complain. Indeed, despite commentary to discredit the belief, ‘... by the
common law a husband was allowed to beat his wife so long as he did it
with a stick no bigger that his thumb’ (per Lord Denning in Davis v Johnson
[1979] AC 264, at p 270). The notion of change had begun to infiltrate social
thinking by 1775; again, to quote Lord Denning in Davis v Johnson, at p 271:
He was able, Blackstone says, to give his wife ‘moderate correction’. But
Blackstone goes on to tell us that by this time this power of correction began to
be doubted: ‘Yet the lower rank of people, who were always fond of the old
common law, still claim and exert their ancient privilege’ (Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 1, 8th edn, [1775] 1825, Butterworths).
7.2.2 Battered wives as a matter of concern
Society has now moved on from the concept of a wife as a possession:
husbands and wives are now seen as equals. In addition, the use of violence
within the home, or domestic life, is seen to be wrong, or uncivilised. Steps to
protect victims were not taken until the mid 1970s following a Select
Committee report on the issue in 1975. Legislation was enacted in 1976 with
jurisdiction in the county court and the High Court, and in 1978 provisions
to give jurisdiction to the magistrates’ were enacted. The passing of civil
legislation did not end the incidence of violence which did, and still does,
continue. The influence of a patriarchal society, with its roots in the ‘wife as
chattel’ theory, can be seen in the offence of rape. It was not until 1991 that
‘marital rape’ was recognised by the House of Lords as being a criminal
offence. The legal validity for the proposition that rape within marriage did
not exist was that when a woman consents to marriage she irrevocably
consents to consortium with her husband. In the case of R v R [1991] 3 WLR
767, the House of Lords upheld a husband’s conviction for raping his wife.
As Lord Keith stated: ‘marriage is in modern times regarded as a partnership
of equals, and no longer one in which the wife must be the subservient
chattel of the husband ...’ Parliament took until 1994 and the Criminal Justice
and Public Order Act to incorporate this ruling into statute.
As you can see, domestic violence is not a matter that has given rise to
concern until quite recently. In addition, the law has responded to different
issues in different ways. Legislation has been enacted as and when problems
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were perceived to exist. The consequence was ‘a hotchpotch of enactments of
limited scope passed to meet specific situations or to strengthen the powers
of specified courts’ (per Lord Scarman in Richards v Richards [1983] 3 WLR
173). This hotchpotch was repealed and a new and potentially clearer set of
rules enacted in the FLA 1996.
7.2.3 Just battered wives?
The common perception will be that it is wives (or girlfriends) who will be
the victims of domestic violence. This fits in with the stereotypes of the
genders, that the male will be aggressive, stronger, and more prone to
uncontrollable outbursts than the female. While this is often the case, the
fact is that women can be violent too. In some cases the violence will
manifest itself differently, and it is true to say that the way in which the law
and legal processes, and indeed society, deals with violence by women
against men can be different. The legislation on domestic violence is
available to both genders, but would a lawyer or judge query why a man
did not defend himself against such violence? Would the question of
manliness be raised, not necessarily explicitly but implicitly? Would the
female aggressor be treated, or castigated, in the same way as a male
aggressor? In criminal law, analysis of sentencing shows that women are
more likely to receive lighter sentences, or to be treated as ‘mad not bad’,
where violence is concerned. However, for the purposes of this chapter, the
victim is referred to as female.
7.3 OPTIONS TO PROTECT, OTHER THAN 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGISLATION
The legislation you will focus on operates within the arena of civil law.
Clearly, the other area of relevance is the criminal law. Domestic violence
will often include the commission of an offence in criminal law that could be
punishable in the criminal court. The crime may range from assault to the
more serious crimes of rape or murder.
Question
What other options for protection may be available?
Question
Who do you perceive to be the victim in cases of domestic violence?
131
Despite the clear criminality involved in domestic violence, in many
situations the civil law will be preferred. For many years it was a general
principle of the police to refrain from intervention in cases of domestic
violence – perhaps this was due to the historical background you read about
earlier. Although this ‘principle’ has now changed, prosecutions are still not
always pursued. Until the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 made a
spouse a competent and compellable witness, evidence was difficult to
adduce. It has been suggested, by Cretney and Davies, that many
prosecutions still fail because the complainant fails to give evidence or
withdraws the complaint, and because the prosecuting agency does not
compel attendance (Cretney and Davies, ‘Prosecuting ‘‘domestic’’ assault’
[1996] Crim LR 162).
In addition to the evidential problems, the criminal law is a slow process.
The victim of violence may wish to see the perpetrator punished, which is
the aim of the criminal law, but often their aim will be to gain protection. The
ability to keep a person accused of domestic violence in custody until trial is
limited. If an accused is released on bail, there is always the potential for
more violence to occur since the involvement of the police may exacerbate
the situation and the accused may simply ignore any bail conditions
imposed. Also, the charge brought may be quite minor, for example,
common assault, with an equally minor sentence upon conviction that in
reality will do little to help the victim. For these sorts of reasons, the civil law
is generally the preferred route to take.
7.4 CIVIL REMEDIES GENERALLY
Civil law can be invoked to obtain a range of orders that attempt to provide a
more suitable remedy for the victim. While statute will often be the first port
of call, there is a general power of the court to grant injunctions ancillary to
existing legal rights. This inherent jurisdiction may be useful to obtain
protection against violence where domestic violence statutes do not provide
a remedy. In Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727, the individuals did not
come within the then existing domestic violence legislation, being merely
Question
What other reasons exist to suggest that the criminal law is not always the
best option?
Question
Would you choose criminal or civil sanctions as the first option for
protection?
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non-cohabiting girlfriend and boyfriend, and hence the claimant had to
prove the existence of some other legal right. This was the tort of nuisance.
As the defendant had acted contrary to the claimant’s right to be free from
nuisance, the court could also grant an injunction to prevent the nuisance
continuing.
The relevance of the inherent jurisdiction will diminish now that Pt IV of
the FLA 1996 is in force, since the scope of possible applicants is considerably
changed as you will now see.
7.5 THE FLA 1996
This Act, in Pt IV, sets out a new coherent scheme for making occupation
orders and non-molestation orders, and in so doing repealed all the previous
domestic violence legislation. Part IV of the FLA 1996 was added at a late
stage, after the Family Homes and Domestic Violence Bill was defeated in
the Lords and withdrawn (notably after a media campaign against giving
cohabitants the same rights as spouses). The intention was to remove the
complexity of the previous legislation and to introduce a consistent range of
criteria under which applications are to be assessed.
7.5.1 Non-molestation orders
These orders are covered by s 42 of the FLA 1996 which provides as 
follows:
(1) In this part a ‘non-molestation order’ means an order containing either or
both of the following provisions –
(a) provision prohibiting a person (‘the respondent’) from molesting
another person who is associated with the respondent;
(b) provision prohibiting the respondent from molesting a relevant child.
As with the legislation that the FLA 1996 replaced, the Act does not in
fact define what type of behaviour will be covered by the term ‘molestation’.
The approach identified in pre-FLA 1996 cases remains, in practice, good
law.
Using the approach developed by courts preceding the FLA 1996,
molestation is more than just violence, and normal practice is for the order
to prevent the respondent from intimidating, pestering or harassing the
applicant, although the order may be expressed to prohibit specific types of
contact, rather than behaviour generally. The court also has the ability to
Question
What would you include?
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prevent the respondent entering a set or defined area and this is potentially
very useful.
In Horner v Horner [1982] 2 WLR 914, H and W had parted although
they had not divorced. The court found that prior to the separation H had
been acting in a peculiar manner and had even threatened W physically.
Since the separation H had harassed W by way of handing her threatening
letters, intercepting her on the way to the station and hanging scurrilous
posters on the school railings where W worked. In relation to the term
molesting Ormrod LJ stated that: ‘[it does] not imply necessarily either
violence or threats of violence. It applies to any conduct which can properly
be regarded as such a degree of harassment as to call for the intervention of
the court.’
In C v C (Non-Molestation Order: Jurisdiction) [1998 ] Fam 70, following the
divorce of H and W, W published articles in the national press in which she
purported to give information concerning H’s relations with her and his
three former wives. The articles were couched in very unflattering terms. H
complained that W’s intention was to humiliate and embarrass him. He
applied for a non-molestation order under s 42 of the FLA 1996 so as to
prevent W harassing him by publishing matter which might affect the
determination of financial issues between H and W. W contended that the
facts of the case did not justify the making of such an order. The court
decided that H’s application would be refused. Although the Act did not
define ‘molestation’, the word seemed to imply conduct which was intended
to result in a high degree of harassment of the other party and which
justified the court’s intervention. A mere invasion of privacy did not
constitute harassment. H’s concern to protect his privacy did not come
within the scope of s 42; per Brown P:
It is significant in my judgment that s 42 is to be found in FLA 1996 Part IV,
which is concerned with the general topic of domestic violence ... The material
complained of is some alleged revelations by the former wife of what she
regarded as her former husband’s misconduct. In my judgment it comes
nowhere near ‘molestation’ as envisaged by s 42 FLA 1996.
7.5.1.1 The applicant
Under the terms of s 42(1)(a) and (b) of the FLA 1996, the applicant must be
an ‘associated person’ or a ‘relevant child’.
Unlike the range of applicants under the preceding legislation, the FLA 1996
has sought to be far less restrictive, and also to recognise that domestic
violence does not just occur between spouses and cohabitants. Section 62 sets
Question
Who do you think would be covered by these terms?
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out the individuals who will be classed as ‘associated’ and also ‘relevant
children’; individuals fall within the definitions if:
• they are or have been married to each other;
• they are cohabitants or former cohabitants;
• they live or have lived in the same household, otherwise than merely by
reason of one of them being the other’s employee, tenant, lodger or
boarder;
• they are relatives;
• they have agreed to marry one another (whether or not that
agreement has been terminated but only within three years of
termination);
• in relation to any child, they (the applicant and respondent) are a parent
of the child or have parental responsibility for the child; or
• they are parties to the same family proceedings (other than domestic
violence proceedings).
As you can see, although the section refers to the traditional spouses and
heterosexual cohabitants, it also includes former spouses and cohabitants.
Cohabitants are defined in s 62 as a ‘man and a woman, who, although not
married to each other, are living together as husband and wife’. Same-sex
couples will be covered too, under the ‘live or have lived in the same
household, otherwise than due to being an employee, tenant, lodger or
boarder’ provision.
The view taken by the Law Commission was that it was inappropriate to
include these groupings since there were thought to be more suitable
remedies under property or employment legislation. While some of this
reasoning may be acceptable, it is hard to understand why ex-spouses who
no longer live together should be able to apply to gain protection, and yet a
resident landlord who has evicted a violent tenant cannot do the same if that
tenant continues to harass or molest him or her.
7.5.1.2 When can the order be made?
A non-molestation order can be made, even if it has not been formally
applied for, if the court feels the order would be of benefit to a party in any
ongoing family proceedings (s 42(2)(b)). Applicants may wish to apply
within the context of existing family proceedings or may wish to make a
freestanding application.
The court may make a non-molestation order having had regard to ‘all
the circumstances including the need to secure the health, safety and well-
Question
Why should employees, tenants and boarders be excluded?
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being ... of the applicant ... and any relevant child’ (s 42(5)). In deciding
whether or not to make an order, the court has its discretion, but must base
its decision on the factors mentioned.
7.5.1.3 Duration of the order
The practice before the FLA 1996 was only to make orders for a short period
of time, to allow other steps to be taken, such as issuing divorce proceedings.
The FLA 1996 does not change this discretionary aspect of the order, but
does clearly state in s 42(7) that the order can be made ‘until further order’,
implying the possibility of an almost indefinite order.
In M v W (Non-Molestation Order: Duration) [2000] 1 FLR 107, the Family
Proceedings Court had indeed made an open ended non-molestation order
following application from the mother. The father claimed that the order
should not be open ended, but for a limited time only. In looking at this
point Cazalet J stated:
Although I have to start from the statute, earlier decisions on the desirability or
appropriateness of a non-molestation order lasting for many years may throw
some light on the court’s approach, although of course I bear in mind that such
are concerned with different statute provisions ... the object of non-molestation
orders is designed to give a breathing space for the parties and, unless there are
exceptional or unusual circumstances, it should be for a specified period of
time.
7.5.2 Occupation orders
These exclusion orders are dealt with in ss 33–38 of the FLA 1996 (excluding 
s 34). The FLA 1996 is theoretically making the legislation simpler; however,
when you look at these sections you may question this fact. The basic
principles for all applications are similar, what differs is the extent of the
criteria to be applied and the available duration of the order.
7.5.2.1 Section 33
This section applies to those applicants who have some form of interest in
the property, as set out in s 33(1). It will therefore cover, inter alia, spouses
who have rights to occupy by virtue of their marital status, joint owners,
whether married or not, or individuals who have a joint lease or tenancy
agreement or where the applicant is the sole owner, leasor or tenant.
Additionally, the applicant must have occupied, or have intended to occupy,
the property with the respondent as their home.
The nature of the order that the applicant can seek is a regulatory one,
and the order may do any of the following:
• enforce the applicant’s right to remain in the property;
• permit the applicant to enter the premises, and remain there;
• regulate the parties’ occupation of the property;
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• prevent the respondent from exercising any rights to occupy the
property, or regulate any matrimonial homes rights that the respondent
may have;
• require the respondent to vacate the property; and
• prevent the respondent from entering a defined area within which the
property is located.
When being asked to make an order, the court considers a statutory list of
criteria in sub-s (6). These factors are:
• the housing needs and resources of the parties and any relevant children;
• the financial resources of the parties;
• the effect of the order or decision not to make an order on the health,
safety or well-being of the parties or any relevant child; and
• the conduct of the parties to each other and otherwise.
In addition to the above factors, the court is required under sub-s (7), to
consider what is known as the ‘balance of harm’ test. Thus, if the court is
minded to exercise its powers to make an order, it must consider if the
respondent or any relevant child is likely to suffer significant harm if the
order is made, and balance the harm caused to the applicant with that caused
to the respondent if the order is made. The relationship between these two
sub-sections has been considered by the courts, but without a great deal of
clarity.
In Chalmers v Johns [1999] 1 FLR 392, following a period of living together
for 25 years, during which time they had occupied the family home as joint
tenants for 20 years, H and W decided to separate. They had a seven year old
daughter, D, and an adult son. The relationship of H and W, described as
‘stormy’, had involved assaults of a minor nature. W and D moved into a
temporary council accommodation which was much further away from the
school attended by D. D had regular staying contact with H. H and W made
cross-applications for a residence order for D, and W was granted an interim
occupation order under s 33 of the FLA 1996 on the ground of H’s violent
conduct. H appealed against the occupation order. The Court of Appeal held
that H’s appeal would be allowed. The court held that the judge had
misdirected herself and that the application for occupation orders was to be
dealt with at the substantive hearing. Per Thorpe LJ:
In approaching its function under s 33, the court has first to consider
whether the evidence does establish that the applicant or a relative child
would be likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the conduct of the
respondent if an order is not made. If the court answers that question in
the affirmative, then it knows that it must make the order unless, balancing
one harm against the other, the harm to the respondent or child is likely to
be as great. If however, the court answers in the negative, then it enters the
discretionary regime provided by s 3(6) and must exercise a broad discretion
having regard to all the circumstances of the case and particularly those
factors set out in the statutory checklist within sub-paras (a)–(d).
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Given the facts of this case, a ‘draconian’ occupation order was not
appropriate. A non-molestation order seemed to be the correct remedy.
In B v B (Occupation Order) [1999] 1 FLR 715, H and W occupied a council
house where they lived with S, who was H’s six-year-old son from a
previous relationship, and D, the two year old daughter of H and W.
Following H’s violent conduct towards W, W moved, with D, into bed and
breakfast accommodation. H and S remained in the home. The court issued
an occupation order under s 33, ordering H and S to leave the home. The
tenancy of the home was transferred to W and a non-molestation order in
W’s favour was granted. H appealed against the occupation order, arguing
that it would cause significant harm to S under the terms of s 33(7).
The court allowed H’s appeal. Weighing the likelihood of harm in
relation to D and S, it was clear that the balance moved in favour of S, if an
occupation order were to be made. Indeed, if S were to move, a change of
school would be necessary and, further, being removed from his father was
in no way a solution to the resulting problems. Per Butler-Sloss LJ:
For a child of D’s age, the essential security is being where her mother is.
Furthermore ... W’s residence in bed and breakfast accommodation is likely to
be temporary ... For S, the position is much more complex. His security
depends not merely on being in his father’s care, but on his other day to day
support systems, of which his home and school are clearly the most important
... In our judgement if, on the facts of this case, the respective likelihood of harm
are weighed as far as D and S are concerned, the balance comes down in favour
of S suffering the greater harm if an occupation order is made ... We have no
sympathy for H ... were it not for the fact that he is caring for S, and that S has
particular needs which at present outweigh those of D, an occupation order
would undoubtedly have been made.
As you can see in Chalmers, Thorpe LJ stated that the court should first direct
its attention to s 33(6) – the general list of factors, which provide the court
with a wide discretion to make the order or not. If the case is more serious,
and there is the risk of significant harm, Thorpe LJ suggests that the court
must look to s 33(7) and balance the issue of harm. He infers that the two
provisions are exclusive and that, in reality, the question of whether there is
significant harm should be dealt with first. If the balancing exercise that is
part of the sub-section results in no order, then the court can turn to the more
general criteria in the previous sub-section. In Banks v Banks [1999] 1 FLR 726,
the court appears to say that, under s 33(7), there was no significant harm
being caused to the husband. But the court then went on to say that the harm
to the wife, if the order were made, would be significantly greater. One could
ask, why deal with the balance of harm test if there is no harm on the facts to
begin with? In addition (and at the same time), the court stated that under
the general criteria the order could not be granted. This therefore treats the
two provisions as being applicable at the same time, which conflicts with the
decision of the Court of Appeal in Chalmers. In B v B, the Court of Appeal
again considered the two provisions and found in the husband’s favour.
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However, here there was no clear priority between the sub-sections or any
indication as to the best method of application of the two.
The possible period for the order to last is established in s 33(10) as being
that period defined by the court in the order, or the occurrence of any event
indicated in the order, or until further order – meaning indefinitely unless
and until the court revokes it. You should remember to link this to the
powers of the courts under the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees
Act (TLATA) 1996 covered in the previous chapter. If the courts are likely to
limit the length of the life of an occupation order under the FLA 1996, would
it not be better to use the TLATA 1996?
7.5.2.2 Section 35
Section 35 covers ex-spouses where one of the couple has a right to occupy
the home, while the other does not. An example where this might arise is
where the husband is the sole owner and the wife has matrimonial home
rights. On divorce, she would lose these rights due to the change in her
status. In this situation the ex-wife would be able to make an application
under s 35, only in respect of the former matrimonial home or a property
which was intended to be a matrimonial home.
If an order is sought, it may be to ensure that the applicant can remain in
the property if already there, or to be permitted to return to the property. It
may also regulate the respondent’s occupation of the property and ability to
enter into the area in which the home is located.
When deciding these cases the courts will again have regard to the
circumstances, including the factors in s 35(6). In addition to the factors for
applicants under s 33, the court must look at the length of time since the
parties separated and also the time since the dissolution of the marriage and
whether any other proceedings are ongoing (that is, ancillary claims in
divorce). The balance of harm test also applies to this section.
In S v F (Occupation Order) [2000] 1 FLR 255, H and W divorced in
1994. Their matrimonial home was in London. They had two children, S, a
boy aged 17, and D, a girl aged 15, at the time of trial. H and W agreed
that W would remain in the home in London with S and D in order that
they might finish their education. H then moved to Kuala Lumpur, and
argued that, because of his contributions, he had a beneficial interest in the
London home. During a visit by S and D to H in Kuala Lumpur, W
declared her intention to leave the London home and move to Somerset. S
refused to move with W. D was taken by another relative to live in the
countryside; S was taken in by H’s sister. H was granted an order
preventing the sale of the London home. H applied for an order permitting
him to occupy the London home with S. The court allowed H’s application.
He was instructed to proceed under s 35 because of a lack of firm evidence
relating to his beneficial interest. Under s 35(6) consideration had to be
given to an applicant’s resources and housing needs. Additionally, attention
had to be given to the effect of an order on the parties’ health and well-
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being. When the facts were balanced, the order for which H was applying
would provide greater security when compared with any short-term
problems likely to involve W. It had to be remembered too, that W
was responsible in some measure for the existing state of affairs. H would
be allowed, therefore, to return to the London home for six months; W
would be given leave to apply for discharge of the order if H failed at any
time to comply with an undertaking which he had given to pay the
mortgage.
Naturally this would depend on how long ago the marriage was ended, and
it is not envisaged that the courts will be ousting an owner 10, 15 or 20 years
after the other spouse left. However, once the divorce is made absolute, if the
parties are not living together, under the existing law, there is little that can
be done to obtain occupation of the ex-matrimonial home. If the wife is
claiming the home as part of the post-divorce financial settlement, but has
nowhere else to go in the meantime, it might be perfectly justifiable to ‘oust’
the husband (if he can maintain himself elsewhere) until the outcome of the
ancillary proceedings.
Any order made under s 35 will have a limited lifespan – initially the
order can last for up to six months. It may be extended on one or more
occasions for similar periods.
7.5.2.3 Section 36
Section 36 applies to cohabitants who are not co-owners or tenants, or former
cohabitants who are not co-owner or tenants. The order that can be sought is
one potentially to remove the cohabitant or former cohabitant with property
rights, or to regulate their use of the property. It will be granted only after
the court has considered all the circumstances of the case including the
matters specified in s 36(6) (which are very similar to s 35). When the court is
considering the ‘nature of the relationship’ under s 36(6)(e), it must ‘have
regard to the fact that [the couple] have not given each other the
commitment involved in marriage’ (s 41(2)).
As part of a package of considerations, you may agree that so far as
occupation of a home is concerned, where otherwise the applicant has no
rights at all in relation to the property, the fact that the couple are unmarried
Question
If the court is faced with an application to remove a partner due to their
violence, should s 41(2) make any substantive difference?
Question
Is it right to give an ex-wife rights in the former matrimonial home?
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may be relevant. Many of you will not see the significance of commitment as
having any role to play. The reasons why a couple do not marry may have
nothing to do with the level of commitment they feel to one another.
Arguably by including this provision, the law is prejudging cohabitation and
declaring it ‘second-best’ and certainly not indicative of any long-term
intentions. It may be suggested that this provision was included to ensure
the passage of the Bill through Parliament after its earlier defeat as the
Family Homes and Domestic Violence Bill.
The duration of a s 36 order is also more limited than other occupation
orders. The initial order may last for six months, with the scope to extend it
once only for another maximum period of six months.
Given the current state of the civil jurisdiction, and the lengthy details
encountered, it may be that s 36 merely operates as a stopgap which will fall
short of what is practically needed.
7.5.3 Nature of proceedings
It is possible to obtain an FLA 1996 occupation order or non-molestation
order on a without notice basis. Consistent with the rest of the FLA 1996, the
court’s powers to grant a without notice order are set out in the Act itself,
including the factors which will support the making of the order without
notice. These factors are set out in s 45 and, in addition to all the
circumstances of the case, include the following:
• any risk of significant harm to the applicant or relevant child,
attributable to the conduct of the respondent, if the order is not made
immediately;
• whether it is likely that the applicant will be deterred or prevented from
pursuing an application; and
• whether there is any evidence that the respondent is aware of the
proceedings and is deliberately evading service and the delay in effecting
service will prejudice the applicant.
Question
Do you think these are workable?
Question
If a cohabitant is seeking rights of ownership via a constructive trust,
could this be achieved in a 12-month period? Will the applicant
necessarily have alternative accommodation after her occupation order
has ended and before her property action is concluded?
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The issues the court must have regard to before making an order on a
without notice basis are founded on common sense, and probably reflect the
factors that the judiciary already consider before making without notice
orders generally. By the inclusion of s 45 of the FLA 1996 merely reaffirms
the requirement of urgency that should be part of the making of orders in the
absence of the respondent.
7.5.4 Undertakings
In many situations the court will accept an undertaking from the respondent
rather than impose an order. The giving of an undertaking does not have the
same ‘wrongdoer’ stigma as being the subject of an order, hence the
popularity of undertakings. The FLA 1996 provides for undertakings in s 46
but also makes it clear when an undertaking will not be acceptable: ‘(3) The
court shall not accept an undertaking ... in any case where apart from this
section a power of arrest would be attached to the order.’
As well as this limitation, the section also states that the undertaking is
enforceable as if it was an order of the court (sub-s 4). While this sub-section
does not change the previous position at law relating to undertakings, the fact
that this position is clearly stated may make a difference. Some respondents to
domestic violence actions see an undertaking as an easy way out and, as it is
not incorporated into an order, as something that can be easily broken. In
practice, enforcement of undertakings is not highly successful, the best
normally achievable being the making of a full order which may be seen as
more ‘legal’.
7.5.5 Enforcement
The breach of an order will carry certain penalties, the prospect of
committal for breach being the normal one, since it is a contempt of court.
As under the previous statutory provisions, the court may also attach a
power of arrest to any order made, including without notice orders. The
details of the court’s powers are set out in s 47. The basis upon which a
power of arrest may be attached requires the respondent to have used or
threatened violence to the person of the applicant or a relevant child, and
the court is not satisfied that in all the circumstances of the case the
applicant or child will be adequately protected without such a power of
arrest.
The problem with powers of arrest is that the trigger point to arrest is an
actual breach of the order. This may well mean that the applicant, the
Question
Do you think this form of enforcement is sufficient?
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beneficiary of the order, has to, again, suffer violence to their person – not
really helpful at all. However there are likely to be situations where the
existence of the power of arrest does dissuade the respondent from
molesting the applicant.
Powers of arrest may be granted in without notice situations. Here the
only difference is that the court must believe that there is a risk of significant
harm on an immediate basis. The need for significant harm is to reflect the
draconian nature of attaching the power of arrest in a situation where only
one party’s side of the story has been heard.
In H v H (A Child) (Occupation Order: Power of Arrest) (2001) The Times,
10 January, an occupation order was made against a 17-year-old minor who
had been ordered out of the family home, with a requirement not to re-enter
for six months, and a power of arrest attached. The minor appealed against
the attachment of a power of arrest. The Court of Appeal held that if the
court had made the occupation order and it had appeared that the
respondent had used violence against the applicant, then the court had to
attach a power of arrest if it was needed to protect the applicant. The power
of arrest was not merely there to provide a quick route into the criminal
process but also enabled the respondent to be removed from the family
home.
7.6 STALKING
In 1997, after much publicity, the Protection from Harassment Act (PHA)
1997 was passed which creates a new, criminally enforceable offence of
stalking. In addition, the PHA 1997 introduces civil remedies, which
include injunctive relief, as well as the ability for a victim to seek damages.
While this Act may not be primarily focused on the domestic violence
victim, the clear links with harassment and molestation may mean that it
is another means to obtain protection. The victim will not have to be
‘associated’ in the sense of the FLA 1996; this is a clear benefit. However,
although the victim may obtain civil law redress, the criminal law
provisions will arguably suffer from the same problems outlined at the start
of this chapter, notably the delay and the nature of the punishment that
will ensue.
7.7 REFORM
The Government announced an overhaul of the current domestic violence
legislation in the Queen’s Speech in November 2003. The Bill to achieve this
overhaul – the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill (the Bill) – was
introduced into the House of Lords on 27 November 2003 and it devotes four
clauses to the topic of domestic violence.
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7.7.1 Proposed changes to the legislative regime
The Bill makes very few changes to the legislative regime outlined above;
some of the changes to be introduced will do little to remove the confusion
that exists due to the already overlapping criminal and civil jurisdictions;
others will address legitimate concerns, but they certainly are not sufficiently
drastic to amount to an overhaul or modernisation. 
The first change will come to the non-molestation order. Clause 1 of the
Bill will introduce a new section, s 42A, into the FLA 1996, and creates a
criminal offence of breaching a non-molestation order: ‘(1) A person who
without reasonable excuse does anything that he is prohibited from doing by
a non-molestation order is guilty of an offence.’
The clause goes on to make clear that the person whose activities are
restricted will not be subject to a criminal sanction unless they are aware of
the existence of the order and its terms (see amendment to cl 1 moved by
Baroness Anelay, 8 January 2004). The maximum sentence on summary
conviction is six months and/or a fine and on indictment is five years and/or
a fine (cl 1(5)). What the clause usefully does is ensure that any conduct which
is punished under this provision by way of criminal proceedings cannot be
made the subject of civil contempt proceedings (cl 1(3) and (4)).
Clause 3 seeks to extend the definition of cohabitants found in s 62 of
the FLA 1996 – this being the section that establishes whether the applicant
and respondent are ‘cohabitants, relevant children and associated persons’.
The new definition will include same-sex couples as cohabitants if their
relationship is deemed ‘equivalent’ to that of husband and wife, implying
there must be some form of intimate or sexual relationship present. For
same-sex couples, who are not treated as cohabitants due to this change,
they will still be associated since cl 4 extends the definition of associated
persons to include those who ‘have or have had an intimate personal
relationship with each other which is or was of significant duration’. It
should be noted that one of the amendments proposed by Baroness Anelay
would change the latter part to: ‘of such significance as to justify the
making of an order’ (amendment moved on 5 January 2004), but this has
not been accepted.
In relation to occupation orders, Sched 10 of the Bill will require the
court to consider making a non-molestation order if it is being asked to
make an occupation order. This is to be achieved by amending s 42 of the
FLA 1996.
Finally, the ability of the court to attach a power of arrest under s 47 will
only relate to breaches of occupation orders not, as currently, to both non-
molestation and occupation orders (see Sched 10 to the Bill).
This latter change makes sense given that breach of the new non-
molestation order will automatically be a criminal offence, hence negating
the need for a power of arrest. However, it is curious that only the non-
molestation order, if breached, will now be classed as a criminal offence,
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whilst breach of an occupation order will not. The explanatory notes to the
Bill justify this by saying that a ‘history of violence or molestation is not a
prerequisite for the grant of an order’ and suggest that the requirement of
the court to consider making a non-molestation order, when dealing with
occupation orders, will be sufficient to protect the victim (para 26). However,
as you have seen, the case law on domestic violence and the seeking of
occupation orders will invariably require evidence of harm. The criteria
upon which the occupation order can be granted makes this evident with the
reference to the ‘conduct of the parties to one another’; the effect of the
decision of the court on the ‘health, safety or well-being of the parties’ and
the requirement that the court consider if anyone is at risk of significant
harm (s 33 of the FLA 1996). Added to this, the court has traditionally seen
an occupation order as a draconian order since it removes the right (even if
time limited) of a land owner leasee/tenant to enjoy the benefits from that
status. It will hence be the rare case where the applicant cannot or will not
have to show some form of harm or history of molestation to be successful in
obtaining an occupation order.
It will also remain to be seen if the ability of the court to grant a non-
molestation order, when there is an application for an occupation order will
be used. In some cases, an occupation order is not sought at the outset of
proceedings for domestic violence but after non-molestation orders have not
been effective in preventing continued violence. Arguably, the fact that a
breach of a non-molestation order will be punishable via criminal
proceedings will reduce the need to seek the more draconian order. However,
an anomaly exists in that the civil court is very reluctant to imprison for acts
of domestic violence, although this may be changing. In the case of Lomas v
Parle [2003] EWCA Civ 1804, the respondent was sentenced, under the PHA
1997, to a community rehabilitation order, whereas the contempt proceedings
for breach of the non-molestation order resulted in four months
imprisonment.
In addition to these changes to the FLA 1996, amendments will be made
to the PHA 1997. As has been seen, the current PHA 1997 enables the court,
if convicting the defendant under s 2 or s 4, to make a restraining order
against the defendant – in effect achieving the same result as an injunction in
the civil jurisdiction, with the advantage that breach is a criminal offence.
Clause 12 of the Bill enables the court to make a restraining order if ‘a person
(‘the defendant’) is acquitted of an offence’ (cl 12 – inserting a new s 5A into
the PHA 1997). The main objection to this amendment to the PHA 1997 is
that the defendant has not been convicted and hence has not been proven to
have committed the acts of harassment. This issue is not mentioned at all in
the explanatory notes, and is probably the reason why Baroness Analey
moved an amendment (16 December 2003) to require that before the court
does make a restraining order it ‘is satisfied on the basis of facts proved on a
balance of probabilities that it is necessary to make an order to protect a
person from harassment by the defendant’.
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It is not clear how this amendment will strengthen domestic violence
remedies – surely the victim could simply use the FLA 1996 for a non-
molestation order? Arguably, the incentive to permitting restraining orders
in the event of an acquittal must be that not all victims will seek civil
remedies (hence raising the question of whether the state should take this
step for them) and not all potential victims under the PHA 1997 would fall
within the criteria of applicants for a non-molestation order under the FLA
1996.
7.7.2 The overlapping jurisdiction
As can be seen, the amendments to the FLA 1996 and the PHA 1997 does not
delineate between them – it will still be the case that civil proceedings may
be brought under the FLA 1996 and criminal proceedings under the PHA
1997 with resulting difficulties for sentencing.
7.8 SUMMARY
Domestic violence is an issue within family law that has, over the last three
decades, become more prominent. The realisation that violence does occur in
the home environment led to a variety of statutes being passed to deal with
specific problems as they were seen to arise. The resulting plethora of
legislation led to claims of undue complexity and overlapping jurisdictions.
The FLA 1996 has tried to overcome this by introducing a coherent set of
rules and orders that are available to a wider range of applicants in a variety
of courts.
7.9 END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT
Four years ago Ingrid began to cohabit with Max in his three-bedroomed
house. Ingrid has no rights of ownership.
Max has always been temperamental with frequent bouts of
depression. In the last 18 months these have become far more common,
and Max has started to exhibit violent tendencies. Ingrid, in the last two
months, has visited the local hospital’s accident and emergency
department twice with broken ribs, bruising and a dislocated shoulder
after being attacked by Max.
Max is always apologetic when he realises what he has done and
always swears never to do anything like that again.
Advise Ingrid on what rights she has to obtain protection.
Understanding Family Law
146
CHAPTER 8
8.1 OBJECTIVES
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
• discuss the notion of children’s rights;
• discuss the historical background to child law and the Children Act 1989;
and
• list and define the fundamental principles of the Children Act 1989.
You are now moving on to a major part of family law, and one which
interlinks with the law of marriage and divorce. Childhood is seen as a time
of vulnerability and one which requires protection. The law therefore seeks
to protect, but preferably in a non-interventionist way. This may sound a
little contradictory, but the philosophy of the law will become clear in the
next few chapters. You will start by learning about the Children Act (CA)
1989, the main legislation concerning children, and the principles that the
Act introduces. After you have mastered this, you will move on to orders
that can be made in respect of children in both private and public law. This
latter topic will be quite a long chapter and will take careful studying. You
will conclude by looking at the areas of wardship and adoption. However,
the whole topic of children’s law is not complex once you have mastered the
basic concepts. To start then, you will be considering the concept of
childhood, whether children have rights and some of the fundamental
principles of the CA 1989.
8.2 WHAT IS CHILDHOOD?
The things you could have written down are potentially endless – much may
depend on the type of childhood you yourself had.
For many, childhood reflects a period of inexperience, vulnerability,
dependency, learning and inquisitiveness, lack of responsibility and
innocence.
Question
How would you define childhood? Write down the things that childhood
encapsulates.
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THE LAW RELATING TO CHILDREN
The changing nature of childhood should be apparent or known to you,
whether you are a parent or not. How many times do the media present the
image of children who have lost their naïvety, or children who act like adults
in the sense of doing adult things? Do you long for the days when childhood
was a simple and innocent period in one’s life? The fact that what is expected
of children, and indeed what children themselves seek and desire, has
changed, and that many of those changes are accepted by society as a whole,
points to the idea of the concept of childhood as being ‘socially constructed’.
This idea gains strength when we reflect upon the attitude to, and perception
of, children in the past.
As you may be aware, children were for many centuries seen as the
property of the parents over whom the parents had considerable rights.
Children were not perceived as having needs in the sense that we would
understand today; their youthful spirits needed to be controlled and
children were seen to need training, almost in the same way as we train
dogs! The Industrial Revolution and the philanthropic movement of the
Victorian era helped change society’s views on children and childhood. The
change in working patterns in the Industrial Revolution resulted in less
home-working for children as part of the family. Children, due to their
cheapness, were however integrated into factory employment. This did not
continue since the philanthropist movement encouraged parliament to
reduce working hours for children and to regulate the employment of
children. In addition the increasing number of adult males needing
employment encouraged a reduction in child labour. Childhood, as a period
of dependency and lack of responsibility, could be argued to have been
created in the 18th and 19th centuries as this is also the time when more
widespread schooling was introduced, which we would see as being a more
typical childhood activity.
The length of childhood probably had nothing to do with the theoretical age
of majority. The social class of the individual child would be crucially
important. Childhood lasted much longer in the upper classes. Most children
of the lower classes, even if they were lucky enough to obtain some sort of
basic education, would be in employment in their very early teens (if not
before).
Question
How long do you think childhood, as created in the 18th/19th centuries,
lasted?
Question
Do you think childhood is changing?
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Today, legally, childhood lasts until a child is 18. At least, that is the age of
majority. Most children remain in education until they are 18, with a large
percentage taking their studies further. The law today also places more
restrictions on what children can do, when, and at what age.
The sort of things you could have thought of includes:
• at 10, a minor can be convicted of a criminal offence;
• at 16 a minor can marry with the consent of all those with parental
responsibility, or the with courts’ authority; and
• at 17 a minor can drive a car.
There appear to be as many inconsistencies with the way that the law treats
children today, as in times gone past. Much will depend on a child’s age and
understanding, or the level of competency that the child has. The fact that the
law looks at issues, such as the understanding of the child itself, indicates that
there can be no clear definition of what a child is, or what can be expected of
children in society, and this makes the adoption of legal principles difficult.
Finally, you should note that many of the activities that are within the scope
of a child’s grasp are different from those in the past, which illustrates how
changes in society’s attitudes directly affect the legislative provisions. An
example is the age of marriage which, as you may recall from earlier in this
book, used to be 12 years of age.
8.3 CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
Children, being semi-autonomous individuals, are theoretical holders of
rights. As you can see, at certain (normally specified) ages, children can ‘do’
Question
To what extent do children have rights?
Question
Is there any clarity in the manner in which a child is treated under the law?
Question
What sort of things does the law say about what a child can do?
Question
How does this compare with today? Which view is preferable?
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specified things. There is also the perception of gaining rights as the child
increases in age and maturity. However one of the problems with these so
called rights is the difficulty that the child may have in enforcing these
rights.
In this situation, who could they claim against other parties than their
parents? Is this the manner in which children should be encouraged to act?
More to the point, if they wished to take the matter to court, could they act
in person? While a child can sue through a litigation friend, generally a
parent, applications by children are not permitted on a carte blanche basis.
Some applications can be brought by a child under the CA 1989, subject to
leave and to an assessment of the child’s competence to make the
application.
The difficulty with having rights is the specific nature of the rights in
question. As stated earlier, if those rights are not truly enforceable, can they
be said to be rights at all? The impact of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), with regard to enforcement of the rights enshrined
within the convention, is such that if a child is a victim, then they will have
the right to claim breach of those rights, and therefore a remedy. Indeed,
you may be aware of cases already where a child has claimed under the
ECHR. If a child wishes to commence a claim, they will normally do so
through their litigation friend, an adult who runs the litigation process for
them on their behalf.  If the child is deemed to have ‘sufficient
understanding’, then the court may grant leave for the child to give
instructions and run the case without a litigation friend.
Competence must relate to the issue in hand; but one of the perceived
dangers must be the assumption that children will lack sufficient
understanding of the processes of law to seek redress through the rights in
the ECHR. It may also be an issue that our system and our legislation give
the rights of enforcement to others, such as the child’s parents, hence
removing the victim from centre stage of the proceedings.
Question
What would be meant by competence in this situation?
Question
If a 13-year-old wishes to buy a pet dog, having saved their Christmas
money, and their parents say no, how can they enforce their rights?
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8.4 THE STATE AND CHILDREN
In relation to protecting children’s rights, there are two main ‘providers’ –
the child’s own parents and the state and it is widely accepted that the state
will play a role in child care matters.
In connection with the CA 1989, the state refers not just to the local authority
social services department (this is probably the first institution you thought
of), but also to the court. Under the CA 1989 principles, the intervention of
the court is to be avoided unless it is necessary in the interests of the child.
This ‘hands off’ principle is intended to realign the balance between the state
and families. It could arguably be seen as regressive, returning to the state of
affairs of previous centuries where children were in effect ignored. In order
to assess this suggestion, and to obtain a more rounded understanding of
today’s child protection law, and family law for children, it is necessary to
consider briefly the history of legal provisions to protect children.
8.4.1 The poor law and property
For many centuries children were seen as property belonging to their
parents. For certain classes children were important for their earning
capacity. Linked to the property model was the belief that only parents had a
responsibility to care or provide for their children. If a parent did not
provide for their offspring little would be done. The Poor Laws, which
provided an early type of welfare benefit, while making provision for
children who were destitute, did not differentiate between children or adult
destitutes. The ability to seek ‘poor relief’ was seen to be the ‘last resort’, and
where children were concerned the main obligation to provide came from
the family. Where state relief was sought, and latterly this would have been
via the workhouse, it was made to be so unpleasant and harsh that many
were discouraged from seeking any relief at all, which meant that the poor
tax was also kept to a minimum. The attitude was very much that the ‘idle
poor’ should not be maintained by the state.
The philanthropic movement in the Victorian era, following on from a
time of great exploitation of children in employment terms, saw the
beginnings of larger scale state intervention. As you have seen, this was
directed at regulating the employment of children, and not at the actual care
of children within the family. Schooling also became more widespread
although not a legal requirement. The Ragged Schools, voluntary schools for
the education of destitute children, originated in about 1818, around the time
that Dr Thomas Barnardo established his first home for destitute boys.
Question
Who or what is meant by the state? How much involvement should the
state have?
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Initially, only children who lived rough were provided with care and
accommodation by these institutions. This concept of provision, care and
accommodation to needy children developed into the ‘removal of children’
who needed ‘saving’ from the poor care provided by their parents. At that
time what was being done was illegal, and contrary to the proprietary rights
which a parent had over their children. The idea of state welfare being
restricted only to those who are deserving poor is very reminiscent of the
attitude today. Most state benefits are reliant on availability to work, or good
reason for lack of availability. The levels of benefit, despite some political
comment, are set at a level designed to be at subsistence level, but also so
low as to make it less worthwhile being on benefits compared to being in
employment.
Legal sanctions for neglect and abuse of children at the hands of parents
did not arise until much later.
8.4.2 Legislation
With regard to the prevention of cruelty to children, it would appear that
the UK was behind in its thinking. Legal action had been taken in the USA,
and societies founded to prevent cruelty, several years earlier. However,
even the USA did not initially recognise child abuse as a problem, the first
American case involving cruelty being based on US legislation designed to
prevent cruelty to animals (see further Cobley, Child Abuse and the Law, 1995,
Cavendish Publishing). The first society in the UK to work to protect
children was formed in 1882. The National Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children was granted its Royal Charter in 1894, having been
formed from a conglomeration of smaller societies. This was in fact later
than the formation of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals!
The first statute to criminalise child cruelty, the Prevention of Cruelty
Act, was passed in 1889. As well as making neglect or cruelty an offence, the
Act authorised removal of children from their parents where this was
deemed necessary. More legislation followed, with the Children Act 1908
establishing a juvenile court to deal with the cases of delinquent juveniles,
and those children who were suffering neglect and cruelty. This link,
between children who are delinquent and children who need care, continued
throughout the 20th century. It was predicated on the view that children
who acted in a criminal manner were ‘deprived’ in some way of the care and
upbringing that they needed. Juvenile delinquents were not so much
wrongdoers as individuals to whom wrong had been done, in other words
they were equally ‘victims’.
8.4.3 Other means of intervention
It was not just the increasing use of statute to prevent cruelty that introduced
state intervention into the family. The concerns over the health of the nation
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also led to more state involvement. In the time of the Boer War (that is, the
last 20 years of the 19th century), the physical health of the recruits was
exceptionally poor and this was blamed on lack of adequate parenting.
Mothers in particular were ‘accused’ of being ill-educated in child raising,
and this lack of knowledge was placing seen as the national stock at risk.
As a result, middle class spinsters (invariably) took to ‘visiting’ the
working class to teach them the art of child rearing and the benefits of
cleanliness. From this level of intervention the origins of both social work
and health visiting can be seen. These interventions have continued and have
been given legal footing by legislation.
8.4.4 Up to the CA 1989
After the implementation of the Children Act 1908 no great changes occurred
until the Children Act 1948, and these changes were driven by the perception
that state intervention in child care was chaotic. The Curtis Committee, 1946,
recommended the establishment of a centralised child care service. This was
done via the Children Act 1948, and children’s departments were created.
There was no real distinction between delinquents and children who simply
needed care, and reasons for being in care were more diverse than today.
The numbers of children in care were large, with 64,000 children in care in
1952, although a large proportion of these children were there due to
homelessness when their parents could not afford to pay rent. Preventive
work was not as apparent as it is today in reducing the numbers of children
in care.
The next major piece of legislation was the Children and Young Persons
Act 1969, which came after the so-called discovery of ‘baby battering’,
although it is unlikely that legislative changes were founded upon this
(re)discovery of child abuse. Under the 1969 Act, local authority social
workers were given considerable powers to act in cases of child abuse and
to enable the protection of children. A child could be received into
care either voluntarily or compulsorily. Under the former, no court action
was needed, and following a reception of a child into voluntary care the
local authority could arbitrarily gain a parental rights order giving it all
parental rights over the child. Compulsory care, via the courts, was also
easier to obtain than today since the criteria in the legislation were much
wider.
Additionally, there also existed the place of safety order – an emergency
order. This order could be granted by a magistrate, and would enable the
child to be removed from its parents for up to 28 days. The criteria relevant
to the making of the order was that it was suspected that the child was being
ill-treated or, alternatively, the existence of any of the criteria upon which a
compulsory care order could be made.
Although the 1969 Act was in force for some considerable time, it was
severely criticised for being too draconian.
153
8.5 WHY THE CHILDREN ACT – WHY 1989?
The state of child care law had been criticised by the Short Committee which
in turn led to the setting up of a government working party which produced
a report, Review of Child Care Law in 1984. Many of the recommendations of
this review were incorporated into the White Paper, The Law on Child Care
and Family Services, published in 1987 (Cm 62, HMSO).
The primary impetus for change was the criticism that was levelled at
local authority social workers throughout the 1970s and 1980s concerning the
way that the 1969 Act was being used. With an increased awareness of
family rights and responsibilities, the interpretation of the criteria and the
lack of participation of parents when children were perceived to be at risk,
were criticised. The 1969 Act focused on what had happened as opposed to
what might happen. Hence, the work of social services departments was still
being directed to reactive situations, the idea of preventive work was not
seen as a priority. Finally, the number of high profile child abuse cases in the
1980s increased the perception that there was a lack of competent
intervention by social workers or, conversely, that the state intervened too
much into the lives of families.
The Review of Child Care Law felt that on balance there was an excess of
state intervention in relation to child care. Consequently, the implementation
of the CA 1989 was designed to:
• reduce the powers of the state;
• protect families from excessive state intervention;
• emphasise the support role for social services; and
• emphasise the role parents have to play when children are cared for by
the state.
As such, the thinking clearly reflects Art 8 of the ECHR which requires that a
citizen’s private and family life be respected and that a public authority shall
not interfere with this right unless necessary.
The level of concern about private law issues was considerably less. One of
the main problems was the extent of legislation that existed in relation to
children (both in public and private matters). The CA 1989 repealed many
other Acts, or at minimum amended them. As well as a plethora of
legislation, there was also a question mark over the extent of state
involvement via the courts into private matters, principally in divorce. In
Question
The above concerns have been in relation to state involvement in family
life, do you think that there were concerns about private law aspects of
child law?
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the majority of divorce matters the court would be asked to make custody
(as they were then called) orders even if parents were in agreement. This
was not perceived to be necessary. The timing of the Review of Child Care
Law (1984) coincided with the investigation into the state of family law by
the Law Commission. The two reports were combined to produce ‘[T]he
most comprehensive and far reaching reform of child law which has come
before Parliament in living memory’ (Lord Mackay, Hansard, HL, vol 502,
col 488).
8.6 THE CHILDREN ACT 1989 – KEY PRINCIPLES
Unlike older statutes, the CA 1989 clearly identifies key principles which
underpin the whole operation of the Act and these principles are found in
ss 1 and 17, which state as follows:
1 Welfare of the child
(1) When a court determines any question with respect to –
(a) the upbringing of a child; or
(b) the administration of a child’s property or the application of any
income arising from it, the child’s welfare shall be the court’s
paramount consideration.
(2) In any proceedings in which any question with respect to the
upbringing of a child arises, the court shall have regard to the general
principle that any delay in determining the question is likely to
prejudice the welfare of the child.
(3) In the circumstances mentioned in subsection (4), a court shall have
regard in particular to –
(a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned
(considered in the light of his age and understanding);
(b) his physical, emotional and educational needs;
(c) the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances;
(d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the
court considers relevant;
(e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering;
(f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to
whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting
his needs;
(g) the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the
proceedings in question.
(4) The circumstances are that –
(a) the court is considering whether to make, vary or discharge a
section 8 order, and the making, variation or discharge of the order
is opposed by any party to the proceedings; or
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(b) the court is considering whether to make, vary or discharge an
order under Part IV (public law orders)
(5) Where a court is considering whether or not to make one or more
orders under this Act with respect to the child, it shall not make the
order or any of the orders unless it considers that doing so is better for
the child than making no order at all.
...
17 Provision of services for children in need, their families and others
(1) It shall be the general duty of every local authority ...
(a) to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area
who are in need; and
(b) so far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the upbringing of
such children by their families, by providing a range and level of
services appropriate to those children’s needs.
8.6.1 The child’s welfare and the welfare checklist
8.6.1.1 Welfare
You may have believed that the interests of the child would be paramount
when any question was being decided in relation to their upbringing, so
why state it explicitly? Do you remember the Matrimonial Causes Act
(MCA) 1973 concerning maintenance for children? Did this make the
welfare of the child paramount? Not all statutes relating to children have
the child’s interests first and foremost: consequently it does need to be
expressly stated.
Although paramount does not  mean first and foremost, the Lord Chancellor
explained the wording thus: ‘the welfare of the child should come before and
above any other consideration in deciding whether to make an order’
(Hansard, HL, vol 502, col 1167). Lord MacDermott, in J v C [1970] AC 668,
concluded that: ‘the course to be followed will be that which is most in the
interests of the child’s welfare’ – surely the same as saying that the child’s
welfare comes first? This is an even stronger argument when having regard
to the factors that the court considers when establishing what is in the child’s
welfare. Section 1(3) sets out the welfare checklist, which contains factors
comparable with Lord MacDermott’s facts, relationships, risks and choices.
Question
What is meant by ‘paramount’?
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8.6.1.2 The welfare checklist
The purpose of this checklist is to establish what is the ‘child’s welfare’ by
focusing attention on the individual, and to ensure a greater consistency
across courts and advisers when dealing with children’s matters.
The factors included within the checklist cover the major issues that will be
relevant to individual cases, but they are not the only factors that can be
taken on board by the court. The CA 1989 says, ‘a court shall have regard in
particular’, that is, the list is not limited.
Not all the factors listed in the checklist may be relevant to the particular
case and so it is not necessary for the court to consider them, hence, the court
has discretion as to which factors to apply and focus on.
Although lists normally indicate a hierarchy, this is not the case here. As you
can appreciate, the wishes and feelings of the child may be unascertainable,
or they may be contrary to the court’s and professionals’ view of the child’s
best interests. While the opinions of the child are to be given weight, the
court is alive to the possibility of undue influence by parents. To counter this
possibility, the involvement of professionals, such as children’s guardians,
often occurs either to assist to establish the child’s wishes, or where this is
not possible to provide a professional opinion as to what is in the child’s best
interests.
8.6.1.3 Delay
The principle of avoiding delay, as enshrined in s 1(2) of the CA 1989, is not
just aimed at achieving a more efficient court system. The length of time for
many child care cases to be heard was, prior to the CA 1989, almost as easy
to predict as the length of a piece of string! The Law Commission proposed
the inclusion of this principle since the delay and uncertainty of litigation
was deemed to cause damage to the welfare of the child. Children, it is
believed, need to have some form of stability in their lives and the lack of
Question
Is the list in order of importance?
Question
Is the court bound to consider all the factors?
Question
Is the checklist exhaustive?
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stability inherent in long-standing court action is therefore prejudicial to the
child. The manner in which the court attempts to reduce this delay is by
setting a timetable for child cases. This is the same regardless of whether the
matter is in public or private law.
The timetable is not imposed without reference to the parties’ legal
representatives to the case as it is a negotiated arrangement. If a party is
unable to meet their timetabled obligations, it is always open to them to
return to the court for directions to amend the timetable. Good and
appropriate reasons should be given. Failure to comply with a timetabled
direction, for example, the filing of statements, may mean that the evidence
within that statement will be excluded from the trial. In practice, while this is
an option, it may not be deemed in the best interests of the child to exclude
relevant evidence. It would appear that sanctions are rarely levied against
failure to comply with timetables, and it would appear that timetabling has
only been a qualified success. For example, in public law matters, the aim of
12 weeks to complete a care order application has not been met, cases
routinely taking around five or six months.
8.6.1.4 No order
The principle enshrined in s 1(5) of the CA 1989 is often referred to as the ‘no
order’ principle since it requires the court only to make an order when it is
necessary to do so.
The main purpose of the no order principle is to address the complaint that
the state intervenes too much in family matters; the state referring not just to
the local authority but to the court. Additionally, this principle illustrates
that the CA 1989 complies with Art 8 of the ECHR. The impact of the
principle has been clearly seen in relation to private law cases. According to
the Judicial Statistics 1991 (the last dealing with pre-Children Act 1989
orders) 88,488 custody orders were made in that year. By 2003, 12 years after
implementation of the CA 1989, the number of residence orders sought
(residence orders replacing custody orders) was down to 34,474. On those
applications, 31,996 orders were made, the remainder of applications having
been withdrawn,  refused or no order made (Judicial Statistics, 2003, HMSO).
Question
Which of the criticisms of the previous legal regime is this principle
designed to address?
Question
How is this timetable enforced?
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While there has been a reduction in the number of orders made by nearly a
third, this is not simply by the court applying s 1(5) of the CA 1989 alone. This
reduction in applications indicates that the principle of no order is being
reinforced via legal advice to the parties. If a potential applicant knows that
they may not get their order, even if they satisfy all the criteria, they will think
twice before expending money in the attempt. Also, in so far as private law is
concerned, the fact that the change from custody orders to residence orders
incorporated a change in the rights that were gained or lost, meant there may
be little to gain from an order anyway.
8.6.1.5 The range of orders
Implicit within s 1(5) of the CA 1989 is the court’s discretion to make any of
the orders available under the Act when hearing an application. Indeed, in
defined family proceedings the court has the power to make an order even if
an application has not been made:
10 Power of court to make section 8 orders
(1) In any family proceedings in which a question arises with respect to the
welfare of any child, the court may make a section 8 order with respect
to the child if –
...
(b) the court considers that the order should be made even though no
such application has been made.
The same sort of discretion operates in public law matters, with private law
orders being available on a public law application.
8.6.1.6 Social services
In s 17 of the CA 1989 you were introduced to the concept that local
authorities have a duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in
their area. The means by which this should be done, under s 17, is by the
provision of services.
If the local authority is considering providing services, there is clearly some
sort of state involvement. However, in the scale of involvement, this is not
overly interventionist. It is more of a supportive role than an enforcement
one. In this sense it is in keeping with the main theme of reducing
state involvement. The ability to work with parents to meet
their child’s needs also deals with some of the criticism levelled at the
preceding legislation. The reference, in s 17 of the CA 1989, to keeping
Question
How does the provision of services help meet the principle of reducing
state intervention?
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children with their families continues this theme and reinforces the ideal of
‘families first’.
This reluctance to intervene, and the emphasis on the responsibility of the
parents and family, is reminiscent of the situation in the 19th century when
child care law was in its infancy.
8.7 SUMMARY
You have now completed your introduction to the CA 1989 and the reasons
for its implementation. As you have learnt, state involvement in the family, to
support and promote good child rearing, has developed over a long period.
Some of the advances in child care practices were not based on welfarist
principles per se, but on other grounds, normally economic. The changing
nature of society has caused changes in the expectations of children, with
childhood being seen as a period of vulnerability and lack of responsibility
and when parents have been expected to take on caring, protective duties.
The failure of some parents to meet these duties, and the lack of clarity of
these duties, has led to the introduction of the CA 1989. This Act operates on
the basis that a child’s welfare is paramount, and that the child’s welfare can
be assessed by reference to a checklist of factors. The intervention of the state
is to be avoided if at all possible, and the simple fact of establishing the
criteria needed for CA 1989 orders does not mean that the orders will
automatically be granted.
At the end of this chapter, which is intended primarily to be an
introductory chapter, you have two short questions to attempt. The first may
be a suitable revision question once you have completed the whole of child
care law in this text.
8.8 END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT
1 The Children Act 1989 is designed to support child rearing with
families, and yet to provide the state, through the local authority, with
improved powers to protect children.
Can these principles co-exist?
2 The welfare checklist in s 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 supports the
concept of children’s rights.
Discuss.
Question
Are we regressing with our legislation, or are we supporting an
enlightened outlook on child raising and family values?
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9.1 OBJECTIVES
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
• explain the concept of parental responsibility;
• advise hypothetical clients about seeking parental responsibility;
• discuss the meaning of the orders available under s 8 of the Children Act
(CA) 1989; and
• answer problem questions in relation to private law matters.
If you are a lover of substantive law, you will enjoy considering much more
legislation in this chapter than in the last one. We are now commencing our
in-depth study of the CA 1989. Initially we will concentrate on private law
matters, being the range of orders that are normally called into play due to
parental separation or divorce. The principles covered earlier, within s 1 of
the CA 1989, will be highly relevant to these orders. We will also need to
understand the meaning and importance of ‘parental responsibility’ – a
crucial concept under the CA 1989.
9.2 THE CONCEPT OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
9.2.1 A definition
The phrase ‘parental responsibility’ (PR) is one which you came across
earlier in this book. In the sense that it implies a parent’s moral duty over
their children, its meaning should be clear. However, the nature of the
moral duty and its meaning does not automatically equate to the legal
definition.
The definition is found in s 3 of the CA 1989 which states: ‘(1) ... parental
responsibility means all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and
authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his
property.’
Did your definition bear any resemblance to this? If not, do not worry, since
the Act’s interpretation of PR is not really a definition at all if you expect a
definition to provide a meaning for the phrase. Indeed, s 3(1) has been described
Question
If you were responsible for defining the term ‘PR’, how would you do so?
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as a ‘non-definition’ (per Lord Meston, Hansard, HL, vol 502, col 1172). What 
s 3(1) does, therefore, is to provide another set of things to be explained.
The phrase PR connotes a relationship of decision making by the parent for
the child; it implies dependency by the child with a protective role for
parents. In this regard, the CA 1989, in introducing PR, is trying to
emphasise the responsibility and duty that a parent owes to the child. The
term ‘rights’ is included in s 3(1); however, this term is in the minority, and
the majority of terms give rise to an implication of a mere power relationship,
with the child as the subservient partner. This argument can be supported by
the statement by Lord Fraser in Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech AHA [1985]
3 All ER 402, when discussing how PR and the various functions within it
should be utilised: ‘They [parental responsibilities] exist for the benefit of the
child and they are justified only in so far as they enable the parent to perform
his duties towards the child ...’
Given that the phrase PR implies a mixture of rights-based powers and
responsibilities or duties towards a child, the question arises: what exactly
are those powers and duties?
9.2.2 What is included within PR?
Many of the aspects of PR are based on common law; as you have seen,
statute does not provide a composite list. Things you should have thought
about are as follows:
• the duty to provide the child with care;
• linked to the above duty, the duty to protect the child;
• the duty to ensure that the child is educated;
• the duty to ensure the child receives timely and appropriate medical
attention (you could include this with the general care duty, above);
• the right to name the child;
• the right to choose a religion for the child;
• the right to discipline the child; and
• the right to act or bring proceedings on behalf of the child.
Question
What are the things you think are included within PR? What do you think
the consequences are for a parent if they fail in their duties?
Question
What type of legal relationship does s 3(1) envisage existing between
parents and children?
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As you can see, these functions of being a parent have been split into duties
and rights; some authors (for example, Cretney, Masson and Bailey-Harris)
refer to all of them in a rights-based context. However, given that failure to
comply with some of these functions can lead to criminal or civil action
against the parent, it is perhaps less appropriate to talk of rights in all
situations.
Some of these functions are quite easy to understand and need little by
way of explanation.
If it is accepted that childhood is socially constructed (see Chapter 8), then it
should follow that the matters within PR will be capable of change as
society’s views on children alter. Clearly there will be some fluidity within
the concept of PR. Even if you do not agree with the notion of social
construction, PR will change as the child develops. This was accepted by the
Law Commission in its report (No 172):
... the list must change from time to time to meet differing needs and
circumstances. As the Gillick case itself demonstrated, it must also vary with
the age and maturity of the child and the circumstances of each individual
case.
9.2.3 Some interpretations
9.2.3.1 The duty to care and protect
The duty to care for a child encompasses a wide range of different activities.
It focuses not just on the physical care of the child, but also on the emotional
and social development, which should be nurtured. The fact that emotional
care is important can be seen from the welfare checklist which requires the
court to have regard to the emotional needs of the child. Practically, caring
for a child requires provision of suitable accommodation, the child to be
adequately fed and clothed, and to be raised in as loving and stable an
environment as possible. For some parents this duty will be reduced to the
duty to provide financial maintenance, governed, as you are aware, by the
Child Support Acts 1991 and 1995.
The duty to provide care is fundamental to a child’s upbringing, and the
consequences for failure can be harsh. Both civil and criminal law sanctions
Question
What would be the consequences of failing in this duty?
Question
Is this list exhaustive?
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can be imposed. Under the criminal law, if a parent neglects a child, they
may be prosecuted for cruelty under the Children and Young Persons Act
1933. This Act is often used in child abuse cases, even if the harm to the child
has been quite severe (including death), since it is evidentially easier to
prove neglect than other more serious offences. Naturally, charges may be
under other statutes, for example, the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
Under the civil law, by failing to care for a child, the parent risks the child
being removed from their care under the provisions of the CA 1989. While
you will be looking at child abuse in more detail later, it is important to
remember that not all cases of neglect involve true moral culpability. It is
easy to blame a parent for neglecting a child, but issues of socialisation, and
especially cycles of deprivation, may have a role to play. The ability to
protect a child from harm is obviously part of care. If a parent does nothing
to prevent a child from endangering themselves, and this is more than an
isolated event, then that surely equates with neglect.
9.2.3.2 The duty to educate
Education is seen as part of the developmental process necessary for a child
to pass from the status of a child to an adult. Today we accept that children
should receive education until they are at least 16-years-old. The duty to
ensure that a child receives an education is placed upon carers by virtue of
s 7 of the Education Act 1996. The normal place for education is in a school
setting.
Despite school being the norm, it is still possible for a parent to educate a
child outside the school setting. The legislation requires a child to receive an
‘efficient full-time education suitable to his or her age, ability and aptitude,
either by regular attendance at school or otherwise’. The ability to educate at
home has always proved difficult given the reference to suitability. As
Neville Harris has stated, it is now ‘well-nigh impossible since the
introduction of the National Curriculum’ (Law and Education: Regulation,
Consumerism and the Education System, 1993, Sweet & Maxwell, p 209). Failure
to meet this duty again results in potential criminal and civil sanctions.
Under the Education Act 1996, a parent can be prosecuted for their child’s
non-attendance at school. The penalty imposed upon parents, invariably, is
quite small although there have been cases in the recent past where parents
have been imprisoned for failure to ensure attendance at school by their
children. Civil sanctions are to be found in s 36 of the CA 1989 and they are
as follows:
Question
Would a parent be constrained by the Education Act 1996 to send a child
to school to comply with their duty?
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(1) On the application of any local education authority, the court may make an
order putting the child with respect to whom the application is made under
the supervision of a designated local education authority.
...
(3) A court may only make an education supervision order if it is satisfied that
the child concerned is of compulsory school age and is not being properly
educated.
The education supervision order is a new order under the CA 1989 and is
linked to the repeal of truancy as a ground for a local authority obtaining
care of a child. This is not to say that truancy, or non-school attendance, will
mean a child can never be taken into care.
In O (A Minor) (Care Order: Education: Procedure) [1992] 2 FLR 7, O was a
persistent truant. In 1991, her parents were prosecuted and fined for not
sending her to school. An interim care order was made later but did not have
the desired effect. The local authority then applied for a care order under s 31
of the CA 1989. O and her parents appealed, contending that no impairment
of intellectual or social development had been established by the local
authority and that any harm suffered by O was not significant and that little
more than might be expected in the case of a similar child. The court held
that the appeal would be dismissed. Per Ewbank J:
In my view it was entirely open to the justices to come to the view, as they did,
that O’s intellectual and social development was suffering and was likely to
suffer, and that the harm which she was suffering from or was likely to suffer
from, was significant ... What one has to ask oneself is whether O suffered
significant harm by not going to school. The answer, in my judgment, as in that
of the justices, is obvious. The second threshold condition is that the harm, or
likelihood of harm, is attributable to the care given to the child not being what
it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give him, or that the child is
beyond parental control. In my judgment, where a child is suffering harm in
not going to school and is living at home, it will follow that either the child is
beyond the parents’ control or that they are not giving the child the care that it
would be reasonable to expect a parent to give ... In this appeal O and her
parents have wholly failed in their endeavour to show that the justices came to
the wrong decision.
As this case demonstrates, if the criteria for a care order can be made out,
even if it is purely on the grounds of non-education, the order can be made.
While government statistics indicate that few s 36 orders are made, it is not
due to the care order route being preferred, simply that authorities prefer to
prosecute under the Education Act 1996.
Question
Does this mean that s 36 of the CA 1989 is irrelevant?
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9.2.3.3 Medical treatment
Although this aspect of PR falls within the care function, it warrants separate
consideration. Generally, due to a child’s perceived lack of capacity, a parent
is responsible for ensuring that the requisite consents to medical treatment
are given. Without consent, unless treatment is deemed to be necessary in an
emergency, that treatment will be unlawful.
If a parent fails to ensure treatment is received, they may find themselves
being prosecuted under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, or the
Children and Young Persons Act 1933. If a fatality occurs, they may face
murder or manslaughter charges.
The ability of parents to consent on behalf of their children raises difficult
issues at law, particularly where there is an older child who may wish to
have their own say on medical treatment.
In this area the law is quite complex. If you have studied medical law, you
will already know the difficulties. In the Gillick case the ratio concerned the
narrow issue of whether a girl under 16 years could be given contraceptive
advice and treatment. The obiter dictum of the case referred to the wider issue
of when a child would have sufficient rights to make medical decisions for
themself. Lord Scarman stated:
... I would hold that as a matter of law the parental right to determine whether
or not their minor child below the age of 16 will have medical treatment
terminates if and when the child achieves a sufficient understanding and
intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed. It will
be a question of fact whether a child ... has sufficient understanding of what is
involved. Until the child achieves the capacity to consent, the parental right to
make the decision continues save only in exceptional circumstances.
Although the other Law Lords expressed their views differently, the
accepted implication of the obiter statements has been that where a child has
the required age and understanding to make a decision on treatment (in
other words has capacity), then the child’s right to decide overrides that of
the parent. The parent’s previous rights or duties on this matter will be
terminated. However, this approach has been ‘watered down’ in subsequent
decisions on medical treatment, primarily by Lord Donaldson. Hence the
current position is that children and parents will have parallel rights – the
child gaining capacity does not mean that the parents’ rights end.
Consequently, rather than two parents being capable of making a legal
decision, there are three individuals who can do so, the parents and the
child. In so far as medical treatment is concerned, this is not a satisfactory
principle: would doctors wish to treat a non-consenting 15-year-old?
Question
What do you think should be the approach in that sort of case?
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Ultimately, the medical profession is left to decide, but the cases do ensure
the doctors have freedom from suit! It is also worth noting that the court will
also play a role and has the power to overrule both the parents’ and the
child’s views. For example, in Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment)
[1992] 1 FLR 190, R, aged 15, suffered from a mental illness which resulted in
severely violent and suicidal behaviour. She required medication which she
often refused, on which occasions it had to be administered without her
consent. Medical evidence showed that, without drugs, R rapidly became
violent and had to be restrained. She was made a ward of court so that the
medication could be administered with or without her consent. The judge
held that he could not override the decision of a competent minor to refuse
medication, but it was clear that R was not competent. The application to
administer the medication with or without R’s consent was granted as being
in her best interests. The Official Solicitor appealed on R’s behalf so that the
relevant law might be clarified. The court held that the appeal of the Official
Solicitor would be dismissed. The court was entitled, in the exercise of its
wardship jurisdiction, to override the decision of a minor in relation to the
giving of medication, and this was irrespective of the minor’s general
competence. R seemed not ‘Gillick competent’ and, even if R had been, the
judge was right to consent to her undergoing treatment which might involve
compulsory medication. The judge’s order had been made correctly
In Re M (A Child) (Medical Treatment: Consent) [1999] 2 FLR 1097, the
doctors treating M, aged 15, concluded that unless she received a heart
transplant within a week, she would die. M would not consent, stating that
she did not want to receive another person’s heart and that she did not want
to be on medication for the rest of her life. She also stated that she did not
want to die. These views were expressed after the Official Solicitor had
appointed a local agent to visit M and ascertain her views. An application
was made for leave to carry out the appropriate emergency operation. The
court held that the application would be allowed. M was mature and
intelligent and weight would be given to her expressed views, but it had to
be remembered that she had experienced much trauma. The risks of the
operation and M’s likely resentment in the future could not override the
need to preserve her life. The desire to achieve what was best for M required
authority to be given for the transplant operation.
9.2.3.4 Name and religion
In comparison with some of the PR issues, names and religion are normally
less contentious. A parent is free to name their child in whatever manner
they see fit and a child’s name can be changed by deed poll (although there
are some procedural rules relating to this). However, names, and family
names in particular, do become more of an issue following divorce. Section
13 of the CA 1989 limits the possibility of changing names thus:
(1) Where a residence order is in force with respect to a child, no person may –
(a) cause the child to be known by a new surname ...
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It is important to note that the restriction on the change of name only applies
where there is a residence order in effect (under s 8). If the court has refused
to make an order under the auspices of s 1(5), there would seem to be no
automatic restriction to a unilateral change in name, although the court’s
current approach is that any change of name for a minor should be referred
to them. If an order is in force then, as the section states, the change may take
place where:
• written consent is given by all persons with PR; or
• the court has granted leave for the change.
The former is unproblematic, but difficulties arise where only one parent has
PR; here the court has stated that where there is a dispute over a name a
court order needs to be obtained.
As you may recall from your previous reading, the approach is to
establish what will be in the best interests of the child. However, even
though this is the case, there are certain key principles that the court has
identified:
• there is an long term importance in maintaining the child’s links with the
paternal family;
• would changing the surname lead to any improvement from the point of
view of the child’s welfare; and
• the short term interests in reducing confusion, convenience and lack of
embarrassment (often to the parent not the child) should not outweigh
the longer term interests.
In Dawson v Wearmouth [1999] 1 FLR 1169, the mother had two children from
an existing marriage and continued to use her husband’s surname following
divorce. The mother commenced cohabitation with the father of her third
child, although they did not marry. The relationship ended shortly after the
third child’s birth. Without telling F, the child’s surname was registered as
that of the mother’s ex-husband. F sought an order requiring the child to
have his surname. The House of Lords held that an order for a change of
name ought not to be made unless there was clear evidence that this would
lead to an improvement from the point of view of the welfare of the child, as
per the CA 1989. The fact that the child would have the same name as the
mother and his half-siblings made the name a logical and natural choice. The
Lords found no reasons to counteract this and hence could not justify the
changing of the child’s name.
In Re R (A Child) 2001 EWCA Civ 1344, again the parents of the child
were unmarried. After separation the mother began to call the child by
Question
On what basis do you think the court approaches an application for a
change of name?
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another surname rather than that of the father. In the context of proceedings
to permit the removal of the child to Spain the matter of the surname was
raised. Hale LJ made it clear that the choice of name is part of PR and that
even if PR is not shared between both parents, they both have a right to
challenge any change in name carried out by the other parent. If there is such
a challenge, the role of the court is to establish if the change is justified under
the terms of the CA 1989. In so doing the court is:
... balancing the long-term interests of a child in retaining an outward link
with the parent with whom that child is not living against what are often
shorter-term benefits of lack of confusion, convenience, lack of
embarrassment and the like.
It was noted that the latter factors may not outweigh the benefits of the
retention of the link with the birth parent. In resolving the issue in this case,
the court held that the child should be known by both surnames since this
would reflect the practice in Spain where the child was to live.
9.2.3.5 Discipline
The subject of discipline is one which raises heated debate, particularly
where physical discipline is concerned. Some people fall into the ‘anti-
smacking’ category, with others in the ‘pro-smacking’ category.
Currently our legislation does not prohibit physical discipline by parents,
but any sort of corporal punishment in schools is forbidden. This ban was
not extended to childcarers in other forms – for example, childminders, and
logically they should be able to use corporal punishment if parents consent,
since the doctrine of loco parentis and delegation of parental responsibility
exists. However, this is an issue which has been considered in the court (such
punishment was permitted), but is now likely to be changed so childcarers
are subject to the same rules as schools.
Smacking is one thing, but what about other forms of discipline?
Question
Imagine you are a parent. Your child, who is aged eight, has ‘answered
you back’ or perhaps sworn at you and you feel that this is bad behaviour.
How would you discipline the child? Now imagine that your eight-year-
old child has been caught throwing bricks through the window of the
90-year-old woman four doors down the street. How would you
discipline the child?
Question
To what extent do you believe a parent should be able to discipline their
own children?
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How you respond to this will depend on your own view point on
discipline. If you were asked which was the more serious act, hopefully
you would have said the latter, since swearing, etc, is often a sign of
testing the boundaries with parents. As the latter is the more serious act,
then you may have thought about imposing a more serious form of
discipline (which may or may not include physical discipline) on the child.
To that end, discipline is permitted to the extent that it is commensurate
to the crime and the child in question (and here naturally age would play
a part).
A major difficulty for parents, however, is knowing what is acceptable
by way of discipline. The ability to chastise is subject to a test of
‘reasonableness’ – at least in the context of criminal law proceedings, which
are brought where discipline has exceeded what was reasonable and hence
caused physical harm to the child. The ability of a parent to claim
reasonable chastisement in criminal proceedings has been criticised by
the European Court of Human Rights in the case of A v UK (Human
Rights: Punishment of Child) [1998] 2 FLR 959. As a consequence of this
case, the government issued a Consultation Paper in January 2000 –
Protecting Children, Supporting Parents, A Consultation Document on the
Physical Punishment of Children (Home Office). The main theme of this
document is that parents’ rights to smack or physically chastise their child
would not be removed, but would be subject to stricter boundaries
including:
• the nature and context of the treatment;
• its duration;
• its physical and mental effects; and
• in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.
To date, no legislation has been brought forward to incorporate these
changes.
9.3 WHO HAS PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY?
It is all very well knowing what PR is, but it is essential to appreciate who
has this responsibility since without it enforceable and legally acceptable
decisions cannot normally be made.
9.3.1 Automatic parental responsibility
Question
Who do you believe will have PR?
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The effect of s 2 of the CA 1989 is simple: the only persons who have PR
automatically are:
• the mother;
• the father if he was married to the mother at the time of the child’s
birth;
• the unmarried father, if he jointly registered the birth of the child with
the mother (introduced into the CA 1989 by the Adoption and Children
Act 2002 and covered below in section 9.3.3).
If one or both of the parents validly believe that they are married, but the
marriage is in fact void, they will still have PR as of right (by virtue s 1 of the
Legitimacy Act 1976).
In this case, s 2 of the Legitimacy Act 1976 will come into play. Under this
Act, if parents of a child marry subsequently to the birth of the child, the
child will be legitimated by the later marriage and PR will automatically be
held by the father.
The one category of individual whom you may have thought had PR is the
unmarried father. However, under s 2 of the CA 1989 the unmarried father
does not have PR as of right. This will affect a great number of parents since
the number of births outside marriage is increasing, with approximately one-
third of births being to unmarried women.
9.3.2 The unmarried father
The idea of child raising outside of marriage is not uncommon or unacceptable
today. You probably know couples with children who are ‘only cohabiting’. If a
child is being cared for and raised by both its parents in a stable relationship,
should the law deny that father responsibility for that child? Would your
response differ if the child had been conceived following a rape? This
distinction between the reasons for childbirth outside of marriage is one of the
factors behind the current legislation. It was believed to be preferable to enable
unmarried fathers who did wish to be involved with their children to apply to
be given those rights, rather than the option of giving rights and the application
being to take those rights away. Section 4 of the CA 1989 sets out the way in
which an unmarried father can seek PR on an almost permanent basis:
Question
Who is potentially excluded from automatic PR?
Question
What is the situation if the birth parents marry after the birth?
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4 Acquisition of parental responsibility by father
(1) Where a child’s father and mother were not married to each other at
the time of his birth –
(a) the court may, on the application of the father, order that he shall
have parental responsibility for the child;
(b) the father and mother may by agreement (‘a parental responsibility
agreement’) provide for the father to have parental responsibility
for the child.
9.3.2.1 Parental responsibility agreements
Normally, oral agreements are just as enforceable as written ones. This
general proposition can be rebutted, and this is the case here. Before a PR
agreement can be effective it must be:
• in the form prescribed by regulations made by the Lord Chancellor; and
• recorded in the prescribed manner (per s 4(2)).
Under the regulations, to be valid the agreement needs to be in the required
wording, and to be witnessed. It must also be filed at the Principal Registry
of the Family Division of the High Court, and following this a copy of the
agreement will be sent to each party.
9.3.2.2 Parental responsibility orders
In the event that agreement cannot be reached between the parents, the
unmarried father may apply to the court for a s 4 order. While the county
court and High Court have jurisdiction over private law matters, the Family
Proceedings Court (the magistrates’ court) may be the preferred venue.
As the matter will concern the upbringing of a child, the court will have to
have regard to the welfare of the child, in the sense that the child’s welfare is
paramount. However, the welfare checklist is not a compulsory
consideration since a PR order is made under s 4 and is not caught by the
provisions in s 1(4); however, it may have a subsidiary role to play. Other
factors, established in case law (Re H (Minors) (Local Authority: Parental
Rights) (No 3) [1991] Fam 151) are relevant to the decision of whether or not a
father should get PR and they are:
Question
If an application is made, what factors will the court bear in mind?
Question
For the purposes of s 4 of the CA 1989 and PR agreements, do you think it
will be sufficient for the mother to agree verbally to share parental
responsibility?
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• the degree of commitment which the father has shown towards the 
child;
• the degree of attachment which exists between the father and the child;
and
• the reason of the father for applying for the order.
It is important to note that these factors are not absolute – a father who fulfils
them all may still not get a PR order.
In D v S (Parental Responsibility) [1995] 3 FCR 783, X had denied Y
contact with their child, C, for a year, although contact had recommenced
by the date of the hearing. There was bitterness between X and Y, and a
refusal to discuss any matters relating to C. Later, Y applied for a parental
responsibility order in relation to C. Welfare reports suggested that such
an order would be impracticable; yet the magistrates found that, in fact, Y
was committed to C and that previous contact had been to the benefit of
C. Y appealed against the magistrates’ order of ‘no order’ in relation to
parental responsibility. The court held that Y’s appeal would be allowed.
Y had demonstrated the necessary qualities (see Re H above): appropriate
degree of commitment, a firm firm bond between applicant and child,
and a genuine reason for making the application. Hostility between father
and mother did not constitute an appropriate bar. Y had demonstrated
that he recognised his responsibilities to the child he loved. The
magistrates were clearly in error and a parental responsibility order would
be made.
Where more than one person has PR, the responsibility is not shared per se
and s 2(7) of the CA 1989 provides that: ‘Where more than one person has
parental responsibility for a child, each of them may act alone and without
the other in meeting that responsibility ...’
Hence, although the father may get PR there is no guarantee he can use it
– unless of course statute requires some form of action from all PR holders.
The granting of PR does give the father a status, although often only slightly
greater than that of being an unmarried father.
9.3.3 Reform
As you are aware, one of the difficulties of the legal regulation of family
life is that regulation by way of law often trails behind the reality of how
we live. The fact is that cohabitation and child raising outside of marriage
is something that most of us take for granted – the statistics illustrate this
too; but the law did not reflect the same acceptance of this reality since it
Question
Does it matter that the father will be in no position to do anything actively
with his PR?
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did not accord full rights automatically to unmarried fathers until the
amendments to the CA 1989 introduced by the Adoption and Children Act
2002.
9.3.3.1 Why change?
The debate on whether or not unmarried fathers should get PR is not a recent
one. In the past there has perhaps been an assumption that unmarried
fathers were ‘irresponsible or uninterested in their children and [did] not
deserve a legal role as parents’ (Procedures for the Determination of Paternity
and on the Law on Parental Responsibility for Unmarried Fathers, 1998, HMSO).
This assumption could be a remnant from the days when it was seen as a
man’s duty to marry a woman if she became pregnant, and that he was a cad
if he did not – a somewhat outdated assumption perhaps? In addition, the
fears of the complex relationships and the feelings of mothers who gave birth
as a result of rape or incest produced a reaction against giving unmarried
fathers responsibility.
This negative approach is now set to disappear, but not due necessarily
to the enlightenment of government, but because the public are ignorant of
their rights.
Because you have had the benefit of reading the preceding sections, you will
know that unless s 4 of the CA 1989 has been used to gain an order or
agreement, or PR has been formally delegated, the unmarried father cannot
give this consent. Did the people you asked say the same? If you have managed
to get a representative sample then hopefully the majority would have said the
father could give consent. The lack of knowledge of the law in this area is borne
out by the judicial figures on the making of s 4 orders and PR agreements.
Question
How many orders do you think were sought from the court for PR in
2003?
Question
Do you know any unmarried couples with children? If so, ask them who
has rights over the children. Present them with a scenario where a
decision needs to be made, such as a routine innoculation at the doctor’s
surgery, and ask them who can consent. Do you think they will give the
right answer?
Question
Do you think the law should be changed? If so, how would you go about it?
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Given that the birth rate in 2003 amongst unmarried couples is over one-
third of the total births per annum (of a total of 621,469 births, 257,288 were
births outside of marriage), you may probably have thought quite a few
applications are made. In reality, only 11,008 applications were made, with
9,524 being successful. This low figure suggests that many cohabiting
couples do not realise that they do not share PR for their child.
The rights available under Arts 8 and 14 of the ECHR will be relevant
to families regardless of whether the family relationship is founded
upon marriage or not. In Keegan v Ireland [1994] 18 EHRR 342, the court
stated:
The Court recalls that the notion of the ‘family’ in [Art 8] is not confined
solely to marriage-based relationships and may encompass other de facto
‘family’ ties where the parties are living together outside of marriage. A child
born out of such a relationship is ipso jure part of that ‘family’ unit from the
moment of his birth and by the very fact of it. There thus exists between the
child and his parents a bond amounting to family life even if at the time of
his or her birth the parents are no longer cohabiting or if their relationship
has then ended.
In the Keegan case, the relationship between the applicant and the child’s
mother lasted for two years, during one of which they cohabited. Moreover,
the conception of their child was the result of a deliberate decision and they
had also planned to get married. Their relationship at this time had thus the
hallmark of family life for the purposes of Art 8. The fact that it subsequently
broke down does not alter this conclusion any more than it would for a
couple who were lawfully married and who subsequently ended their
relationship. It follows that from the moment of the child’s birth there
existed between the applicant and his daughter a bond amounting to family
life.
However, the European Court of Human Rights permits a great deal of
flexibility to individual states and this will mean that it is hard to argue
that our law in denying certain rights to unmarried fathers does not
comply. Thus, in McMichael v UK (1995) 20 EHRR 205, an unmarried
father’s lack of rights in relation to adoption proceedings was not seen to
be contrary to Art 8. The aim of the relevant legislation, distinguishing
between married and unmarried father’s rights, was designed to identify
worthy and meritorious fathers and to protect the interests of the
unmarried mother and the child.
Although we do not have to change our laws to comply with the ECHR,
changing the law to grant automatic PR to unmarried fathers will deal with
Question
Do you think that the current system which withholds automatic PR is
compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)?
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the perceived discrimination, but also with the apathy and lack of
knowledge of parents.
9.3.3.2 How to achieve the aims
To achieve the objectives of granting PR to unmarried fathers, a number of
methods were highlighted in the Consultation Paper. The method ultimately
adopted looks at the registration of the child’s birth and who carries this out.
Now that the necessary amendments to the CA 1989 (by s 111 of the
Adoption and Children Act 2002) have been brought into force, an
unmarried father who jointly registers the child’s birth will get PR
automatically. This will mean that around 80% of unmarried fathers will get
PR in future. However, there will still remain some unmarried fathers who
do not jointly register their child’s birth who will have to use s 4 of the CA
1989 to get PR with all the attendant problems of satisfying the requirements
set out in Re H.
9.3.4 Parental responsibility for others
The birth parents are the most likely candidates to seek PR, but PR can be
obtained by others.
One way in which grandma could claim to exercise PR is if it has been
delegated under s 2(9) of the CA 1989. However, s 3(5) may also assist:
A person who –
(a) does not have parental responsibility for a particular child; but
(b) has care of the child, 
may (subject to the provisions of this Act) do what is reasonable in all the
circumstances of the case for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the
child’s welfare.
This provision is designed primarily for temporary carers, and the carer can
only do what is reasonable to safeguard the child. It would cover an
emergency where PR has not been delegated. You should note that if
delegation does occur, it is preferable that it is in writing, then there is less
room for dispute.
If a long term arrangement for care is anticipated, it might be worth
considering a residence order in favour of the carer since under the
provisions of s 12(2):
Question
In the following situation, on what basis can grandma exercise PR?
Anna and Bill, who both have PR, have left Christopher with grandma
whilst they go on a year’s vacation. Since they are backpacking, they
deemed it inappropriate to take a nine-month-old child with them.
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Where a court makes a residence order in favour of any person who is not the
parent or guardian of the child concerned that person shall have parental
responsibility for the child, while the residence order remains in force.
We will look at residence orders in more depth shortly.
9.3.4.1 Step-parents
As you will know, a step-father cannot seek a PR order or agreement under 
s 4 of the CA 1989 because this section only relates to birth fathers. Unless the
step-father seeks a joint residence order with the child’s mother (or adopts),
only s 3(5) provides him with any powers to act, unless the mother delegates
responsibility via s 2(9). As this has been seen to create difficulties within the
more complex family structures found in society, the Adoption and Children
Act 2002 amends the CA 1989 to enable step-parents to gain PR without
having to seek a residence order (although this provision is not yet in force).
Section 112 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 inserts a new s 4A into
the CA 1989 and enables a step-parent get PR if the birth parent(s) agree for
the step-parent to have PR or, alternatively, if that agreement is not
forthcoming, for the court to grant the step-parent PR upon application. The
approach to agreements is the same as for unmarried fathers.
The ability to take decisions on behalf of and for a child is one reason
why step-parents seek to adopt their step-child, hence the ability to get PR
may reduce adoption applications.
9.4 JOINT OR INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
As we saw earlier, PR can be held by more than one person but exercising PR
is something that can be done individually; there are only limited situations
where the agreement of all holders of PR will be needed. This reflects the
practicalities of child raising, particularly where parents with PR no longer
live together.
If you recall, a child of 16 can only marry with the consent of all those with
PR, or the agreement of the court. This is therefore such a situation.
Question
What if they cannot agree?
Question
Can you think of any situations where consent from all holders of PR is
needed?
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Inherent in a system of joint or individual responsibility is the potential for
conflict. Section 8 of the CA 1989 provides a mechanism for dealing with
such disputes via the specific issue order or prohibited steps order, which
you will look at shortly.
9.5 LOSING YOUR PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
Anyone with children (or parents for that matter) will know that parenthood
is a lifelong commitment. Legally, most responsibility for children ends
when they reach 18. This can, exceptionally, be extended – for example, with
regard to maintenance if a child enters higher education. PR can be lost in a
limited number of ways before a child reaches 18 but, to a degree, the ability
to lose parental responsibility is dependent upon how you gained PR to start
with.
If you are a parent with automatic PR the only ways it can be lost, other
than the child reaching majority, are:
• by the child being adopted; or
• by death, either of the child or yourself.
PR will survive divorce (the adage ‘you can divorce your spouse but not
your children’ needs to be remembered), and it will also survive any orders
made in respect of the child. If a care order, or wardship order is made, PR
will not be lost, but a parent’s ability to exercise that PR may be severely
constrained.
If you are a parent (an unmarried father) who has gained PR by virtue of
a court order (s 4) or an agreement (s 4), or any other person who has gained
PR by virtue of court intervention (s 8 residence orders), the PR obtained can
be lost by:
• the child being adopted;
• death; or
• the court revoking or discharging the order that originally gave you PR.
In the latter case, the PR is less permanent because what the court gives, the
court can take away.
Additionally, if the unmarried father has gained PR through joint
registration of the birth, the court has powers to remove that PR upon
application.
Question
How do you think a person with PR can lose it?
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9.6 PRIVATE LAW ORDERS
The holding of PR is important when it comes to seeking private law
orders in relation to a child. The CA 1989 sets out who can apply
automatically for orders, and who needs leave, in s 10. These rules can be
summarised thus:
• parents, guardians and people with a residence order in their favour can
apply for any s 8 order;
• any party to a marriage (whether or not subsisting) can apply for a
residence or contact order;
• any person with whom the child has lived for the last three years can
apply for a residence or contact order;
• any person who has consent from (i) the holders of a residence order, (ii)
the local authority where the child is in local authority care, or (iii) all
holders of PR in all other cases may apply for a residence or contact
order.
In case you are wondering who is deemed a ‘parent’, the CA 1989 includes
unmarried fathers within the definition of a parent. Thus, they have the right
to apply automatically for s 8 orders.
Section 9 provides some additional restrictions in relation to s 8 orders:
• if the child is subject to a care order, the only s 8 order that may be made
is a residence order;
• the local authority cannot seek a residence or contact order;
• a local authority foster carer cannot seek a s 8 order unless they have the
consent of the local authority or is a relative of the child or the child has
lived with them for three years (note: this will be reduced to one year,
following changes in the Adoption and Children Act 2002).
9.6.1 The s 8 orders
Section 8 sets out four orders which can be sought in private law and which
are:
• a residence order;
• a contact order;
• a specific issues order; and
• a prohibited steps order.
The first two orders are the most commonly sought.
9.6.2 The residence order
The residence order replaces the previous ‘custody order’; however, unlike
the custody order, a residence order is designed to ‘settle the arrangements
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to be made as to the person with whom a child is to live’, arguably less
stringent than a custody order which gave ‘custody, care and control’ to one
parent over the other.
9.6.2.1 The question of parental responsibility
As you should recall, the father’s PR will not be removed. However, the fact
that the parents have separated will mean that it is harder for the non-caring
parent to utilise their PR. Day-to-day care, which will be within the remit of
the person with the residence order, and the exercise of PR to meet that care,
will fall almost solely on the caring parent. More major decisions, perhaps
where the child should receive its schooling, should remain as joint
decisions. This cannot easily be enforced because PR is an individual
liability. However, the philosophy of the CA 1989 tries to encourage parents
to work together in the best interests of the child, and that includes liaising
on the future plans for that child.
9.6.2.2 Conditions
The phrase ‘settling the arrangements’ used within the CA 1989 provides a
wide discretion for the court to include conditions, especially since the order
does not now give all the rights and responsibilities to the carer (which a
custody order arguably did). Additionally, the court has clear authority for
this power under s 11(7) of the CA 1989 which provides as follows:
A section 8 order may –
(b) impose conditions which must be complied with by any person –
(i) in whose favour the order is made;
(ii) who is a parent of the child concerned;
(iii) who is not a parent of his but who has parental responsibility for him;
or
(iv) with whom the child is living.
The range of possibilities is almost endless but you may have thought of
conditions relating to medical treatment, education and religious
upbringing.
Question
What sort of conditions do you think may be included?
Question
If married parents separate, and a residence order is made in favour of the
mother, to what extent does this affect the father’s PR?
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Certain conditions will be placed automatically on residence orders. You
have already come across one within s 13 of the CA 1989 which prevents the
changing of a child’s name without the consent of all with parental
responsibility, or a court order. This section also restricts the person with the
residence order from removing the child from the jurisdiction for a period of
more than one month without consent of all those with PR. Finally, no person
with parental responsibility is able to exercise it if, by so doing, they are acting
in a manner which would be incompatible with an order made under the CA
1989 (such as a residence order). This prohibition is laid down in s 2(8).
9.6.2.3 Split orders
The fact that parental responsibility is now not so closely bound up in orders
relating to the person with whom a child lives, allows a greater flexibility in
court orders. It is now clearly enshrined in s 11(4) of the CA 1989 that the
possibility of a split residence order can be considered. Both holders of the
order would have parental responsibility (which they probably would have
anyway), but under a split order they will both have more ability to use it.
While these orders may be appropriate in some cases, they are not perceived
as being the norm. Department of Health Children Act guidance states (at
vol 1, para 2.28):
... it is not expected that it will become a common form of order, partly because
most children will still need the stability of a single home and partly because in
the cases where shared care is appropriate there is less likely to be a need for
any order at all.
This highlights certain reasons for not making split orders. The notion of
stability is important, since the courts must be assessing what is in the child’s
best interests. An order which would ‘confuse’ a child may not be in their
interests. Also, the sharing of residence orders will normally be based upon
the ability of the two carers to co-operate. If there are unresolved difficulties,
or a lack of communication, it is unlikely the order would benefit the child.
By contrast, if the parents or carers can co-operate, the court will look to the
impact of s 1(5): the ‘no order’ principle. If parents can agree and work
together, will there be any benefit to the child in making an order at all?
In Re WB (Minors: Residence) [1995] 2 FLR 1023, M and F were unmarried
and had lived together for 10 years. There were two children aged 8 and 11.
Care of the children was shared, following the breakdown of the
relationship. F’s contact with the children ceased following a severe
disagreement with M. An application was made by F for a residence order
and an order prohibiting the removal of the children from the jurisdiction.
Later, DNA tests seemed to indicate that F was not the genetic father of the
Question
Do you think these orders will be commonly made? If not, why not?
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children. A residence order was made in M’s favour and another order was
made allowing F to have holiday staying contact and alternate weekend
contact. F appealed. The court upheld F’s appeal in part. There should have
been a prohibited steps order preventing removal of the children from the
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the magistrates were acting correctly in not
making a shared residence order: once it had been decided that F ought to
have limited contact only, it would have been wrong to have made a shared
residence order for other purposes.
In Re D (Children) (Shared Residence Orders) [2001] 1 FLR 495, H and W
had married in 1986 and were divorced in 1995. There were three children,
aged 13, 11 and 9. The children lived with W, but had maintained substantial
contact with F, including staying contact for half their holidays, and during
the week. H and W had returned to the court on several occasions so as to
settle matters concerning education of the children and problems relating to
passports. The judge at Watford County Court had made an an order for
shared residence, having concluded that the difficulties between H and W
arose from W having sole residence. W appealed, arguing that there were
substantial issues between the parties which had not been resolved, so that
the shared residence order was premature. Shared residence orders, she
contended, were appropriate only in exceptional circumstances. The Court of
Appeal decided that W’s appeal would be dismissed. There was no
requirement, either under CA 1989 or the case law, that a shared residence
order was appropriate only in exceptional circumstances. Where children
spent a significant amount of time with both parents, intentionally or by
accident, such an order would be appropriate if in the children’s interests. In
the present case the children had settled homes with H and W; the
arrangement had worked well and had lasted for a considerable period of
time, giving rise to a positive benefit for the children.
9.6.2.4 Criteria for orders
Section 8 itself does not lay down any criteria to be satisfied before the orders
can be made. Hence the court is reliant on s 1 principles of welfare. The
welfare checklist will apply, but is only directly called into play where the
making of the order is contested.
With the impact of s 1(5), fewer residence orders are being made. While
this may be beneficial in the terms of reducing state involvement, it has
potential implications with reference to child abduction and utilisation of the
Hague Convention on Child Abduction. Detailed knowledge of this area is
beyond the scope of this work and if more information is needed, reference
should be made to texts, such as Cretney, Masson and Bailey-Harris,
Principles of Family Law.
Question
What factors will the courts consider before making an order?
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9.6.2.5 Duration of the orders
There are a number of answers to this, because residence orders have a range
of potential cut-off points. As the court can impose conditions on orders, it
may impose a time condition, which reduces the duration of the order. If this
is not done, then there are a variety of ways in which the duration of the
order can be affected.
Under s 9, residence orders (and indeed all s 8 orders) will normally end
on the child’s 16th birthday. This is at odds with the age of majority which is
set at 18. Exceptional circumstances may give rise to the extension of the
order until the child is 18. However, exceptional circumstances are perceived
to arise in those cases where a child is suffering from physical disabilities or
learning difficulties. If a child falls into these categories then they will be
unable to make decisions for themselves, hence needing care until 18.
Difficulties may arise, however, if for example a non-parent cares for a child
under a residence order. Morally, once the child reaches 16, continued care
should be provided but there would be no legal obligation to do so. A 16-
year-old may find themselves without a roof over their head. Local authority
accommodation may be provided, but resource shortages may limit this.
Also the young adult may find themselves caught in the crossfire of local
authority departments passing responsibility from one department to
another. Finally, at 16 a young person cannot legally enter into a tenancy
agreement; this might possibly lead to homelessness. These difficulties have
been recognised in s 114 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, which
permits the court to extend the order until the child’s 18th birthday where
the person seeking the residence order requests such an extension.
Alternatively, the order may be discharged upon the application of the
parents, the child or other party to the order. Note, however, that if the child
seeks to discharge the order, they must obtain the court’s leave first.
Finally, if a parent obtains a residence order, and then cohabits with the
other parent for a period of six months or more, the residence order will
lapse automatically (s 11(5)).
9.6.3 Contact orders
The contact order replaces the pre-CA 1989 access order with the change in
terminology reflecting a change in emphasis of the law.
Question
Can you foresee any problems with this approach?
Question
How long do you think a residence order will last?
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9.6.3.1 Rights
Section 8 defines a contact order thus:
... ‘a contact order’ means an order requiring the person with whom a child
lives, or is to live, to allow the child to visit or stay with the person named in
the order or for that person and the child otherwise to have contact with each
other.
The actual definition of a contact order does not clearly refer to the right to
have contact. However, a common assumption is that contact is the right of
the person named in the order. Equally, it is assumed that the duty to ensure
that contact occurs is placed on the person with care of the child. Only the
second assumption is correct.
If contact can be said to be a right, it is seen as being a right of the child. This
principle was established well before the implementation of the CA 1989 in
the case of M v M (Child Access) [1973] 2 All ER 81. Cases decided since the
CA 1989 continue with this principle. It has been suggested that that the
issue of contact as a right can be sidestepped since the definition reflects
only on the duty of the carer, and that contact orders merely reflect the
requirement to meet the child’s needs. The child’s needs will, in a majority
of cases, require that some form of contact is given and the courts have
worked on a presumption that contact is nearly always best. However, it is
important to note that this application of the presumption of contact has not
gone unchallenged in academic circles. Commentators such as Cantwell,
Roberts and Young ([1999] Fam Law 226) have suggested that the adherence
to the presumption by the court may in some situations cause more harm to
the child – for example, where the non-caring parent uses the contact to get
back at the other parent. Equally, it should be of concern that there is little
research to support the contention that children do benefit from contact in
all situations, and this is particularly of concern where there has been
domestic violence. Indeed, the fact that the presumption of contact often
seems to take priority, regardless of the circumstances, has been considered
primarily of late in the context of domestic violence. The pendulum would
now appear to be moving away from ‘contact at all costs’ to a more
reasoned approach.
Question
If, therefore, it is not the right of the person named in the order to have
contact, whose right is it?
Question
Whose right is it to contact, and whose duty is it to see that contact takes
place?
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In Re W (A Minor) (Contact) [1994] 2 FLR 441, H and W married in 1988
and separated in 1989. Contact with the child created problems for H.
Following W’s second marriage, she attempted to end contact. She appeared
to be instructing her child to accept that her second husband was the natural
father. H applied for a contact order, but this was refused. W indicated that
she would disobey a contact order if it were made. H appealed. The court
held that H’s appeal would be allowed. Contact was the child’s right and,
except in unusual circumstances, the judge had the duty to make an order
even when faced by a mother’s stubborn attitudes. By refusing to make an
order, the judge had, in effect, abandoned his responsibilities under the CA
1989.
In Re W (Minors) (1996) CLY 568, an application had been made by W for
the discharge of a contact order made in H’s favour concerning their
children, aged eight and nine. The application had been dismissed. Evidence
had been given by a child psychologist, suggesting that any benefit accruing
to the children from maintaining contact with H was not as significant as the
psychological harm resulting from that contact. W contended that although
the judge was empowered to reject expert evidence, in this particular case
the evidence had been given by a psychologist who had extensive
involvement with the family. Furthermore, the judge’s decision was out of
line with recommendations made by the court welfare officer. W appealed.
The court held that W’s appeal would be allowed in part. The judge was
perfectly entitled to reach his decision on the facts, but the order was not
appropriate in the circumstances. Contact would be made less frequent.
Re L, Re V, Re M and Re H [2000] 2 FLR 334, the issue of domestic violence
was involved in all of the appeals and the Court of Appeal laid down some
general points in relation to how the court should deal with this issue. The
court stated that the conduct of the parties to one another and also towards
the children, the effect on the children of the domestic violence and the effect
on the residential parent, and the motivation of the parent seeking contact
were all relevant factors that must be considered. If the parent seeking
contact were doing so to continue the violence and/or the intimidation of the
other parent, rather than seeking contact to promote the welfare and
interests of the child, contact would be less likely. Also, the fact that the
violent parent acknowledged the fact of their violence would be an
important factor.
9.6.3.2 The implication of the ECHR
By now you should be very familiar with the right to family life enshrined in
Art 8; and this Article will have the potential to bring about some subtle
changes to the current judicial thinking on contact. The approach of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been to define the right to
contact (or access) in terms of the rights of the parent, not purely the rights of
the child. This is quite an important difference, but the case law also
illustrates that there may not be dramatic consequences for all aspects of
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contact since the test applied is what is in the best interests of the child – the
factor currently at the heart of contact decisions made in the domestic courts.
In Hendricks v Netherlands (1983) 5 EHRR 231 it was stated:
On the preliminary point the Commission recalls that, in accordance with its
jurisprudence constante, the right to respect for family life within the meaning
of Article 8 of the Convention includes the right of a divorced parent, who is
deprived of custody following the break-up of the marriage, to have access to
or contact with his child, and that the State may not interfere with the exercise
of that right otherwise than in accordance with the conditions set out in
paragraph 2 of that Article ... Respect for family life within the meaning of
Article 8 thus implies that this contact should not be denied unless there are
strong reasons, set out in paragraph 2 of that provision, which justify such an
interference.
In Peter Whitear v UK [1997] EHRLR Issue 3, the Commission considered the
factors in Art 8(2), in particular the child’s mental health. The Commission
considered that the best interests of the child were of crucial importance and
interference with rights to access would be justified as pursuing a legitimate
aim when intended to protect the child’s health, in the broadest sense.
Hence, here, contact was denied to the father.
9.6.3.3 What is contact?
Regardless of who (if anyone) has a right to contact, what is meant by
‘contact’ needs to be established.
Contact falls into two categories: direct and indirect. The former should be
considered the norm, and is traditionally viewed as such. Direct contact
involves face-to-face meetings between the child and the person named in
the order. In many situations this direct contact will involve overnight stays,
or even longer term visits, especially in school holidays.
In many cases where contact can be negotiated between parents amicably,
the court should consider refusing to make a contact order on the basis of
s 1(5) of the CA 1989. However, contact is easier to deny and is also a source
of much acrimony. If a contact order is to be made, then it may appear
Question
What is the difference between a contact order that allows the child to
stay every weekend with its father (with a residence order to the mother)
and a shared residence order with the father’s order specifying that he has
residence for the weekends only?
Question
What would you include in a definition of ‘contact’?
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similar to shared residence orders. In reality there may be no difference,
other than in the names of the orders. If, however, the father of the child is
not married to the mother, the granting of a shared residence order would
automatically give him parental responsibility (s 12(1)).
In some cases direct contact, whilst seen to be in the best interests of the
child, may not be appropriate if the child and adult were to be left alone.
This may be because allegations of abuse have been made, or because the
child does not really know the adult and may become upset, or because the
caring parent is concerned and will not allow contact to happen unless
supervised.
Just as direct contact may have conditions as to supervision, it may also
have conditions as to time or duration or venue, all of which will be decided
in the interests of the child.
Indirect contact, by contrast, does not include face-to-face meetings. The
child may therefore be contacted by telephone or by letter. If this would be
detrimental to the child’s welfare, but it is seen as appropriate for the absent
parent to have knowledge of the child, reports and photographs may be sent
to them instead. Indirect contact should be considered either only where it is
clear that the child would suffer as a result of contact, or as a means of
establishing direct contact if none has existed before.
The court can, and has imposed, conditions in such situations, although the
difficulty with enforcement of the terms is recognised.
In Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) [1995] 2 FLR 124, M and F were
unmarried and had cohabited for three years. They separated before the
birth of their child, who was aged three at the date of proceedings. F had
been convicted in relation to the breach of a non-molestation order
concerning M. M was totally opposed to any contact between F and the
child. In 1994 the judge made an order for indirect contact which required M
to send photographs of the child to F every three months, together with
reports on progress at school, and to pass on letters and presents sent by F.
M appealed on the ground that there was no jurisdiction to attach conditions
of this nature to the order. The court held that M’s appeal would be
dismissed. It was for the court to make a decision as to whether indirect
contact was in the best interests of the child; there were sufficient powers
under ss 8(1) and 11(7) of the CA 1989 to make such contact orders possible.
M’s clear unwillingness to co-operate ought not to be allowed to defeat the
court’s powers. It was perfectly justifiable that the parent with care of the
child ought to be obliged to report to the absent parent on the child’s
Question
Can the court impose conditions on the caring parent to facilitate indirect
contact, that is, if the child is very young and illiterate and needs to have
letters read to them?
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progress so as to invest the indirect contact with some positive meaning in
these particular circumstances.
9.6.3.4 Enforcing contact
Refusal of contact is a matter that has taken up considerable judicial time in
recent years. Invariably it is the refusal of contact, rather than the failure to
take up contact, that is at issue.
Refusal of contact
If a caring parent does not agree to the making of the contact order, then the
immediate option for that parent is to appeal. An application for discharge
may be pursued, although discharge of the order may not adequately
displace the presumption that contact should occur. It is far better to seek an
order for no contact to clarify the situation.
If an appeal or application is unsuccessful, the immediate reaction is
often to ignore the order and stop contact. If the parent with contact is still
seeking to exercise the order, an application for enforcement may ensue. The
range of options for the court in this case is wide. The court may:
• agree with the hostile caring parent, and refuse contact;
• amend the nature of contact, perhaps reducing the amount of direct
contact time to make the order workable;
• change direct contact to indirect contact (perhaps with conditions);
• swap over the orders, so that the parent with contact becomes the parent
with residence rights; or
• if all else fails, imprison the non-compliant parent.
The first option was utilised in the case of Re H (A Minor) (Parental
Responsibility) [1993] 1 FLR 484, although this case may be confined to its
facts. In many more cases the court prefers to try to obtain a workable
option, even though this may mean changing direct contact to indirect
contact. This may seem like ‘giving in’ or acting contrary to the original ‘best
interests of the child’. However, the assumption would appear to be that
anything is better than nothing. If an alteration to the nature of contact is not
effective, the court may be faced with no option but to commit the non-
compliant parent to jail for the breach of the order.
Question
Imagine you are a parent with care. You have two young children and the
court has granted a contact order allowing contact with their father for
each Saturday afternoon. You refuse to allow contact to take place since
you believe that the father will abduct the children. Can you do this?
What would the situation be if it were the father who was refusing to take
up his contact? How could you enforce contact?
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For a long time, the imprisonment of the carer was seen as an inappropriate
resolution; it being unlikely to be in the interests of the child. However,
judicial opinion is changing, whether you agree with it or not, and failure to
comply with a contact order is seen as something that will not be
countenanced.
In A v N (Committal: Refusal of Contact) [1997] 1 FLR 533, M was appealing
against and order for committal of M to prison (suspended) for failure to
comply with a contact order made to F. F had played a considerable role in
the child’s upbringing before the parties separated. M had failed to comply
with any of the numerous contact orders made by the court and had made it
clear that she would never comply with them. Ward LJ’s judgment was
particularly robust and also clear in import. The court’s view was that the
mother in the case had had more than ample opportunity to enable contact
to take place, and that her objections were unreasonable. As Ward LJ stated:
The stark reality of this case is that this is a mother who has flagrantly set
herself upon a course of collision with the court’s order. She has been given
endless opportunities to comply with sympathetic attempts made by the judge
to meet her flimsy objections to contact taking place. She has spurned all of
those attempts. For it to be submitted that the hardship to the child is the result
of the court imposing the committal order is wholly to misunderstand the
position. This child suffers because the mother chooses to make her suffer. The
mother had it in within her power to save T that suffering, but she did not avail
of that opportunity.
The court upheld the committal and also held that the welfare of the child is
not an issue for committal proceedings – an approach that may be of
surprise, but is logical.
Another innovative way to enforce contact, or perhaps to try to get the
obdurate parent to reconsider their attitude to contact, was highlighted in the
case of CDM v CM, LM, DM (Children) [2003] 2 FLR 636. Here the mother had
convinced the two children that they had been sexually abused by their father
and that they did not want to have contact with him. The court found there
was absolutely no basis in fact for the allegations of abuse and that the mother
was, in effect, brainwashing the children and that the lack of relationship with
their father was causing them harm. Additionally, the court found the mother’s
approach was causing emotional harm to the children. In proceedings to
enforce contact, the court ordered a s 37 report from the local authority. After
the local authority had investigated, it was decided that the children were
suffering harm due to the mothers care, and that it would be appropriate for
the children to live with the father instead. Obviously this outcome fits within
the list of options set out earlier, but what is interesting is the use of the local
authority’s investigative powers and the potential use of an interim care order.
Question
Is this in the best interests of the child?
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As highlighted above, the presumption that contact is always good for
the child, and mothers who object are always unreasonable, is changing and
now the pendulum would appear to be moving away from ‘contact at all
costs’ to a more reasoned approach and this is endorsed by the Lord
Chancellor’s Department Consultation Paper (2001) and report (2002) on
Making Contact Work. However, it should be noted that in many cases where
contact is likely to be refused, there is clear evidence of domestic violence
against the caring parent and possibly against the child itself.
Failure to take up contact
Contrary to the legal armoury that has been built up in relation to failure to
allow contact, there is nothing to rely on in relation to a failure to take up
contact. From the wording of s 8, there is no clear implication of rights or
duties, but, by placing responsibility to permit contact on the person with
care, there is no means for that person to enforce contact by the person
named in the order. One means by which it could be done is to threaten to
stop contact completely. However, this may not have the desired effect,
especially since it has been suggested that most contact will end or tail off
after only about two years. That families need fathers may not be disputed,
but the vocal minorities highlight the case of fathers being denied contact,
not mothers who cannot ensure that it continues.
It will be interesting to see if the introduction of the ECHR will result in
change. If a parent has a right to contact, does that parent not then have a
duty or obligation to participate in contact arrangements? Should this be the
case, then arguably the state is in breach of its ECHR obligations by not
providing a remedy to the victim – normally the child – in the form of
compelling attendance at contact since that child, too, has a right to family
life. While this sounds an attractive argument you have probably already
thought of the practical difficulties and also about the quality of that
‘compelled contact’ – it could be far worse than leaving be. Be that as it may,
this point does illustrate the lack of finesse that exists when trying to legislate
on family life and human emotions.
The fact that contact is contentious is clear and the government has
published a Consultation Paper, Parental Separation: Children’s Needs and
Parents’ Responsibilities (July 2004, TSO) concerning the issue of how to make
contact work.
9.6.3.5 Duration of orders and criteria to be applied
Contact orders are subject to the same rules and considerations as residence
orders. You should recall the fact that the court applies a positive
presumption in favour of contact since it is nearly always seen as being in the
best interests of the child.
9.6.4 Specific issues and prohibited steps orders
The CA 1989 defines these orders thus:
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‘a specific issue order’ means an order giving directions for the purpose of
determining a specific question which has arisen, or which may arise, in
connection with any aspect of parental responsibility for a child ...
and:
‘a prohibited steps order’ means an order that no step which could be taken by
apparent in meeting his parental responsibility for a child, and which is of a
kind specified in the order, shall be taken by any person without the consent of
the court.
The fact that both of these orders deal with questions of parental
responsibility is clear, but the terminology of the orders is possibly
confusing. Both orders seem to do the same thing: they are different sides of
the same coin. The main function of the orders is to deal with any dispute
between persons who hold parental responsibility. This possibility of conflict
should be known to you from your work on parental responsibility earlier in
this chapter. If resolution is not possible, the court can be asked to step in.
The court will then make a decision based on its perception of the child’s
best interests.
To illustrate how the orders can be used to achieve the same ends,
consider this example:
Anne and Bill cannot decide to which school Christopher should go. Anne
would like to register him at the local state infant school which has reasonably
good teacher/pupil ratios. Bill, however, would like him to go to a nearby
private school where he could attend as a day student. Bill considers the
presence of large numbers of children from the local travellers’ campsite to be
detrimental to a state education.
If the couple are incapable of deciding this issue, they could approach the
court. Anne could seek a specific issue order (SIO) to ensure that Christopher
does go to the local state school. She could alternatively seek a prohibited
steps order (PSO) to prevent Bill sending him to the private school.
Whichever she applies for, if she is successful, she will achieve what she set
out to do.
In Re J (Specific Issue Orders: Child’s Religious Upbringing and Circumcision)
[2000] 1 FLR 571, M, the English mother of J, aged five, was granted a
prohibited steps order preventing J’s Muslim father, F, from making
arrangements to have J circumcised without a court order. F appealed
against the decision to grant the order, contending that the judge had been
wrong to place greater emphasis on the fact that J had been brought up in a
secular environment than on the fact that J had been born a Muslim. F
argued that the judge had given too much weight to M’s opposition, whilst
not appreciating the impact that F’s views would have on J. The court
dismissed the appeal, stating that where there was a dispute concerning an
important decision regarding a child, the matter should be referred to the
court. Ritual circumcision was an irreversible operation which was not
medically necessary, bearing physical and psychological risks, and in such
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cases s 2(7) of the CA 1989 stated that the consent of both parents was
essential. The issue of what was in the best interests of the child would
depend on the facts and, in the instant case, the judge had correctly found
that circumcision, which was not medically necessary at the age of five, was
not in the child’s best interests.
As the orders refer to the use of parental responsibility, it may seem logical
to prevent local authorities from utilising these provisions. However, the
definitions of the orders refer to the doing of acts covered by PR, not the fact
that the act in question is being done by someone with PR. This would
suggest that a local authority could apply for one of these orders. This is also
borne out by s 9(2) and also s 9(5) of the CA 1989 which prohibit the use of
residence and contact orders by local authorities and not the other s 8 orders,
subject only to the caveat that the court cannot grant an SIO or PSO to
achieve a result capable of being reached via a residence or contact order.
Hence, if a local authority does try to use these orders, it must restrict itself
to matters of parental responsibility.
In Nottinghamshire CC v P [1993] 3 WLR 637, the eldest of three sisters had
complained of sexual abuse by her father (F) and had made allegations that
he had abused another of the sisters. Emergency protection orders were
obtained by the local authority and a prohibited steps order was sought
which would have ordered F to leave home and to have no contact with his
daughters except under supervision of the local authority. The local
authority did not, however, apply for care or supervision orders. The judge
would not make a prohibited steps order because it was not in accordance
with s 9. He used his residual power under s 10(1)(b) of the CA 1989 and
made a residence order requiring F to leave home, with the condition that
contact with the daughters would be supervised. All the parties appealed.
The court dismissed the local authority’s appeal, but the appeals by F and
the children would be allowed. A local authority was prohibited from
obtaining residence or contact orders (see s 9(2)) and, under s 9(5), could not
obtain a prohibited steps order intended to have the same effect. It was the
task of the local authority to apply under Pt IV of the CA 1989. The local
authority’s application for a prohibited steps order would not be granted.
The residence order was merely artificial and, in the circumstances, without
relevance.
9.6.5 Special guardianship
Special guardianship orders are being introduced into the CA 1989 by virtue
of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (s 115 inserting s 14A–G into the CA
Question
Should local authorities be able to use these orders?
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1989). Part of the purpose behind these orders is to reduce potential adoption
applications and, also, to provide an alternative to the s 8 residence order.
However, quite how many of these orders are likely to be made will remain
in doubt, given the lack of success of similar types of orders that existed
prior to the 1989 Act.
The definition of applicant for a special guardianship order is set out in 
s 14A and includes:
• a (testamentary) guardian of the child;
• someone who has a residence order;
• someone with whom the child has lived for at least three years; and
• a local authority foster parent who has had the child live with them for at
least one year before the application.
When an application for special guardianship is made, the local authority
must be informed to enable it to assess the applicant for suitability as a
special guardian and the court cannot make an order unless it has seen the
local authority assessment.
If an order is made, the court can also permit the child to be known by a
new surname and permit the child’s removal from the UK. The effect of the
order will be to give the special guardian PR for the child and to give them
the power to exercise this PR to the exclusion of any other PR holders, unless
the law specifically requires the consent of all PR holders (for example, in
relation to marriage). The local authority will also be required to provide
services to special guardians if those services are needed.
Apart from the potential benefits in relation to PR, it is hard to see what
this order is seeking to achieve. The order assumes the child will live with
the special guardian, given the list of applicants, but this is not made clear in
the legislation. The ability to access local authority services, as provided for
in s 14F, may also benefit the carer and child if the child would not otherwise
be a child in need and, hence, covered by the public law remedies we will
look at in the next chapter.
9.7 SUMMARY
We have now come to the end of a reasonably long chapter, and have
covered a large amount of material. You will possibly find it useful to
consolidate your learning by making short revision notes now. You will need
to refer to the concept of parental responsibility, focusing on:
• what it is;
• who has it; and
• who can get it, and how.
Your notes should also refer to the consequences of failing to comply with
one’s duties and responsibilities as a parent.
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The private law orders available would then form the next part of your
notes. Definitions of the four s 8 orders would be needed, together with
supplementary information on:
• who can apply;
• what the criteria are;
• how long the orders last; and
• any potential problems with the orders.
If you do this, you will have a suitable set of notes from which to learn. A
final stage of learning for this chapter is the following End of Chapter
Assessment.
9.8 END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT
Hussein and Jayne married 10 years ago. They have two children, Robina,
aged five, and Joshua, aged three. The marriage started to deteriorate
shortly after Joshua was born and now the couple have decided to
separate. No divorce is planned yet, although Jayne would like to dissolve
the marriage in the not too distant future. Jayne is planning to go to live
with her parents, who live in Cumbria in a large farmhouse. She would
therefore have plenty of space for herself and the children. Hussein is not
pleased at this decision, since it would be very difficult for him to travel
the 200 miles to see the children. He is also concerned about Jayne’s
inability to bring up the children in the Muslim faith.
Advise Hussein who wishes to prevent this move and would prefer
Joshua to remain with him so he can be raised in accordance with the
Muslim faith.
What advice would you give Hussein if he wished to take the children
to Iran to see their paternal grandparents and other relations?
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CHAPTER 10
10.1 OBJECTIVES
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
• understand the range of child abuse;
• produce a flow diagram indicating the stages of local authority
intervention;
• discuss the variety of legal orders that can be utilised by the local
authority;
• evaluate the effectiveness of some of these orders; and
• apply the law to hypothetical scenarios and give relevant advice to
clients.
It is now time to move to what will be a lengthy chapter dealing with the
variety of legislative provisions in public law relating to child care. The
principal agency you will be concerned with is the local authority social
services department, which, due to the Local Government Act 1970, has the
responsibility to protect children within its area. The principles you have
studied under s 1 of the Children Act (CA) 1989 will all be applicable to
public law (some considerations being more relevant than others). You must
always remember the principles of ‘non-intervention’ and ‘working in
partnership’, since these are crucial to social work practice in this field.
Remember, this is a long chapter and dividing up your study may be
appropriate. Suggested sections to study together are:
Part One: 10.2 to 10.5: child abuse and investigation.
10.6 to 10.9: short term orders.
Part Two: 10.10 to 10.16: long term orders.
PART ONE
10.2 CHILD ABUSE
As you may remember, the ‘discovery of child abuse’ is linked to the passing
of legislation. However, some child abuse can be seen as a recent
phenomenon since some actions which are today perceived as abusive or
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harmful to a child have in the past been accepted as normal behaviour. In
previous generations the use of corporal punishment, say by use of the belt
or slipper, was perfectly acceptable. Today this attitude is questionable. The
recognition of child abuse, as we understand it today, has often been linked
to the ‘battered baby’ syndrome which was ‘discovered’ in the 1960s by Dr
Henry Kempe. Thereafter, other forms of abuse were discovered, for
example, via the investigation into ritual sexual abuse in the Orkneys and the
investigation of alleged widespread sexual abuse in Cleveland. The
increasing frequency of public enquiries and investigations into alleged
abuse, and the increase in media coverage, has led, over a period of time, to
society being more willing to accept that these sorts of things do go on. This
belief may have been held before, but a major change was the public voicing
of concerns.
10.2.1 What do we mean by child abuse?
Child abuse tends to be defined by category, although fitting an alleged act
of child abuse into a specific definition is often an arbitrary and artificial
process.
There are four categories used for defining child abuse. They are:
• physical abuse;
• neglect;
• sexual abuse; and
• emotional abuse.
In terms of defining the acts that would constitute a particular form of abuse,
it is not easy, since value judgments, cultural beliefs and individual
background can all play a part in what may be seen as abusive.
Question
Looking at sexual abuse as a category, would you agree that allowing a
child to watch a sexually explicit video is abusive? What about underage
sexual activity – is that abusive? On what basis do you answer those
questions? Are you answering on behalf of yourself and your own
opinions, or on behalf of everyone? If you can, why not ask others for
their views on what equals abuse.
Question
What do you think are the main categories of child abuse and how would
you define them?
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By thinking about this, you should see that there is scope for judgments to be
based on subjective positions rather than objective ones, and this is a real
difficulty where child abuse is concerned.
You can also see this in the category of physical abuse where, for
example, some of the indicators for abuse include:
• multiple bruising and scratches;
• injuries found to have occurred at different times; and
• linear marks and weal marks.
Clearly this is not all that is indicative of physical abuse, but you can ask
yourself what would happen if a child presented with these sorts of
injuries. If a child leads a reasonably active life, it is suggested that bruises
and/or scratches at different times will be inevitable. (Do you recall how
many times you fell off a bike whilst learning how to ride it, or fell out of
a tree scrumping?) Therefore, simply having regard to the nature of the
injuries cannot be sufficient, especially if only one set of injuries is
presented. If the harm suffered is severe then the degree of concern may
be higher; but how is the risk of harm judged, and must more than one of
the indicators need to be satisfied? Additionally, and to remove the risk of
incorrect diagnosis, the injuries should generally be accompanied by an
inadequate or no explanation as to how they arose leading to a reasonable
belief of harm being deliberately caused. Here again you return to a
subjective element, and the ability to assess evidence. The link between
and injury and the cause of harm may therefore be difficult to
prove, particularly if a reasonable explanation can be provided. Hence,
a major problem is the difficulty of proving that physical abuse is
occurring.
10.2.2 The extent of abuse
There is no clear, definitive picture as to the extent of child abuse within
England and Wales. Two reasons identified for the difficulty in finding
‘figures’ have been suggested by Cobley in Child Abuse and the Law (1995,
Cavendish Publishing), and they are as follows:
• there is no standardised definition of the subject matter; and
• figures that are obtained are from those cases reported to the 
authorities or from self report surveys, which are of themselves 
limited.
Question
Why might it be difficult to assess the degree of child abuse that occurs in
England and Wales?
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In terms of official figures, these can be obtained from the Department of
Heath statistics, and these state that at 31 March 2002 there were 25,700
children registered on local authority child protection registers. This will not
reflect the true number of abused children since not all will be known to the
local authority or placed on the protection register, but it does provide some
form of indication of the extent of abuse.
10.3 THE LOCAL AUTHORITY’S ROLE 
IN CHILD PROTECTION
Despite a concentration on child abuse and child protection work, it is
important to remember that not all cases where the local authority gets
involved will involve abuse: the local authority’s duties are much wider than
that. However, the fact is that crisis work has a higher priority than it should
perhaps receive. This is often due to budget and personnel constraints,
which reduce the ability to act in a preventive way.
10.3.1 The basic duties: s 17 of the CA 1989
The duties, in general terms, are set out in s 17 of the CA 1989 and require
the local authority:
(a) to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are
in need; and
(b) so far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the upbringing of such
children by their families by providing a range and level of services
appropriate to those children’s needs.
The section then refers to Sched 2 to the CA 1989, which gives more detail of
the service provision. Each local authority must:
• develop a children’s service plan and review that plan in relation to the
services it provides;
• maintain a register of disabled children and provide services for them;
• assess children who appear to be in need of services whether under the
CA 1989 or other legislation;
• take reasonable steps to prevent children being harmed or neglected;
• provide accommodation to children in order to protect them;
• take steps to reduce the need for court proceedings – especially care
proceedings;
Question
What do you think is the basic duty of all local authorities in relation to
child protection?
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• make provision to enable children to live with their families and to
provide family services such as counselling, etc; and
• provide family centres.
The provision of services and attempting to keep children with their families
are consistent with the fundamental principles of the CA 1989. They are also
consistent with Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
since it can be seen to support family life, although there is some state
interference.
You should also try to remember that the local authority, as it is a public
body, must, due to the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, uphold the principles
within the ECHR.
Whilst the child is the primary client of the local authority, services may be
provided to any member of the child’s family if ‘it is provided with a view to
safeguarding or promoting the child’s welfare’ (s 17(3)). The family of a
child, for the purposes of this duty, is perhaps a little wider than the normal
definition. Under s 17(10), family includes ‘any person with parental
responsibility [PR] for the child and any other person with whom he has
been living’. This latter aspect operates to widen the potential beneficiaries of
services.
While the duty to provide services rests with the local authority, the local
authority can get other agencies or voluntary bodies to provide the actual
service, with the local authority paying for it. Traditionally, the local
authority contracts with other providers for the service, but amendments to
s 17 of the CA 1989 mean that the authority can make direct payments to the
family or provide vouchers to spend on getting a service for a child – for
example, day care. It is important to note that in some cases the local
authority can actually charge the family for the provision of services too –
this is permitted under s 17(7) and (8), although in the majority of cases this
would not happen.
Question
Which children will be provided with services?
Question
Does the local authority have to provide the services themselves or can
they ‘contract out’ service provision?
Question
If services are to be provided, are they only provided to the child?
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As you have seen from s 17 of the CA 1989, above, the type of child to whom
services can be provided is a ‘child in need’. This is defined in s 17(10) thus:
For the purposes of this Part a child is taken to be in need if –
(a) he is unlikely to achieve or maintain, or have the opportunity of achieving
or maintaining, a reasonable standard of health or development without
the provision for him of services by a local authority ...
(b) his health or development is likely to be significantly impaired, or further
impaired, without the provision of such services; or
(c) he is disabled.
10.3.2 Other services
These ‘other duties’ are found in the following sections:
• s 18(1) and (5): day care for some children aged under five and other
(older) children;
• s 20(1): provision of accommodation for some ‘children in need’;
• ss 22, 23 and 24(1): duties to children ‘looked after’ by the local authority,
or ‘relevant’ children; and
• s 24: duty to provide advice and assistance for certain children, and 
s 23B and C: ‘keeping in touch’ with the child, including when they are
no longer ‘looked after’.
10.3.2.1 Day care for children aged under five and others
Section 18 provides:
(1) Every local authority shall provide such day care fore children in need
within their area who are –
(a) aged five or under; and
(b) not yet attending schools, as is appropriate
...
(5) Every local authority shall provide for children in need within their area
who are attending any school such care or supervised activities as is
appropriate –
(a) outside school hours; or
(b) during school holidays.
As you can see, the purpose of the section is to impose a duty on local
authorities to provide day care for pre-school-age children and supervised
Question
Section 17(1) of the CA 1989 makes reference to ‘other duties imposed’ on
local authorities by virtue of the CA 1989. Can you think what these might
be?
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care and activities after school for school age children, if those children are
‘in need’ within the definition of s 17. The local authority is empowered to
extend these services to other children even if they are not in need. However,
these services are not commonly provided.
If this was an outright duty, local authorities would be open to legal action
for failure to comply, given the general lack of such services. A careful
consideration of the section shows that the duty is discretionary, that is, the
local authority need only provide services ‘as are appropriate’. If the local
authority reasonably decides that existing facilities are appropriate, or that
no facilities are appropriate, it has met its statutory requirements.
10.3.2.2 Accommodation
The general duty is specified in s 20(1):
Every local authority shall provide accommodation for any child in need
within their area who appears to them to require accommodation as a result
of –
(a) there being no person who has parental responsibility for him;
(b) his being lost or having been abandoned; or
(c) the person who has been caring for him being prevented (whether or not
permanently, and for whatever reason) from providing him with suitable
accommodation or care.
Clearly the section relates to children in need where one of the factors in 
s 20(1)(a), (b) and (c) applies. However, if a child is not classed as being in
need under the terms of s 17, the local authority may still provide
accommodation if the situation is within s 20(4) which provides:
A local authority may provide accommodation for any child within their area
(even though a person with parental responsibility for him is able to provide
him with accommodation) if they consider that to do so would safeguard or
promote the child’s welfare.
This would appear to conflict somewhat with the provision in s 20(7), which
states that if any person with PR (and this will normally be someone other
than the person seeking the accommodation) objects to the provision of
accommodation and is able to provide or arrange suitable accommodation
themselves, the local authority’s powers are ended. Of course, there is the
question of who decides on suitability! If the child concerned is the subject of
a residence order under s 8 of the CA 1989, the picture is a little different.
Here, if it is the person(s) with whom the child is to live who requests
Question
Should they be commonly provided if this is a duty?
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accommodation, then no other person with PR can stop the local authority
assisting.
Section 20 is unusual in that it gives a child a specific right with reference to
accommodation. This right is, however, subject to the discretion of the local
authority. Under s 20(3), the local authority ‘shall provide accommodation
for any child in need who has reached the age of 16 and whose welfare the
authority consider is likely to be seriously prejudiced if they do not provide
him with accommodation’.
It is clear that the 16-year-old faces some hurdles here, that is, they must
be a child in need and they must convince the local authority that their
welfare will not just be at risk, but will be seriously prejudiced if
accommodation is not provided.
When the local authority is considering providing accommodation,
regardless of the reason or provision for so doing, it should discuss the
matter with the child and try to establish the child’s wishes (s 20(6)).
Prior to the CA 1989, accommodation was provided either on a ‘voluntary’
basis or ‘compulsory’ basis. The distinction was that the former did not rely
on any legal intervention before it could arise, whilst the latter was
dependent upon an order placing the child into the local authority’s care.
While the terminology of voluntary and compulsory care has gone, the idea
of children being cared for by the local authority in the absence of a court
order continues.
Children accommodated under s 20 are provided with this
accommodation on a voluntary basis. Consequently, the local authority does
not gain PR, except to the extent that it is delegated by the person placing the
child with it. When a parent seeks to remove the child from s 20
accommodation, there is nothing the local authority can do if it does not feel
removal is appropriate, other than seek a court order.
If a child has been made subject to a legal order (that is, a care order), the
local authority is obliged to provide accommodation. The local authority
would, in this situation, have PR and parents, or others with PR, would not
be in a position to remove the child at will. You should note that the duty to
accommodate arises by virtue of the legal order made by the court, not s 20
itself.
Question
Is there any element of compulsion in provision of accommodation under
this section?
Question
Do you think the child should have any rights? If so, what?
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If a child is being provided with accommodation, whether it be by virtue
of a legal order or by agreement with the parents under s 20, the child will be
said to be ‘looked after’ by the local authority. This is a generic term, and
simply knowing that a child is ‘looked after’ will not clarify the child’s status.
The terminology that is appropriate to distinguish looked after children is
either that the child is ‘in the local authority’s care’, meaning subject to a
legal order placing the child with the local authority, or ‘accommodated’,
meaning that the child is being provided with accommodation under s 20,
and hence on a voluntary basis.
If a child has been looked after by the local authority at any time after
they have reached the age of 16, but whilst still a child, for a minimum
consecutive period of three months (this period includes time prior to the
16th birthday), the local authority is under a duty to provide advice,
assistance and befriending. The purpose is to promote the child’s welfare
when they cease to be looked after (s 24).
In addition, amendments to s 23 of the CA 1989 (made by the Children
(Leaving Care) Act 2000) place local authorities under a duty to provide
services to ‘relevant children’ that is, children who have been looked after
and are 16 or 17 and not now being looked after. These duties include the
provision of maintenance, accommodation and other support following
assessment and development of a pathway plan. The local authority is
required to take steps to ensure it keeps in touch with the relevant child by
way of a personal adviser and this extends past the time frame in which the
child is deemed a relevant child.
10.4 THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
Before a local authority can take any action toward the provision of services,
it needs to establish to which families or children to direct its attention. In
some situations this is easier than others, for example, the single mother
requesting accommodation while she goes into hospital, or the disabled child
who attends a specialist school. However, the majority of child care work is
not with these types of families.
10.4.1 Section 47 of the CA 1989
A case will normally become apparent via some form of referral to the local
authority. Referrals may be from anyone: neighbours, friends, family, health
visitor, GP, hospital casualty department, police or school.
Question
In what ways will suspected cases of abuse become known to the social
services?
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For many professionals, the making of referrals of suspected child abuse may
conflict with the ethical duty to maintain confidence. However, the public
interest in disclosing abuse, and the emphasis that is placed on the welfare of
the child, means that this duty may be breached. The original guidance to the
CA 1989, Working Together Under the Children Act 1989 (1991, HMSO) makes
specific reference to the ethical perspective, and the duty to co-operate and to
share information across different professional agencies is confirmed in
s 47(9) of the CA 1989. Indeed, as the more recent inquiries into child abuse
or death confirm, the lack of co-operation and sharing of information is often
prejudicial to the protection of the child (see, for example, the Laming
Inquiry 2003).
Once a referral is made, the local authority is under a duty to make
enquiries about the child. This duty arises under s 47 of the CA 1989, which
provides:
(1) Where a local authority –
(a) are informed that a child who lives, or is found, in their area –
(i) is the subject of an emergency protection order; or
(ii) is in police protection; or
(iii) has contravened a ban imposed by a curfew notice [under the
Crime and Disorder Act 1998]; or
(b) have reasonable cause to suspect that child who lives, or is found, in
their area is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm,
the authority shall make, or cause to be made, such enquiries as they
consider necessary to enable them to decide whether they should take any
action to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare.
As you can see, there are several ‘trigger’ criteria for the commencement of a
s 47 investigation, which include:
• the child is the subject of an Emergency Protection Order (EPO);
• the child is in police protection (this is covered in s 46);
• the child is in breach of a curfew notice; and
• the local authority has reasonable cause to suspect that a child is
suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm.
Do not worry if you do not know about EPOs or about significant harm; we
will consider all these issues later.
Question
Should a doctor make referrals, or is this contrary to their duty of
confidentiality?
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While the section states that the local authority shall make enquiries, it
then states ‘such enquiries as they consider necessary to enable them to
decide whether they should take any action’. The local authority may
consider it unnecessary to make enquiries, and in so far as this is based on
reasonable grounds, judicial review would be unsuccessful in challenging
the decision.
If enquiries are considered to be necessary, it is hard to see how the local
authority can assess the child’s risk of suffering harm without actually seeing
the child. Section 47(4) requires the local authority to:
... take such steps as are reasonably practicable –
(a) to obtain access to [the child]; or
(b) to ensure that access to him is obtained, on their behalf, by a person
authorised by them for the purpose, unless they are satisfied that they
already have sufficient information with respect to him.
Again, the duty is qualified, but s 47(6) does cover the consequences where
access to the child is not granted. Hence the local authority, if access is
denied and access is needed, is required to apply for one of a range of orders
(for example an EPO) ‘unless they are satisfied that his welfare can be
satisfactorily safeguarded without their doing so’. Qualified duties strike
again!
The purpose of the investigation, set out in sub-s (3), is to establish
whether certain steps should be taken; that is:
• whether the local authority should apply for any legal order, under the
CA 1989 or Crime and Disorder Act 1998, for the purpose of
safeguarding or protecting the child’s welfare;
• where the child is subject to an EPO and not in local authority
accommodation, whether the child should be provided with such
accommodation; and
• where a child is in police protection, whether an application should
be made under s 46(7) which permits an application to be made for an
EPO.
Hence the focus is on the possible legal orders that could be obtained.
Question
Must the child be seen?
Question
Is the duty to investigate absolute?
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If the spirit of the CA 1989 is to be complied with, then s 47 should perhaps
reflect the need of the local authority to provide services under s 17 since
these may be all that is required to protect the child and safeguard its well-
being.
When legal action is not to be pursued, the local authority needs to
decide whether or not to review the case (s 47(7)). By including this
provision, the local authority is at least directed to producing reasons why
no later review is deemed necessary, and this should prevent cases being
allowed to drift.
10.4.2 Section 37 investigations
Although we are looking at public law in this chapter, you should note that
the private law in the CA 1989 has investigation procedures, although in the
majority of cases parents will have agreed a solution. If this is not so, or the
court is not happy with the parents’ solution, it can utilise the services of
CAFCASS (Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service). An
officer of CAFCASS (normally a social worker or court welfare officer) can be
requested (under s 7) to provide a report on the family to the court. The
officer will not normally have protracted contact with the family members.
In some situations the court will request a s 7 welfare report direct from the
local authority. However, this is generally the exception since local authority
budgets do not set aside funds for this purpose.
In some private law matters, the court may believe that the child is at risk
of significant harm and that the local authority needs to be involved. It might
be a case where child protection is an issue, but one where the family is
unknown to the local authority, or where no referrals have ever been made.
In this type of situation, s 37 can be invoked. This section provides that:
(1) Where, in any family proceedings in which a question arises with respect to
the welfare of any child, it appears to the court that it may be appropriate
for a care or supervision order to be made with respect to him, the court
may direct the appropriate authority to undertake and investigation of the
child’s circumstances.
When the law preceding the CA 1989 was reviewed it was believed that
the giving of power to the court to commit a child to the care of the local
Question
Why do you think that the court cannot simply make a care order?
Question
What do you think that the local authority should focus on initially in
terms of investigation – should it be legal orders?
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authority, without necessarily having involved the local authority, or
without the need to comply with specific criteria, was inappropriate. The
pre-CA 1989 law also reflected an imbalance of power and responsibility
between the courts and the local authority. Hence now a care order can
only be made where the local authority applies for it, or the child has
broken the terms of a curfew order under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998
(this is an order in relation to possible criminal activity of the child, and
hence is outside the scope of the text, but you do need to be aware of its
existence).
Where a s 37 investigation is carried out, the focus of the local authority
should be to consider whether it needs to apply for a care order or
supervision order, provide services or any other assistance or take any other
action. As with s 47, the extent to which intervention is needed, and the
nature of that intervention must be carefully assessed. If a child’s welfare can
be safeguarded satisfactorily with a minimum level of intervention, this is
the path that should be taken.
Under the terms of sub-s (4) the local authority must report back to the court
within eight weeks, unless the court directs otherwise; this may mean a
shorter period rather than a longer period. By contrast, there is no set time
limit for s 47 investigations. While it is naturally in the child’s best interests
to conclude matters quickly, there is no legal obligation to finish a s 47
investigation by a specified time.
The courts are in a difficult position if the local authority decides to do
nothing: the court itself has no powers to make a local authority apply for
a care order. This was highlighted as being a major gap in the law, but as
yet no moves have been made to change the situation. The gap arises
simply because of the need to reduce the local authorities’ powers and
those of the court to remove children from the care of their parents. Such
draconian state intervention should only be done in accordance with set
criteria.
In Re H (A Minor) (Section 37 Direction) [1993] 2 FLR 541, a lesbian couple
requested a residence order in relation to a child who had lived with them in
their home since being born there. The court held that the situation would be
Question
If the court orders a s 37 investigation, and the local authority decides to
do nothing, and the court disagrees with that decision, can the court force
the local authority to act?
Question
How long should an investigation take under this provision?
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regularised as far as was possible by the grant of an interim supervision and
interim residence orders. The local authority was directed, under s 37(1), to
make an investigation into the child’s circumstances. The phrase ‘child’s
circumstances’ should be construed in a wide sense so as to include any
situation which might affect the possibility of the child’s being likely to
suffer any significant harm in the future.
In Nottinghamshire CC v P [1993] 3 WLR 637, the local authority had
applied for a s 8 prohibited steps order (PSO) under the CA 1989 as it
wanted to prevent the father of the children residing in the same house as
them and also to stop contact between the father and the children. In the
original hearing the judge had stated:
I made it perfectly plain when speaking to the manager of social services that I
felt it [the supervision order] would give me teeth and powers that I did not
have without their application by the local authority refused to give me the
opportunity to exercise any of the powers which are ancillary to a supervision
order.
The local authority was said to have persistently and obstinately refused to
undertake what was the appropriate course of action, and it thereby
deprived the judge of the ability to make a constructive order. Additionally,
the Court of Appeal stated that:
[it was] deeply concerned at the absence of any power to direct this authority to
take steps to protect the children. Unfortunately, as appears from this case, if a
local authority doggedly resists taking the steps which are appropriate to the
case of children at risk of suffering significant harm it appears that the court is
powerless.
The fact that a s 8 PSO had been sought to exclude the father and prevent
contact was also criticised as being contrary to the CA 1989.
10.5 CHILD PROTECTION CASE CONFERENCES
The holding of case conferences is part and parcel of the child protection
process.
10.5.1 What is the conference there for?
The conference is intended to:
... bring together the family and the professionals concerned with child
protection and provides them with the opportunity to exchange information
and plan together. The conference symbolises the inter-agency basis and the
conference is the prime forum for sharing information and concerns, analysing
risk and recommending responsibility for action (Working Together, 1989, HMSO,
para 6.1).
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In terms of who is likely to attend, this will reflect the professional nature of
those involved: social work, education, health visiting and health authorities
and the like. In addition the parents or persons with PR and the child will
often be invited.
The decision to include the child in the attendees is not, nor should be,
automatic although parents would normally attend. Indeed, in some cases,
even if a child had reached a certain level of understanding, it would be
contrary to the child’s interests to attend due to the potentially harmful conflict
that may arise between the child and the parents. Even if the child is invited, it
is always open to exclude them from part of the conference, and this is true of
the parents as well. Occasionally it may be the case that the presence of the
family will inhibit the free exchange of information that is needed.
10.5.2 When will a conference be needed?
Conferences fall into two categories:
• the initial child protection case conference; and
• the child protection review.
The former needs to be convened when a referral into suspected abuse has
occurred; the latter acts as a means to ensure that cases do not drift.
The initial conference is clearly part of the child protection process, but
should not be used to delay protective work and it is expected that the initial
conference should be held within eight days of the initial referral.
Eight days is a very short time frame within which to operate, and
Department of Health guidance sets 15 days as a maximum, but in many
cases even this is not achieved. Despite this being contrary to the guidance,
there will be no comeback. The guidance does not have the force of law. The
delay is inevitable given the nature of the invitees. A conference will only
work at an acceptable level if professionals can attend, and convening a
conference at short notice does not promote good attendance rates.
Review conferences are subject to different time frames, since a decision
has already been made, and the purpose of the review is different. Reviews
will examine the existing level of risk to the child and ensure that the
protection plan that has been put into effect is working.
Question
Is this realistic?
Question
Do you agree that the child and the parents should always be invited?
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10.5.3 What decision can be made?
There is only one decision that can be made at the conference: ‘should the
child’s name be placed (or removed)’ from the child protection register.
One of the major difficulties with case conferences is that they are
perceived to be the forum within which the decision to take legal action is
made. This is one decision that is not within the conference’s remit. As you
have seen, the function is to decide whether or not to register the child’s
name on the child protection register. If the child is already registered, the
review conference will assess whether it is safe to remove the child’s name
from the register. As part of this decision making process, or rather as an
adjunct to it, the conference can formulate a child protection plan. This plan
may set out the variety of different agencies involved and the extent to
which they will act. The benefit of establishing this plan is that everyone will
be there, and this may include the parents.
The only decision maker will be the local authority (which is charged with
this function), and in particular the social services department. The legal
department of a local authority will not make the decision but merely act to
advise the social workers.
10.6 SHORT TERM ORDERS
By now you will be familiar with the notion that the local authority will
intervene by means of legal action only where it is necessary.
The preferred route should always be to attempt the voluntary options.
In some situations a voluntary route may not succeed. Indeed, some
families may actually co-operate better if subject to a court order. If legal
action is needed, the local authority will approach each individual case on
its facts and history. While the CA 1989 gives both short and long term
orders, there will be no guarantee as to how intervention will first arise.
What is clear is the requirement for local authorities to ensure that the legal
action meets the standard set by the ECHR – that in determining a person’s
civil rights, they are entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time (Art 6). In addition, local authorities must ensure that any interference
with the right to respect for an individual’s private and family life is
consistent with the prevailing national legislation. For study purposes, we
will look at short term and emergency orders first before considering long
term intervention.
Question
Whose decision is it to take legal proceedings?
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10.6.1 The child assessment order: s 43
The reason for introducing the child assessment order (CAO) has been
suggested by Masson and Morris as being due to ‘concern that the more
rigorous requirements for an EPO could mean that it was impossible to get
an EPO where there was fear for the child’s safety but no hard evidence’
(Children Act Manual, 1992, Sweet & Maxwell, pp 129–30). It could be argued
that by allowing the assessment of a child, the order is akin to a fishing
exercise, to enable the local authority to get evidence on which to base a
future application. The use of the order to gather evidence is
incontrovertible. However, that it is a ‘fishing exercise’ is a less valid
suggestion, since the CAO can only be obtained after the criteria in s 43 have
been proved.
10.6.1.1 The criteria
The order is set out in s 43:
(1) On the application of a local authority or authorised person ... the court
may make the order if, but only if, it is satisfied that –
(a) the applicant has reasonable cause to suspect that the child is suffering,
or is likely to suffer, significant harm;
(b) an assessment of the state of the child’s health or development, or the
way in which he has been treated, is required to enable the applicant to
determine whether or not the child is suffering, or is likely to suffer,
significant harm; and
(c) it is unlikely that such an assessment will be made, or be satisfactory, in
the absence of an order under this section.
The Secretary of State is responsible for authorising agents under the CA
1989 to carry out specified functions or duties. The only agent so authorised
at present is the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
(NSPCC).
The criteria for the court to consider comprise three elements:
• the applicant has reasonable cause to suspect that the child is suffering or
likely to suffer significant harm;
• an assessment is needed to establish whether the child is so suffering;
and
• the assessment is not likely to happen without the order.
All three elements need to be satisfied.
Question
Who do you think would be classed as authorised for the purposes of
sub-s 1?
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This may be proved from a variety of acts or omissions by the child’s
parents. For example, the local authority may be seeking to work
voluntarily with the family and may have set up a series of appointments
with various professionals to assess the child. The parents may refuse to
assist, or fail to attend. Alternatively, the parents may simply refuse to
allow access to the child. If access is refused, then the authority may go
straight to an application for an EPO which is contrary to the idea of
working together. Hence, a CAO may be seen as a threatening device as
opposed to a ‘real’ order. The fact that CAOs are hardly used would
support this suggestion. Is co-operation voluntary when supported with the
threat of legal action?
In addition to proving the criteria set out in s 43, any applicant must also
satisfy the court that the making of the order will be better than making no
order at all (s 1(5)) and that the order is in the best interests of the child 
(s 1(1)). There is no need to go through the welfare checklist: s 1(3) is not
applicable since s 43 is within Pt V of the CA 1989 and hence not referred to
in s 1(4). Practically, any applicant would do well to remember the checklist
and ensure that statements in support of their application make some
reference to the issues within it, since the checklist is taken as indicating the
factors by which the child’s welfare can be assessed. (Remember that we
looked at the welfare checklist earlier in the text.)
10.6.1.2 Consequences
A CAO is only available for a period of seven consecutive days. All
assessments and examinations, which the local authority wishes to conduct,
must be completed within this period. The applicant cannot remove the child
from the parental home, unless this has been authorised by the court itself,
nor will the applicant obtain PR for the child; this remains with the
parents. In some cases the court, if faced with an application for a CAO, may
consider the case to be too serious for a mere investigative order. In such
cases, under sub-s (3), the court can treat the application as being for an EPO.
This potentially reduces the effectiveness of the CAO, since the court,
consisting of lay magistrates in the majority of cases, will perhaps not wish
to be seen as placing a child in potential risk, regardless of the views of the
applicant.
If a parent refuses to comply with a CAO, while it would be unlikely that
any action to commit for breach of a court order would arise, the chances of a
successful EPO or care order application would be higher.
Question
How do you think the local authority can prove the third point in this list?
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10.6.1.3 Advantages
Advantages of the order are that:
• the parents keep PR exclusively;
• the child may be seen by the family doctor in a familiar environment;
• parents may co-operate with this type of order more willingly, hence the
social work relationship with the family will not be damaged; and
• the child can be protected in serious but not emergency situations.
Think about these advantages for a moment. Do you agree with them?
Although there are advantages to having an order to investigate, there
are difficulties. These may include the evidential difficulties in establishing
lack of co-operation, through to problems with establishing working
relationships with the family and the fact that this is not a protective order.
The CAO is certainly not an emergency order: notice must be given of the
application, and there is the time taken to prove that the parents will not co-
operate. Given these criticisms, can you understand why the order is used
infrequently?
10.7 EMERGENCY PROTECTION ORDERS: s 44
Whilst CAOs are under utilised, EPOs certainly are not. The EPO is a short
term order, its aim being to protect in an emergency situation.
10.7.1 Criteria and applicants
Section 44(1) is often misunderstood or confused by students, primarily since
they mix up the criteria and fail to appreciate how the criteria operate. The
section sets out three different criteria upon which an application can be
based, and dictates which type of applicant can use which of the criteria. The
section states:
(1) Where any person (‘the applicant’) applies to the court for an order to be
made under this section with respect to a child, the court may make the
order if, but only if, it is satisfied that –
(a) there is reasonable cause to believe that the child is likely to suffer
significant harm if –
(i) he is not removed to accommodation provided on or on behalf of
the applicant; or
Question
Do you perceive there to be any advantages in seeking CAOs?
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(ii) he does not remain in the place in which he is then being
accommodated.
(b) in the case of an application made by a local authority –
(i) enquiries are being made with respect to the child under section
47(1)(b); and
(ii) those enquiries are being frustrated by access being unreasonably
refused to a person authorised to seek access and that the applicant
has reasonable cause to believe that access to the child is required
as a matter of urgency; or
(c) in the case of an application made by an authorised person –
(i) the applicant has reasonable cause to suspect that a child is
suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm;
(ii) the applicant is making enquiries with respect to the child’s
welfare; and
(iii) those enquiries are being frustrated by access to the child being
unreasonably refused to a person authorised to seek access and the
applicant has reasonable cause to believe that access to the child is
required as a matter of urgency.
10.7.1.1 The any person criterion
Section 44(1)(a) is referred to as the ‘any person criterion’, since ‘any person’
may apply for an EPO under these grounds. There are certain elements to the
criterion on which you need to be clear.
First, to be successful, there must be ‘reasonable cause to believe that the
child is likely to suffer significant harm’.
The common sense reaction would be to say the applicant. However, by
reading the section carefully, you will know that it is the court that must
hold that belief. The applicant’s function is to convince the court that the
child is at risk.
Secondly, the risk of harm must arise from the child remaining in their
current accommodation, or being removed from it (s 44(1)(a)(i) and (ii)
respectively).
The burden of proof to be satisfied is the civil standard.
Question
Can the local authority utilise s 44(1)(a)?
Question
Who has to hold that belief?
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As the sub-section allows an application by ‘anyone’, the local authority can
certainly use it to obtain an order, and frequently does. Others you may
come across using it include hospitals, if they believe that the removal of a
child from hospital care will be detrimental to its welfare (this falls within 
s 44(1)(a)(ii)), the police and family members.
If an EPO is gained by anyone other than the local authority, the court
will notify the local authority of the making of the order. This will trigger the
investigation of the case and the child by the local authority under the
provisions of s 47.
10.7.1.2 The local authority criterion
Section 44(1)(b) is specific to the local authority. To gain an EPO under this
section, the local authority must establish that:
• it is carrying out a s 47 investigation;
• the enquiries are being frustrated by access being denied; and
• it believes that access is needed as a matter of urgency.
All three elements of the criterion must be satisfied.
Arguably, the answer is yes. Under s 44(1)(a) it is the court that has to be
satisfied that the child is at risk of harm; under s 44(1)(b) only the local
authority has to believe anything. You will see that there is no mention of
significant harm in s 44(1)(b); it is implicit from the fact of the s 47
investigation. Again, note the differences in wording. For s 44(1)(a), the court
must have reasonable cause to believe, whereas under s 47, the local
authority must only have reasonable cause to suspect. The differences are
subtle, but it is suggested that suspicion implies a lower threshold than
belief. The extent to which any court would question the evidence of the
local authority for holding that suspicion is also a matter for conjecture.
The inability to gain access to the child is linked into the s 47
investigation. You should recall that the local authority, under s 47(4), is
under a duty to see the child (unless it has sufficient information) and, if
access is refused, s 47 directs the local authority to consider legal action. The
question you should be thinking is, ‘what is meant by access?’ Naturally it
will refer to physical access; but the local authority social worker may wish
to see the child in the home setting, while parents will only allow ‘access’ at
the local authority’s offices. The social worker may wish to gain access to
examine for injuries. The social worker may be prevented from such access if
the parents refuse to allow examination or for the child to be undressed.
‘Urgency’ is another issue open to interpretation; it clearly means
something more than the social worker wanting to see the child on a set
Question
Is this easier to satisfy than the any person criterion?
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day. Urgency will be assessed in the light of the overall situation, the
history of the case, the age of the child and also whether other venues for
seeing the child can be arranged and agreed between the family and the
local authority.
10.7.1.3 The authorised person criterion
The final criterion in s 44 is available only to ‘authorised persons’, the
NSPCC. The criteria to be satisfied under s 44(1)(c) are a conglomeration of 
s 44(1)(a) and (b). Note that there has to be some evidence supporting the
suspicion of harm but here it is the applicant that must have the suspicion,
not the court. Section 44(1)(c) replicates s 44(1)(b) in that there must be
enquiries being carried out and refusal of access which is needed urgently.
If you remember, s 47 requires the local authority, when any of the trigger
criteria are met, ‘to make, or cause to be made’ any necessary enquiries.
Hence, the local authority may ‘contract out’ enquiries to the NSPCC.
When the court is considering the making of an order under s 44,
regardless of whom the applicant is, it must have regard to the basic s 1 of
the CA 1989 principles: that the child’s welfare is paramount; that the court
should not delay; that it should consider whether to make an order at all.
The welfare checklist is not directly called into consideration since the
procedure for seeking EPOs, as with CAOs, is to be found in Pt V of the Act.
10.7.2 Consequences of making the order
10.7.2.1 Removal
Section 44(4) authorises the removal of the child by the applicant to
alternative accommodation. If the child is already in suitable accommodation
(that is, a hospital) the sub-section will permit the retention of the child in
that place. However, this needs to be read in conjunction with s 44(10),
which has the effect that if an EPO is obtained, but when the child comes to
be removed there is found to be no reason for removal, the child shall remain
where it is. Additionally, if the child is removed, and the source of that harm
subsequently disappears, then the local authority must consider returning
the child. To give you an example, consider the following situation
Anne and Bill cohabit, and have one son, Christopher. Bill is known to be
violent. After a routine health visitor check-up, a referral was made to
Wollham Social Services. The social worker has visited the home twice; on
neither visit did she get into the house. An EPO was obtained, and
Christopher removed to foster care. Two days after the order was made Anne
obtained an occupation order against Bill (remember, we covered these in the
Question
Why might the NSPCC be carrying out enquiries?
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domestic violence chapter). In this situation, if Anne has not been seen to be
causing harm to the child, then it may be deemed appropriate to return
Christopher.
If the child is returned, this will not automatically result in the termination of
the order. So, if the source of harm reappears, the child can be removed
again for the remainder of the EPO’s duration and without the need to seek
further approval from the court.
If you looked at Nottinghamshire CC v P [1993] 3 WLR 637, you may recall
that here the authority had attempted to use a prohibited steps order under s
8 of the CA 1989 to do just that (these orders were covered in previous
chapter). The court held that it was not an appropriate use of the order. Now
the CA 1989 has been amended to give the court power to include an
exclusion order, when making an EPO (s 44A and s 44B), ordering the
removal of the abuser from the home. The court will still make the EPO, but
if an exclusion order is made, the child will be expected to remain in the
family home. Undertakings to leave voluntarily may also be acceptable, but
here too you should note that the EPO must be made by the court,
presumably to enable the local authority to remove the child if the suspected
abuser reneges on the undertaking or breaches the exclusion order.
Additionally, a suspected abuser may be encouraged to leave, since Sched 2,
para 5 of the CA 1989 permits the local authority to assist by provision of
accommodation or even money to a suspected abuser, but this section is not
commonly used.
10.7.2.2 Contact
If a child has been removed from their family, there is an expectation that the
child will be given reasonable contact with their parents or carers during the
life of the EPO (s 44(13)). It is hoped that the trauma to the child will be
lessened by allowing contact. However, it may not be appropriate for contact
in all cases, or certainly not for unsupervised contact. The court may
therefore be asked to restrict or prevent contact for the benefit of the child.
The court has the power to grant such directions under s 44(6). In this
situation the local authority and the court need to remember the right of a
parent to contact under the auspices of Art 8 of the ECHR.
Question
Would it not be better to remove a suspected abuser from the home?
Question
If Christopher is returned and Bill is accepted back into the home
(contrary to the occupation order), what can the local authority do?
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10.7.2.3 Duration
The EPO, as its name indicates, deals with emergency situations and is,
therefore, of a limited duration. This reflects the attempt to move away from
the previous, and quite draconian, place of safety order. The EPO will last for
up to eight days on the first application (s 45(1)). The applicant must be ready
to persuade the court to grant the maximum duration since it is not
guaranteed. During the EPO, the local authority (whether the applicant or
not) should assess the child to establish whether further legal action is
needed or services should be provided.
It is hard to imagine a full assessment being carried out in the currency of an
EPO to enable a fully informed decision to proceed (or not) with other legal
action. Indeed, as an application for a supervision order or care order needs
to be made on notice, the eight days is an unrealistic proposition. If
necessary, an application can be made to extend the initial order, by up to
seven days (s 45(5)). Only one such extension is permissible.
If no other application is made (such as for a care order), then at the end
of the EPO the situation will, legally, revert to normal. Practically, this may
not be so since the parents may agree to work voluntarily with the local
authority.
10.7.2.4 Parental responsibility
During the existence of the EPO, the applicant will obtain limited PR for the
child (s 44(4)(c)). The gaining of PR will not extinguish that held by the
parents. It will, however, restrict the other holders’ ability to exercise it. As
you should remember, the other holders will not be able to act in a manner
to conflict with the order.
The extent to which decisions can be made by the applicant is strictly
limited to actions needed to safeguard and protect the welfare of the child 
(s 44(5)).
You might, logically, assume so; however, this was not the view of the court
in the case of F v Wirral MBC [1991] 2 WLR 1132, although this decision was
based on the actions of the local authority under the legislation prior to the
CA 1989.
Question
Should any liability accrue if the applicant went beyond their powers?
Question
Is eight days long enough to complete an assessment?
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10.7.2.5 Appealing the order
Most court orders can be appealed: the EPO cannot. This is logical given the
limited time duration for the order. If an order has been made, the child, a
parent of the child, anyone with PR or the person with whom the child was
living before the order was made, may apply for it to be discharged (which is
not the same as an appeal) (s 45(8), (9) and (10)). The discharge option is not
available for all EPOs; it depends on the procedure used to get the order. If
the individual(s) seeking to discharge the order had formal notice of the
hearing and attended the hearing, or in relation to an extension, was present
when the extra duration was ordered, then they cannot seek discharge. In
any event, no application can be brought until 72 hours after the making
of the order has expired. If the local authority is successful in getting the
order, it will always have a minimum of three days before the order can be
ended.
The situation where no order is made highlights the fact that gaps do
exist in this legislation. The only viable option is to reapply to the court.
In Re P (Emergency Protection Order) [1996] 1 FLR 482, C, aged two
months, was admitted to hospital after receiving injuries which appeared to
be non-accidental. The judge concluded that M, one of the parents, was
responsible. An emergency protection order was obtained by the local
authority, but an extension was refused by the magistrates. On appeal,
Johnson J commented on the refusal to extend the EPO thus:
... that the justices having refused to extend the emergency protection order, the
Children Act 1989 lacked any effective procedure by which the local authority
could challenge that decision.
A variety of options were raised, such as immediate application for a care
order but, as Johnson J pointed out, these were all very cumbersome and not
ideal in the circumstances.
10.7.3 Procedure
From the previous paragraphs you will know that an EPO can be obtained
‘on notice’. That notice is, under Sched 2 of the Family Proceedings Rules, set
at one day.
Question
Is this consistent with the notion of emergency?
Question
Can you appeal against the making of, or refusal to make, an EPO?
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You should answer this in the negative. Can it really be said that a child is
being protected if parents or carers are given a day to do something worse,
or disappear (if you take a very pessimistic view of human nature)? Due to
the inconsistency with the concept of ‘emergency’, very few EPOs are sought
after giving notice. Normally, they will be sought without notice; hence,
most parents can seek to apply for discharge of the order.
For all public law proceedings, the starting place is the Family Proceedings
Court (FPC) (magistrates). Therefore, if an order is to be sought without
notice, it can be obtained out of court hours from a single magistrate. Indeed,
under the Family Proceedings Rules (FPR) (SI 1991/1247) a single court clerk
may be empowered to grant an out of hours EPO.
10.8 THE CHILDREN’S GUARDIAN
In certain specified proceedings, as established in s 41 of the CA 1989, the
court is required to appoint a children’s guardian for the child (referred to in
the CA 1989 as ‘an officer of the Service’ – the ‘Service’ being the Children
and Family Court Advisory and Support Services (CAFCASS)), unless the
court is satisfied that it is not necessary to do so. Some of the situations
where a children’s guardian is appointed are where there is:
• an application for a care or supervision order or discharge of such an
order or an appeal against the making of such an order;
• a s 37 investigation;
• an application to substitute a supervision order for a care order;
• a consideration of residence order being granted where the child is in
care or an appeal relating to this situation; or
• an issue relating to contact to a child in care.
Appointment of a guardian may not be necessary if the proceedings are
relatively simple or uncontested (primarily, agreed discharges), or if the
child is considered mature enough to participate on their own behalf. The
children’s guardian will be a qualified social worker or probation officer but,
to avoid claims of lack of impartiality, must not have worked in the
particular social services department involved with the child.
The role of the guardian is to act on behalf of the child and to safeguard
the child’s interests. In effect, they act as an independent expert who is there
to put forward their professional views as to the child’s needs and welfare in
a given situation. They are entitled to appoint a solicitor for the child and
normally this does not cause any difficulty. However, the solicitor’s client is,
Question
Which court will be involved?
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in fact, the child and problems can arise if, for example, there is a mature
child who disagrees with the recommendations of the guardian. In this case,
the solicitor would have to accept instructions from the child, not the
guardian.
As guardians are independent and have a legal right (s 42) to gain access
to all the social work files on a case to which they are appointed, their
recommendations are given a great deal of weight in the proceedings.
10.9 SUMMARY OF PART ONE
You have now come to the end of a major part of child protection legislation.
There is a lot of information here to learn and consolidate. This is not helped
by the general lack of reported cases, which should not surprise you since
they are mainly in the Family Proceedings Court, and EPOs are not subject to
appeal. This will change when you move on to the long term orders under 
s 31 of the CA 1989. 
PART TWO
10.10 LONG TERM ORDERS
The two orders that we are concerned with here are supervision orders and
care orders, both of which are dealt with in Pt IV of the CA 1989. The section
which establishes the primary criteria for seeking both these orders is s 31,
although other sections deal with the consequences of the orders. In this part
of the chapter you will study the criteria for, and consequences of, these
orders and also a little about the process of making an order in the sense of
the court’s involvement.
10.11 THE CRITERIA
As indicated, s 31 provides most of the information on what is needed to get
either a care or supervision order and this section states:
(1) On the application if any local authority or authorised person, the court
may make an order –
(a) placing the child with respect to whom the application is made in the
care of a designated local authority; or
(b) putting him under the supervision of a designated local authority.
(2) A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is satisfied –
(a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant
harm; and
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(b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to –
(i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order
were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a
parent to give to him; or
(ii) the child’s being beyond parental control.
(3) No care order or supervision order may be made with respect to a child
who has reached the age of seventeen (or sixteen in the case of a child who
is married).
Purely from your reading of s 31(1), and without knowing any of the
consequences of the orders, it can be suggested that the supervision order is
the less onerous of the two. It merely places the child under the supervision
of the local authority, whereas a care order will potentially remove the child
from the care of their parents.
You may find this difficult to answer at this stage, but write down your
initial thoughts, and then think about this when you have studied more of
the chapter.
10.11.1 Section 31(2)
You should have noticed that this subsection has two distinct elements to it.
These two elements are often called the ‘threshold criteria’ since they form
the basic evidential threshold to be reached before the court’s power to make
an order kicks in.
The first stage of the test is to establish that the child ‘is suffering or is
likely to suffer significant harm’. The second stage is to establish the reason
for that harm or risk of harm. The risk of harm should be due to the ‘care
given to the child ... not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent
to give’ or ‘the child being beyond parental control’, both of which relate the
harm suffered by the child to the ability of the parents to care or control. Of
the second element only one aspect needs to be proved, that is, that the child
is not being given adequate care or is beyond control.
Question
Do you think it is appropriate to have the same qualifying criteria for two
distinct orders?
Question
Before analysing the criteria in depth, which of the two orders do you
think is the more draconian?
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10.11.2 Significant harm
This is a phrase which has run throughout the criteria for orders available to
the local authority and their duty to investigate.
The difference in the wording within the sections is subtle but crucial. The
s 44 reference is to reasonable belief that the child is suffering significant
harm. In s 47, it was only reasonable suspicion. However, in s 31 the
reference is to the fact that the child is suffering or is likely to suffer. This is a
more definite statement: you have gone beyond the realms of belief to actual
knowledge. This higher burden is clearly necessary since you are dealing
with far more interventionist orders.
10.11.2.1 The meaning of significant harm
Significant harm is defined in s 31 thus:
(9) In this section –
‘harm’ means ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development
including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-
treatment of another;
‘development’, means physical, intellectual, emotional, social or
behavioural development;
‘health’ means physical or mental health; and
‘ill-treatment’ includes sexual abuse and forms of ill-treatment which are
not physical.
(10)Where the question of whether harm suffered by a child is significant turns
on the child’s health or development, his health or development shall be
compared with that which could reasonably be expected of a similar child.
The definition in sub-s (9) (and (10)) has been described by Masson and
Morris (Children Act Manual, 1992, Sweet & Maxwell, p 99) as ‘constructed
like a Russian doll’. You may or may not agree, but it is true that the
definition is not easy to deconstruct.
Harm is clearly defined in sub-s (9) as being ‘ill treatment or the
impairment of health or development’. These terms are then further defined.
The further definitions place more emphasis, than was evident in pre-CA
1989 legislation, on the effects of emotional harm. The impairment of a
child’s emotional development or socialisation can therefore lead to a
possible application.
Question
How does the reference to significant harm in s 31 differ from that in s 44?
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When looking at this provision, you should have noted that the means to
establish whether harm is significant, given in sub-s (10), only relates to
harm to a child’s health or development. There is no reference to ill-
treatment of the child. Also, comparing a child with another ‘similar child’
does not really define ‘significant’; it merely highlights the method used to
prove harm is significant.
The Royal Commission on Child Care Law stated, in relation to
‘significant’, that it meant ‘substantial’ and that:
minor shortcomings in the health and care provided or minor deficits in
physical, psychological or social developments should not give rise to any
compulsory intervention unless they are having, or are likely to have, serious
and lasting effects on the child (para 5.15).
While many judges with experience in family matters will have a good
knowledge of child development, some will have only a limited knowledge.
The decision on whether a child is suffering harm will, thus, be based upon
the expert evidence that is put before the court. In relation to comparison
under sub-s (10), the Lord Chancellor indicated during the passage of the CA
1989 through Parliament that it referred to a child of similar physical
attributes but that the background of the other child should not be brought
into account. The Lord Chancellor’s view is, however, contradicted by the
Children Act 1989 Guidance and Regulations (1991, HMSO, Vol 1, Court
Orders), which states that: ‘the meaning of similar in this context ... may need
to take account of environmental, social and cultural characteristics of the
child.’ This could lead to potential difficulties.
In relation to the meaning of significant harm, you have been referred
earlier to the case of Re O (A Minor) (Care Order: Education: Procedure) [1992]
1 WLR 912, which looks at this matter. In Humberside CC v B [1993] 1 FLR
257, the parents of the child both had mental health difficulties. They had left
their young baby, N, alone in their flat and also left her with relatives
on numerous occasions. N was also found to have unexplained bruising.
The court referred to significant harm by saying it should be seen in the
context of all the circumstances of the case and in relation to the particular
child. The court accepted the local authority’s argument that the fact that the
child had suffered bruising when the child was immobile and could not have
caused it herself. The fact that there was no explanation and the fact that the
Question
If the courts are required to compare one child with another, how should
they pick that other child?
Question
Do you agree with the definition of significant? Is this sufficient?
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parents required constant guidance and support which had not helped
protect the child indicated that the child was at risk of suffering significant
harm.
In Re M (Care Order: Parental Responsibility) [1996] 2 FLR 84, the fact that
the parents had abandoned the child on the steps of a health clinic when
the child was only a few days old was deemed to constitute significant
harm.
10.11.2.2 When will significant harm need to be proved?
What is meant by this is at what point in time during the process of
intervention must the court be able to say ‘the child is suffering, or is likely
to suffer significant harm’.
225
Question
On the diagram below, which indicates a stereotypical care order
application, mark the point when you think this issue has to be satisfied.
History of a Care Case
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hypothetical Time Frame
20 weeks
(1) Local authority begins an investigation under s 47 of the CA 1989.
(2) Local authority provides services under s 17 of the CA 1989.
(3) Crisis occurs, and EPO is obtained under s 44(1)(a).
(4) Application for care order made by local authority under s 31.
Between points (4) and (5), there are numerous direction hearings and
appearances to obtain interim care orders under s 38 of the CA 1989.
(5) Final hearing of care order application.
The court will naturally make the decision at the time of the final hearing
since this is the time when all the criteria are considered to see if the order
can be made. But did you think this was the same point when the significant
harm test must be satisfied? The court, if taking the date of the final hearing
as the point when the significant harm test must be satisfied, may find itself
faced with a situation where the child is not suffering harm since they have
been removed from the harmful environment. Hence, the House of Lords
has stated that the point to assess significant harm is the time at which the
local authority took steps to protect the child. This makes far more sense as
at that point there has been no removal from the cause of harm.
While it is not totally clear, and you may of course argue in a different way, it
is suggested that the investigation of the family by the local authority is
certainly not within the remit of ‘taking steps to protect’. The provision of
services is somewhat more ambiguous, and it may depend on the nature of
services provided. Some services may not include sufficient intervention to be
truly protective. The application for the EPO is clearly ‘taking steps to protect’.
In Re M (A Minor) (Care Order: Threshold Conditions) [1994] 2 AC 424, the
mother of a very young child, C, was murdered by the father, F. C was then
fostered and a residence order was made in relation to C and three siblings
in favour of the mother’s cousin, X. F was convicted and recommended for
deportation. X applied for a residence order. F agreed with the making of a
care order which was granted. X’s appeal was allowed by the Court of
Appeal and the care order was discharged and replaced by a residence order
in favour of X. F appealed to the House of Lords. The House of Lords
decided that F’s appeal would be allowed. The Court of Appeal did possess
the jurisdiction to enable it to make a care order. The care order should be
restored so as to allow C’s general progress to be monitored by the local
authority. The relevant date, under s 31(2) of the CA 1989, on which the court
had to be satisfied of threshold criteria was the date on which the local
authority had commenced protective arrangements concerning C.
10.11.3 Past, present or future harm?
Question
In relation to s 31(2)(a) of the CA 1989, of the three alternatives in the heading
(that is, past, present or future), which do the criteria for harm fall into?
Question
Going back to the line diagram, as the local authority is working within the
clear non-interventionist framework of the CA 1989, it investigated and
then it provided services. Only after the services failed to achieve change
was an EPO sought. Which of these events equals ‘taking steps to protect’?
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The CA 1989 is focusing on the present and the future risks to the child. It
does not act retrospectively by asking what has happened to the child
previously.
The simple fact is that past harm, by itself, will never be enough to satisfy the
threshold criteria: past harm must be accompanied by cogent evidence that
indicates that the harm may happen in the future. When ‘predicting’ future
harm there does not need to be certainty that it will happen, the criteria state:
‘is likely to’. It is often easier to satisfy this test where cumulative harm is
concerned, that is, neglect. If you are dealing with a one-off incident, it is
much harder to show that it will happen again.
In Re H and Others [1996] 1 All ER 1, W had four children, all girls. C1
and C2 were fathered by H, whom W had married in 1979; C3 and C4 were
fathered by X, with whom W had lived after separating from H in 1984.
In 1993, C1, aged 15, complained to the police, alleging that she had been
sexually abused by X since the age of eight. X was charged with rape and
C1 was then placed with foster parents. In 1994 the local authority made
an application for care orders in relation to C2, C3 and C4. X was acquitted
of rape, but the local authority proceeded with their application, which was
based on the alleged abuse of C1 by X. The local authority asked the judge
to find that X had sexually abused C1, or, at least, that there was a
substantial risk that he had done so. The application was dismissed and
the Court of Appeal dismissed the local authority’s appeal. The local
authority appealed to the House of Lords. The House of Lords held that
the appeal of the local authority would be dismissed. In order to establish
that a child was likely to suffer significant harm in the future (within the
meaning of s 31 of the 1989 Act) so as to enable the court to make a care
or supervision order, there had to be a real possibility of risk, based on actual
facts rather than mere suspicion.
Lord Nicholls said that he could not accept the argument that ‘likely’
within the meaning of s 31 meant ‘probable’. ‘Likely’ was used in the sense
of a real possibility, one which could not be sensibly ignored, having regard
to the nature and gravity of the feared harm in the particular case. The
standard of proof required here was the ordinary civil standard of on the
balance of probabilities. To decide that C2, C3 and C4 were at risk because
there was a possibility that C1 was abused would be to base a decision not
on fact, but on the suspicion that C1 might have been abused. That would be
to lower the threshold prescribed by Parliament. Parents were not to be at
risk of having a child taken from them and removed into the care of the local
authority on the basis of suspicions only.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson (dissenting) said that if legal proof of actual
abuse was a prerequisite to a finding that a child was at risk of abuse, the
Question
Does this mean that ‘past harm’ can never be used evidentially?
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court would be powerless to intervene to protect children in relation to
whom there were the gravest suspicions of actual abuse but where the
necessary evidence legally to prove such abuse was lacking.
Lord Lloyd (dissenting) said that the question was whether, on all the
evidence, the court considered that there was a real possibility of the child’s
suffering significant harm in the future. If so, the threshold criteria were
satisfied. The court did not have to be satisfied, on the balance of
probabilities, that the child had in fact suffered significant harm in the past,
whether by sexual abuse or otherwise, even where the allegation of abuse
was the foundation of the local authority’s case for a care order.
In the case of Re D (A Minor) (Care or Supervision Order) [1993] 2 FLR 423,
there was evidence of previous harm to another child but not a sibling.
Despite no evidence of harm to the child in question, the court made the care
order due to the high risk the father posed. Of particular importance were
the nature of the injuries, the criminal conviction, the lack of
acknowledgment by the father that he had caused harm, and also the lack of
acknowledgment by the mother and wider family that the father posed a
problem.
10.11.4 The standard of care by parents
The second element of the threshold criteria concentrates on the cause of
harm to the child. This may either be poor care or lack of control.
Poor parenting has for some time been ground for intervention, and the
standards to be imposed have, in the past, reflected a very middle class
attitude. Even today, it can be questioned whose values of what makes good
parenting are being applied.
The standards required are not those of the perfect parent; this is
reflected in the fact that minor problems are to be ignored when assessing
harm. However, the test to be applied is clearly of an objective nature, that is,
not what is this parent capable of providing, but what is a parent capable of
providing by way of care?
This existed as a means to obtain a care order under the preceding Children
and Young Persons Act 1969, but today it will only be applicable where the
Question
Why is ‘beyond parental control’ included in the criteria?
Question
With regard to the care available to the child, what is the nature of the test?
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child is suffering significant harm. It could be suggested that a child who is
beyond control is not being provided with adequate care, and that therefore
this duplicates s 31(2)(a). This may be the case, but it is also true to say that
parents may be doing all they can for a child, and all that a reasonable parent
would do, and still be left with a child beyond their control.
In M v Birmingham CC [1994] 2 FLR 141, the child had a history of making
allegations against others, including family members, of being harmed,
abused or bullied, most allegations being withdrawn. She self-harmed and
was admitted to hospital and was later voluntarily accommodated by the
local authority. From there she repeatedly absconded. The court was clear
that the child was suffering significant harm and also that this was due to her
being beyond parental control. There was no evidence to indicate that the
harm was due to the level and standard of care that the parents had tried to
provide for the child.
10.11.5 Age
Although it is only a short sub-section, you should not overlook the
importance of s 31(3), which prohibits the making of a care or supervision
order once a child has reached the age of 17 years, or 16 if the child is
married. This point needs to be remembered since it is somewhat out of sync
with other legislation, and also begs the question of how can the local
authority protect children in this age range.
10.11.6 Why the ‘threshold’ criteria?
This should not be difficult as you have encountered the reasons before. The
answer is simply that the proof that a child may be suffering significant
harm, and that this is due to the parents, is only the first hurdle that needs to
be overcome. Thereafter, the court is required to consider the welfare of the
child, the welfare checklist (since the order is within Pt IV), and the no order
principle. Linked to the welfare checklist is the need to consider all other
options or other orders that would be available under the CA 1989. Proving
the threshold criteria may not result in the order sought.
10.11.7 Other situations where care orders can be made
Following the implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, a new set
of criteria for the making of a care order has been introduced. Prior to the CA
1989, a care order was a legitimate response in criminal proceedings in the
juvenile court. As a method of sentencing, it was not popular and so
following the Review of Child Care Law (1985, HMSO), the powers of the
Question
Can you think why the criteria are described in this way?
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criminal court to make this civil order were removed. However, the 1998 Act
has, in a way, reintroduced the civil response to a criminal act.
The 1998 Act creates some new orders with regard to children. You have
already come across the curfew notice in relation to s 47 of the CA 1989
investigations. In addition, the 1998 Act introduces the child safety order
(CSO). The circumstances when a CSO can be made by the magistrates’ court
are set out in s 11(3) of the 1998 Act as:
• the child has acted in a criminal manner but because the child is below 10
cannot be charged with a criminal offence;
• the order is necessary to prevent the child committing a criminal act;
• the child has breached a curfew notice, so has been in a public area
covered by the curfew notice between the relevant hours and without a
responsible adult; and
• the child is behaving in an anti-social manner.
If the local authority seeks a CSO the court will have regard to the factors in 
s 12 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, but it is of note that these do not
address issues such as the child’s welfare or child’s needs per se. All that is
mentioned is the need to consider the child’s family circumstances.
In the event of a breach of the CSO by the child, the CSO may be enforced
by the local authority via a responsible officer. The court’s powers are set out
in s 12(6) and (7) thus:
(6) Where a child safety order is in force and it is proved to the satisfaction of
the court which made it or another magistrate’s court ... that the child has
failed to comply with any of the requirement included in the order, the
court
(a) may discharge the order and make in respect of him a care order ...
(7) Subsection (6)(a) above applies whether or not the court is satisfied that
the conditions mentioned in section 31(2) of the 1989 Act are fulfilled.
The important thing to note is that if the court makes a care order under the
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, it is not required to consider whether the
threshold criteria are met, thereby bypassing completely the provisions of
the CA 1989. This is a major change, and one that may have significant
repercussions for children and local authorities.
10.12 THE PROCESS
As you have seen from the earlier line diagram, a care order application will
take a considerable time to complete its passage through the court. This time
has, however, been somewhat reduced since the implementation of the CA
1989.
Proceedings for care or supervision orders do not, generally, begin
without there having been any involvement with the family by social
services. In many local authorities, if an EPO is obtained by way of crisis
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management, a care order application will invariably follow. However, the
gaining of an EPO or CAO is not a prerequisite to the application; neither is
the provision of s 17 services.
10.12.1 The applicant
Only two possible applicants exist: the local authority or the NSPCC, as an
authorised person (s 31(1)).
As you know, the court cannot make an order of its own motion (again, 
s 31(1)) and the court cannot make the local authority apply for an order
(Nottinghamshire CC v P [1993] 3 WLR 637).
By introducing these restrictions, the amount of state involvement should
be reduced.
10.12.2 Where to apply and when
Again, you will know that the local authority must make the application to
the Family Proceedings Court. Whereas applications for EPOs and CAOs
will normally remain in the Family Proceedings Court, in the majority of
cases applications for care orders and supervision orders can be, and often
are, transferred to other courts. If a case is perceived to be complex, that is, if
it will last over three days’ duration, if it will involve expert evidence and
cross-examination, or if there are other family proceedings with which the
application can be consolidated, it may move to the county court or the High
Court. Only certain county courts are authorised to deal with care
applications, and these courts are named as designated care centres. Any
judge dealing with these issues will concentrate on family cases.
Applications must be made on notice which, according to the Children
Act rules, will be three days – but these are clear days’ notice.
10.12.3 Who will be involved?
The parties to the proceedings will be the child, all persons with PR and, of
course, the local authority. If there is a parent without PR (an unmarried
father), that parent will be told that the proceedings are taking place. That
party may then seek leave to be joined to the proceedings. Once the
application has been made, if it was not preceded by an EPO, the court will
appoint a guardian for the child.
Question
Who is the applicant?
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10.12.4 Directions
The first hearing that will take place in court after the application has been
filed, will merely establish the timetable for the running of the matter. The
court, having consulted with the parties, will set the dates for the filing of
statements, expert reports, the guardian report and the final hearing. Several
weeks may be taken up with the process of gathering and exchanging
evidence. For the guardian the evidence is crucial since they know nothing
or very little about the case at the time of their appointment.
The gap between their initial application and the final hearing is also
important to the local authority, which will probably still be in the process of
investigating and formulating a future plan for the child.
10.12.5 Care plans
In addition to the production of various statements for the court, the local
authority will be required under s 31A to produce a document known as a
care plan in relation to the child:
(1) Where an application is made on which a care order might be made with
respect to a child, the appropriate local authority must, within such time
as the court may direct, prepare a plan (‘a care plan’) for the future care
of the child.
The care plan must contain certain information, as prescribed under
statutory instrument. As yet, the requirement to file a care plan is not yet in
force, having been inserted into the CA 1989 by the Adoption and Children
Act 2002. However, prior to this provision, care plans were required by
virtue of case law and so an indication of what will be required can be
established. The sort of information required will include:
• the proposed placement: type and details;
• the arrangements for contact and rehabilitation with the family;
• the duration of placement;
• the contingency plans in case of breakdown; and
• the details of the parents’ role in day-to-day arrangements.
In Re J (Minors) (Care: Care Plans) [1994] 1 FLR 253, the local authority was
asking for final care orders in relation to M’s four children. The judge
was satisfied that the threshold criteria had been met and felt that, in
the interests of the welfare of the children, they should be removed
from M’s care and final orders made. However, a care plan made by
the local authority had been modified a few days before the hearing.
It proposed placements with foster parents, although no complete
matching of the children and foster parents had been undertaken. The
guardian opposed final care orders, suggesting the alternative of interim
care orders.
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The court held that final care orders would be made. The local authority
plan must be in line with guidance structures issued by the Department of
Health. The threshold criteria had clearly been satisfied and, on the facts,
final care orders as issued seemed to be the appropriate course of action to be
taken in relation to the four children. In relation to the care plan Wall J stated
that:
A properly constructed care plan is not only essential to enable the court to
make its decision based on all the known facts; it will or should have been
compiled either in consulation with the parents and other interested parties,
including where appropriate the child or children involved, or at the very least
after taking their views and wishes into account.
The care plan should also, wherever possible, be supported by evidence.
The problem with care plans is the difficulty of enforcing them; if the
local authority changes its mind, there is little the court can do. This is
because once the care order is made, all control passes to the local authority.
The most practical solution, if the care plan is altered, is for an application to
discharge the care order to be made by the child’s parents or possibly the
child themselves. This would seem to be the best means to get a court
review. The alternative of judicial review would be more complicated and
perhaps less likely to be successful. However, failure by the local authority to
comply with the care plan may also result in proceedings under the ECHR
since there are Art 8 rights at issue.
Several alternatives could be suggested:
• the court refuses to make the order;
• the court adjourns the final hearing to allow reconsideration;
• the court makes the care order but with conditions attached; or
• the court makes a private law order under s 8 of the CA 1989 (covered in
the previous chapter).
Whether any of these are suitable remedies depends upon the nature of the
situation, the child’s best interests, and the legality of the remedy. Now the
court has also to consider the issue of compatibility with the ECHR when
deciding on the outcome of the care proceedings.
In R v W and B (Children) W (Children) [2001] HRLR 50, the appellants in
two cases appealed against the making of full care orders arguing that the
CA 1989 was potentially incompatible with Sched 1, Pt 1 of the Human
Rights Act 1998, and if not incompatible, that pre-existing case law
governing the interpretation and operation of the 1989 Act must be
modified. In the first appeal, the care plan had subsequently broken down
Question
What happens if the court does not agree with the local authority’s
proposals?
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whilst, in the second appeal, the plan had been made without full and
sufficient information and had also failed. It was argued there were
potential breaches of the right to respect for family life under Art 8 and of
the right of access to the courts under Art 6, as once the care order had
been made, all responsibility for the child passed to the local authority and
the role of the guardian was removed, which left the children potentially
without representation. The absence of an overriding mechanism in the
event of a care plan failing was raised as a hurdle in the way of a court
which otherwise would have sought to remedy the situation. The Court of
Appeal held that the CA 1989 was not fundamentally incompatible with
the HRA 1998. The provisions of the CA 1989 were not problematic, but the
philosophy surrounding the legislation of the division of responsibility
between the court and the local authority raised potential breaches of the
HRA 1998. These potential breaches could be avoided by two major
adjustments in the application of the care order provisions. First, it was
important that judges had a wider discretion to order interim care and
were free to defer the full order. Secondly, the development of the care
plan should be collaborative, elevating important milestones to a ‘starred
status’. If these highlighted factors, ie, those with starred status, were not
achieved within a reasonable time, the matter should return to the court.
Despite this view, creating or elevating key factors to a ‘starred status’
is not happening in practice.
10.12.6 What happens to the child whilst proceedings are ongoing?
While all this investigation and report writing is proceeding, the child will
have to be cared for.
In some cases, the child may be left with their parents, but these are likely to
be the minority of cases. If a child has been removed under an EPO it is very
unlikely that a return will be planned until the s 31 proceedings are
concluded. Hence, the court can make interim care orders under the
provisions of s 38 of the CA 1989. The section provides two situations where
an interim order may be made:
• where care or supervision order proceedings are adjourned; and
• where the court has requested a s 37 investigation.
It is very important to be aware of the limited situations in which the court’s
powers to make interim care orders (ICOs) arise. A local authority cannot
apply for an ICO as a stand alone order, and so an ICO is not a protective
option in that sense.
Question
If the application is for a care order, will it be appropriate for the child to
remain with its parents?
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In both situations, under s 38(2), the court must have reasonable grounds
for believing that the threshold criteria are satisfied.
When an ICO is made, it is made without the benefit of all the relevant
evidence. Hence, the burden to be satisfied regarding the threshold criteria is
lower. The court is not looking for absolute proof that the threshold will be
satisfied, but the reasonable belief that it will – not the same at all. The
making of a s 38 order will not, therefore, mean that the full order will
necessarily be made.
It is worth remembering that when the court makes an interim care
order, it has discretion to include an exclusion requirement (s 38A). This
works in a similar way to exclusion requirements for EPO’s under s 44A (if
you cannot recall these, re-read the relevant pages).
The court can, therefore, leave a child in its home with a carer who the
court believes is able to meet the child’s needs, and yet exclude others who
the court believes are responsible for the harm being suffered by the child.
The court may also accept an undertaking to leave the property from the
person viewed as being the source of harm (s 38B).
To comply with the ‘no delay’ principles of the CA 1989, ICOs are time
limited. To prevent a child drifting in care due to the court system, under
s 38 an ICO can initially be made for a maximum of eight weeks. It may be
necessary to renew this order, and any renewals can be for up to four weeks’
duration. On each renewal the court must reasonably believe the threshold
criteria to be met.
10.12.7 Assessments
Under s 38(6), the court can give directions as to assessments that are to be
undertaken during the course of the ICO. The CA 1989 refers specifically to
medical and psychiatric assessments.
An assessment of this sort is clearly focused on the capabilities of the
parents, and yet the section indicates that the assessment must be of the
child. This issue is one which has led to judicial comment in the case of Re C
Question
Could the court order a residential assessment, that is, one whereby the
mother (and sometimes father) are observed and supervised in a
residential setting (often called mother and baby units)?
Question
Does this mean that the making of an ICO will guarantee that a full care
order is made?
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(Interim Care Order: Residential Assessment) [1997] 1 FLR 1, decided by the
House of Lords, where the view was that such assessments were within the
remit of s 38, since without such an assessment the court would be prevented
from having all the relevant evidence to hand. However, the opinion of the
House of Lords could lead to some difficult decisions for local authorities,
especially when financial constraints are taken into account. Is it right to
spend several thousands of pounds on assessing one child’s parents,
especially if the result can be predicted as being negative, and deprive
several other children from receiving services or preventive work? The
decision in Re C did not rule out the costs argument being successful; it has
just made it harder to run.
10.13 THE FINAL HEARING: WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS?
If the court is satisfied, at the final hearing, that the local authority has
proved the threshold criteria at the time when steps to protect the child were
taken, it may then make the order sought.
You should have thought of:
• the welfare of the child;
• the welfare checklist;
• the other options available under the CA 1989; and
• no order at all.
10.13.1 No order
The concepts may seem contradictory. However, the court may believe that
the parents will co-operate in a satisfactory manner to ensure the child’s
welfare is protected (in many cases of this sort the court will make a
supervision order). In addition, there is a growing body of research which
would suggest that the removal of a child from their home environment by
virtue of a care order is more damaging to the long term welfare than leaving
Question
If a court has found that the threshold criteria have been satisfied, can it
ever be said to be in the child’s interests for the child to return to the
parents without the making of an order?
Question
What are the other issues or factors that the court must consider before
making the order?
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the child where they are. Also, the very nature of the care system may result
in longer term harm. Many children who have been through the care system
have lower than average qualifications, little or no real employment
prospects and a higher chance of being involved in crime.
10.13.2 Other options
Despite the proceedings being commenced in the public law domain, the court
can make a s 8 residence order if it deems it appropriate. In developing its care
plan, the local authority should have regard to the extended family of the
child, and consider whether suitable carers can be found from this category of
individuals. The fact that the local authority may support the placement of the
child within the wider family does not necessarily mean that it will not wish to
have a care order. In some cases though, the local authority will be perfectly
amenable to the making of a s 8 of the CA 1989 residence order (covered in the
previous chapter). To illustrate this, consider the following example:
Anne had a relationship with Bill and conceived a child. They split up before the
birth of Christopher. Bill has so far played no role in the child’s life. Anne
presents at the casualty department of her local hospital with Christopher and
non-accidental injuries are diagnosed. Anne is believed to have beaten and
burnt Christopher repeatedly. The local authority commences care proceedings.
They give notice of the application to Bill, but as an unmarried father without
parental responsibility he is not a party to the proceedings. Bill has now settled
down, has a stable relationship and a reasonable job. He and his new girlfriend
wish to care for Christopher. The local authority assesses the couple and agrees
that their care would be appropriate, as does the children’s guardian. At the
final hearing the local authority recommends the making of a s 8 order.
If the court agreed with the local authority and the children’s guardian on
the outcome, a s 8 order could be made, without Bill having even been party
to the proceedings. However, in the majority of cases where a s 8 order is
sought, the party seeking it will apply for leave (if necessary) to be joined to
the proceedings. One difficulty with the making of s 8 orders is that the local
authority has no means to control or dictate how the child is cared for.
Hence, the court may consider the need to impose conditions on the
residence order, or combine it with a supervision order. However, in the
main, the use of private law remedies in public law cases seems to work. If
Bill and the local authority were at odds on the outcome, it would definitely
be necessary for him to seek leave to join the proceedings in order to ensure
that his case was fully explored.
10.13.3 Care versus supervision
Under s 31(5) the court has the power:
(a) on an application for a care order, [to] make a supervision order;
(b) on an application for a supervision order, [to] make a care order.
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The ability of the court to do this stems from the fact that the criteria to be
fulfilled to obtain the orders are exactly the same. However, the court, as
arbiter, may disagree with the ‘expert’ opinion of social workers and the
children’s guardian when it comes to the nature of the state intervention and
the welfare of the child. The debate over care orders or supervision orders is
frequently found within the law reports. In the following cases, some of the
factors that led the court to their decision are highlighted:
• Re D [1993] 2 FLR 423
 the father’s history of violence and failure to acknowledge the same;
 the father’s failure to undergo therapeutic treatment;
 the mother’s inability to accept the level of risk posed and also her
inability to protect the child;
 the family’s poor relationship with social services;
 the ability of the local authority to leave the child living with parents
under a care order; and
 poor enforceability and safeguards under a supervision order.
• Re O (Care or Supervision Order) [1996] 2 FLR 755
 the limited duration of the supervision order would mean more
overseeing by the court;
 the improvements that had occurred in relation to weight gain;
 the co-operation with other agency workers (family centre); and
 the need to build a good relationship with the social workers.
• Re B (Care or Supervision Order) [1996] 2 FLR 693
 the fact that the father had kept away from the children and the
home;
 the fact that if the father were to return, EPOs would be applied for;
 the effect on the mother if care orders were made; and
 the ability of the local authority to meet the children’s needs under
the supervision order if the order was subject to conditions.
Naturally, these cases will only give you an illustration of the sorts of
things that will be relevant to the balancing exercise that the court will
undertake. In all the cases there was a strong emphasis on the children’s
welfare.
10.14 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ORDERS
One of the fundamental distinctions between these two orders lies in the
consequences, some of which you will have gleaned from your reading to
date.
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10.14.1 Care orders
The consequences of making a care order are set out in ss 33 and 34 but do
not raise many theoretical difficulties and, in reality, they do not seem to
raise many practical difficulties.
10.14.1.1 Section 33: suitable accommodation; parental responsibility
Once a care order is made, the child is to be placed in the care of the local
authority. Due to this, the local authority has a duty to provide suitable
accommodation for the child.
There are several possibilities with regard to accommodation for a child in
care. The child may be placed in foster care, which acts as a substitute family.
If the local authority’s care plan set out a rehabilitation scheme for the child
and their family, then short term fosterers would be used. If rehabilitation is
unlikely, long term fosterers would need to be found. All foster carers must
be approved by the local authority before they can act as such (there are
situations where a child can be placed without the requisite approvals, but
this is where it is an emergency). Linked to long term fostering, the child
may be seen as suitable for adoption. Here the child may be placed with
foster parents until an adoptive placement is identified. Children’s homes
are uncommon nowadays and, if used, tend to focus on older children, and
often those who will shortly be reaching adulthood. Children’s homes are
also subject to approval and must comply with certain regulations. The local
authority may decide to place a child with their wider family; even though
there may be a blood tie, this would in effect be nothing more than a foster
placement. Finally, the child may be returned to their parents. This is
permissible but, before the placement can take place, the local authority must
comply with the requirements of the Placement of Children with Parents etc
Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/893).
Following the making of a care order the local authority will gain PR
under s 33(3) and may determine the extent to which parents can utilise their
PR. The making of the care order will not extinguish the parents’ PR, but the
local authority can restrict the use made of it by parents. To all intents and
purposes, the local authority will be the parent. The ability to restrict the
parents is dependent upon the placement. If the child is returned to its
parents, the local authority will not be in a position to make all decisions for
the child, but would expect to participate in major decisions. Likewise, good
social work practice (and compliance with the ECHR) would indicate that
where a child is in care, the local authority endeavours to encourage parental
participation in major decision making.
Question
What types of accommodation are potentially suitable?
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The continued involvement of parents would need to be assessed in the light
of the child’s welfare. In addition, if the plan for the child is adoption, it
could be argued to be unfair to parents to continue to allow participation in
decision making if ultimately all links will be ended (you will learn more
about adoption in Chapter 11).
Not all decisions that form part of PR can be taken by the local
authority. Section 33(6) and (7) restricts the local authority in that they are
unable to change the child’s religion; consent to the child’s adoption;
appoint a testamentary guardian (a person appointed to care for a child in
the event of the parents’ death, the appointment being made normally in
a will); change the child’s surname; or remove the child from the UK for
over a month. The last two are permitted if the agreement of all with PR
is obtained or the court agrees to it.
10.14.1.2 Section 34: reasonable contact
Under s 34 there is a presumption that reasonable contact will take place and
hence there is no automatic need for an order. It is only where the parents or
the individual seeking contact and the local authority disagree as to what is
reasonable, or the local authority does not believe contact to be in the best
interests of the child that an order should be sought.
The issue of contact should be included within the care plan that is
produced by the local authority for the final hearing and the court is
specifically required to consider contact under s 34(11) before making the
order. Failure to address this point may lead to the application being
dismissed (at worst), and almost certainly being adjourned. This issue is also
clearly linked to the jurisprudence from the European Court of Human
Rights.
If the child is to be adopted, or the parents’ behaviour to the child is such as
to cause distress and harm, the local authority may wish to stop contact
totally. This will need to be brought before the court, as the presumption of
contact can only be rebutted by the making of an order. That order, for ‘no
contact’, will be under s 34. However, in some cases the need to terminate
contact may only arise as a matter of urgency; for example, if the child makes
an allegation of abuse, claiming that the abuse happened during the contact.
In this situation the local authority can terminate contact, without the need to
go to court, for a maximum of seven days (per s 34(6)).
Question
Can the local authority prohibit contact?
Question
When would this be unsuitable?
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In Berkshire CC v B [1997] 1 FLR 171, the care order had been made with
contact to M. The local authority appealed against the making of the contact
order. The court held that there were a range of cases that came before them
regarding contact; those where the child needs a new family and contact
with the birth family will bring no benefit to the child and impede the
placement of the child; those where the child is likely to return home so
contact is essential to ensure this happens and those where although a return
home is not likely, the relationship with the birth family is of importance to
the child and hence some form of contact should be maintained. The
requirement in these latter cases is for the advantages of contact to be
balanced against the disadvantages that will arise, bearing in mind that
contact may result in difficulties finding a suitable placement. The local
authority cannot approach contact on a take it or leave it basis.
10.14.1.3 Duration of the order
You will recall, from your earlier reading, that no court can make a care
order in respect of a child who is aged 17. However, despite this restriction, a
care order will, unless brought to an end earlier, last until the child reaches
majority at the age of 18.
It can be ended earlier by the court making a s 8 residence order (which
you may recall from s 9 of the CA 1989 is the only s 8 order that can be made
with respect to a child in care). The care order may also end by being
discharged (and on discharge the situation returns to how it was before the
care order). Section 39 of the CA 1989 deals with discharge and who can
apply. Most discharge applications are commenced by local authorities.
However, you should note the implication of sub-ss (4) and (5) of s 39, which
permit the court to substitute a supervision order for a care order without
the need to establish the existence of the threshold criteria. The same is not
true of converting a supervision order into a care order.
10.14.2 Supervision orders
10.14.2.1 Consequences under s 35
The main consequence of the supervision order is that the local authority
will have to appoint a supervisor whose role is to advise, assist and befriend
the child. Sched 3 to the CA 1989 states the child may also be subject to
conditions in relation to residence, attendance at specified places or
participation in specified activities. Medical and psychiatric assessments may
also be carried out on the supervised child, although in respect of these
conditions the mature child can in effect veto them (para 4(4)). Treatment
may also be specified, but only for the purposes of treating the child’s mental
health. It is interesting to note that this power overlaps with the powers
available under the Mental Health Act 1983 to permit detention for
treatment, and yet under the 1983 Act treatment can be given in the face of
opposition whereas under the CA 1989 a mature child can veto treatment.
241
The answer is no, unless of course the order permits the supervisor to
require the child to live in a specified place (which may not be with the
parents). In this situation PR for the child on a day-to-day basis will have to
be delegated by the parents to the temporary carer, or s 3(5) will need to be
utilised.
10.14.2.2 Enforcement
Section 35 states that one of the functions of the supervisor is to consider
whether or not to apply for the variation of the supervision order or for its
discharge in the event that the order is not wholly complied with
(s 35(1)(c)(i)). However, the variation of the order is restricted to obtaining
the right to impose conditions if conditions were not initially imposed. The
success of the order with new conditions is questionable if the first attempt
at supervision has failed.
Although the supervision order can only be obtained after proving the same
threshold criteria as for a care order, the ‘trading up’ of orders is not
permissible. As we saw in the section on the duration of care orders, the
opposite is available, ie, trading a care order for a supervision order, but this
is justifiable only on the basis that the orders are being ‘traded down’ from
care to supervision. If a care order is believed to be necessary, a supervision
order having failed, a new application must be made and the threshold
criteria satisfied. The failure of the supervision order will, of course, be
evidence of the need to make an order, but the making of the care order is
not a certainty. The lack of enforcement powers for a supervision order may
tip the balance in favour of a care order in some cases.
It has been suggested that a supervision order will only work if co-
operation already exists. If that is the case, then to what principle should the
court have regard?
You should immediately have thought of s 1(5), the no order principle.
Question
Can the supervisor apply for the order to be varied to a care order?
Question
What powers do you think the supervisor has in the event of non-
compliance?
Question
Does the local authority get PR under a supervision order or the power to
remove the child?
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Duration
As the supervision order is less draconian than the care order, it lasts for a
shorter period of time.
The initial time limit on a supervision order is one year (Sched 3, Pt II,
para 6(1)). It may, however, be extended upon the application of the
supervisor for a period not in excess of two years (para 6(3)), although any
extension cannot take the supervision order beyond the child’s 18th birthday
or give a total period in excess of three years.
This necessity to renew the order, whilst it may be argued to be a time
wasting exercise, at least requires the local authority to review the matter
and to deliberate on the case. Again, this supports the idea of limiting the
amount of time during which child care matters may be allowed to ‘drift’,
and also supports the reduction of state intervention.
In addition to this time limit, the order may be brought to an end by an
application to discharge by the same range of applicants as for care orders.
10.15 APPEALS
Unlike the EPO, the making of, or failure to make, a care order or
supervision order may be appealed. The court will have the power to make
certain orders pending the appeal being heard, that is:
• to permit the care order to take effect whilst the appeal is ongoing; or
• to continue the existence of an ICO (if one was in operation at the time of
the final hearing) pending the outcome of an appeal against the refusal to
make a full care order or supervision order (s 40 of the CA 1989).
10.16 SUMMARY OF PART TWO
You have now finished the bulk of your studying on the public law
intervention into families in respect of children and their care. We will look
at post-care matters and options for the local authority outside of the CA
1989 in Chapters 11 and 12 when you consider adoption law and wardship.
These areas also cover private law too. However, you should now be able to
advise clients, whether they be individuals or local authority social workers,
in respect of the legal means to protect children. You should always
commence your thought processes by considering voluntary action or the
legal steps which have the least draconian intervention by the state. You
Question
How long do you think the supervision order lasts?
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should also be able to identify situations where a voluntary or ‘softly-softly’
approach is inappropriate.
10.17 END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT
Helen is grandmother to Imogen (nine). Imogen lives with her mother,
Janet, and has no knowledge of her birth father who was in fact married
to someone else at the time of Imogen’s birth. Five months ago Janet’s
boyfriend Kevin moved into the house. Helen has become increasingly
concerned about Imogen since then as Imogen has told her that she is not
allowed to talk at meal times and if she does not clear her plate she is
slapped by Kevin and that this hurts. Imogen has also told Helen that
Kevin locks her in the garden shed if she has been naughty and has left
her there for several hours. More recently, Imogen has complained that
she has been locked in the back garden when Janet and Kevin have
friends round to the house when they smoke ‘something with a funny
smell’. Helen has tried to raise her concerns with Janet but was told to
mind her own business and that Kevin is merely trying to teach Imogen
good manners. Helen did not accept this and has contacted the social
services.
Discuss the legal powers and duties that the social worker will have
available to them.
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CHAPTER 11
11.1 OBJECTIVES
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
• provide an explanation of adoption, what it is and what the effects are;
• describe the procedures for arranging adoptions;
• explain the legal requirements in adoption;
• highlight the distinctions between legal and non-legal requirements in
relation to local authority placements;
• relate the adoption legislation to the provisions of the Children Act (CA)
1989; and
• advise hypothetical clients.
The topic of adoption is one which will overlap both public and private law,
although it will more frequently be more of an issue in public law since local
authorities may regard adoption as the best means of promoting the long
term care of children. In private law, the majority of cases arise where step-
parents wish to adopt their step-children. The law regarding both situations
is fundamentally the same; there are a few small distinctions with
procedures, which will be made apparent during this chapter. Your studying
will take the form of considering the main issues involved in adoption law
and this will be on the basis that the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (ACA
2002) is fully in force, although full implementation is not expected until late
2004. Hence, all references will be to the ACA 2002 unless indicated
otherwise.
11.2 WHAT IS ADOPTION?
11.2.1 A recent phenomenon
As a legal procedure, adoption was only introduced into our system in 1926
in the Adoption of Children Act 1926, although many children, prior to this
were, in fact, in what would be perceived as adoptive relationships. The
nature of adoption introduced in 1926 was not the same as today, the legal
consequences being somewhat different. As child protection and the role of
the local authority developed, adoption was increasingly seen as a means of
providing a caring environment for children who could not otherwise live
with their parents. The Adoption of Children Act 1926 was repealed and
since then we have had several Acts dealing with adoption. The latest, the
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ACA 2002, replaced the Adoption Act 1976, following several years of debate
on how a modern adoption law should be framed.
11.2.2 A declining phenomenon
Adoption was very popular and the ‘heyday’ for the process was in the late
1960s. In 1968 the number of adoption orders made reached nearly 25,000. By
2003 the total number of adoption applications had reduced to 4,870 with
only 4,713 orders made, less than one-fifth of the 1968 figures. It is evident
that for some reason adoption is losing popularity.
Some reasons for the decline in adoptions are: the change in society’s
attitude to single parenthood, and ‘illegitimacy’; the possible opportunities
for women to work and raise children; and, possibly, the availability of
welfare benefits. It is now no longer unusual for single women to keep their
children. This is true for women, and girls, of all ages. Neither is it expected
that single mothers will put their babies up for adoption, or be pressurised
into doing so. Those single women who did not wish to have their children
adopted, but wished to hide the fact of their illegitimacy, were able to do so
by adopting their own child, as a single person. The law recognised the child
as legitimate. This can still happen today.
Additionally, today there exist other orders which may achieve similar
aims to adoption. The residence order, under s 8 of the CA 1989, is a
potential alternative to adoption for step-parents or other familial carers.
Despite these alternatives, step-parents still seem keen to seek the ‘security’
that an adoption order can bring, with 1,287 applications and 1,172 orders in
2003. The amendments to the CA 1989 to permit a step-parent to gain PR
without the need for getting a s 8 of the CA 1989 order may result in a
reduction to these figures although this remains to be seen.
11.2.3 Who is adopted?
With the trend away from adoption, there has also been a change in the type
of children who are adopted.
For the majority of people, the image of an adopted child is a baby, or very
young child, who will be adopted by a childless couple. However, that is not
Question
If you had to give a stereotype of an adopted child, what would it be?
Question
Can you think of any reasons why this might be?
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the reality; so called ‘baby adoptions’ are in the minority of all adoptions. In
2002 only 5% of adoptions were in respect of this group, with a total of 76%
of adoptions being in relation to children under 10 years at the time of the
order.
Adoption is now a potential long term option for children in care, who
are unlikely to be rehabilitated with their birth families, and the government
would like to see the numbers adopted from care increased dramatically. In
many cases, though, these children will have behavioural problems, or may
be suffering from varying degrees of impairment, which may make adoption
harder to achieve. This changing face of adoption has led to the
implementation of the ACA 2002 and to a change in emphasis on the
assessment of who wants to adopt and the qualities expected from adoptive
parents.
11.3 WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF ADOPTION?
Section 67 sets out the primary concept of adoption, that is, an adopted
person is to be treated in law as the child of the adopter(s) and is the
legitimate child of the adopter(s). The order is one which gives parental
responsibility (PR) to the adoptive parent(s) and extinguishes any PR held by
the birth parents (or anyone else) (s 46(1)). Hence it is, in effect, recreating the
legal relationship between child and adoptive parents that would otherwise
have existed between child and birth parents.
Whilst in strict legal terms PR does end on majority the practicalities of life
mean that the relationship, which an adopted child has with its adoptive
parents, will continue after the age of 18. Indeed, because the adoption order
recreates a legal relationship, the rules on succession and intestacy will apply
to the new adoptive family, and will last until death. Hence, an adoptive
child becomes a child for the purposes of their adoptive parents’ wills
or death intestate (ss 69 and 70). The ability to inherit on intestacy from
the birth family is, accordingly, extinguished. Other such areas of law where
the fact of adoption may have an impact are set out in ss 69–76 of the ACA
2002.
There are situations where links will be retained with the birth family,
that is, where there exists a peerage, dignity or title which is hereditary (not
Question
Will this relationship end when the child reaches their majority?
Question
What do you think are the consequences of adoption?
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likely to affect many cases of adoption), and the ability to marry. An
adopted child will remain within the prohibited degrees with all the
specified birth family members in Sched 1 to the Marriage Act 1949 (s 74(1))
and, in addition, will be prevented from marrying their adoptive parents.
However, there is no prohibition on an adopted child marrying his or her
adoptive sibling.
11.4 WHO CAN BE ADOPTED?
Whilst we have already seen that the nature of adoption has changed over
the last decade or two, it is important to be aware of the legal restrictions on
who can be adopted.
The limitations in law relate to the child’s age and status. A child must
be below 19-years-old (although this provision (s 47) does mean an adult of
18 may be adopted!) and cannot be adopted if they have been married. The
reference to marriage presumably means a valid marriage or a voidable
one. In addition, the ACA 2002 establishes a minimum age for adoption,
and this is related to the requirement that the adopted child live with the
applicants before the application can be granted. These restrictions are set
out in s 42 and require:
• 10 weeks residence before application if the child is placed via a local
authority placement for adoption, or by order of the High Court, or the
applicant is the child’s parent;
• six months if the applicant is the partner of the child’s parent; or
• one year if the applicant is a local authority foster parent and the
placement was for the purposes of foster care, not adoption.
Finally, it is worth remembering that until the child is six weeks old the
mother cannot give valid consent to the adoption – we will be looking at
consent in more detail later.
11.5 WHO CAN ADOPT?
The legal requirements concerning who can adopt are potentially weaker
than the requirements placed on prospective adopters by the local
authorities who arrange adoptions. Any local authority, which operates as an
adoption agency, may establish its own policy guidelines. The legal
requirements are set out primarily in ss 49–51 and state:
• an application can be made by a couple or one person;
• at least one of the couple, or the single applicant, must be domiciled in
part of the British Isles;
• both of the couple, or the single applicant, must be habitually resident in
part of the British Isles for a minimum of one year;
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• both the couple, or the single applicant, must be 21 years of age unless
the application is by a couple and one is the parent of the child and they
have reached the age of 18 years, provided the other is 21;
• a married person can apply as a single applicant if their spouse cannot be
found, they are separated and this is likely to be permanent, the spouse is
unable to apply due to ill-health; and
• the applicants must be deemed suitable with reference to any relevant
regulations.
Unlike the previous Adoption Act 1976, where a step-parent is seeking to
adopt a step-child, the application need not be by the parent and the step-
parent; s 52(2) permits the application to be by the step-parent alone. Also,
the ACA 2002 tries to restrict birth parents adopting their own children (and,
hence, ensure they are legitimate) by requiring that a birth parent may only
adopt their own child if:
• the other parent is dead or cannot be found;
• due to the impact of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990
there is no other parent (for example, where the birth parent has received
fertility treatment as a single person using donor gametes and, hence,
under the 1990 Act any resulting child will have only one legal parent,
that is, the mother); or
• there is a reason why adoption by a parent is deemed necessary.
In Re B (Minor) (Adoption by Natural Parent) [2002] 1 WLR 258, the House of
Lords considered the sort of situations when one of the natural parents
should be excluded from the life of the child. Although in connection with
the Adoption Act 1976, the court stated that: ‘there had to be some reason
justifying the exclusion of the other natural parent and that reason had to
outweigh the adverse consequences of such an order upon the child’s life.’
Before the ACA 2002, if a same-sex couple wished to adopt a child, the only
means to do so would be for one applicant to apply as a single person and if
the adoption were to be granted, for the couple to seek a joint s 8 residence
order under the CA 1989. Generally, there was some concern about a child
being raised in this type of environment, although far less than in the past.
In AMT (Known as AC) (Petitioners for Authority to Adopt SR) [1994] Fam
Law 225 (a case under Scottish law although the provisions were the same as
in England and Wales), the child was disabled and had been taken into care
at birth. Difficulties had been encountered in finding a suitable placement,
and eventually the child was placed with the petitioner and his long term
male partner. The application for an adoption order was refused on the basis
that the mother was reasonable in refusing consent and that adoption by a
Question
What about a homosexual or lesbian couple: can they adopt jointly?
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homosexual applicant, who planned to raise the child with a same-sex
partner, was contrary to principle. On appeal, in relation to the latter point,
the court stated that there was no fundamental objection to an adoption
order in these circumstances. The legislation did not prohibit an application
by a homosexual and the requirement to take on board the characteristics of
the parties cannot prevail over the need to meet the needs of the child.
Hence, the adoption order would be granted.
The prospect of adoptions by same-sex or cohabiting couples proved to
be one of the main areas of contention in the passing of the ACA 2002.
However, despite attempts by the House of Lords to prevent non-married
couples adopting, s 50 does not require the couple to be married, hence
enabling same-sex and heterosexual cohabiting couples to apply jointly.
They will however have to satisfy s 45, which states:
(2) In particular, the regulations [on suitability] may make provision for the
purpose of securing that, in determining the suitability of a couple to adopt
a child, proper regard is had to the need for stability and permanence in
their relationship.
Although this can be directed at married applicants, it is inevitable that there
will be an emphasis on non-married couples establishing the permanence,
etc, of their relationship.
One of the main concerns expressed at the time the Bill was passing through
Parliament was what would happen if the relationship ended, with some
commentators suggesting that the child would have to go back into local
authority care. However, both the adoptive parents would be treated as legal
parents, both would have PR, and both would be able to access s 8 of the CA
1989 orders to regulate where and with whom the child should live. In other
words, the situation would be exactly the same as if the adoptive couple had
been married.
As mentioned above, any body acting as an adoption agency may impose its
own requirements on potential applicants. While local authorities fulfil the
major role in acting as agencies (indeed, under s 3 of the ACA 2002 every
local authority has to establish services for adoption or secure them via an
Question
These are the legal restrictions in relation to applicants. Can you think of
any others that may be imposed by an adoption agency?
Question
What are the potential difficulties in permitting non-married couples to
adopt?
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approved adoption agency), other bodies may be approved to act as such. In
many cases these adoption societies are part of a religious body.
Frequently imposed criteria include the following:
• a maximum age: often 35 or sometimes 40 if there are already adopted
children in the family;
• the requirement that couples are childless or infertile or not undergoing
fertility treatment;
• the requirement that potential adopters are non-smokers;
• a certain level of physical fitness, and that adopters are not obese;
• a preferred religion; and
• an unwillingness to use corporal punishment.
You may have thought of other possible conditions.
When an applicant wishes to adopt, there will be a variety of reports
prepared on them, including such matters as health and lifestyle. You may
therefore query why there need to be additional requirements such as those
listed above. The primary reason is linked to the long term welfare of the
child. If a parent is unfit, unhealthy and overweight, it does not bode well for
the future health of the child (or so the reasoning goes). It is also more likely
that such a parent would be at greater risk of early death or disability or
permanent ill-health.
As the policy guidelines are not statutory, the only means of challenging the
decision is by way of judicial review, arguing that the decision is
unreasonable, or one that no reasonable authority would have reached on
the facts. In addition, as the policy should be discretionary, it can be argued
that applying it without recognition of the individual case and facts is a
fettering of discretion. This argument was tried in the case of R v Lancashire
CC ex p M [1992] 1 FLR 109, but without success.
As we saw earlier, there is currently government concern at the delay and
inefficiencies within the adoption service. Children who would benefit from
adoption are not identified as being suitable, or, if they are, cannot be matched
with ‘ideal adopters’. The use of policy to restrict the range of adopters is a
matter that has been addressed by the Department of Health in its various
policy documents and guidance, with the National Adoption Standards –
policy with the force of law – being one of the most important produced. One
of the more contentious aims of the new standards is for all children looked
after by local authorities to have permanence planning once they have been
looked after for six months. What this will mean is that all local authorities will
Question
If an applicant is classed as being too old, on local authority guidelines,
can they challenge the decision?
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have to plan possible adoption for children they are looking after, even if there
is the prospect of rehabilitation with the birth family.
11.6 WHO CAN ARRANGE ADOPTIONS?
There are strict rules governing the placement of children for adoption,
although, of course, ways around the provisions can be found. However,
establishing the rules is not easy under the new ACA 2002.
The following are expected to be the main methods of placing a child:
• via an adoption agency, with or without a placement order;
• via an order of the High Court;
• with a partner of the child’s parent; and
• via placement for the purposes of fostering where the applicants are
foster carers and have had the child living with them for the required
length of time.
Where a local authority is arranging an adoptive placement, it will have to
have regard to the suitability of the prospective adopters in light of the legal
requirements under the ACA 2002 and also its own policy guidelines. The
assessment of the adopters is not solely done by social workers acting on
behalf of the local authority, since all prospective adopters must also be
approved by an adoption panel (or similar if the placement is by a non-local
authority agency). The panel will comprise social workers, a member of the
local authority social services committee, medical adviser, and two
independent persons. The panel will not only consider the adopters, but also
the suitability of this placement with these adopters and this individual
child.
11.6.1 Placement by the adoption agency
Unless the child is being adopted by their step-parent, the majority of
adoptions will arise due to the placement of the child for adoption through
the local authority acting as adoption agency. Section 18 of the ACA 2002
permits the agency to place children only if the agency is satisfied that the
child ought to be placed for adoption (sub-s (2)). Before the placement can
occur the agency must ensure compliance with s 19, which states:
(1) Where an adoption agency is satisfied that each parent or guardian of a
child has consented to the child –
(a) being placed for adoption with prospective adopters identified in the
consent, or
(b) being placed for adoption with any prospective adopters who may be
chosen by the agency,
and has not withdrawn consent, the agency is authorised to place the child
for adoption accordingly.
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However, if the child is subject to care proceedings or, subsequent to the
giving of consent, a care order or placement order has been made, the local
authority cannot act on any parental consent to place for adoption other than
by seeking a placement order for the child (placement orders are covered
below).
For the purposes of placement (and the making of the adoption order)
consent is defined in s 52(5) as being: ‘... consent given unconditionally and
with full understanding of what is involved; but a person may consent to
adoption without knowing the identity of the person in whose favour the
order will be made.’
Unconditional consent is a concept that was in place in the Adoption Act
1976 and requires that the parent must understand the full extent and impact
of the adoption order, and not try to place restrictions on it, such as agreeing
only on condition that contact will be continued post-order.
If the parent(s) do not give consent to the placing of the child for
adoption, or the child is subject to care proceedings, the only way the agency
can proceed is by applying for a placement order. These orders are covered
in s 21, which defines the order as being one that authorises the agency to
place with prospective adopters of the agency’s choosing. The order can only
be made if:
(2) (a) the child is subject to a care order;
(b) the court is satisfied that the conditions in s 31(2) of the 1989 Act ... are
met; or
(c) the child has no parent or guardian.
(3) The court may only make a placement order if, in the case of each parent or
guardian of the child, the court is satisfied –
(a) that the parent or guardian has consented to the child being placed for
adoption with any prospective adopters who may be chosen by the
local authority and has not withdrawn the consent; or
(b) that the parent’s or guardian’s consent should be dispensed with.
Hence, if the child is subject to a care order made after the consent to
placement was given, or the agency believes that the criteria for making a
care order would be met, they must seek a placement order to which the
parent(s) can consent. If the care order has been made before consent to
placement is given by the parents, the agency can place without a placement
order under the terms of s 22(3), but this is anticipated to be an unusual
practice – inevitably the agency will seek the order. If the parent(s) will not
give consent to placement, the agency can seek to have that consent
dispensed with. The grounds for dispensing with consent, a notion that was
in the previous legislation, have been narrowed considerably. Under the
terms of s 52, the court:
(1) ... cannot dispense with the consent of any parent or guardian of a child to
the child being placed for adoption or to the making of an adoption order
in respect of the child unless the court is satisfied that –
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(a) the parent or guardian cannot be found or is incapable of giving
consent; or
(b) the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with.
We will look at the welfare test shortly; the first ground for dispensing with
consent is, however, unproblematic.
11.6.2 Placement via other means
As you are aware, only half of the adoption orders made each year are as a
result of placement via the adoption agency. The remainder arise from other
forms of placement, the most common being where a child lives with one of
their birth parents and a step-parent.
In these circumstances the local authority will still be involved in the
adoption proceedings since the ACA 2002 requires the prospective adopters
to give notice of intention to adopt under s 44. According to this section: ‘(5)
On receipt of a notice of intention to adopt, the local authority must arrange
for the investigation of the matter and submit to the court a report of the
investigation.’ This investigation will focus on the suitability of the adopters,
and also the welfare of the child.
There are time limits specified in the ACA 2002 as to how far before the
application to adopt is made that this notice of intention must be given.
11.7 THE MAKING OF THE ADOPTION ORDER
In relation to the making of the order, the court is primarily required to
consider two issues, ie:
• whether the conditions for making the order under s 47 been met; and
• whether the child’s welfare requires them to be adopted.
Naturally, there are other things the court will have to confirm, for example,
are the adopters actually qualified to adopt under the terms of the
legislation, and these are factors that should also be confirmed by the agency
before placing the child, or during their investigation under s 44 of the ACA
2002.
11.7.1 Conditions for making adoption orders
Under s 47, before a court can make an adoption order it must be satisfied
that one of three conditions is met. These are stated thus:
(2) The first condition is that, in the case of each parent or guardian of the
child, the court is satisfied –
(a) that the parent or guardian consents to the making of the adoption
order,
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(b) that the parent or guardian has consented under section 20 (and has not
withdrawn the consent) and does not oppose the making of the
adoption order, or
(c) that the parent’s or guardian’s consent should be dispensed with.
...
(4) The second condition is that –
(a) the child has been placed for adoption by an adoption agency with the
prospective adopters in whose favour the order is proposed to be
made,
(b) either –
(i) the child was placed for adoption with the consent of each parent
or guardian and the consent of the mother was given when the
child was at least six weeks old, or
(ii) the child was placed for adoption under a placed order, and
(c) no parent or guardian oppose the making of the adoption order.
...
(6) The third condition is that the child is free for adoption by virtue of an
order made [under the law of Scotland or the law of Northern Ireland].
In relation to the opposing of orders, this can only be done with leave of the
court.
As can be seen, the conditions relate to the giving of consent or the
existence of a placement order where consent to adoption will have already
been considered. The reference to s 20, in the first condition, refers to a
provision whereby a parent can consent to the making of the adoption order
at a very early stage, even as early as giving consent to placement, and then
in effect drop out of the picture.
11.7.2 The welfare of the child
As you may recall, one of the criticisms of the Adoption Act 1976 was that the
welfare of the child was not given the same prominence as it is in the CA 1989.
This has been addressed by providing a similar sort of checklist for the court in
the ACA 2002 for the court as can be found in s 1(3) of the CA 1989. Hence, in 
s 1 of the ACA 2002, where the court is coming to a decision relating to the
adoption of the child it must have the child’s welfare, throughout its life, as 
the paramount consideration. To establish what will be in the child’s welfare
the court must have regard in particular to the following:
• the child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (in
the light of the child’s age and understanding);
• the child’s particular needs;
• the likely effect on the child of being adopted and ceasing to be a member
of its birth family;
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• the child’s age, sex, background and any characteristics that the court
considers relevant;
• any harm the child has suffered or is likely to suffer;
• the relationship the child has with relatives or other relevant individuals
including whether continuation of that relationship will be valuable, the
ability of relatives to meet the child’s needs and the wishes and feelings
of such relatives; and
• the child’s religious, cultural, racial and linguistic background.
Naturally, these are only indicative and not an exhaustive list of the
factors the court will have to take on board. The list is different to the
CA 1989 welfare checklist, but this is to be expected given the more
draconian consequences of adoption. The fact that the child’s views, and
those of relatives, will be taken into account is also important since many
children to whom this Act applies will have a fully formed relationship
with their parents, etc, due to their age – remember that baby adoptions
are rare!
As this is a new checklist, the approach by the courts remains to be seen.
The court will still have to be very clear as to how it has balanced the various
factors in reaching its decision.
11.8 OTHER ORDERS
Section 1(6) of the ACA 2002, as with the similar CA 1989 requirement,
requires the court to consider the whole range of orders available to it under
both the 2002 and 1989 Acts, and to only make an order if it would be better
for the child than doing nothing at all.
This continues the approach from the previous Adoption Act 1976 where
courts were able to use s 8 orders of the CA 1989 instead of adoption, or to
supplement adoption, although this was not common.
The main alternative to adoption per se will be the making of a s 8
residence order or possibly a special guardianship order (which we looked at
in earlier chapters). These alternatives may not be as effective, however,
since PR is shared, the order does not fully transplant the child into the new
family and may be perceived to provide inadequate security. Indeed, the
failure of step-parents to use residence orders was one of the criticisms of the
working of the Adoption Act 1976.
The type of order the court may have to consider more frequently will
be that of contact, primarily due to the changing face of adoption being for
older children rather than babies. These children will know and have
relationships, with parents and other relatives, and those relationships
may still have value to them, even if these relatives may not be able to
provide full-time care for the child. As we have seen earlier, consent to
adoption cannot be made conditional on the granting of a contact order,
but it can be raised and considered under the welfare criteria. These ‘open
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adoptions’ can be successful, but in some cases the extent of contact with
the birth family can prevent full integration into the new adoptive family
leading, ultimately, to placement breakdown. Most open adoptions,
therefore, provide for limited contact and only occasionally will the
contact be face to face – provision of annual letters, school reports and the
like being most commonly ordered.
Contact is not just considered at the adoption stage, but also at
placement, with ss 26 and 27 covering contact in placement situations.
Once an adoption order has been made, without other CA 1989 orders,
the birth parents of the child will lose their status to make applications under
the Act unless they are able to gain leave to do so. Hence, if contact or other
such orders are required, they need to be applied for in the adoption
proceedings to which the parents are parties.
11.9 REVOCATION
The principles behind adoption are clearly that it is an irrevocable process.
The ACA 2002 states that an adopted child may be made subject to a second
adoption order, but there are no provisions to permit the first order being
overturned. This is not to say that the exceptional case will never arise where
overturning the order on appeal is warranted. One such exceptional case
arose in Re K (Adoption) [1997] 2 FLR 221, in connection with a Bosnian
refugee, where the adoption order was overturned on the basis that it had
been obtained without the true facts being known. However, even where the
situation may have profound effects on the child, in many cases revocation
will not occur.
In Re B (Adoption Order: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) [1995] 2 FLR 1, B’s
parents were Arab. He had been placed with, and adopted later by, a
Jewish couple. Several years later he learned that his parents were Arabs
and made application for an order which would nullify the adoption order.
B’s application was refused on the ground of a lack of jurisdiction. B then
appealed. The Court of Appeal held that B’s appeal would be dismissed.
The court did not have the jurisdiction which would have enabled it to
nullify the adoption order, which had been made in a correct manner,
simply because of a mistake relating to B’s ethnic origins. If such an
application were to be allowed it would assist in the impairing of the
adoption system, which accepted adoption orders as existing for life. An
order might be set aside only where it clearly involved a denial of natural
justice.
Question
Can an adoption order be revoked?
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11.10 SUMMARY
You are now almost at the end of your study of family law. Adoption fits in
to both public and private law spheres and is perceived to be a valuable
means to achieve permanence in a child’s life, especially in local authority
care cases. You have seen how the law lays down a variety of regulations
that must be complied with before an order can be made. Agencies, which
carry out a large number of placements for adoption, often impose their
own, often more rigorous, conditions. Placement for adoption is subject to
strict criteria which the agency must comply with. If the agency is not
placing a child for adoption it is still required to assess the suitability of
adoptive parents – for example, where a step-parent is seeking to adopt. The
consequences of adoption are permanent transplantation from one family to
another and an order, once made, can rarely be revoked.
To consolidate your knowledge of adoption, complete the End of Chapter
Assessment.
11.11 END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT
Why are adoption applications from step-parents and relatives seen with
some disquiet? What problems can arise from this sort of application and
what alternatives exist?
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12.1 OBJECTIVES
By the end of this chapter you should be able to:
• explain the meaning of the inherent jurisdiction;
• place the order of wardship within the inherent jurisdiction;
• highlight the situations where wardship may be used, in comparison
with other orders; and
• explain who may be subject to the jurisdiction and the consequences.
In this final chapter we will be considering the inherent jurisdiction of the
court to make orders in respect of children. As an area of law, the importance
of the inherent jurisdiction has waned in recent years, in the main due to the
impact of the Children Act (CA) 1989. There still exist situations where this
jurisdiction is useful, and so you need to study them. This chapter will be
comparatively short and you will not be expected to complete an End of
Chapter Assessment.
12.2 WHAT IS THE INHERENT JURISDICTION?
The jurisdiction is historically based and stems from the sovereign’s
powers to act as ‘father to the nation’ (acting as parens patriae) and to
protect minors and those incapable of making decisions for themselves
from harm or injury. The Crown, and now the state, acted in the
sovereign’s place in making those decisions. Hence, under the inherent
jurisdiction the court could do whatever it felt was necessary to protect the
interests of the child (or adult if looking at, for example, domestic
violence). As such, the concept of the inherent jurisdiction is very similar to
the rules of equity, that is, doing right in a situation even if statutory
powers do not exist.
In so far as children are concerned, the use of wardship is the normal
means by which the inherent jurisdiction is invoked. Wardship is part of the
inherent jurisdiction, but is also an entity in itself since it has its own rules
and consequences.
Question
Do you understand what is meant by the inherent jurisdiction of the court?
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One such order should be easily identifiable, that is, the injunction which
seeks to prohibit certain types of actions. However, you may not have
identified the opposite type of order: a declaration which is permissive in
nature.
12.3 INJUNCTIVE OR DECLARATIVE ORDERS
You could have mentioned any of the situations where an application for a
specific issue order (SIO) or prohibited steps order (PSO) could be made, as
these orders under the CA 1989 do much the same thing as those under the
inherent jurisdiction. However, the case law would seem to indicate that in
many of the cases where the inherent jurisdiction, instead of CA 1989
remedies, is used there is a question relating to medical treatment of the
child. While the inherent jurisdiction declaratory relief could be used, it is
also common for wardship to be used in this type of case.
For example, in Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1992] 4
All ER 614, J was aged 16 months. He was microcephalic, blind and severely
epileptic. Medical opinion was unanimous in advising that he could well
deteriorate and that his expectation of life, although uncertain, must be short.
The local authority was granted leave, under s 100 of the CA 1989, to invoke
the inherent wardship jurisdiction of the High Court so as to determine
whether artificial ventilation and/or life-saving measures should be given to
J if he suffered a life-threatening event. The judge had ruled that, pending a
further hearing, the status quo should be observed. The local authority
appealed. The Court of Appeal held that the local authority’s appeal would
be allowed. Per Lord Donaldson:
The fundamental issue in this appeal is whether the court in the exercise of its
inherent power to protect the interests of minors should ever require a medical
practitioner or health authority to adopt a course of treatment which in the bona
fide clinical judgment of the practitioner concerned is indicated as not being in
the best interests of the patient. I have to say that I cannot conceive of any
circumstances in which this would be other than an abuse of power as directly
or indirectly requiring the practitioner to act contrary to the fundamental duty
which he owes to his patient. This, subject to obtaining any necessary consent,
is to treat the patient in accordance with his own best clinical judgment,
Question
Can you think of any situations where these types of orders may be used?
Question
What orders would you expect to fall within the inherent jurisdiction of
the court in addition to wardship?
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notwithstanding that other practitioners who are not called upon to treat the
patient may have formed a quite different judgment or that the court, acting on
expert evidence, may not agree with him ... I have no doubt that all the doctors
concerned [in this case] would agree that situations can change, and that if and
when a decision whether or not to use mechanical ventilation has to be taken, it
must be taken in the light of the situation as it then exists. This is what clinical
judgment is all about ... So long as those with parental responsibilities consent
to J being treated by the health authority’s medical staff, he must be treated in
accordance with their clinical judgment.
As the court proceedings in inherent jurisdiction are still classed as family
proceedings, the court will have the power under the CA 1989 to make a s 8
order, subject only to the restrictions imposed by the CA 1989 itself. This is
where difficulties arise for the local authority especially, since the CA 1989
has placed severe restrictions on the use that can be made of the inherent
jurisdiction by the local authority (which we will look at shortly).
12.4 WARDSHIP
In practice, this is the most frequently used area of the inherent jurisdiction
in respect of children and, until the implementation of the CA 1989, over half
of the applications to make a child a ward were made by a local authority.
From this you can surmise that wardship (and the other orders within the
inherent jurisdiction) will be available in private law.
12.4.1 Who is covered?
You should have recognised that you must be talking about a child, who will
be an individual below 18 and who has never been married. A child must
also have an independent existence from their mother before they can be
made subject to an order. In Re F (In Utero) [1988] Fam 122, an application
was made by a local authority to make an unborn child a ward. The
application failed due to the child not being in existence, in the sense of not
yet being separate from its mother and independent. The child does not need
to be habitually resident in the jurisdiction, nor does the child have to be in
the jurisdiction when made a ward of court. It is unlikely that a child will be
made a ward whilst abroad unless, of course, the child has been abducted.
The applicant, who is seeking to make the child a ward, does not need to
have any relationship or connection to them. However, if an application is
lodged where there is no link, or a very tenuous one, the court may not be
Question
Who you think can be made a ward and who can apply to make a child a
ward?
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minded to make the order unless it is clear that making the child a ward is in
the child’s interests. For example, in the case of Re D (A Minor) (Wardship:
Sterilisation) [1976] Fam 185, the applicant was an educational psychologist,
and in Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 WLR 1421, the
applicant was a doctor.
As you can see, the nature of the applicant’s profession may suggest why
they were seeking to make the child a ward.
12.4.2 Where to apply
The jurisdiction to grant wardship orders lies primarily with the High
Court Family Division, although many aspects of wardship may be dealt
with in the county court (s 38 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings
Act 1984). The procedure will involve one or more directions hearings
prior to the final hearing, and it is these directions appointments that will
take place in the lower court, generally before a district judge. The final
hearing is normally dealt with by a High Court judge, although it is
possible that a county court judge (acting as a High Court judge) may deal
with the matter.
12.4.3 When does wardship become effective?
Most legal orders only become effective once they have been made at the
final hearing. If action needs to be taken prior to the final hearing, interim
orders may be made. Wardship does not quite work like that. The child will
become a ward of court, and subject to all the consequences of wardship, as
soon as the application has been lodged at court, regardless of whether it is
served on the other parties and regardless of a hearing. This state of affairs
does not last indefinitely – this temporary protection will only remain for 21
days after the application has been filed at court – hence, within this time
frame, the applicant must ensure that a hearing takes place, at least to decide
if the wardship should continue.
Question
What happens if an issue needs deciding immediately?
Question
Imagine that you are the aunt or uncle of a young child. The parent, your
sister, is a drug addict. Because of her addiction, you believe that she
should not care for the child. You do not really want to involve the social
services, so you apply to make the child a ward. When would you expect
that wardship to become effective?
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Not all cases of wardship involve emergency situations but if something
needs to be done as a matter of necessity or urgency, then a without notice
hearing can take place (that is, a hearing where only the applicant is
present, the respondent parents would be absent). Such a without notice
hearing would not act to satisfy the requirement of the Family Proceedings
Rules that a hearing take place within 21 days to prevent the wardship
lapsing.
The fact that wardship is ‘immediate’ in its effect is one of its great
advantages. In private situations this immediacy can be used if, for example,
the child has been abducted and it is believed the child will be removed from
the jurisdiction.
While a s 44 of the CA 1989 emergency protection order (EPO) could be
sought, it will invariably involve a few hours’ delay. This in itself may not be
such a detriment to warrant the more expensive High Court application, but
the fact that the wardship will last at least 21 days (unless there is a hearing
in that time) is certainly more advantageous.
When non-emergency cases are dealt with, the use of CA 1989 orders
may increase, although it may be arguable that the use of wardship
jurisdiction is preferable. In the case of Re K (Adoption and Wardship) [1997]
2 FLR 221 (a case you have come across in the previous chapter), following
the revocation of the adoption order the need to protect the child and ensure
the reintroduction to her Bosnian family was a high priority. By retaining
wardship, the court could be in control of the process.
The procedures for concluding wardship applications are not subject to
the timetabling requirements of the CA 1989 and, in practice, it would seem
that many wardship cases will take much longer to reach a final hearing than
s 8 residence orders and, particularly, s 31 care orders. This would certainly
be the situation in Re K, dealing as it did in private law and the possible
long-term reintroduction to the Bosnian family.
12.4.4 Consequence of wardship
The nature of wardship may be another reason for its being preferred in
some situations to the CA 1989 remedies. When a child is made a ward of
court, the court will in effect ‘step into the shoes’ of the parent and no act can
be taken with respect to the child without the court’s permission or
authority. Any exercise of parental responsibility by anyone else, unless in
accordance with the directions of the court, will be unlawful. The only
sanction, presumably, would lie in contempt proceedings.
Question
Would any CA 1989 order be as effective?
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Practically, the court cannot fulfil a parental role in full, but must delegate
some of the parental duties and responsibilities to others. This would
include the day-to-day care of the child. The issue of providing care for the
child may be one which would necessitate a without notice application
when the wardship application is filed, if the protection of the child was at
issue. In many cases, the person to whom care will be delegated will be the
applicant.
12.5 THE LOCAL AUTHORITY AND 
THE INHERENT JURISDICTION
12.5.1 Restrictions
As mentioned earlier, the use of wardship has been restricted in the case of
local authorities by virtue of s 100 of the CA 1989 in sub-ss (2) and (3). The
latter sub-section simply prevents any application under the inherent
jurisdiction by a local authority unless the local authority has obtained the
leave of the court. Leave may be granted in the situations covered by
sub-s (4), which is discussed below.
The court is also prevented from using the inherent jurisdiction to
involve the local authority in child care. Thus, under sub-s (2) of the CA
1989:
• the court cannot use the inherent jurisdiction to put a child into the care
of a local authority;
• the court cannot use the inherent jurisdiction to put a child under the
supervision of the local authority;
• the court cannot use the inherent jurisdiction to put the child into
accommodation provided by or on behalf of the local authority;
• the court cannot use the inherent jurisdiction to make a child subject to a
care order a ward of court; and
• the court cannot use the inherent jurisdiction to confer parental
responsibility or any aspect of parental responsibility on the local
authority.
Even though this is directed at the court, it provides a severe limitation on
local authorities too.
Question
If the court takes over the parental role, does this mean the court will
provide day-to-day care, etc?
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12.5.2 Why s 100?
The restrictions that have been created by s 100, being so comprehensive,
must have some justification.
You were told earlier that almost half of the applications in wardship pre-CA
1989 were made by local authorities. This extensive use of the procedure was
one reason for seeking to reduce the powers of the court and the local
authority in respect of inherent jurisdiction. Local authorities had come to
utilise wardship to combat the perceived problems with the Children and
Young Persons Act 1969 which provided their powers of intervention for
child protection. The grounds available under the 1969 Act were thought to
be inflexible and backward looking. Wardship with its ability to consider
future perceived harm (without the existence of past harm), its speed and the
variety of options once made was a more attractive proposition. With the
implementation of the CA 1989, and the new powers to take a child into
protective care, the faults of the old law were removed. The intention was
that the CA 1989 powers should be perfectly sufficient for the local authority
to act to protect a child, without the need to resort to the inherent
jurisdiction.
12.5.3 When can the inherent jurisdiction be used?
As we have seen, there exists a means by which the local authority can use
the inherent jurisdiction, having obtained leave to do so and this is covered
in s 100(4) and (5) of the CA 1989.
The local authority must satisfy two criteria before leave will be granted
for the application. The granting of leave, you must remember, does not
mean that the order will be granted; it is just the first hurdle to overcome.
The first condition is that the making of an order under the inherent
jurisdiction will achieve something that the local authority could not do
using the orders available to it under the CA 1989. In other words, the
inherent jurisdiction is being used to plug gaps that exist in the legal regime.
Secondly, the making of the order will prevent the child suffering significant
harm which would otherwise be suffered.
Question
Can you think of any examples when the inherent jurisdiction will, or
could, be used?
Question
Can you think of any?
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From your earlier reading on public law you will have come across a couple
of situations where the inherent jurisdiction would be the only means of
protecting a child.
Do you recall who can be made subject to a care order or supervision
order? Under the CA 1989, a court cannot make either of these orders if the
child has reached their 17th birthday. If a child of 17 is believed to be at risk
of suffering significant harm, how can the local authority protect them? The
only conceivable way would be to use the inherent jurisdiction, since the
local authority cannot be expected to use s 44 EPOs repeatedly.
Other cases where the inherent jurisdiction will commonly be used are
medical treatment matters, that is, where children require medical attention
and are either refusing to consent or their parents are refusing consent.
However, here the local authority may wish to apply only for a declaration,
rather than wardship, and arguably should really be applying under the CA
1989 since a SIO or a PSO is available as a remedy to the local authority.
12.6 SUMMARY
As you have seen, the inherent jurisdiction can be used in both public and
private law cases, although following the CA 1989 the use made of it by local
authorities has declined. The inherent jurisdiction is used in respect of
children usually by declaring the child a ward of court. In so doing, the
child’s parents or others with parental responsibility are usurped from their
role and the court becomes the decision maker for the child. Wardship is
used primarily where a range of decisions needs to be made, as it is a more
rounded order, since wardship covers all decisions relating to the child. In
contrast, the inherent jurisdiction will be used where a specific question
needs to be decided or referred to the court. As a residuary power, and as a
means to plug any apparent gaps in the statutory code, the inherent
jurisdiction is crucial.
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CHAPTER 13
END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT – MARRIAGE 
– THE STARTING POINT
‘[M]any of the procedures [relating to marriage] are unnecessarily complex and
restrictive’: Registration: A Modern Service, Government Green Paper, Cm 531.
Discuss the validity of this statement.
Outline answer
To answer this question you are not only required to discuss the procedures
or formalities relating to marriage, but also to evaluate whether they are or
are not restrictive and complex. Hence, to start, you should identify the core
formalities to marriage.
Starting with the pre-marriage formality of notice, the question requires
you to identify the different types of notice that can be given in relation to
the various religious or civil ceremonies. These would be:
(a) Marriage under a superintendent registrar’s certificate (seven days’
residence and 15 days’ notice).
(b) Marriage under a registrar’s general licence (relevant to deathbed
marriages or those where the individual cannot get to the registered
place for the ceremony).
(c) Marriage after banns have been called (banns called for three successive
Sundays in the parish of residence and celebration of the marriage if
different).
(d) Special licence or ‘Archbishop’s licence’, which permits deathbed marriages
or marriages in churches where there is no connection for the parties.
With respect to all notice provisions, the issue of payment of fees and length
of residence or time between giving notice in an area and the actual ceremony
are key features. Complexity arises in the sense that there are different notice
periods in existence in terms of types of ceremony. If a couple can fit into all
three categories then they may find it hard to make a choice – but this is
hardly ‘complex’. The notice periods appear to cater for different needs (and
products) and if this is accepted, then the process is not harsh.
The question of restrictiveness is somewhat different. The time periods
are also restrictive in the sense that they require some sort of planning of the
marriage, but this should be evaluated in the light of why notice periods are
needed. If the notice periods are designed to enable impediments or
objections to be given, then they should be retained. However, given the
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general ineffectiveness of the process, you may agree that they are not really
needed. To suggest this is not to agree that they are restrictive or complex.
Looking now at the formalities of the marriage ceremony itself, the
requirements you should have focused on were:
• the qualification of celebrant;
• the place of marriage;
• the wording and the witnesses; and
• hours for the ceremony and open doors.
In all but Quaker and Jewish ceremonies, the law lays down requirements to
meet the above requirements. If the celebrant, whether it is a civil marriage
or religious, is not qualified and this is known to the parties, the marriage
will be invalid. This would not appear to be too complex. As to restrictive,
surely the parties will decide what type of ceremony to have in light of the
celebrant they want.
The place of marriage is restricted by virtue of the type of notice given. In
1994 the law widened the scope of venues for marriages. You may argue that
the nature of the regulations are too limiting – a marriage cannot be
conducted on a beach or at the top of Snowdon (although a marriage can be
blessed), which may be the preferred place. You may believe that these sorts
of venues are inappropriate but you should also have linked this to the
proposed changes to be brought about by the Civil Registration White Paper
(Civil Registration: Vital Change: Birth, Marriages and Death in the 21st Century).
Turning to the wording, the legal requirements are not draconian. It is,
however, strange that a so-called ‘simple contract’ needs to have a minimum
of two witnesses. The reference to ‘no lawful impediment’ may result in a
perjury charge if there was, in fact, a known impediment.
Thus, these requirements can be classed as complex or restrictive since,
especially where wording is concerned, there is nothing to stop the rest of
the ceremony being in the couple’s chosen wording.
The hours for marriage and the ‘public’ element of open doors could,
arguably, be seen as irrelevant. If a couple wish to marry, have the necessary
licence, does it matter what time the ceremony takes place? Equally, is it
relevant that the public can gain access when there are the required
witnesses? Whilst you may believe these formalities are unnecessary,
especially given the lack of sanctions if they are broken, this does not mean
the requirements are complex, although they may be restrictive.
Finally, look at past marriage requirements – that of registration. The
purpose of registration is to provide public evidence of a change in status.
Marriage confers additional rights and obligations, which are not otherwise
available, so registration is necessary. The process of evidencing a marriage,
with handwritten certificates and filing of copies is, arguably, complex but,
more relevantly, far too outdated.
In your conclusion you should draw all these threads together. In
isolation, the requirements are not overly complex or restrictive of an
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individual’s freedom. Taken together, a picture of more complexity may
build up, but even so, it can be suggested that the Law Commission’s
statement does not reflect the truth of the situation when taken at face value.
By broadening out the evaluation of the reason and need for the
requirements, it is easier to agree that the formalities need to be changed.
END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT – 
NULLITY AND LEGAL SEPARATION
1 Alfred has been undergoing medical treatment for clinical depression.
The drug regime has made him intermittently ‘hazy’ and he has difficulty
in understanding or making sense of things. Last week Alfred went
through a register office wedding with Bernadette. After the ceremony
they booked in to an hotel nearby and the marriage was consummated.
They have not lived together beyond that first night. Alfred has now
sought your advice on bringing the marriage to an end.
2 To what extent can an individual marry whomsoever they wish,
wherever they wish?
3 Andre is married to Steffi and the marriage took place eight months ago.
Shortly after the marriage Andre confessed he was bisexual. Due to this,
Steffi insisted Andre have an HIV test. This has been returned with a
positive result. No sexual intercourse has taken place. Advice Andre,
who wishes to set up home with Phillip and to relinquish all his marriage
ties.
4 Four years ago Paramjit and Ravi married in their local temple, the
marriage having been arranged by their respective families. The couple
had not met prior to the ceremony. Ravi was not keen on the prospect of
marrying but, due to her age at the time (28), her parents were constantly
telling her of the shame that she was bringing on the family. The
marriage has never been a happy one; Ravi has never felt able to have
physical contact with Paramjit, and sexual intercourse has never taken
place. Again, due to the family concerns, Ravi agreed to be artificially
inseminated and has borne one child, Amandeep, now eight months old.
Advise Ravi on her chances of bringing the marriage to an end.
Outline answers
1 The issues within this answer will revolve around whether the marriage
is void or voidable. You must always be aware of who you are advising
since not all the grounds for voidable marriages are available to both
parties. Here you are advising Alfred.
Looking initially at void marriages, reflect upon s 11 of the Matrimonial
Causes Act (MCA) 1973. You would not be expected to list all the
grounds upon which a marriage can be avoided under this provision, but
to consider if any of them are relevant. The advantage for Alfred of
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falling within s 11 would be that the marriage has never existed and
hence he would not need to do anything to ‘end’ the marriage. A decree
of nullity would be proof that the marriage was in fact invalid from the
start. Does Alfred fall within the section?
Unfortunately, there are no grounds for declaring the marriage void that
can be identified from the facts given. Whilst the facts are not very detailed,
there is no indication of the couple being within the prohibited degrees,
they appear to be of the requisite ages, have complied with the formalities
(they may, of course, have lied to obtain the necessary licence to marry),
and there is no reference to a previous marriage that is still existing.
Consequently, you would need to turn your attention to the provisions in
s 12 of the 1973 Act. This concerns voidable marriages. These are
marriages that are valid, unless and until they are avoided by one of the
parties to the marriage. The grounds that are given in s 12 refer generally
to some pre-existing defect which affects the basis of marriage. Again,
pick out the most appropriate grounds suitable to Alfred’s case, and
indicate why others may not be relevant.
Section 12(a) and (b) are not applicable in this scenario, since the facts
given show that the marriage has been consummated. You may find
more mileage in the next ground in s 12(c). It is unlikely that the
marriage can be avoided by Alfred on the basis of mistake or duress,
but there may be a way to avoid the marriage on the basis of Alfred’s
‘unsoundness of mind’. You are told that Alfred has been undergoing
treatment for clinical depression and, in particular, that the drug
regime has affected his ability to make sense of things. It could be
argued that this haziness resulted in Alfred not understanding what he
was doing when he went through the ceremony. In other words, he
was not mentally capable of consenting to the marriage. Remember
that under this ground in s 12 you are looking at the ability to consent.
Also remember that marriage is a simple contract (Re Park), and so
Alfred’s incapacity must be quite severe. Alfred would be able to
utilise this ground since it states that ‘either party’ may rely on
unsoundness of mind.
The next ground, under s 12(d,) may also be applicable to Alfred. Again,
this provision reflects the mental capacity and mental health of one of the
parties. The distinctions between this ground and the one in s 12(c) is that
under s 12(d) there must be a recognisable mental illness as defined by
the Mental Health Act 1983. Clinical depression, whilst only a minor
mental illness, would fall within the 1983 Act’s provisions. The issue will
be whether or not this mental illness makes Alfred ‘unfit for marriage’.
This does not relate to an impediment at the time of the marriage but one
which is discovered later. It can be relied on by Alfred, even though it is
his own mental state, since the provision states that ‘either party’ could
suffer from a mental incapacity.
The other provisions of s 12 (venereal disease (VD) and pregnancy)
would not seem to be applicable to Alfred’s situation.
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Finally, you would need to mention whether or not Alfred’s application
to annul the marriage would be prevented under s 13 of the MCA 1973.
From the facts given, it would not seem that Alfred has acted in such a
way as to lead Bernadette to believe that he would not seek to annul the
marriage. Also, the marriage has not existed for more than three years
and hence s 13(2) is not applicable.
To gain extra marks, a brief consideration of the consequences of a
voidable marriage would be necessary. For example, you could discuss
the fact that ancillary relief can be obtained and that any children born of
the marriage will be legitimate.
2 This, again, reflects void and voidable marriages. The question looks at
two issues – the marriage to whomsoever an individual chooses, and
where the marriage can be conducted.
Dealing with the first issue, you should have looked at s 11 of the MCA
1973 and, in particular, discussed the following categories:
(a) s 11(a)(i) – that the parties are within the prohibited degrees of
relationship. Explain what is meant by this, and who is caught by the
provision. Refer to the loosening up of the restrictions in the degrees of
affinity by the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act 1986.
Clearly, these provisions do restrict the freedom of an individual to
marry whomsoever they choose. The provisions do not, however,
prohibit the cohabitation between individuals within these categories;
(b) s 11(a)(ii) – the age of the parties and being below the age of 16. This
again is restrictive in the sense that if one of the parties is below the
age of 16 no marriage can take place. This can be justified on social
grounds, and also if a marriage does take place, the question of
unlawful sexual intercourse may arise. You could suggest that this
provision is less restrictive than the former, since it is open to the
couple to wait until they both become of age;
(c) s 11(b) – one of the parties is already married. This provision, whilst
again restricting the freedom to marry, is linked to criminal law, and the
notion that marriage is the union of one man and one woman, forsaking
all others. On public policy, the restriction is not unwarranted, and can
be resolved by the married party obtaining a divorce;
(d) s 11(c) – that the parties are not male and female. This links in to the
concept mentioned above, that marriage is the union of one man and
one woman. The restriction on same-sex marriages does deny
homosexuals and lesbians the ability to obtain the same rights and
status as married heterosexual couples. It is a restriction, but one
which would be justified on public policy grounds.
Moving now to the restriction as to where a marriage can be conducted,
this relates to the formalities of marriage. Note that marriages can only be
carried out in specified and registered premises. Failure to comply with
this requirement, when done wilfully and knowingly, may invalidate the
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marriage. The nature of the restriction, you may suggest, is not that
draconian. Since the Marriage Act 1994 authorised the granting of
licences to premises other than churches and registry offices, the ability to
marry where an individual wants is quite wide.
3 Steffi and Andre’s situation falls within the provisions of s 12 of the
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Section 11 is not relevant since none of the
grounds are applicable. As with question 1, concentrate on the grounds
which may be utilised rather than simply discussing all of them.
The marriage has not been consummated, and so your attention should
be drawn to s 12(a) and (b). Andre is the person seeking advice, and
under s 12(a) either party can be incapable. Andre could, therefore, rely
on his own incapacity. The issue would be whether he is in fact incapable
of consummating the marriage. The facts are not clear on this, so you
would have to explain the meaning and interpretation of this ground.
With regard to wilful refusal to consummate, Andre would have to show
that it is Steffi who is refusing to consummate the marriage. From the
facts this would appear to be a more likely scenario since she was the one
who requested the HIV test. You may also explore the issue of whether
the refusal to consummate is refusal per se, or whether Steffi refuses
intercourse unless Andre uses a condom. The latter would not amount to
wilful refusal and hence Andre would not be able to utilise this ground.
Finally, the issue of HIV needs to be discussed. As you should have
mentioned, if a party to the marriage is suffering from VD in a
communicable form, then the marriage can be annulled. There are two
problems with reference to this scenario. First, Andre has HIV, and so
would be unable to rely on s 12(e) since he is the petitioner, and the
provision refers to the respondent having VD. Secondly, there is a
question mark over the meaning of VD and whether this in fact includes
HIV. Whilst the AIDS virus is normally passed on through sexual
contact, this is not the only means whereby the disease will be
transmitted. Also, is HIV a disease in its true sense? Medical opinion is
not clear, but it can be suggested that HIV is merely the precursor to the
disease of AIDS.
4 This question should have been relatively easy to answer, given the work
you have done in the previous three questions.
The main issue is whether the marriage is voidable for lack of consent on
the part of Ravi under s 12(c) of the MCA 1973, or whether it is voidable
for the lack of consummation under s 12(a) or (b). Unlike the earlier
questions, you should have focused on s 13 more closely here.
Dealing first with duress under s 12(c), mention the reason why duress
can invalidate a marriage. The duress should go to the heart of consent to
the marriage. The cases of Szechter and Hirani are relevant authority to
quote. Ravi’s difficulty would be the influence of s 13(2), since the
marriage has been in existence for more than three years. In addition,
under s 13(1) it may be argued that the fact that Ravi agreed to artificial
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insemination indicates that she has conducted herself in such a way as to
lead the respondent to believe that the marriage would not be annulled.
The fact that Ravi has been artificially inseminated would not prejudice
an application under s 12(a) or (b) since artificial insemination is not
within the definition of ‘consummation’. She would not be able to rely on
wilful refusal since she is the one who is refusing intercourse. To succeed
on incapacity, she would have to prove that she is psychologically
repugnant to the idea of intercourse. This would be difficult since it is
harder to show mental difficulties compared to physical difficulties.
END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT – THE LAW ON DIVORCE
1 Joyce and Ralph married 10 years ago and approached their relationship
on an ‘open marriage’ basis. Consequently, both partners have had casual
relationships outside the marriage. Last year Ralph began to have a change
of heart and decided that he would not participate in any such casual
relationships. Joyce did not concur with this decision and has continued to
act in the same way, much to Ralph’s disgust. Recently he learnt that for
the last seven months Joyce has been having an affair with Anne-Marie.
Advise Ralph on his rights in relation to divorce. Is there any way that
Joyce could prevent a divorce?
2 Peggy and Tony married 15 months ago and stayed together for two
months before Tony left the matrimonial home. He has recently contacted
Peggy and asked to give the marriage a second chance. Advise Peggy
how this would affect her potential rights to seek a divorce.
3 Anne and Ben married four years ago, having cohabited for the 14 years
preceding the marriage. Carl, their son, was adopted by Anne seven
years ago, and Ben has a joint residence order with Anne. Three years
before they married, Anne adopted Carl.
Their relationship was deteriorating when the adoption took place – not
having a child was one reason why the difficulties were occurring. The
situation did improve for a while, but not for long. The marriage was a
method to achieve a reconciliation. This has not happened. Anne and Ben
have slept in separate rooms for the last five years. Ben has now met
Diana and would like to commence a relationship with her.
Advise Ben on ending his marriage.
Outline answers
1 As with the answers to the questions in the previous chapter you should
always remember who you are advising. Ralph is your client in this
scenario. He is seeking a divorce and for the purposes of this question
you need to consider the divorce legislation under the Matrimonial
Causes Act (MCA) 1973.
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To commence, you would have to advise him that there is only one
ground for divorce under s 1(1) – that the marriage has broken down
irretrievably. From the facts in the question, it would appear that as far as
Ralph is concerned the marriage has broken down.
However, you would need to advise him that to prove irretrievable
breakdown, one or more of five facts will need to be proven too. It would
be unnecessary to recite all the facts under s 1(2); you should focus on the
relevant ones. In this case, s 1(2)(a) or (b) would seem to be the most
appropriate to discuss.
Section 1(2)(a) deals with the respondent’s adultery and the fact that the
petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent. Ralph and Joyce
have previously enjoyed an open marriage. Whilst this constitutes
adultery, it would be questionable whether Ralph found it intolerable to
live with Joyce. As you should have commented, the fact of intolerability
is not related to the adultery.
Also mention that it would not be possible for Ralph to cite Joyce’s
current relationship with Anne-Marie as being adulterous. For adultery
to take place the intercourse must be between a male and female, one of
whom is not a party to the marriage. Clearly, therefore, a lesbian
relationship will not count as adultery. The date when Joyce last had
intercourse with a male partner would need to be identified, and also
whether or not Ralph knew about it. This refers to the content of s 2(1).
Under this section a party to a marriage cannot rely on the other’s
adultery if, knowing that the adultery has occurred, they have lived
together for a period of six months after the last act of adultery.
Given that the success of a petition under s 1(2)(a) seems in doubt, the
fact in s 1(2)(b) may be more applicable. Under this fact the breakdown
can be shown by proving that the respondent has behaved in such a way
that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with them. The
fact that Ralph has now changed his opinion as to open marriages may be
sufficient, together with the continued actions of Joyce with her lesbian
partner. The question you may like to pose is whether it is unreasonable
to expect Ralph to live with Joyce, using the authority of Ash, since he too
has had relationships outside the marriage. Would it make a difference
that Joyce’s new partner is female if Ralph has always had heterosexual
relationships in the past? The fact of continued ‘living together’ could
detract from the reasonableness of the expectation of cohabitation, but as
Ralph is seeking to take action shortly after discovering the facts of the
relationship this is unlikely.
If Joyce wished to prevent the divorce, she would have to rely on s 5 or
s 10 of the MCA 1973 Act. The former section acts as a power to refuse a
decree of divorce, and s 10 acts as a delaying tactic. Joyce, unfortunately,
will be unable to avail herself of these provisions, since they relate purely
to the separation facts in s 1(2)(d) and (e).
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2 In this situation you are focusing on the separation facts and also the
reconciliation provisions of s 2(5). If Peggy is contemplating a divorce,
there are two facts which she could be advised to apply under in future.
The first would be desertion, under s 1(2)(c), for a period of two years. To
be successful there must be no just cause for Tony’s leaving the
matrimonial home, and Peggy must have been willing for the marriage to
continue. If at this stage she refuses to accept Tony’s return, he could
argue that it is Peggy who is now deserting rather than himself! A better
option would be two years’ separation with consent. The difficulty would
be, not in proving that the couple have lived apart, but in getting consent
if Tony continues to request a reconciliation. If consent is not
forthcoming, then the only option would be to wait for a total of five
years.
Insofar as the wish to reconcile is concerned, the MCA 1973 does attempt
to promote the saving of marriages by permitting trial reconciliations,
without necessarily affecting the fact that is to be relied upon. Under
s 2(5), where desertion or separation is to be relied upon:
... no account shall be taken of any one period (not exceeding six months) or
of any two or more periods (not exceeding six months in total) during
which the parties resumed living with each other, but no period … shall
count as part of the period for which the parties to the marriage lived apart.
Therefore, if the reconciliation is not successful, Peggy will still be able to
rely on s 1(2)(d) but will not be able to count the period of reconciliation
as part of the two year separation.
3 In dealing with ending the marriage, you should note they married four
years ago and hence meet the s 3 one year bar. In terms of satisfying the
MCA 1973 there needs to be discussion on whether the marriage has
irretrievably broken down and which, if any, of the five facts in s 1(2)
apply. Behaviour or two years separation should be the main facts
discussed, and you should relate the latter to the cases of Mouncer and
Fuller. You may also comment on the fact that if both parties are willing
to accept the marriage is over, then using behaviour or adultery may be
possible, given the lack of verification under the special procedure, and if
one of the couple are willing to perjure themselves. You should also note
the possibility of mediation if one or both of the couple are seeking state
funding to finance either the divorce or the proceedings to deal with
property or finance. You may also have considered the issue of nullity
since the marriage may not have been consummated.
END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT – PROPERTY AND 
FINANCE ON DIVORCE
Anna and Bob have been married for 18 years and together have built up a
successful business. They have two children: Carmen, 20, and David, 16.
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Both children live in the matrimonial home. Carmen is currently finishing
her university degree and David is soon to start college.
Anna has worked in the family business since the time of the marriage,
although she has never received a proper salary. The matrimonial home is
owned jointly in equal shares, although Bob has been the major contributor
financially to the acquisition and upkeep of the house.
The marriage began to deteriorate several years ago and Bob has been
living in a separate annex to the matrimonial home for the last six years.
Advise Anna on:
(a) her ability to seek a divorce;
(b) the principles the court would apply in assessing her claims for ancillary
relief; and
(c) the types of order the court could make.
Outline answer
This question is not that difficult, but requires the ability to relate law to facts
and to be able to choose the relevant law, rather than simply writing all you
know about the topic.
Hence in part (a), you need to explain to Anna the process of divorce
under the Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) 1973 and to illustrate which of the
five facts would be suitable to her situation. You should also have advised on
the minimum duration of marriage (one year), the ground for divorce and
also highlight the fact that if she used the fact of separation for five years,
Bob had the right to seek to delay, or seek to prevent the divorce due to
hardship; these latter points being somewhat irrelevant on the facts, due to
the financial status of the couple.
In part (b) you need to apply the relevant factors from s 25 of the MCA
and also to consider the issues of mediation. While it would be unlikely
that Anna would need to seek state funding for the ancillary claims, this
cannot be ruled out. In any event, if private funding were used, the
solicitor may suggest mediation. In going through s 25, the key is to
highlight those factors that are relevant – the issue of disability, for
example, is not relevant at all, so why include it? Also important is to at
least consider what Bob’s needs and requirements will be. When
considering ancillary relief, there are always two parties! Conduct is
relevant since Anna has contributed positively to the business and her
contributions to the family should not be ignored. While the case of White
may also assist, remember that Mrs White owned substantial assets of her
own before the marriage; this is not the case with Anna, although Lambert
may have overtaken some of the White points. The issue of starting points
also should be mentioned, as well as the clean break principles, since this is
a case where there may be sufficient assets to permit a clean break, even
with a minor child (the more so as he is 16).
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Finally, when dealing with part (c), there needs to be an application of
the law to the facts. Rather than simply listing the orders, it is better to
suggest which will be most suitable. So periodical payments may be
necessary but might be time limited. If there is sufficient capital, a lump sum
order could easily be used to create income for Anna so she has no ongoing
links with Bob, which will support the concept of clean break. Insofar as the
house is concerned, while there are several possible orders, a Mesher order or
an immediate sale may be the most suitable. A Mesher order will not
disadvantage Anna greatly as the youngest child may end education in a
couple of years, and this type of order presupposes that the children will
remain with Anna, not a guaranteed outcome. The immediate sale may be
warranted if there is sufficient equity to enable Anna to purchase alternative
accommodation (and the same for Bob). One range of orders that must also
be considered are those for pension funds – given that the petition will be
filed after 1 December 2000, then Anna could seek a pension sharing order,
or have a pension attachment, or simply an increased lump sum.
END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT – 
PROPERTY AND FINANCE WITHOUT DIVORCE
Simon and Janice have lived together for seven years. They bought their
current house in 1993, each having sold previously owned properties. As
Janice was still going through her divorce, the new house was conveyed into
Simon’s sole name. The relationship between Simon and Janice has now
broken down, although they are still living in the same property.
The house is worth £120,000, with an endowment mortgage of £50,000.
Janice contributed £40,000 towards the purchase price, with Simon
contributing £30,000. Janice, despite only working part-time, has paid half of
the endowment fees.
Explain how the courts will assess her claim to be entitled to a half-share
in the property.
Outline answer
This is not a difficult question to answer and, hence, you may find the
outline here somewhat short! The issue for discussion is the application of
constructive or resulting trust doctrines to Janice’s case. As Janice does not
have her name on the title deeds to the property, and there is no evidence on
the facts given that a declaration of trust has been executed, it is to be
assumed that Simon is the legal and beneficial owner. To claim entitlement,
Janice will have to prove that in reality the beneficial entitlement is shared
between them. Your answer will consequently consider the way in which the
courts approach the doctrine of constructive trusts.
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The first thing that the court will need to establish is whether there was a
common intention that the property should be shared (Gissing v Gissing). In
relation to this test, the court may look for direct evidence of intention or
implied evidence. The former is naturally easier to establish. The types of
direct evidence that the courts will look for are as follows:
• express declarations;
• contribution to the purchase monies; and
• payment for substantial works or renovation.
Janice may fall within one of these categories.
There does not seem to be any express declaration on the facts presented
to you. Janice has, however, provided a large contribution to the purchase
monies, being £40,000 of the purchase price, and subsequent payments to the
mortgage. Even if purchase money has been paid by the party claiming a
beneficial share, it is still open to the other party to argue that the money was
a loan or even a gift. Fortunately for Janice the presumption of advancement
operates in marital relationships only and, anachronistically, only in favour
of the wife.
The payment of purchase monies may be sufficient to satisfy the courts
that the couple did have a common intention to share the property
beneficially, and therefore it may be unnecessary to consider the implied
evidence to satisfy the courts. However, it would be useful to mention the
nature of that evidence, that is, conduct, especially undertaking substantial
works to the property (bearing in mind Lloyds Bank v Rosset) or financial
contribution to the relationship (again bearing in mind that a cohabitant’s
payment of bills, in the absence of an express declaration, may be treated as
the equivalent of rent).
There is no evidence that Janice has done any work of improvement, or
paid for the same. However, following Rosset, the carrying out of works on
premises is of a lesser evidential weight. Paying for the work increases the
weight of the evidence.
The second element to the test is to establish if the party claiming the
beneficial entitlement has acted to their detriment. This test is often
subsumed into the first. Here it is arguable that Janice has acted to her
detriment since she paid a large sum of money to help purchase the property
and has continued to pay the endowment.
Finally, having established that a common intention exists, the court will
have to assess the extent of that beneficial ownership. As you will recall,
there has been a split in the way that the courts approach this, one line of
argument being that a purely financial view is taken – what percentage the
claimant put in equals what they will get out. The second line of argument
considers what the parties intended the percentage share to be. The latter
system includes a degree of crystal ball gazing and may be deemed
inappropriate. However, following Midland Bank v Cooke, this seems to be the
line that the courts are taking. On the basis of Janice’s contributions, she will
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qualify for a 30% share in the equity of the property. More difficult to assess
would be the share she should receive by virtue of her payments towards the
mortgage (on the assumption that the court views this as right-bearing rather
than as occupation rent). The question states that she is paying half the
endowment fees, which leaves Simon paying the other half, together with
the interest on the capital sum. Without precise figures, you cannot estimate
the exact share this would entitle her to. This purely financial calculation
would result in less than the half-share she is claiming. If the court
approaches the claim on a Cooke basis, she may well get her half-share, but it
is unlikely that she would get any more.
END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT – CHILD SUPPORT
1 In what situations can maintenance be obtained for children without
recourse to the Child Support Agency?
2 Steve is 32 years old and employed as a fireman. He is unmarried. Just
over a year ago he split up with his girlfriend, Toni, and he has had no
contact since. Yesterday he received a letter from the Child Support
Agency together with a maintenance enquiry form asking for details of
his income, etc, with regard to Toni’s child, William. Toni is claiming
Steve is the father of William.
Steve seeks your advice. He does not believe that he is the child’s father
and he wishes to know how the Agency will approach this denial. Also
he wishes to know how the Agency will assess the claim if he is treated as
being the father.
Outline answers
1 In this answer you have to consider all the situations where the Child
Support Agency (the Agency) does not have jurisdiction to make an
assessment for support or, in the event they have jurisdiction, fail to
make an assessment. Consequently, you need to mention a variety of
different statutes under which maintenance can be ordered, as well as the
fact that voluntary arrangements may be made.
To start with, it may be useful to state briefly when the Agency does have
to be approached – those cases where a parent with care is receiving one
of the specified state benefits and there is an absent parent. The existence
of a pre-1993 court order or maintenance agreement will not prevent the
Agency’s involvement if the parent with care is on benefits, and any
Agency assessment will override and extinguish the previous
arrangements. In this case the compulsory involvement is due to the
operation of s 6 of the Child Support Act 1991.
If a parent with care is not on benefits (or the child is being cared for by
someone who is not a parent), then under s 4 of the 1991 Act, an
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application for assessment by the Agency can be made as the Agency has
jurisdiction, but this is not compulsory.
If a pre-1993 written maintenance agreement exists, or there is an existing
court order for child support, then a parent with care who is not on
benefit cannot seek an assessment by the Agency unless that court order
has been in existence for a minimum of one year. If there is a pre-existing
agreement or order, the correct approach is to re-negotiate the agreement,
or return to court to seek a variation of the order.
If there is no pre-existing agreement or order, then the parent with care
may seek maintenance through the Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) 1973,
the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Court Act (DPMCA) 1978 or
the Children Act (CA) 1989. Factors that would be crucial to mention in
your answer are:
• The inability of the court to make provision, other than in consent
orders, in respect of child support. In other words if the parties
disagree then the matter will have to go to the Agency.
• The possibility of making a non-court sanctioned written maintenance
agreement, again by consent, which would deal with the child
support payments but may be harder to enforce if not subsequently
embodied in an order.
• The status of the applicant since the MCA 1973 and the DPMCA 1978
are only available to married parents – non-married parents must
utilise the CA 1989.
• The factors and criteria to be applied by the court under these Acts
when assessing the appropriateness of the consent order with respect
to child support.
• The ability of the court to make property adjustment orders under
these Acts, which cannot be made by the Agency, although the
reluctance of the court to do so should be mentioned.
If the Child Support Act 1991 does apply the court may be used to seek a
‘top-up’ to the maintenance assessment made under the CSA formula. As
the percentage slice does not adequately deal with wealthy parents (the
percentage deduction only applies to a set amount of income) it is
permissible to go to court for an additional award of child support to be
paid. This is not subject to the same requirement of consent as under s 4 of
the 1991 Act. This ‘top-up’ may involve additional periodical payments or
may also involve the making of a property adjustment order.
You should also refer to the other situations where the court has jurisdiction
over additional child support, that is, the situations set out in s 8 of the CSA
1991 and refer to educational fees and the disability of the child.
Finally, there are certain situations where the Agency has no jurisdiction
at all, and where the courts must be used. These situations will arise
where the definitions of qualifying child and absent parent or parent with
care do not apply. Hopefully, you have mentioned the possible liability of
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a step-parent who has treated a step-child as a child of the family, to pay
maintenance under the 1971 and 1978 Acts. In addition, if the child is over
16 then they do not class as a qualifying child and support will have to be
sought through the courts or a voluntary agreement.
2 This question concerns other aspects of the Child Support Act 1991 and its
operation by the Agency. In this question you are focusing more on the
practicalities of the making of the assessment and the formula approach.
To start with, advise Steve with regard to the question of paternity. If
Steve has been declared the child’s father in any other proceedings, the
Agency is able to presume that he is the father and continue the
assessment on that basis. If Steve is adamant that he is not the father and
no other presumption of paternity exists, then the Agency is required to
stop the assessment until the matter of paternity is concluded.
Paternity will be decided by reference to DNA testing. This can be
provided at reduced cost from the Agency, but if Steve is found to be the
father then any costs will need to be paid by him. Only if the results of the
testing prove him not to be the father will the cost be borne by the Agency.
If Toni refuses to co-operate and will not allow blood tests, then adverse
inferences can be made to the effect that Steve is not in fact the father.
Assuming testing goes ahead and shows that Steve is the father, you
need to explain the assessment process and the fact that only Steve’s
income is assessed and he will have to pay on a percentage basis. You
would also need to mention the consequences of Steve failing to co-
operate or return forms quickly, that is, he would be assessed on an
interim basis which invariably is much higher than a full assessment.
The possibility of departure from the percentage slice also has to be
covered. It is unlikely that many of the departure grounds will be
applicable; Steve will not have a pre-1993 property adjustment to
consider, nor are his travel to work costs likely to be higher than the
requisite mileage. He may have excessive expenditure on property,
which will entitle Toni to claim under the departure regulations.
END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT – DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Four years ago Ingrid began to cohabit with Max in his three-bedroomed
house. Ingrid has no rights of ownership.
Max has always been temperamental with frequent bouts of depression.
In the last 18 months these have become far more common, and Max has
started to exhibit violent tendencies. Ingrid, in the last two months, has
visited the local hospital’s accident and emergency department twice with
broken ribs, bruising and a dislocated shoulder after being attacked by Max.
Max is always apologetic when he realises what he has done and always
swears never to do anything like that again.
Advise Ingrid on what rights she has to obtain protection.
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Outline answer
Starting with the physical violence, Ingrid can still seek a non-molestation
order under s 42 of the Family Law Act (FLA) 1996 as she will be an
associated person (the definition of associated person is found in s 62). The
acts that will provide evidence for an order are not specified, hence the
meaning of molestation will be the same as under the case law for the
Domestic Violence (Matrimonial Proceedings) Act (DV(MP)A) 1976. The
violence inflicted upon Ingrid by Max will clearly be caught by the FLA 1996.
The court has to consider certain criteria before it can make the order. These
are set out in s 42(5) as being ‘all the circumstances including the need to
secure the health, safety and well-being [of the applicant]’. In reality, the
application of the criteria will not make that much difference, although that
the health, safety and well-being factors promote a more victim-centred
approach to the order. The FLA 1996 does not set a minimum or maximum
duration for the order, and hence it is still open to the court to make short
duration orders in the expectation that the parties will sort the matter out by
themselves (presumably by reconciling or by divorce, etc). The court still
retains the ability to attach a power of arrest to the non-molestation order,
although it is important to note that there seems to be a greater emphasis in
the FLA 1996 on the court so doing. Powers of arrest are covered in s 47 and
are expressed thus:
(2) If –
(a) the court makes a [non-molestation] order; and
(b) it appears to the court that the respondent has used or threatened
violence to the applicant
it shall attach a power of arrest … unless satisfied that in all the
circumstances of the case the applicant … will be adequately protected
without such a power of arrest.
Hence, the indication within the Act is that a power of arrest should be made
unless it is unnecessary. It would seem that it is for the respondent to show
this, rather than under the previous scheme where the applicant had to show
the need for a power of arrest to be attached. Equally, the respondent does
not have to have used violence, the mere threat will be sufficient to trigger
s 47. There still remains the possibility for the court to accept an undertaking
from Max, rather than to impose a non-molestation order. Undertakings are
dealt with in s 46 and are little changed. However, it should be noted that if
the court attaches a power of arrest to an order, then it cannot accept an
undertaking from the respondent.
On the procedural side, the court can still be approached to make the
order on a without notice basis. The ability of the court to make orders
without notice is dealt with in s 45, which lays down factors for the court to
consider before making the order requested. These factors include, inter
alia, the risk of harm to the applicant if the order is not made immediately
or the respondent is deliberately avoiding service of proceedings. It
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should also be noted that the courts empowered to make orders for non-
molestation (and orders dealing with occupation of the home) have been
widened – it may be possible to obtain the orders from magistrates sitting
as the Family Proceedings Court.
With regard to occupation of the ‘matrimonial home’, the FLA 1996
lays down a series of different regimes and factors for the court to apply
when deciding to ‘oust’ one party from the home. The FLA 1996,
therefore, tries to avoid the complexity of the previous mixture of statute
and case law. The key to advising Ingrid is to establish the status of the
two parties and fit this to the legislation. As Ingrid and Max are not
spouses or former spouses, ss 33 and 35 will not be relevant. Max has a
right to occupy the home due to his ownership – Ingrid has no such
rights. Therefore, you will be advising Ingrid under s 36 of the FLA 1996,
which applies to cohabitants or former cohabitants with no existing rights
to occupy. Under s 36 Ingrid can seek to remove Max from the home and
for her to remain there, or to re-enter the property if she has been
excluded by Max. Before the court will make an occupation order under
s 36 there are several factors to be considered. These are set out in s 36(6)
and (8). In addition to the factors within the section itself, the court is also
required to have regard to the fact that the couple have not shown the
commitment involved in marriage (s 41). In addition to the FLA 1996
establishing clear criteria or factors for making the order, it also
establishes clear periods of duration for the order. As Ingrid is a
cohabitant, she will be entitled, on the first application under s 36, to an
order of a maximum period of six months’ duration. She will  be
permitted to apply for an extension to the order and the court can make
one such extension. This, too, will last for a maximum of six months.
Thereafter, she will have no rights to the property under the FLA 1996.
The court can attach a power of arrest to the occupation order (using the
same criteria as for the non-molestation order) and can also consider
making the order without notice (again using the same criteria as for the
non-molestation order).
END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT – 
THE LAW RELATING TO CHILDREN
1 The Children Act 1989 is designed to support child rearing with families,
and yet to provide the state, through the local authority, with improved
powers to protect children.
Can these principles co-exist?
2 The welfare checklist in s 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 supports the
concept of children’s rights.
Discuss.
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1 This is not an easy question to answer, and hence it might be a good idea
to return to it as a revision question having completed the rest of the
child law chapters.
At this stage all that you can discuss is the concept of non-intervention
and the principle of working in partnership with parents.
The notion that the best place for a child to be reared is with their family
reflects the existing social structure, that of privacy and reduced state
intervention. You may question the basis for this perception. Does the
modern way of living, with less support from the extended family, and
with many parents both working either full- or part-time, mean that we
have moved away from the family structure when it was deemed best for
children to be raised within the family at all costs? Or is the support for
the family a result of the move away from the traditional family unit? Is it
a means to reproduce the concept of father as breadwinner and mother as
homemaker? You may also reflect upon the extent to which the state
intervenes in any event. Currently the state intervenes by way of health
visitors, ante-natal care, public health measures and guidance. This
intervention is subtle and far less intrusive than that perceived from the
social services, but it still exists to reproduce a consistent and focused
direction to parenting and child development.
The Children Act (CA) 1989, through s 17 and the accompanying schedule,
promotes the concept of partnership, and directs that a local authority
should endeavour to reduce the need to take proceedings. This implies a
proactive role for the authority, but you may raise the question of
resources, and the fact that the authority operates more on a reactive basis.
In working with a family on a voluntary basis, inevitably there will be a
tension between the legal background to the local authority’s work and the
parents’ role. You could highlight the fact that the local authority can
always resort to the CA 1989 to take proceedings if parents do not comply.
Does this, therefore, mean that parents will comply because of the threat of
legal action? If this is so, then is this really a voluntary arrangement?
The tension that can be identified here is such that the principle of
partnership and keeping children within the family cannot always be met
within the framework of the existing legislation. Indeed, you may
conclude that the mere existence of powers to protect children by
removal from the home shows the principles behind the legislation are in
tension from the start.
2 This question concentrates on a very small part of the CA 1989, but one
which is central to the whole operation of the legislation. As well as
assessing the impact of s 1(3), you may also find it useful to discuss the
concept of children’s rights and what is meant by this term.
There is a difference between promoting a child’s rights in a moral sense
to rights that are enforceable in law. On what basis does the CA 1989
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promote children’s rights? It can be suggested that the rights included are
more legal than moral and, in addition, that there are not many rights at
all. However, many of these legal rights stem from the ability to seek
orders under the Act, which are not apparent from the face of s 1.
The contents of the welfare checklist are more directed towards the moral
rights of the child – the right to be heard. Section 1(3) starts by referring to
the ‘ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child (in the light of his age
and understanding)’, which clearly does not introduce any real enforceable
right. The list of factors in s 1(3) is not in order of priority, nor is the list
exhaustive. It is also a matter for the court’s discretion how much weight is
to be placed upon each individual factor. Where a child’s wishes and
feelings are concerned, the child may be considered unable to express their
wishes and feelings if of tender years. Even if an opinion can be given, the
court, or any professional involved with the case, may question that
opinion on the basis of age and understanding. Children are seen as
potentially malleable, and hence their opinions susceptible to disbelief. You
may have referred to issues such as a parent influencing the child’s voice in
divorce and contact disputes.
Given this general atmosphere of mistrust, the idea of s 1(3) supporting a
child’s rights is somewhat misplaced. The welfare checklist may provide
the child with a voice, but it is one which can be overridden by adults
and professionals who know better than the child. In many cases, the
adults will know best, but each case must be decided individually. You
should be able to question whether or not lip-service is being paid to the
concept of rights not only in s 1, but throughout the CA 1989.
END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT – THE PRIVATE LAW
RELATING TO CHILDREN
Hussein and Jayne married 10 years ago. They have two children, Robina,
aged five, and Joshua, aged three. The marriage started to deteriorate shortly
after Joshua was born and now the couple have decided to separate. No
divorce is planned yet, although Jayne would like to dissolve the marriage in
the not too distant future. Jayne is planning to go to live with her parents,
who live in Cumbria in a large farmhouse. She would therefore have plenty
of space for herself and the children. Hussein is not pleased at this decision,
since it would be very difficult for him to travel the 200 miles to see the
children. He is also concerned about Jayne’s inability to bring up the children
in the Muslim faith.
Advise Hussein who wishes to prevent this move and would prefer
Joshua to remain with him so he can be raised in accordance with the
Muslim faith.
What advice would you give Hussein if he wished to take the children to
Iran to see their paternal grandparents and other relations?
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The issue for consideration in this question is the ability to obtain orders
with respect to the children, which will enable Hussein to care for Joshua
and take the children abroad with him.
First, it is always advantageous to clarify the position regarding parental
responsibility in any family problem question. As Jayne and Hussein are
married, and the children were born after the marriage took place, under the
provisions of s 2 of the Children Act (CA) 1989, both parents will automatically
gain parental responsibility. This can be exercised independently and without
the consent of the other. Part of parental responsibility is the duty to provide
care for the child, which will naturally include physical care and the provision
of a home. In the current situation, there is nothing to prevent Hussein taking
the children to live with him – equally, there is nothing to prevent Jayne
moving to Cumbria with both children.
It is also important to mention that orders under the CA 1989 can be
obtained regardless of the existence of divorce proceedings. Any applications
can be made to the Family Proceedings Court or the county court. It is for the
party applying, on the advice of their legal representative, to decide where to
commence proceedings.
The application that will be required, in the absence of any agreement, is
for a s 8 residence order. In the circumstances highlighted in the question,
agreement between the two parents is unlikely to occur. Explain or discuss in
your answer the consequences and meaning of a residence order. Consider
the criteria and factors taken into account by the court when deciding
whether to make an order or not. These are found in s 1 of the CA 1989.
The primary factor is that the welfare of the child is the court’s
paramount concern. Linked to that is the welfare checklist in s 1(3) – a list of
non-exhaustive considerations used to establish what is in the best interests
of the child. Discuss the checklist in the light of the children in question.
Here, you may have to look at the needs of the two children separately since
Hussein appears to be more concerned to care for Joshua than for Robina.
Look at a few of the issues that will be relevant. You have the ages of the
children to consider: both are young and generally there is a tendency for
young children to be placed in the care of the mother. There is also a strong
tendency for siblings to be placed together, and here there is the possibility
of them being cared for by different parents. This may be contrary to their
welfare. The question of religious upbringing is important in this scenario,
but the court will be concerned to evaluate whether the need for Joshua to be
brought up in the Muslim faith necessitates his possible separation from his
mother. It might be perfectly feasible for Jayne to ensure he is brought up as
a Muslim. The court would also be careful to consider the actual
arrangements for care of the children – to what extent is Hussein able to
provide full-time care for one or both children? The court may believe that it
will be too stressful for the children to be cared for by Hussein and possibly
another carer rather than just Jayne and the maternal grandparents.
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As well as the welfare checklist, the court must have regard to the
possibility of delay, which can be harmful to the children, and this is relevant
here since Robina is of school age, and it will be important to settle her at a
new school quickly. The court must also have regard to the no order
principle – however, it is unlikely that the court will find it appropriate to
make no order if the parents are unable to agree or decide issues with respect
to the children amicably.
The question of contact is also important here and it would appear to be
somewhat insurmountable. However, in many situations one parent will be
the inevitable ‘loser’ with regard to child care and contact. The court, even if it
has only been asked to deal with a question of residence, may make a contact
order. The CA 1989 enables the court to make orders without the need for an
actual application. If Hussein is unsuccessful in obtaining a residence order,
he may be more successful in gaining a contact order.
Turning to the question of taking the children to see the paternal
grandparents and relatives in Iran, the ease with which this can be done
depends on the outcome of any residence order application. If there were no
order made, there would be nothing to prevent Hussein taking the children
abroad. The only way Jayne could stop this would be by seeking a
prohibited steps order under s 8 of the CA 1989.
If, however, a residence order is made, then under s 13 certain limitations
are placed on those with parental responsibility, regarding the children’s
names and removal from the jurisdiction. Under s 13(1)(b) and (2) where a
residence order is in force, a child can only be removed from the jurisdiction
for periods of up to one month. If a period of removal is to be longer than
this, or permanent, the consent of all with parental responsibility, or the
consent of the court, is required. Only the person with the residence order is
permitted to remove the children from the jurisdiction.
In advising Hussein, you would have to explain all this and the fact that
if Jayne is granted the residence order, he will be unable to take the children
to visit their relatives in Iran unless he has Jayne’s permission, or seeks an
order permitting the visit from the court. You may also mention that if any
such application is made, Jayne may object on the basis of potential
abduction by Hussein. If this is deemed to be likely, the court may fail to
give consent to the visit taking place.
END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT – THE
PUBLIC LAW RELATING TO CHILDREN
Helen is grandmother to Imogen (nine). Imogen lives with her mother, Janet,
and has no knowledge of her birth father who was in fact married to
someone else at the time of Imogen’s birth. Five months ago Janet’s
boyfriend Kevin moved into the house. Helen has become increasingly
concerned about Imogen since then as Imogen has told her that she is not
allowed to talk at meal times and if she does not clear her plate she is
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slapped by Kevin and that this hurts. Imogen has also told Helen that Kevin
locks her in the garden shed if she has been naughty and has left her there
for several hours. More recently, Imogen has complained that she has been
locked in the back garden when Janet and Kevin have friends round to the
house when they smoke ‘something with a funny smell’. Helen has tried to
raise her concerns with Janet but was told to mind her own business and that
Kevin is merely trying to teach Imogen good manners. Helen did not accept
this and has contacted the social services.
Discuss the legal powers and duties that the social worker will have
available to them.
Outline answer
This question covers a wide remit in terms of local authority duties and
powers. Although it may not seem the most logical place to start, a brief
discussion as to the position on parental responsibility (PR) is appropriate,
since this will mean that when it comes down to the issue of who is party to
the proceedings the local authority may take, you have already looked at PR.
So, Janet as the birth mother will have PR automatically; Kevin will not have
PR – although Janet may have delegated some powers of decision making to
him; Helen will not have PR.
When the local authority is first contacted by Helen, they will need to
consider if an investigation under s 47 of the Children Act (CA) 1989 is
necessary, or if the situation is bad enough to warrant an immediate
application to court for an emergency protection order (EPO). It would check
the child protection register to establish if Imogen has been subject to
investigation before and check records to see if they have dealt with Kevin as
a possible abuser in the past.
If, as is most likely the case, the local authority decides to investigate, it
will need to be mindful of its duties and powers under s 47 and the purpose
of s 47 investigations. Hence, it will be making enquiries to see if Imogen is
‘in need’ and if any services need to be provided to Imogen (and the family)
as a result of this; it will also be looking to see if legal steps need to be taken
to protect Imogen if the provision of services would be insufficient to
safeguard her welfare. You should refer to the need to work voluntarily with
the family and the requirement, wherever possible, to keep the child with
their family (although, of course, this does include the wider family and so
would cover Helen). You should refer to the manner in which the
investigation should take place and the consequences for Janet if she fails to
co-operate. One of the main aims for the local authority is to see Imogen on
her own and to verify the reports from Helen. They would also liaise with
other agencies – for example, the school – to see if Imogen’s behaviour had
deteriorated or they had noticed or been told anything by Imogen.
The local authority will also have to hold a child protection case
conference within seven days of the referral if guidance is followed strictly.
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However, compliance with this time frame is unlikely since they will have to
see the family, etc, in order to have information to present to the conference!
Remember, the conference is only able to decide if Imogen’s name should be
placed on the child protection register.
If the local authority is unsuccessful in seeing Imogen, then under the
terms of s 47 it should consider whether it needs to apply for an EPO under
s 44 – and if it does, it will most likely be using the local authority criteria
under s 44(1)(b). If having seen Imogen the local authority believes that she is
at risk of suffering significant harm it can apply to the Family Proceedings
Court (FPC) for an EPO under the s 44(1)(a) criteria. You would need to go
through these criteria and explain the differences that exist between them,
and clarify who would be a party to the proceedings (referring back to who
has PR). You will also have to have regard to the issue of whether the s 1
welfare checklist is applicable to the case before the FPC. You should also
cover the effects of the order if granted, these being the same regardless of
which trigger criteria is used for the proceedings. If Kevin alone is seen as
being the cause of risk or harm to Imogen then the court does have the
power to order him out of the premises, but there would need to be
consideration of Janet’s ability to keep him out of the home.
In the event that an EPO is granted, you would need to mention the
longer term possibilities, since the EPO can only last a maximum of 15 days
(this is, where an extension has been granted). If the local authority has been
successful in obtaining an EPO it is highly likely that they will, as a matter of
routine, apply for a care order, given the need for notice. As the facts in the
problem question are not that detailed you should not go into a detailed
explanation of the requirements to be satisfied to get a care order – reference
to the section that applies and the basic criteria and the consequences would
be more than sufficient here.
END OF CHAPTER ASSESSMENT – ADOPTION
Why are adoption applications from step-parents and relatives seen with
some disquiet? What problems can arise from this sort of application and
what alternatives exist?
Outline answer
In this question you are looking at the category of individuals who adopt in
approximately half the adoptions made in England and Wales.
You should identify that placements with relatives is a permissible way
to establish a placement under the Adoption and Children Act (ACA) 2002,
as is placement via an order of the High Court, where the placement is made
by an adoption agency, or where the carer is a local authority foster parent.
Given that a placement with relatives is allowed, you should then identify
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why these types of placement are questionable. The difficulties that arise
depend on whether it is a step-parent applying to adopt because they are
married to the natural parent, or a relative of the child say, for example, a
grandparent or an aunt or uncle.
Taking the situation of an application of a step-parent and natural parent
first, the perceived difficulties arise by virtue of the consequences of the
adoption order. The effect of the order will be to terminate all the legal links
between the other birth parent and to recreate them with the adoptive step-
parent. In a step-parent adoption this will mean that one birth parent
(normally the father) will lose all rights and responsibilities with respect to
the child. The question has to be whether it is right for this to happen and
whether the making of the order is in the interests of the child under s 1 of
the ACA 2002. It could be suggested that as the ACA 2002 permits the step-
parent alone to make the application (before it had to be a joint application
by the step-parent and the birth parent), the legislation will, in fact,
encourage more applications and, hence, the interests of the child will be
more contentious.
One of the major criticisms of step-parent adoptions is that it does sever
the legal links between the child and one birth parent, and this is seen as
detrimental to both child and parent. This is more so if the child has had
some form of relationship with that parent. The need to know about one’s
origins is currently perceived as very important (and hence the ability to
trace birth parents is being made available to adopted children), and is
something that may be lost on adoption.
The reasons behind the step-parent seeking to adopt can also be
criticised. In some cases the adoption is predicated by a wish to change the
surname of the child (officially) since this is not easy to achieve under the
Children Act (CA) 1989. The adoption may be sought (and agreed to by the
birth parent) in order to avoid the intervention of the Child Support Agency
or simply to exclude the birth parent from the new family. However, this
should not suggest that all step-parent applications are based on
inappropriate reasons; many are sought to cement the new family unit, and
to highlight the step-parent’s commitment to the family.
Whilst the first three reasons mentioned are in themselves seen to be
problematic, the more ‘beneficial reasons’ are still not viewed as being totally
acceptable. Many second marriages break down with the result that the
children will lose yet another parent. This loss arises regardless of the
adoption order, but is often deemed more serious since there may have been
no contact with the birth parent since adoption. You may not agree that this
is a valid concern sufficient to justify restrictions on step-parent adoptions.
Also, it is stated that the security of the family unit can be created and
maintained by use of other orders.
Those other orders will be the s 8 residence order in favour of the step-
parent, and possibly a s 8 contact order to the non-caring birth parent. You
should discuss the effect of these orders and also highlight the differences
between them and the adoption order to illustrate why they may not be
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utilised fully. Such differences include the fact that parental responsibility is
not exclusive to the adoptive parents, that the order will only last until the
child is 16 whilst adoption is for life, the fact that both step-parent and birth
parent need to apply, etc. The fact that under the ACA 2002 the step-parent
can seek parental responsibility (PR) may be seen as sufficient to reduce the
need for adoption applications but, again, PR may not provide enough
‘security’ in the parental relationship, especially if the child is young.
Turning to relative adoptions, the major criticism that is leveled at this
type of application is the potential distortion of the family structure post-
adoption. When there was a greater stigma on illegitimacy, situations would
arise where grandparents would adopt an illegitimate grandchild. This
would then result in the child’s mother becoming the child’s sister – a
situation that is not viewed favourably. In addition, if the relatives adopting
the child are somewhat older, there is the risk that the child will be left
without a full-time carer in the future (this being one of the reasons why
adoption agencies place a maximum age limit on prospective adopters).
Other criticisms that can be made concern contact with the birth parents(s). If
the birth parent was a poor carer, or even an abuser, the adoption by a
relative may raise further concerns over contact. Will a relative be
sufficiently strict to ensure that no harm will arise from continued contact?
An advantage of relative adoptions over stranger adoptions is that the child
will remain within the wider birth family and, hence, have (potentially)
greater knowledge of their origins.
The alternatives to adoption, where a relative is involved, again are to be
found in s 8 of the CA 1989. You would not be expected to go through
another explanation of the orders if you have already done so with regard to
step-parents. You should however point out that the problems with s 8 may
be the same.
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